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NATIONALISM
ITS MEANING AND HISTORY

HANS KOHN

*Late Professor Emeritus of History
The City University of New York*

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To
Louis L. Snyder,
friend and fellow worker

Spring 1965

H.K.

PREFACE

Nationalism has been one of the determining forces in modern history. It originated in eighteenth-century Western Europe; during the nineteenth century it spread all over Europe; in the twentieth century it has become a world-wide movement, and its importance in Asia and Africa is growing with every year. But nationalism is not the same in all countries and at all times. It is a historical phenomenon and thus determined by the political ideas and the social structure of the various lands where it takes root.

An understanding of nationalism and its implications for modern history and for our time appears as fundamental today as an understanding of religion would have been for thirteenth-century Christendom. Like religion, nationalism can present many forms, and most diverse ones. Only a study of the historical growth of nationalism and a comparative study of its different forms can make us understand the impact of nationalism today, the promise and the peril which it has carried and continues to carry for the liberty of man and the preservation of peace.

HANS KOHN

1955

The world-wide character of nationalism as the determining force of contemporary history, not only in the "new" nations but in Western and Communist lands as well, has become even more obvious in the last ten years. This new edition carries the discussion of the problems of nationalism to the present.

HANS KOHN

1965

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Part I

NATIONALISM

THE ROOTS OF NATIONALISM

What is Nationalism? Nationalism is a state of mind, in which the supreme loyalty of the individual is felt to be due the nation-state. A deep attachment to one's native soil, to local traditions and to established territorial authority has existed in varying strength throughout history. But it was not until the end of the eighteenth century that nationalism in the modern sense of the word became a generally recognized sentiment increasingly molding all public and private life. Only very recently has it been demanded that each nationality should form a state, its own state, and that the state should include the whole nationality. Formerly, man's loyalty was due not to the nation-state, but to differing other forms of social authority, political organization and ideological cohesion such as the tribe or clan, the city-state or the feudal lord, the dynastic state, the church or religious group. Throughout many centuries the political ideal was not the nation-state but the, at least, theoretically world-wide empire comprising various nationalities and ethnic groups on the basis of a common civilization and for the assurance of a common peace.

Nationalities are the products of the living forces of history, and therefore fluctuating and never rigid. They are groups of the utmost complexity and defy exact definition. Most of them possess certain objective factors distinguishing them from other nationalities like common descent, language, territory, political entity, customs and traditions, or religion. But it is clear that none of these factors is essential to the existence or definition of nation-

ality. Thus the people of the United States do not claim common descent to form a nationality, and the people of Switzerland speak three or four languages and yet form one well-defined nationality. Although objective factors are of great importance for the formation of nationalities, the most essential element is a living and active corporate will. It is this will which we call nationalism, a state of mind inspiring the large majority of a people and claiming to inspire all its members. It asserts that the nation-state is the ideal and the only legitimate form of political organization and that the nationality is the source of all cultural creative energy and of economic well-being.

The Modernity of Nationalism. Even before the age of nationalism, we find individuals who profess sentiments akin to nationalism. But these sentiments are confined to individuals. The masses never feel their own life—culturally, politically, or economically—to depend upon the fate of the national body. Danger from the outside may arouse a passing feeling of national cohesion, as it happened in Greece during the Persian Wars or in France in the Hundred Years War. But as a rule, wars before the French Revolution did not arouse deep national emotions. In the Peloponnesian War Greeks bitterly fought Greeks. In religious and dynastic wars of early modern times, Germans fought against Germans, and Italians against Italians, without any realization of the “fratricidal” nature of the act. Even as late as the eighteenth century, soldiers and civilians in Europe entered the service of “foreign” rulers and served them often with a loyalty and faithfulness which proved the absence of any national sentiment.

Nor was nationality regarded as a source of cultural life until very recently. Education and learning, the formation of man’s mind and character, were throughout most of history not determined by any national limits. Religion was regarded in many ages as the fountainhead of all cultural and spiritual life. During and after the Renaissance, education in Europe everywhere was rooted in the common tradition of classical civilization. The ideals of knighthood in Medieval Europe or the model of the French court in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries spread beyond all national boundaries. Only in

nineteenth century Europe and America and in twentieth century Asia and Africa have the people identified themselves with the nation, civilization with national civilization, their life and survival with the life and survival of the nationality. From this time on nationalism has dominated the impulses and attitudes of the masses, and at the same time served as the justification for the authority of the state and the legitimation of its use of force, both against its own citizens and against other states.

Ancient Hebrews and Greeks. In spite of its modernity some fundamental traits of nationalism were developed long ago. The roots of nationalism spring from the same soil as Western civilization, from the ancient Hebrews and the ancient Greeks. Both peoples had a clearly defined consciousness of being different from all other peoples. The Hebrews from the Gentiles, the Greeks from the Barbarians. The bearer of group consciousness was with them not king or priesthood but the people as a whole, every Hebrew or every Greek. With the other peoples of antiquity, only rulers and empires left their traces on history. With the Hebrews and the Greeks it was the national character and the spiritual creative energy of the people which endured. It is because their cultural continuity proved stronger than racial, political, or geographic continuity, that they live on today. The idea of the nation-state was unknown to them but they had the strong consciousness of a cultural mission.

Three essential traits of modern nationalism originated with the Hebrews: the idea of the chosen people, the emphasis on a common stock of memory of the past and of hopes for the future, and finally national messianism. At the beginning of Hebrew history stands the Covenant concluded between God and His people. From the time of the prophets on, the Hebrews envisaged the whole of history as a unified process, as a continuity from one source to one goal, with a special distinctive role for the Hebrews at its center. In the kingdom of God the drama of universal history was to find its atoning conclusion and the idea of the Covenant its fulfillment. Messianism became a philosophy of history justifying the ways of God to suffering man. Not only oppressed nationalities took refuge in the hope of a messianic mission; at other times

it became a symbol of national pride and an often dangerous call to greatness and overreaching power; it expressed also the struggle of heretical sects and oppressed classes for the realization of their dreams and aspirations, and as the secular idea of historical progress it still retains today some of its religious fervor.

The Greeks shared with the Hebrews the feeling of cultural and spiritual superiority over all other peoples and expressed this feeling in the most trenchant terms. In addition the Greeks developed the concept of supreme loyalty to the political community, in their case the city-state or *polis*. Every citizen had to identify himself completely with the life of the *polis*, to become thoroughly politicized. Sparta in ancient Greece and Plato in his *Republic* postulated the absolute precedence of the state over the individual and idealized a closed and authoritarian state. But at the end of the fourth century B.C., Alexander's dream of a world empire, un-Greek in its origin, helped to transform the sharp division between Greeks and Barbarians into a new and universal attitude, surpassing all ethnic frontiers and distinctions. Under the influence of Alexander's aspiration, the Greek Stoic philosophers taught mankind to consider that their fatherland was the whole inhabited earth, the *cosmopolis*, and that man was a citizen not of a nation but of mankind.

The Universalism of the Roman Empire. This Stoic philosophy influenced Roman thought in the last two centuries B.C. at the very time when the city-state grew into an empire organizing the then known part of the earth on the basis of a common law and a common civilization. The universalism of the empire which was rooted in Hellenistic civilization but devoid of the exclusiveness of the Greek state, prepared the soil for the spread of universal Christianity, which was rooted in Judaism but devoid of the ethnic exclusiveness of Israel. Later the Roman Empire—with its center transferred to Constantinople—and the Christian church fused into one body. Under their combined influence the political and cultural thought of the Middle Ages was characterized by the conviction that mankind was one and had to form one community. Down to modern times religion, with its unifying regulation of thought, social life, and attitudes,

entirely dominated the private and public life of all Christian, as well as of all Mohammedan countries. The greatest poet of the Christian Middle Ages, Dante, gave to the idea of universalism and of the continuation of the unifying mission of the Roman Empire as majestic and as enduring an expression as any idea and hope could ever pride itself on having received. No thought of the political unity of Italy, or of the rejection of the Germans as bearers of the imperial dignity, ever entered his mind.

Renaissance and Reformation. In the fourteenth century it became clear that the unification by the imperial power for which Dante had hoped could not be realized. At the same time the Papacy, the other center of universal hopes, found itself in Avignon in captivity. Thus the search for new sources of authority and integration began. The two great spiritual revolutions known as Renaissance and Reformation form the transition from the Middle Ages to modern times in Western Christendom. The ancient classics and the Old Testament were then read in a new light and with a new understanding. In both of them the seeds for a rising national consciousness were found. Words and associations taken from the patriotic devotion of the classical Greeks for the *polis* and of the republican Romans for the *patria* were revived. The new emphasis on ancient history aroused in the Italian intellectuals a consciousness of their supposed identity with the ancient Romans. Medieval writers had written in the service of the Church and for the glory of God. Renaissance humanists were employed by princes and cities and wrote for their glory. But the Renaissance was too passing a phenomenon and too much restricted to the small literate circles to develop any nationalism. The Reformation put an end to the brief secular interlude of the Renaissance. Christianity and religious disputes became again the center of all life and activity. The European peoples of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries did not fight for national values but for dogmatic truth. People were expelled or punished not for ethnic or linguistic differences but for religious heresy or apostasy.

A lonely voice for nationalism was raised in Italy of the Renaissance by Niccolò Machiavelli (1469-1527). A Florentine like Dante, he had, however, no use for uni-

THE AWAKENING OF NATIONALISM AND LIBERTY

The First Modern Nation. The first full manifestation of modern nationalism occurred in seventeenth century England. That century for the first time saw England as the leading nation of the European community; she exercised this leadership in the very fields which characterized the modern age and which sharply distinguished it from preceding epochs, in the scientific spirit, in political thought and activity, in commercial enterprise. Inspired by an immense confidence in the new possibilities opening up, the English people felt upon their shoulders the mission of history. They, the common people of England, were the chosen people at a great turning point from which a new true Reformation was to start. For the first time the authoritarian tradition on which the Church and the State had rested was challenged by the seventeenth century English Revolutions in the name of the liberty of man.

Under Puritan influence the three main ideas of Hebrew nationalism were revived: the chosen people, the Covenant, and the Messianic expectancy. The English nation regarded itself as the new Israel. Thus English nationalism arose out of a religious matrix and has preserved this original character throughout. It has never known the bitter conflict between nationalism and religion found elsewhere. At the same time English nationalism became identified, to a degree unknown anywhere else, with the concept of individual liberty. This new feeling for liberty found its greatest expression in the writings of John Milton (1608-1674). With him nationalism was not a struggle for collective independence from an "alien yoke"; it was the affirmation of individual freedom from authority, the self-assertion of personality in

face of its own government or church, "the deliverance of man from the yoke of slavery and superstition." Liberty to Milton was religious, political, and personal. His plea for the freedom of unlicensed printing in the *Areopagitica* culminated in the outcry: "Give me the liberty to know, to utter, and to argue freely according to conscience, above all liberties."

In the words of its leader, Oliver Cromwell (1599-1658), the Puritan Revolution raised for the first time two great causes into the clear light of history. "Liberty of conscience, and liberty of the subject—two as glorious things to be contended for, as any God hath given us," he proclaimed in his speech before Parliament on September 4, 1654. The "free Church" demanded a "free State." Yet the time was not ripe. The Puritan Revolution was still filled with all the emotional fervor and the factual intolerance of the age of religion. It was apparently defeated by the Restoration, but its main aspirations were revived and confirmed, thirty years after Cromwell's death, in the Glorious Revolution: the supremacy of law over the king, the preponderance of Parliament in law-making, the impartiality of justice, the security of individual rights, the freedom of thought and press, and religious tolerance. The Glorious Revolution lifted the new liberties above the welter of fanatical religious and party strife: it made them the common foundation of the whole nation and anchored them as "true and ancient rights of the people of this realm" in its historical tradition. The Puritan Revolution degenerated into a parliamentary and military dictatorship; the Glorious Revolution made the new and growing order of liberty and tolerance so firmly rooted in national life and character that no serious attempt has ever been made to undermine them. The Glorious Revolution created the climate of reconciliation, of discussion and compromise in which alone democracy can permeate national life.

Nationalism and Liberty. Nationalism as an active force in history was confined in the eighteenth century to the shores of the North Atlantic. It expressed the spirit of the age in its emphasis upon the individual and his rights and in its participation in the humanitarian character of the Age of Enlightenment. The rise of English national-

ism in the seventeenth century coincided with the rise of the English trading middle-class. Both found their foremost expression in the political philosophy of John Locke (1632-1704). In characteristic fashion, his first *Treatise on Government* started with a sentence which summed up his humanitarian and his national point of view: "Slavery is so vile and miserable an estate of man, and so directly opposite to the generous temper and courage of our nation, that it is hardly to be conceived that an Englishman, much less a gentleman, should plead for it." Locke's philosophy also performed a great service to the new middle-classes by its emphasis upon property and the new justification for property, based not upon conquest but upon man's labor and toil. Yet, Locke served more than his class by the two fundamental principles which he upheld, namely, that the individual, his liberty, dignity, and happiness, remain the basic elements of all national life, and that the government of a nation is a moral trust dependent upon the free consent of the governed. While in France, and generally throughout Europe, the authoritarian absolutism of King and Church emerged victorious from the struggles of the seventeenth century, England was the one country where the hold of absolutism had been broken. There alone a freely and vigorously expressed public opinion grew up and secured its influence upon the conduct of national affairs, though this conduct remained for the time being in the hands of an oligarchy. Yet, in England a national spirit permeated all institutions and created a living tie between the governing class and the people. It was under the influence of liberal English nationalism, that the French *philosophes* fought in the eighteenth century against the authoritarianism, the intolerance, and the censorship of their church and state.

English influence upon France, strengthened by Voltaire's visit to England in 1726 to 1729 and his reports on English life and liberty, was significant not only for France. In the eighteenth century France had been for two hundred years the intellectual leader of Europe. French had become the universal language of the educated circles everywhere. The English ideas of personal liberty and national organization became known abroad through the intermediary of French thinkers, and were

absorbed and transformed into the general consciousness of eighteenth century Western mankind through the genius of French rational thought and the clarity of the French language. Thereby the national and historical liberties of Englishmen gained universal importance. They became a model for the awakening liberal thought of the age. They exercised little immediate influence on French political, social, and religious realities before 1789, but they were a potent factor in the birth of American nationalism in 1775.

Nationalism in British North America. The political and intellectual life of the thirteen colonies in North America was based upon the foundation of the Puritan and Glorious Revolutions. The English traditions of constitutional liberties and common law could grow more freely in the wide and open spaces of the yet unexplored continent than in the old country. In the colonies there were no survivals of the feudal past impeding the new development. The Puritans in New England preserved the feeling of being the new Israel, their self-identification with the ancient Hebrews, at a time when this feeling had already disappeared in England. Providence seemed to open up immense possibilities before the new country; eighteenth century European glorification of primitive and unspoiled nature added to the significance of America's virgin territory; the new rational interpretation given to English liberty by the French *philosophes* helped to broaden the historical liberties of the old country into universal liberties in the new world. The Americans reared in the freedom of Englishmen felt the strength for the birth of a higher form of freedom. Their struggle for the interpretation of the English Constitution, fundamentally a civil war within the British Empire between Tories and Whigs, not only secured a freer Constitution for the whole empire. It gave also birth to a new nation, born in liberty by the will of the people, originating not in the dim past of history or the feudal and religious tradition of the Middle Ages, but in the bright light of the Age of Enlightenment.

The new nation was clearly not based upon common descent or upon a common religion and it was not separated by its own language or its literary or legal tradi-

tions from the nation from which it wished to differentiate itself. It was born in a common effort, in a fight for political rights, for individual liberty and tolerance,—English rights and traditions but now raised into inalienable rights of every man, universalized as a hope and message for the whole of mankind. The diversity and tolerance of religion which existed in eighteenth century America to a degree unheard of at that period, was matched by the diversity and tolerance of the racial strains mingling in the "melting pot." What held the new nation together was an idea, the idea of liberty under law as expressed in the Constitution. The American Constitution entered into force at the beginning of 1789, the year of the French Revolution. In spite of its imperfections, the Constitution has withstood the test of time better than any other constitution on earth. It has lasted because the idea for which it stands is so intimately welded with the existence of the American nation that without the idea there would have been no nation. For the first time a nation had arisen on the basis of "these truths held to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights, that among these are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness"—truths which the nation could not give up without destroying its own foundation. These "truths" deeply influenced the beginning phase of the French Revolution which enthroned French nationalism in place of French royalty as the decisive factor in French history. But into the new French nationalism a new element entered, the myth of the collective personality as envisioned by the fertile and unstable mind of Rousseau.

Jean Jacques Rousseau. Under the influence of English ideas the Enlightenment or Age of Reason had proclaimed the liberty of the free personality. Rousseau (1712-1778) shared this belief in the freedom of man. But he sensed that this individualism was not enough; with the old dynastic and religious authority in the state breaking down he saw the necessity of establishing the collective personality of the nation as the new center and justification of society and social order. The sovereignty of the state had found its visible embodiment in the prince

whose will was the state. *Regis voluntas suprema lex*. How could the new sovereign, the people, express a unified will? How could the people become one as the prince was one? To that end the whole people must be united in the closest possible feeling of affinity, of common destiny and common responsibility. Rousseau, who was born in the Swiss city republic of Geneva, looked longingly back to the ancient Greek city-states, to the exclusive and all-inclusive devotion of their citizens to the *polis*. In France Rousseau, who lived there as an unhappy exile, saw the evils of arbitrary government by a prince and a court. He wished to replace it by a rational government where man would will the social order out of his own free will and obey laws because he prescribed them for himself. To this end Rousseau wrote the *Social Contract* (1762); in it he created an ideal community out of the patriotic virtues of the ancient city-states, Geneva's Calvinist tradition of being a saintly nation, and the proud feeling of independence of the rural Swiss republics. Rousseau was convinced that the true political community could be based only on the virtue of its citizens and their ardent love of the fatherland. Public education had to implant these feelings in the hearts of all children.

Rousseau was also the first great writer who did not share the belief that the aristocratic and rationalist civilization of his century represented the highest program so far achieved in man's development. He was dismayed by the egoistic life of pleasure of French society in his day, its lack of interest in public life, and its disregard of responsibility for social welfare. He called for a new sense of community mindedness, for a reformation not of the mind but of the heart, for nobler sentiments and emotions, for a simpler and more dedicated life. He thought that he found purer virtue, so sadly missed among the upper educated classes, among the common men, especially the peasants; they were still living near the source of all goodness, nature, unspoiled by the artificiality of civilization. For Rousseau it was no longer the aristocracy of birth and brain which stood in the center of the nation and gave it strength and direction, but the people themselves. Their active participation as equal citizens, held together by a feeling of brotherhood and mutual devo-

tion, appeared to Rousseau the only moral and rational foundation of the state. At the same time he believed that the love of the national community, that an emotional and almost religious patriotism, would form the life-blood of the development of the human personality. In his Utopia—and Rousseau's *Social Contract* is as much a Utopia as Plato's *Republic*—Rousseau placed the sovereignty in a virtuous and united people, expressing their will in the "general will" which—in the Utopia—was a product of all the individual wills and yet could be different from any of the single wills, because it was the expression not of anything accidental or arbitrary, but of the reasonable and the good, of that virtuous patriotism that should animate each member.

Rousseau had a tremendous influence upon succeeding generations. His faith in the healing forces of nature, in the purity of the unspoilt human heart, his respect for the common people, his insistence on individual liberty, and his call to national patriotism, shaped much of the thinking of the Western world between 1770 and 1850. To the generation at the end of the eighteenth century the young republic across the Atlantic Ocean seemed like a realization of Rousseau's ideals, a national community without court and aristocracy, without state church and dominant priesthood, with people living the simple virtuous life of nature and innocence. There none of the vested interests and refinements of civilization seemed to hinder the growth of the spontaneous goodness of man. English liberty and Anglo-American moral enthusiasm seemed to have accomplished great things in the unfavorable climate of Britain and in the remoteness of the forests of the new world. How much greater things could France accomplish, a country favored by nature and civilization and highly renowned even under a despotic rule, if she would enjoy the blessings of reason and liberty!

The French Revolution. Such a regeneration of France under a reign of rational liberty was the primary purpose of the Revolution of 1789. The political and cultural leadership which France had exercised in the Western world under the absolute monarchy of the seventeenth century was manifestly in decline. The glorv

of the French arms was dimmed, great parts of the French Empire were lost, French public finances were at the brink of bankruptcy, the economic and intellectual life of the nation was shackled by outworn traditional institutions and laws. A feeling of deep uneasiness permeated the whole social body of France.

Originally, the French Revolution was inspired by the English model of constitutional liberty and limited government, but in France the authoritarian and absolutist tradition had done little to prepare the people for self-government and for the limitation of the powers of the sovereign. The absolute sovereignty of the king was replaced, as the Revolution progressed, by the absolute sovereignty of the people. In the spirit of Rousseau many Frenchmen called for a common patriotic enthusiasm and for an aroused national will. They looked for guidance to the alleged civic virtues of Sparta and of republican Rome, to their stern patriotism and their combative spirit. The nationalism that developed among the English-speaking peoples in the century between the Glorious Revolution and the outbreak of the French Revolution respected the privacy of the individual: the nation-state was regarded as a protective shell for the free interplay of individual forces. The nationalism of the French Revolution stressed that the duty and dignity of the citizen lay in political activity and his fulfillment in complete union with his nation-state.

The year 1789 witnessed the birth of the French nation in a sudden burst of enthusiasm. At the beginning of the year the centrifugal forces were still very strong in France. The division into provinces and cities with their own traditional laws, local economy, and systems of weights and measures, and into classes and castes with their own well-defined privileges, rights, and duties, set up unsurmountable barriers across all aspects of national life. In June, 1789, the traditional "Estates General" were reconvened for the first time since 1614; but the interval had been too long, the conditions of social life had in the meantime changed too much. The Estates were transformed under the pressure of the Third Estate into a National Assembly, a body no longer representing the separated estates, but the united nation. In August a

further and tremendous step toward the birth of a French nation was taken: all geographic and class barriers fell, and the various classes and castes renounced all the infinite variety of their privileges and historical rights. National unity was for the first time achieved. In the same month, the Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen established the base of the new order, a nation of free individuals protected by law. In making the autonomous individual the starting point and the justifying end of all society, the Declaration was a consummation of the Age of Enlightenment, of the Glorious Revolution and of 1775-6. It protected the dignity, privacy, and happiness of the individual against the growing pressure by government and collectivity. Throughout the nineteenth century, faith in the Declaration succeeded in preventing the new nationalism from degenerating into an authoritarian and totalitarian creed. The danger of such a degeneration, however, was already present in the passion for national unity and for rational efficiency which underlay the French Revolution and which carried its nationalism far beyond that of England and the United States to an excessive centralization and a pseudo-religious creed.

The passions generated by this new nationalism threatened to break the dikes set up by eighteenth century respect for the individual and his sphere of liberty. The coming of the new nationalism coincided with the transition from rural to urban economy, with the growing social dynamism and mobilization of capitalism, with the quicker pace of life spurred on by mechanized industrialization and popular education. The traditionally organized and integrated villages and guilds gave way to the unorganized city masses increased by migration from the countryside. Masses and mass psychology created new problems. Lacking the stability of the traditional society, the masses were more easily swayed by utopian hopes and stirred by unreasonable fears. With the new mobility of the age, élites formed in more rapid succession and grew more skillful in manipulating the hopes and fears of the masses. For the élites and for the masses, nationalism became the foremost medium for organization and self-expression. (Later socialism began to compete with

nationalism, until in Stalinism and Hitlerism the two dynamic and revolutionary mass appeals fused.) From the time of the French Revolution, social and economic questions played an increasingly important part, wherever nationalism penetrated. Thus between 1789 and 1795 the new nationalism led to two contradictory climaxes: the recognition of individual dignity in the Declaration, and the outburst of collective passions hostile to individual rights. Janus-like, the new age faced two ways.

The New Nationalism in Action. For historical reasons two ancient papal enclaves, Venaissin and Avignon, had survived within France. They invoked now the new principle of national self-determination for their union with France. The popular will was ascertained in a plebiscite. This method was followed in innumerable cases in the age of nationalism, but already as the French Revolution progressed, it was abused in the name of national interest. "Longings" for unity were manipulated, the popular will was falsified. Yet, in its beginning in France the feeling of national union and fraternity was spontaneous. It genuinely expressed itself in the *fête de la fédération* celebrated for the first time on July 14, 1790, the anniversary of the capture of the Bastille prison by the Parisian people. (See *Reading No. 2.*) In all the communities of France an altar of the fatherland was erected with the inscription: "The citizen is born, lives and dies for the fatherland." Before it the population assembled with patriotic songs, took an oath to uphold national unity and to obey and protect the supreme law giver, the sovereign people.

But this national unity did not last long. Political and religious divisions split the nation. The regenerated nation demanded its own regenerated church; it was distrustful of the traditional universal ties of the faith. Hitherto, all the fundamental acts of human life—birth, marriage, and death—had been the province of the church and received from it meaning and legitimacy. In 1792 the registration of all acts of family and personal status before the authorities of the new nation-state was made compulsory. In its first enthusiasm, the new patriotism went even further. Calendar days, new born children, and city streets received names expressing the new civic religion.

Many of the adherents of the traditional religious faith were forced into a conflict of conscience between the old religious and the new national dogmas and authorities. Until then education had been left largely in the hands of the church. The new nationalism also brought a fundamental change thereto.

The French Revolution established the first comprehensive system of national education to raise new generations of virtuous and patriotic citizens. Education was for the first time regarded as a duty and chief interest of the nation. Only a common education, it was felt, could realize the unity of the fatherland and the union of its citizens. The emphasis shifted from the classics and the humanities to patriotic songs and history, and at least in theory to manual training and gymnastic exercises. Their new pride in the nation wished to make its capital the artistic center of the world. In 1793 the former royal palace of the Louvre was transformed into the first national museum. The arts, above all music, were no longer to serve only individual enjoyment or religious sentiment. They were to arouse national passions. The famous patriotic song, the *Marseillaise*, stirred the people when arranged for massed brass instruments. National festivals were planned as mighty spectacles in which the people themselves participated and played a leading role. Festivals and schools advanced also the spread of French as the only language used throughout the nation, where formerly among Bretons and Flemish, Basques and Alsatians, Catalans and Provençaux, native idioms had almost exclusively been used.

Before the Revolution higher education in France stressed Latin more than French, classical authors more than French writers. The new nationalism changed that. None expressed the new feeling better than Maximilien Robespierre (1758-1794) in his *Report to the National Convention* on national festivals on the 18th Floréal, 1794: "Yes, this delightful land which we inhabit and which nature caresses with love is made to be the domain of liberty and happiness. This sensitive and proud people is truly born for glory and virtue. Oh, my fatherland, if fate had caused me to be born in a foreign and distant country, I would have addressed heaven continuously for

thy prosperity; I would have been moved to tears by the recital of thy combats and thy virtues; my attentive soul would have followed with a restless ardor all the movements of thy glorious revolution; I would have envied the fate of thy citizens; I would have envied that of thy representatives! I am French, I am one of thy representatives! . . . Oh, sublime people! Accept the sacrifices of my whole being. Happy is the man who is born in your midst; happier is he who can die for your happiness."

The New Nationalism and War. The French Revolution, which at first proclaimed a message of universal peace, drove France and Europe into a war more prolonged and more devastating than any since the wars of religion. In the turmoil ancient states disappeared, new loyalties were born, national passions were aroused for the first time, from Ireland to Serbia and Russia, from Spain and Italy to Norway. The wars of the French Republic appealed to a degree unknown before to the national devotion and unity of the people. On September 25, 1792, Georges Jacques Danton (1759-1794) demanded that "France must be an indivisible whole: she must have unity of representation. The citizens of Marseilles wish to clasp hands with the citizens of Dunkerque. I, therefore, ask the death penalty against whomsoever wishes to destroy the unity of France, and I propose that the National Convention decree unity of representation and execution as the foundations of the government to be established. Not without trembling will the Austrians learn of this holy harmony; then, I swear to you, our enemies will perish." This passion seemed to bear fruit: the newly organized republican armies defeated the enemy. Not the monarchy but the nation triumphed on the battlefields. The victory converted France from the loyal monarchism of 1789 to the republican nationalism of 1793, from the peaceful spirit of eighteenth century Enlightenment to the aggressive dynamism of modern nationalism.

The initial victories were soon followed by reverses made even more dangerous by internal insurrections. They aroused in the leading French minority the bitter determination to concentrate all forces in order to fight

out the war and to liquidate without mercy all domestic opposition and disunity. The Terror saved the Republic but it did not strengthen in the nascent French nationalism the spirit of compromise and agreement and the respect for liberty under law. Robespierre regarded only the "sincere and virtuous patriots" as true citizens; the others had to be forced into becoming true children of the fatherland. Threatened by the despotism of kings, Jean Paul Marat (1743-1793) exclaimed that France had to organize the despotism of liberty. Only a dictatorship of virtuous men, devoted exclusively to the interest of the whole nation and reflecting the true general will, seemed able to serve the fatherland. Any opposition to its leadership appeared treason to the nation. Everything had to be sacrificed to the fatherland. The whole nation was to be mobilized, the war had to be nationalized in all its aspects. "When the fatherland is in danger," Danton proclaimed on September 2, 1792, "no one can refuse his service without being declared infamous and a traitor to the fatherland. Pronounce the death penalty for every citizen who refuses to march, or who directly or indirectly opposes the measures taken for public safety."

In the eighteenth century, wars had been fought with limited contingents and limited efforts. For the first time in 1793 the National Convention requisitioned everybody and everything in the service of the nation, at least in theory. Men and industry were mobilized, writers and artists were engaged to kindle the people's enthusiasm. All these efforts bore fruit. The invading armies were repelled. The young French nation was saved, but it was saved by the army, and even after the hour of danger had passed, the army remained preeminent in national thought to a degree unknown in the English speaking nations. The new French nation-state emerged covered with greater military glory than ever in the days of her mightiest kings. "*O terre des guerriers! O France! O ma patrie!*" a republican poet addressed the fatherland in 1797. The popularity of the army helped the ascent of General Napoleon Buonaparte (1769-1823) to power.

Napoleon. Napoleon appealed to the new French nationalism, but he himself was not a nationalist. He put the finishing touch to the centralized nation-state. with its

unified system of law, bureaucracy, and education, but he did it in the spirit of the eighteenth century enlightened despots. He was ready to use national aspirations as far as they seemed to fit into his system, without having any sincere desire to satisfy them. He gave vague encouragement to nationalist desires in Italy and Poland but he subordinated them to the momentary interest of his empire and dynasty. Napoleon's ambition was not the nation-state, not even the expanded nation-state, but the renewal of Charlemagne's or Caesar's empire. His instrument was not the people aroused to a new sense of patriotism but the power of the state, a mechanism forged by the princes of the Renaissance and improved by the absolute monarchs. Napoleon was defeated not only by his overbearing ambition but also by the new force which his wars aroused abroad and which he did not understand—the nationalism of the European peoples, especially that of the Germans. What these peoples—Germans, Italians, Spaniards, Russians,—did not learn from the French Revolution—the spirit of 1789 hardly touched them—they learned from Napoleon: nationalism, not as a vehicle of individual liberty but as adoration of collective power.

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NATIONALISM AND TRADITION

In the modern West, nationalism which arose in the eighteenth century, the Age of Enlightenment, was predominantly a political movement to limit governmental power and to secure civic rights. Its purpose was to create a liberal and rational civil society representing the middle-class and the philosophy of John Locke. When nation-

alism, after the Napoleonic wars, penetrated to other lands—Central and Eastern Europe or to Spain and Ireland—it came to lands which were in political ideas and social structure less advanced than the modern West. There was only a weak middle-class: the nation was split between a feudal aristocracy and a rural proletariat. Thus nationalism became there first a cultural movement, the dream and hope of scholars and poets. This rising nationalism, as the whole modern social and intellectual development outside Western Europe, was influenced by the West. Yet this very dependence on the West hurt the pride of the native educated class, as soon as it began to develop its own nationalism, and led it to oppose the “alien” example and its liberal and rational outlook. Thus the new nationalism looked for its justification and differentiation from the West to the heritage of its past. It often extolled ancient traditions in contrast to the Western Age of Enlightenment. While English and American nationalism was, in its origin, connected with the concepts of individual liberty and represented nations firmly constituted in their political life, the new nationalism, not rooted in a similar political and social reality, lacked self-assurance. Its inferiority complex was often compensated by over-emphasis. German, Russian, or Indian nationalism appeared as something deeper than Western nationalism, richer in problems and potentialities. The quest for its meaning, the musing about a national “soul” or “mission,” the discussion of its relationship to the West, all these became characteristic of the new nationalism.

Johann Gottfried Herder. Nationalism in the West was based on the concept of a society which was the product of political factors; German nationalism substituted for the legal and rational concept of “citizenship” which the Germans call *Staatsbürgerschaft*—the infinitely vaguer concept of “folk”—in German *Volk*—which lent itself more easily to the embroideries of imagination and the excitations of emotion. The folk’s roots supposedly reached into the soil of the remote past; it did not grow in the bright light of rational political ends but in the long unconscious development of the people, the very

people whom Rousseau had proclaimed the true embodiment of the goodness of nature. Rousseau's German disciple, Herder (1744-1803), developed the theory of the folk-soul or the folk-spirit (*Volksgeist*) and its roots in the long chain of national tradition from hoary primitive times on.

Herder viewed nature and history as organic growths, as self-revelations of the Divine—innumerable manifestations of life, an endless creative process in which attention should be centered not on the general and common but on the individual and unique. Herder was the first to insist that human civilization lives not in its universal but in its national and peculiar manifestations. The creative forces of the universal individualized themselves primarily not in the single human being but in the collective personalities of human communities. Men were above all members of their national communities; only as such could they be really creative, through the medium of their folk language and their folk traditions. Folk songs, and folk-lore, entirely neglected until then, were regarded by Herder as the great manifestations of the unspoiled creative spirit.

Herder was not a nationalist in the modern sense of the word. He did not demand the creation of a nation-state nor the unification of nations. To him nationality was not a political or biological but a spiritual and moral concept. Politically he remained an enlightened humanitarian and pacifist. Though born in the lands of the king of Prussia, he hated Prussian militarism and gladly accepted Russian rule. In 1769 he wrote that "The states of the king of Prussia will not be happy until they are divided up," and he characterized their inhabitants as "too much ignorant Germans and too much subjects." He was in no way partial to the Germans. Each nationality was to him a manifestation of the Divine, and, therefore, something sacred which should not be destroyed but cultivated. He equally respected all national languages. Each man, Herder thought, could be himself only by thinking and creating in his own mother-tongue. He was the first to claim that the rights of nationality were above all the rights of language, he claimed these

rights also, and above all, for the languages which were at that time only spoken by illiterate peasants and deemed to be without future or dignity.

Herder was deeply convinced that true nationalism would promote the cause of peace. Princes and states may think of war, politics and power; nations and fatherlands, Herder wrote, could think only of peaceful human coexistence. "They would never wash their hands in blood, and even if forced to shed blood they would do it as if it were their own blood." He was convinced that the essential conditions for a good and civilized folk life were better fulfilled by the peaceful Slav peasant peoples than by the Germans, a proud warrior nation. (*See Reading No. 3.*) Herder predicted for the Slavs a glorious future, and his sympathy for the Slav peoples, languages, and folkways was a powerful stimulant for the awakening of national consciousness among young Slav intellectuals at the beginning of the nineteenth century. Herder's emphasis on cultural national individuality and its rights and his high evaluation of popular traditions and folkways deeply influenced nationalist thought in Central and Eastern Europe.

Wars of National Liberation. In the eighteenth century, intellectual life in Germany, Italy, and Russia, as throughout Europe, was under the influence of the French Enlightenment. Its rational and universal ideas were generally accepted and French was the common language of European intellectual society. The nationalism of the French Revolution and the Napoleonic wars changed all that. French victories and domination aroused not only the desire for the creation of other modern nation-states after the French model, they turned the attention also to French ideas. This new nationalism did not penetrate to the people; it remained confined to the intellectuals, and even among them only to part of them. Many saw in Napoleon not the hated conqueror but the great personality and reformer and praised him in speeches and poems. But, as a result of the protracted wars and of the emphasis on French nationalism, national sentiment gathered strength until it reached its first peak in the Russian "Great Patriotic War" of 1812, which immensely enhanced Russian self-esteem by the victory over Napo-

leon, and in the German "War of Liberation" of 1813 which led to the Battle of the Nations at Leipzig in October 1813 and to the entrance of Prussian and Austrian troops into Paris in the following year.

In Italy and Germany Napoleon indirectly supported the rise of nationalism by abolishing many of the medieval relics and by laying the foundations for modern government. In Italy the first kingdom of Italy was his creation, and the French Marshal, Joachim Murat (1767-1815), whom Napoleon installed in 1808 as king of Naples, made himself in 1814 when Napoleon's star waned the champion of Italian unity. But popular support for the national cause was slight. Patriotism remained for the time being confined to poets and writers of whom the best known were Vittorio Alfieri (1749-1803), who in his *Il Misogallo* furiously attacked the French for daring to lead other peoples in civilization and liberty while the palm of leadership belonged by history and nature to the Italians, and Ugo Foscolo (1778-1827), who in his ode *De' Sepolcri* summoned the mighty dead of Italy's past from their tombs to fight again the battle of their country. On the return of the Austrians in 1814, Foscolo as a convinced patriot went into exile, first into Switzerland and then to England, the same road which twenty years later his younger fellow patriot, Mazzini, was to take.

A similar turn from liberal cosmopolitanism and friendship for France to a nationalism opposed to France and looking back to its traditions was exemplified in Russia by the writer and historian, Nicolai Karamzin (1765-1826). As a young man he was an enthusiastic Francophile; later, he wrote a History of the Russian State, a work that gained wide popularity and aroused great pride in Russia's past and ancient institutions, which Karamzin glorified. "The existence of each individual," he wrote, "is intimately bound up with the fatherland; the noble sentiment which ties us to it forms part of the love of ourselves. Universal history embellishes the world before our mind; that of Russia beautifies the fatherland, the center of all our existence and of our affections." Karamzin wished, writing in 1812, that the Russians of his time would be as convinced as their ancestors were "that

the Orthodox Russian is the most perfect citizen on earth and Holy Russia the first state." In the struggle against Napoleon, who saw himself as the heir of Charlemagne and Caesar, the Russians regarded their emperor as the rightful heir of the Roman emperors of Constantinople, of the Christian Roman Empire of which Holy Russia was the truly Christian heir. To the popular Russian imagination Napoleon represented in 1812 the anti-Christ leading the hosts of the heretic West against Moscow, the citadel of the true faith.

German Romanticism. The connection between nationalism and tradition received its strongest expression in German romanticism. Romanticism as an esthetic revolution was a European movement, a resort to imagination which produced a poetry richer in emotional depth and more potent in magic evocation than eighteenth-century poetry had been. But German romanticism, poor in creative genius, wished to be more than poetry, it was an interpretation of history and society, of the totality of human life, which mobilized the fascination of the past to fight against the principles of 1789. Starting as extreme individualists the German romanticists developed the opposite longing for a true, harmonious community, an organic folk-community, which would immerse the individual in the unbroken chain of tradition. Such an ideal folk-community seemed to the romanticists to have existed in the Germanic Middle Ages. They edited and praised the medieval sagas and poetry, folk songs, and fairy tales. Medieval castles appealed to their imagination as a reminder of past national glory and beauty. Even nature became an attribute of nationality—German forests and German rivers, especially the Rhine, which impressed Friedrich Schlegel (1772-1829) as "the all too faithful image of our fatherland, our history and our character."

To the optimistic idealization of the future, so characteristic of the Age of Enlightenment, the romanticists opposed a similar idealization of the national past. Adam Müller (1779-1829), the political philosopher of German romanticism, admired Edmund Burke and claimed that the eighteenth century British politician belonged more to the Germans than to the British who, according to

Müller, never fully understood him. But the German romanticists had none of Burke's practical wisdom, nor his respect for individual liberty and constitutional rights. To them the nation-state or folk-state was not a societal organization based upon human law with the purpose of assuring man's liberty, security, and happiness, but an organic personality, God's creation like the individual himself, only infinitely greater and more powerful and the fountainhead of all individual life. Though the great German philosopher, George Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831), was not a romanticist but a rationalist, his concept of the state resembled that of the romanticists. For him the State was the Divine Idea as it exists on earth. (*See Reading No. 4.*)

Early German Nationalism. Romanticism influenced the character of the incipient German nationalism during the anti-Napoleonic wars. The greatest German minds of the preceding period were opposed to nationalism. The philosopher, Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), was a representative of the liberal, individualist, and cosmopolitan Enlightenment. The two greatest German poets, Johann Wolfgang von Goethe (1749-1832) and Friedrich Schiller (1759-1805), turned not to the folk-community of the Middle Ages but to the individualism of Greek antiquity as a source of regeneration. Goethe throughout his life and even during the wars against Napoleon expressed his deep admiration for the French and French civilization. "There is as little for us in the somber old-German epoch as we could get out of Serbian folk-songs or other primitive folk poetry," the old Goethe told his secretary, Eckermann. "One reads it, of course, and for a while is interested, but only to cast it aside. Mankind is already too much shadowed by its own passions and dooms to need still more darkening by contemplating the gloom of primitive and barbaric times. Mankind needs clarity and serenity, needs to turn to those epochs of art and literature in which superior human beings achieved a finished culture and then, serene within themselves, were able to pour out the blessings of that culture upon others."

Goethe saw in Napoleon a great human phenomenon embodying beyond all ethnic or national frontiers the

spirit of historical development. His contemporary, the German philosopher Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762-1814), like most German nationalists saw in the Prussian state the citadel of culture and ordered liberty. When Prussia was defeated by Napoleon in 1806, Fichte's *Addresses to the German Nation*, which he delivered in Berlin in the winter of 1807-1808, called the Germans not only to national regeneration but to cultural world leadership. Through their language, mind, and history the Germans alone were destined for it. Among the civilized peoples of Europe, the Germans alone, Fichte maintained, spoke an original language, not like the French, English, Spaniards, or Italians, who, in spite of their at least partly Germanic origin, had stultified their intellectual life by the use of an adopted or derived language. Fichte was convinced that among the modern nations the Germans alone were capable of the highest perfection. Therefore, they had to resist Napoleon, as their ancestors had resisted Roman domination. Should the Germans succumb to the French, it would mean the end of all the best hopes of mankind and of culture.

A similar attitude was taken by Ernst Moritz Arndt (1769-1860), who also maintained that the Germans excelled over all other nations by having preserved their racial purity and by speaking the purest language. Herder had believed in the equal rights of all national tongues. The new German nationalists, however, proclaimed the superiority of their language as against the Latin and Slav languages. At the same time Arndt centered upon language as the factor constituting a nation; all German speaking people had to be united in a common fatherland. Arndt was one of the most powerful agitators for the national uprising of the Germans against the French; of similar importance was Friedrich Ludwig Jahn (1778-1852) or "Father Jahn" as he was commonly called. He was the author of *Deutsches Volkstum* (*German Folkdom*, 1810), in which he glorified the originality of the German folk, a divine creative force. Jahn had a great influence upon three movements which have remained characteristic for nationalism in Central and Eastern Europe and have even spread later to Asia: military free-corps of patriotic volunteers; gymnastic

associations for the training of patriotic fighters; and student unions imbued with nationalistic enthusiasm. All three groups were filled with revolutionary activism; responding to appeals overcharged with emotionalism and stressing the disciplined dedication to national service, they identified it with a strangely conceived "freedom" which had little in common with the Western concepts of individual liberty.

The war of 1813 against Napoleon was fought by the armies of Russia, Prussia, and Austria. No German political entity existed then. The only "German" forces which participated in the war was the free-corps, commanded by Adolf Freiherr von Lützow, a band of patriotic volunteers in black uniforms. Many of them were members of the gymnastic organization, the *Turnerschaft*, which Jahn had founded in 1810 in Berlin. These gymnastic organizations, later imitated by other peoples—among the Czechs and other Slavs they were called *Sokols* or *Falcons*—did not serve primarily the purpose of physical education or the ideals of fair play, of sportsmanship, or of the good loser. They were a preparation for a nationalist end and served it by the spirit of disciplined unity and militant preparedness. They were a potential army trained for the ardently desired day of the battle against the enemy. The same spirit animated the student fraternities or *Burschenschaften*, of which the first was founded at the University of Jena in 1815. They accepted black-red-gold as the colors of German unity. All these youth movements were to prepare national unification and independence. Jahn never tired of calling upon the Germans to protect their minds, their habits, and their character against all alien influences. He was convinced that the hero who by fanaticism and fury would unite the nation and make it powerful would be venerated by the people as a saviour and would be forgiven for all his sins. For nothing could be allowed to stand in the way of the one ultimate goal—the formation of the nation-state.

NATIONALISM AND REVOLUTION

Post-Napoleonic Disillusionment. The defeat of Napoleon in 1814 and 1815 did not realize the desires and ambitions of the nationalistic youth. In France, deprived of her imperial glory, many nationalists smarted under the reduction of her territory to the frontiers of 1790 and saw in Napoleon's defeat at Waterloo a national humiliation. The Congress of Vienna gave a limited satisfaction to the national demands of the Germans and the Poles but none to those of the Italians. After all Germany had formed until 1806 the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation, and Poland had known an independent national statehood until 1795. No similar Italian state had ever been in existence. The various German states were organized in 1815 into a loose confederation, called the German *Bund*, and a major part of Poland was constituted as an autonomous kingdom with its own national rights within the domains of the Russian Empire. The former Austrian Netherlands (Belgium) were joined with Holland into the Kingdom of the Netherlands; Norway, until then a part of Denmark, was joined with Sweden but under its own national constitution. On the whole, however, the territorial arrangement of 1815 took little cognizance of the new nationalist aspirations. After a quarter of a century of incessant wars and changes the peacemakers at Vienna stressed above all peace and order. The Holy Alliance of the Princes, under the leadership of the Emperors of Russia and Austria and the King of Prussia, the principal victors over Napoleon, was to assure in a spirit of Christian morality and brotherly solidarity the tranquillity of Europe.

The peoples on the whole were not dissatisfied with the conservative order after the years of violent turmoil. But the youth and the intellectuals, stirred by the expectations aroused by the new principles of the French Revolution,

by the daring of Napoleon and by the emotional fervor of romanticism, resented the unheroic stillness of the Restoration period which the Congress of Vienna inaugurated and of which the Holy Alliance and its champion, the Austrian Chancellor, Prince Metternich, became the hated symbol. In their common hostility against the Holy Alliance of the Princes the patriots, as they called themselves after the example set at the beginning of the French Revolution, of all nations felt their close affinity. Their nationalism stressed the collaboration of the peoples against the monarchs and the desire for liberal constitutions to limit the absolutism of the rulers; a Holy Alliance of the Peoples was proclaimed against the Holy Alliance of the Princes. The patriots of one people showed their active sympathy whenever and wherever patriots of other peoples revolted against the order established at the Congress of Vienna. At a time when in Europe outside Britain a free public opinion and a constitutional political life hardly existed, the patriots formed secret societies and believed in plottings and uprisings to achieve their aims.

The great advance of historical scholarship in the first half of the nineteenth century powerfully contributed to the new nationalism of the educated classes. Everywhere the documents of the past were collected and edited; the people began to take a new interest in their own history and drew from it a new pride. In Germany the great patriot, Baron Heinrich Friedrich Karl vom und zum Stein (1757-1831), promoted the publication of the *Monumenta Germaniae historica*, the medieval sources of German history. Each of the published volumes carried the inscription *Sanctus amor patriae dat animum* (The sacred love of the fatherland animates us). Similar publications were undertaken in other nations. (See *Reading No. 5.*) Among the nationalities which had lost their political statehood, historians like František Palacký (1798-1876) among the Czechs gave a new luster and a new meaning to almost extinct memories. This fascination by the past was most helpful to the first successful national uprising, that of the Greeks in 1821. (See *Reading No. 6.*) It was followed all over Europe with great sympathy, for were the Greeks not the descendants

of Homer and Praxiteles, of Aeschylus and Socrates, of Plato and Demosthenes, and would not an independent Greece mean the rebirth of all the ancient glories? The immense hopes aroused by the Greek war of independence are an example of that strange alliance of historicism and nationalism which believes not only in the legendary continuity of blood but even in the equally mystical survival of the national genius over many centuries.

Mazzini. The revolutionary agitations reached an initial climax in July 1830, when the Bourbon monarchy was overthrown in Paris and Louis Philippe ascended the French throne as the citizen-king. The French example inspired short-lived revolutionary uprisings in Italy, Germany, and Poland. They failed miserably because they were nowhere supported by the people. Only in Belgium did the revolution succeed. On August 25, 1830, in Brussels, the Belgian capital, students attended a performance of the then popular opera, *La Muette de Portici*, by Auber, which glorifies an uprising of the Neapolitan people in 1647 against Spanish rule. The students were stirred by the duet "*Amor sacré de la patrie*" (O sacred love of the fatherland) into a manifestation which after several developments led to the recognition of Belgian independence by the European powers on October 14, 1831. On the whole, the revolution of 1830 was successful in Western Europe; it liberalized there the constitutions of France, Belgium, and Britain; it brought the middle-classes into power and carried on the historical development which had started in 1688 and 1789. But in Central and Eastern Europe the old order remained unshaken in 1830. The uprisings were quickly suppressed. From Italy, Poland, and Germany a stream of refugees poured into Switzerland and England. Among them was the Italian, Giuseppe Mazzini (1805-1872).

Mazzini's thought was typical of the nationalism of that period. He became the indefatigable apostle of nationalist thought and action, carried on by a youth educated in the right spirit. Faced by the inertia of the people and the pusillanimity of the middle-classes, Mazzini called for the energetic leadership of Young Italy. "The secret of raising the masses," he wrote, "lies

in the hands of those who show themselves ready to fight and conquer at their head." He called upon the youth and the people to sacrifice everything to the attainment of a united, centralized, strong nation. He was even convinced that true art could flourish only in such a nation. He forgot that art did bloom in exemplary greatness in Italy in the late Middle Ages and in the Renaissance, when there was no Italian country, and that this art had inspired mankind when it did not seek to arouse a nation. Like so many nationalists Mazzini in the fire of his apostolate misread history. And he equally misread it when he extolled the Italian revolution which he wished to lead far beyond the French revolution, which he regarded as negative. The French Revolution had established liberty and destroyed the old world; on its ruins a new faith had to arise to fill the void left by the French Revolution. Mazzini was convinced that only the Italians could bring a positive message for the new age and establish that unity which Rome had already twice brought to mankind, in the age of the Caesars and in the age of the Popes. A third and greater Rome, the Rome of the People, would bring leadership and unity to Europe to a higher degree than Rome of Antiquity or of the Middle Ages ever could. "Today a third mission is dawning for our Italy," Mazzini wrote in 1858, "as much vaster than the missions of old as the Italian People, the free and united country, will be greater and more powerful than Caesar or Popes." (See *Reading No. 7.*)

Young Europe. In 1831 Mazzini founded a movement, *Giovine Italia* (Young Italy). As an emigré in Switzerland he inspired similar movements among the German and Polish emigrés and tried to constitute them into an association of Young Europe. These secret revolutionary organizations did not amount to much as actual fomenters of revolution. But Mazzini had coined a new word and concept which reverberated throughout the nationalist movements of the nineteenth century as far as Young Turkey and Young China. Mazzini believed in the fundamental comradeship of all the young nationalist movements. The years between 1830 and 1848 were a period of stirring hope and generous optimism. Mazzini had an unshakeable faith—in the tradition of Rousseau

and Herder—in the goodness of the people while governments and states appeared to him as corrupt. This faith was shared by the French historian, Jules Michelet (1798-1874), whose book *Le Peuple*, written in 1846, expressed the feeling of heroic patriotism and messianic fervor of the period. Like Mazzini, Michelet believed that the People incarnated nationality and that the diverse nationalities, once they would be freed from the despotism of government, would form a peaceful European union. Michelet was a friend and supporter of the Polish poet, Adam Mickiewicz (1798-1855), who then lived in Paris as an emigré. This great poet, after the failure of the uprising of 1831, in which he had not participated, became one of the leaders of Polish nationalism. Through their messianic fervor he and his fellow-emigré poets upheld Polish confidence in the midst of defeat and despair. Polish martyrdom received a meaning by this messianic interpretation. Poland was proclaimed the Christ among the nations; innocently crucified, it would rise again and its liberation would become the liberation of all mankind from oppression and war.

Mickiewicz, Mazzini, and Michelet, like the Young Europeans in general, were nationalists and democrats. They realized that the wakening of the nationalities demanded the active participation of the people. In the industrialized countries of Western Europe the call to the working classes was then frequently couched in nationalist terms, appealing to their patriotic pride and resuming the slogans of the Parisians of 1792-3. In Central and Eastern Europe the problem confronting the patriots was that of the emancipation of the peasants. The Polish national cause had been largely defeated by the apathy of the rural masses and their distrust of the nobility. The Polish democrats, among whom the historian Joachim Lelewel (1786-1861) was the most prominent, pressed for a greater consideration to be given to popular education and to the equality of all classes. But Lelewel, who at the University of Vilna had been the teacher of Mickiewicz, like so many of his fellow countrymen spent the last thirty years of his life in exile, unable to influence the developments at home. More successful was the Danish parson and poet, Nikolai Frederick Severin

Grundtvig (1783-1872), a fervent patriot who established folk high schools among the Danish peasants where the national poetry and history formed an essential part of the instruction.

Similarly, the peasant problem was solved in the nineteenth century in Ireland, politically by the emancipation of the Catholic voters throughout Great Britain and Ireland in 1829, socially and economically through the land reforms of successive British governments, beginning with Gladstone's Irish Land Act of 1870. But the Irish aspirations went farther. Under the leadership of Daniel O'Connell (1775-1847) an agitation was started for the repeal of the union of 1800 between Britain and Ireland and the reestablishment of an Irish Parliament. A more radical note was sounded by Young Ireland, which in 1842 founded the Dublin weekly *Nation*. Young Ireland went beyond the Catholic framework of O'Connell's agitation. It appealed to all the inhabitants of Ireland, Catholics and Protestants, Celts, Normans and Saxons. At the same time, however, it exalted the great past of ancient Ireland, which in the early Middle Ages had been the center from which education and Christianity radiated over parts of Europe. Young Ireland's greatest poet, Thomas Osborne Davis (1814-1845), was a Protestant who in his poems glorified among others King Dathi, the last pagan monarch of Ireland who had extended his conquests to the continent of Europe and invaded the Roman Empire.

The revolutionary unrest of the period spread also to Spanish America. Under the influence of the American and French revolutions, the Creole population, Americans of Spanish descent who felt treated as second-rate subjects compared with the Spaniards sent from the old country to fill all important positions, rose to the leadership of Simon Bolívar (1783-1830), a Venezuelan, and José de San Martín (1778-1850), an Argentinian, and fought to gain national independence for the Spanish colonies. By 1823 the Spanish rule was terminated. But the development was different from that in Anglo-America. Spain had offered to its American subjects as little training in self-government and democracy as to its own subjects at home. The Ibero-Americans could

as little overcome this political and social backwardness in the nineteenth century as the Spaniards could. Like Spain herself Spanish-America could not apply the principles of democracy and federalism which Anglo-America introduced, both in the United States and Canada. In most Spanish-American republics anarchy and dictatorship alternated. Military leaders, known as *caudillos*, frequently seized and held power. Only the former Portuguese colony of Brazil knew under the monarchy of Pedro II (1840-1889) a more orderly continuous development. The Indian native populations remained in most cases outside the new nations. Only in the twentieth century were efforts made, by far the most important one in Mexico, to integrate them into the nation, to revive their ancient folk culture, to study their history and traditions, and to bring about a synthesis of the American and Spanish civilizations.

National Movements in Central-Eastern Europe.

In 1815 Central-Eastern Europe was ruled by the three monarchs united in the Holy Alliance and by the Ottoman (Turkish) Sultans. Great Russians, Germans, and Turks, these were the three dominant nationalities all over the vast territory inhabited by many and varied ethnic groups. These groups had nothing in common except the lack of national statehood; they represented different racial, linguistic, and religious divisions. The most numerous linguistic group were the Slavs among whom the Great Russians were the only independent nation. The Russians were Greek Orthodox as were the Serbs and Bulgars who lived in the Balkan peninsula under Turkish domination. The Roman Catholic Poles who had formed a mighty commonwealth in the eighteenth century, including many non-Polish peoples—Lithuanians, Ukrainians, and Byelorussians—were by 1815 part of the lands ruled by the Emperor of Russia, the King of Prussia, and the Emperor of Austria. The latter monarch ruled also over the Roman Catholic Czechs in Bohemia and Moravia and the Slovaks in northwestern Hungary, and over the equally Roman Catholic Croats and Slovenes who lived in the southern part of his Empire, near and akin to the Serbs. The Slav Ukrainians and the Byelorussians, most of them Greek Orthodox, others Greek

Catholics, were in their majority subject peoples of the Great Russians. As a result of their geographic situation the Ukrainians formed in modern times a battleground for Russian and Polish imperial conflicts, though the Ukrainians are a numerous people, second among the Slavs only to the Great Russians themselves.

Though the Slavs formed the majority of the populations between Germany and Italy, they intermingled with other nationalities living there, making the ethnic map of Central-Eastern Europe even more checkered. Along the Baltic Sea we find the Lutheran Finns, Estonians and Latvians and the Roman Catholic Lithuanians. Throughout the expanse of the Russian Empire various nationalities, mostly of Finnish or Tartar descent, were living, which in the course of Russian imperial expansion had been absorbed but not assimilated. In the Hungarian plain along the middle Danube the Roman Catholic Magyars had settled, and to the north of the lower Danube the Greek Orthodox Romanians had preserved a Latin dialect from the time that the ancient Romans had there established their Dacian province. In the southern part of the Balkans and in Asia Minor Greeks were settled; their religion and culture played a dominant role among the Slavs and Romanians in the Balkan peninsula who were politically ruled by the Sultan in Constantinople but spiritually and socially by the Greek Patriarch of Constantinople. In addition there were the Albanians in the western Balkans, partly Mohammedans, partly Greek Orthodox and partly Roman Catholic, and finally the orthodox Armenians in Asia Minor.

The century between 1815 and 1918 witnessed the struggle for national independence on the part of all these nationalities. By 1918 the Russian, Austrian, Prussian, and Ottoman dynasties had lost their power. But everywhere throughout this territory, except in the case of the Baltic peoples, the creation of independent and satisfied nation-states after the Western model encountered almost insuperable difficulties. In most cases it was impossible to draw clear-cut ethnic frontiers. Yet it was not only the intermingling of racial, linguistic, and religious groups which presented obstacles to solutions acceptable to all the elements involved. Even more dangerous to peace

than the conflicting "natural" rights of the nationalities were their "historical rights." Each nationality claimed the frontiers as they existed at the time of its greatest historical expansion, frontiers which disregarded the ethnic and historical development of intervening centuries. Many territories had formed at different times part of different national spheres and were now claimed by each of the nationalities. Thus nationalism did not lead as Mazzini and Young Europe had expected to a fraternal association of neighboring peoples and to international peace. The awakening of the peoples released collective passions which became in the century after 1848 the most potent factor in arousing hatreds and fomenting wars. Democratic federalism in multi-ethnic empires would have offered a solution; it demanded, however, a preference for orderly development by compromise similar to that pursued in the English speaking world. But on the European continent such an approach was successfully applied only in Switzerland, where, after a brief civil war in the Fall of 1847, democratic federalism provided the framework for the peaceful development in liberty of populations speaking German, French, and Italian, and having highly diversified traditions and religious backgrounds. Outside Switzerland, German, French, and Italian speaking populations fought bitter wars against each other in the last one hundred years and sacrificed liberty to the demands of nationality. The nineteenth century English liberal Catholic, Lord Acton, foresaw the danger of this development. (*See Reading No. 8.*) Nowhere was this danger felt more acutely than in Central-Eastern Europe after the success there of the nationalist revolutions.

This success was prepared by the cultural efforts of scholars and poets. Under the influence of Herder they concentrated on writing literature in the vernacular languages and in exploring the folk traditions. Until the beginning of the nineteenth century the educated classes had used French, German, and Latin as their language. Now the young generation set out to write grammars and compile dictionaries of their native tongues, to translate foreign works, to collect folksongs, to explore national antiquities, to do research in historical chronicles and

archives. All that was not done for its own sake but *ad majorem nationis gloriam*, to enhance the glory of one's own nation, and to establish its equality, if not its superiority in relation to its neighbors and to the more advanced nations. Among the Slovaks Jan Kollár (1794-1852), a Lutheran minister and poet, lamented in his sonnet cycle, *Slavy dcera* (The Daughter of Slava, 1824), the decline of Slav power, called for the unity of all Slav peoples and prophesied their future greatness, peopling the immense territory from the Elbe River to the Pacific Ocean, from the Arctic Sea to the Mediterranean. Among the Czechs Palacký recalled the Hussite wars of the fourteenth century when the Czechs had been the first fighters for the Reformation, and Karel Havlíček (1821-1854) dedicated his journalistic and critical talent to the democratic education of his countrymen.

Among the Southern Slavs (Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes) the Napoleonic wars had aroused a new national sentiment. Some Serbs under their Orthodox prince-bishop had maintained their independence from the Turks in the inaccessible highlands of the Black Mountains or Montenegro; in 1805 other Serbs in the valley of the Morava revolted against the Turks and established there an autonomous principality in 1830. The Serbs under Ottoman rule were culturally much more backward than the Serbs and other Southern Slavs who lived in the Habsburg domains. Among the latter, Croats and Slovenes were incorporated for a short time by Napoleon into his empire; following his custom, he called the new provinces with the ancient Roman name Illyria. As a result, the national feeling awakened there among the Southern Slavs became known as Illyrian. Its leading spokesman was Ludevít Gaj (1809-1872), its greatest scholar Vuk Karadžić (1787-1864), who was foremost in creating a common literary language for the Croats and Serbs and in collecting their *pesme* or folk-songs. Illyrian nationalism soon gave way to the distinct and often conflicting national movements of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, but a feeling of close Southern Slav or Yugoslav affinity of these three peoples was preserved.

The Romanians inhabited the Turkish autonomous principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia under Orthodox

princes of Greek descent appointed by the Sultan, and Transylvania, a part of Hungary where the Romanians or Vlachs, as they were often called, lived intermingled with Magyar and German settlers without, however, enjoying any of the rights and privileges reserved to these two peoples. Yet, it was from Transylvania that the national and cultural awakening of the Romanians started. In the eighteenth century the Romanians were all Greek Orthodox using the Cyrillic or Old-Slavic script and hardly conscious of the Latin origin of their language. In 1700 in the Transylvanian city of Alba Julia, an ancient Roman colony, Romanian priests joined Rome and established a Romanian Uniate Church. Under its influence Samuil Klein (1745-1806) introduced the Latin alphabet and emphasized the Roman origins of the native language. This supposed Roman origin endowed the Romanian people with the feeling of superiority over Magyars and Slavs, Turks and Greeks. They felt themselves an outpost of imperial Latin civilization in the East. A teacher, Gheorghe Lazar (1779-1823), brought this Latin spirit from Transylvania to Wallachia. As a result the new national spirit overcame there the Greek influence, and from 1822 on native princes were appointed as Turkish governors. Cultural and historical research starting from Alba Julia in the eighteenth century laid the foundations for Romanian nationalism; this nationalism in its turn brought about in 1918 the political unification of the former Turkish principalities with Transylvania in a ceremony conducted at Alba Julia.

The years before 1848 also witnessed the birth of an Ukrainian national movement and literature. In Kiev, Ukrainia's historical capital, then part of the Russian Empire, the poet, Taras Shevchenko (1814-1861), formed with his friends the society of St. Cyril and St. Methodius. The Russian government terminated its activities in 1847 by Shevchenko's arrest and exile. More fortunate was the Ukrainian national movement in the Austrian province of Galicia, where at the University of Lemberg (Lvov) a chair for Ukrainian language and literature was created and an Ukrainian press could develop.

Whereas the nationalist activities of Czechs and Croats, Romanians and Ukrainians, were before 1848 mostly

confined to the cultural field, the Magyars in Hungary turned to transform this ancient multi-racial kingdom into a Magyar national state. In due consideration for its ethnically and linguistically composite character the official language of the kingdom had been Latin. In 1833 the Hungarian Diet changed the official language to Magyar and started the process of Magyarization of the Hungarian administration, which aroused the deep resentment of the non-Magyar nationalities, Slovaks and Croats, Serbs and Romanians. Great progress was made in the creation of a modern Magyar literature. Under the leadership of Lajos Kossuth (1802-1894), who edited the progressive newspaper *Pesti Hirlap*, the Magyar nationalists demanded constitutional reforms, liberal legislation, and national independence for Hungary, without, however, taking into account the similar nationalist demands of the non-Magyar peoples. Appealing to the conscience of liberal Europe for the rights of nationality against Habsburg domination, as far as they themselves were concerned, the Magyars were at the same time in no way willing to apply the same standard to other peoples. The "liberation" of the Magyars meant the "oppression" of the non-Magyar peoples within what the Magyars regarded as the historical frontiers of the medieval Hungarian kingdom. But it was not only in the case of the Magyars that nationalist aspirations clashed. It was this clash of nationalist revolutionary aspirations among themselves which defeated the 1848 revolutions in Central Europe.

The Spring of the Peoples. The signal in 1848 came again from Paris, where on February 24 the Second French Republic was proclaimed. In the following month revolutions broke out in Berlin and Vienna, in Prague and Budapest, in Milan and Venice. German, Italian, Slav, and Magyar nationalists in Central Europe from the North Sea to the Mediterranean greeted the dawn of a new day. The long winter of the Holy Alliance seemed broken, the regime of Metternich was overthrown, popular parliaments met, the peoples were in the ascendancy like an irresistible force, their Spring had come. But the promise and hope of this Spring ended soon in bitter disillusionment. 1848 was welcomed as the fulfil-

ment of 1789. The proclamation of the republic in France was received in Europe as the fulfilment of the hope of the ages, as a universal message destined for all peoples and guaranteeing the peace of mankind. But the new age which emerged on the European continent as the result of the nationalist revolutions of 1848 was not a world of harmony and fraternity but of conflict and violence. Soon the new nationalism stressed collective power and unity far above individual liberty: it tended to mean independence from outside rather than freedom within. None of the new nationalities could resist, as soon as the opportunity offered itself, the temptation to assert its rule over ethnically disputed territory and populations. Nationalism changed in the middle of the nineteenth century from liberal humanitarianism to aggressive exclusivism, from the emphasis on the dignity of the individual to that on the power of the nation, from limitation and distrust of government to its exaltation.

In France the republic was overthrown not by the old monarchists or aristocrats but by Louis Napoleon, who in free elections received the overwhelming support of the people. The majority voted for him because he made the cause of nationalism and social progress his own. He was the candidate of all those who lamented the peaceful "anti-national" policy of Louis Philippe and who longed to see the glory of the victorious armies of 1793 and of Napoleon revived and to revenge Waterloo and the treaties of 1815. Napoleon I while a prisoner in St. Helena had expressed his understanding and appreciation of nationalist movements. (*See Reading No. 9.*) His nephew, Louis Napoleon, had participated as a young man in the nationalist uprisings in Italy. After founding the Second French Empire as Napoleon III, he showed himself throughout his reign a friend of the revolutionary principle of nationality. In France herself no national problems were to be solved in 1848. France was a nation since 1789. The situation was different, however, in Central Europe. There the year 1848 meant the awakening of the nationalities and their first bitter clash.

At the beginning of 1848, Poles and Germans fraternized in the streets of Berlin, and Czechs and Germans in the streets of Prague. But as the revolution progressed

it became clear that it meant in Central Europe less a fraternal longing for human liberty than a divisive nationalism. Individual liberty and constitutional guarantees were subordinated to the realization of nationalist aspirations. The revolutionary fervor was directed toward national goals rather than liberal ones. Wherever the two conflicted, nationalism prevailed. The first elected German Parliament, which met in May 1848 in Frankfurt on the Main, disputed the frontiers of the German nation-state which it was about to create. Lands which were historically Danish or French or ethnically Polish or Czech were claimed for Germany. A German liberal, Wilhelm Jordan (1819-1904), made himself the spokesman of German claims to Polish territory. He appealed to "healthy" national egoism against "abstract" justice, to the right of conquest by plow and sword, and called all those Germans who saw the justice of the Polish point of view "traitors to their own people." By the end of 1848 the dream of the brotherhood of equal peoples in a universal order of democratic justice had given way to appeals based upon historical rights, the "reality" of power, and the supposed vital or strategic necessities of the nation. The liberal German historian, Friedrich Christoph Dahlmann (1785-1860), declared at Frankfurt on January 23, 1849 that "The road of power was the only road which could satisfy and satiate the desire for liberty which was fomenting but which had not yet understood itself. For this desire does not want liberty alone, it thirsts much more for power which has so far not been granted it. Germany must at last become one of the political great powers of the European continent."

Looking back at the events of 1848, the English philosopher, John Stuart Mill, diagnosed the situation with unusual perspicacity in the following year. He complained that nationalism makes men indifferent to the rights and interests "of any portion of the human species, save that which is called by the same name and speaks the same language as themselves." He characterized the new feelings of exclusive nationalism and of appeals to historical rights as barbaric, and remarked bitterly that "in the backward parts of Europe and even (where better things might have been expected) in Germany, the sentiment

of nationality so far outweighs the love of liberty that the people are willing to abet their rulers in crushing the liberty and independence of any people not of their race or language."

This change of the character of nationalism in the middle of the nineteenth century occurred not only among the Germans but among all the peoples of Central and Eastern Europe. The new spirit of violence, of glorification of heroic deeds, of the revival of a dim past and of its use as an inspirational source—phenomena which came to darken the horizon of the twentieth century—was first noticeable in 1848. No measure of Pope Pius IX, who had ascended the throne in 1846 as a liberal reformer, was so popular in Italy as his decision to send Papal troops to join the Sardinian army in the war against Catholic Austria. At the very outset of the war, on May 30, 1848, the Sardinian army, generally defeated in all its battles against Austria, won an insignificant and inconsequential victory at Goito. Forty-four years later the great Italian poet Giosuè Carducci (1835-1907), commemorating the victory in his poem "Piemonte," rapturously sang of "the smoke of blood rising from fields of battle." A growing popular impatience made violence and revolt in the service of the nation appear as highest moral values; nationalist self-sacrifice replaced the martyrdom of saints. The same spirit made itself felt outside Central Europe, in Ireland and later in Asia. Even the national anthem of Mexico written in 1854 is a resounding call to war. "Fatherland! Fatherland!" its last verse runs, "thy sons swear to breathe their last on thine altars, when the trumpet with its bellicose accent calls them to fight with valor. For thee the olive wreaths! For them a glorious remembrance! For thee a laurel of victory! For them an honorable grave!" The centenary of this poem of "roaring cannons" was celebrated in 1954 all over Mexico with unusual solemnity.

Scholars and writers were always at hand to produce historical and moral reasons for supporting the ambitions of their nation and to point out that their nation and its necessities presented a unique case to which general rules did not apply. In the welter of conflicting ethnic claims and counterclaims, national passions became overheated,

historical scholarship often became subservient to nationalist aspirations, and individual freedom was neglected. Thus it was that the revolutions of 1848 all over Central Europe failed to strengthen the cause of liberty, in spite of the sincere idealism of many of its participants. Poles and Prussians, Danes and Germans, Czechs and Germans, Croats and Italians, Slavs and Magyars, Poles and Ukrainians, opposed each other bitterly. These nationalist struggles helped the absolutist powers of the Metternichian period to reassert themselves. The idealism of 1848 failed, largely because it aroused nationalist passions and lacked the wisdom of patience and compromise. Instead of constructive building it preferred enthusiastic declamation. By 1852 the Second French Republic was dead, and no visible progress had been achieved on the road to Italian and German unification. But the spirit of nationalism was in the air; its mainstay, the middle-classes, gained in numbers and economic strength; their nationalist aspirations were realized in the twelve years from 1859 to 1871, but they were realized not by revolutionary idealists but by the pre-nationalist governments and in their interests, not by the people on the barricades nor by votes in Parliaments, but on the battlefields of regular armies and by the wiles of international diplomacy. After 1848 nationalism entered the age of what has become known by German words—for the Germans played the leading role in this transformation—as the age of *Machtpolitik* and *Realpolitik*, a policy based on power and self-interest and not on humanitarian declarations.

NATIONALISM AND REALPOLITIK

The years between 1852 and 1878 marked a decisive step forward in the realization of national goals in Central Europe, no longer by popular revolutions and moralist propaganda but by governments, war, and diplomacy. The ideology of nationalism was now supported more and more by economic factors. Capitalism, industrialism, and the growing importance of the middle-class changed the social structure and the rhythm of life all over Central Europe. The old stillness and patriarchal order gave way before the new means of communication. Friedrich List (1789-1846), a German immigrant to the United States who was deeply impressed by American nationalism and economic progress, returned to Germany as United States Consul and opposed the dominant eighteenth century cosmopolitan theory of political economy, which then celebrated its triumph in the free trade movement in England. List wished to replace it by his new theory of the "national system of economy." He saw in the Customs Union (*Zollverein*), which Prussia started in 1828 and which most German states joined by 1834, an incarnation of the idea of national unity and the best approach to its realization. (*See Reading No. 10.*) He advocated high protective tariffs to facilitate Germany's rapid industrialization and to enable her to compete with Britain, the building of a net of railroads to forge a closer link among the German states, and the construction of a German navy to expand German trade on the high seas. List did not live to see the fulfilment of his projects. Discouraged by the lack of support of his countrymen he committed suicide. His program of large scale industrialization and railroad building was executed in France under Napoleon III, who in 1856, ten years after List's death, found himself at the height of his power and renown.

The Crimean War. The foreign policy of the Second French Empire was directed against the system established at the Congress of Vienna, which recalled to French minds not the long peace it established but the downfall of the First Empire. The Congress of Vienna had tried to erect dikes against the revolutionary force of nationalism. Napoleon III, with his past of an Italian revolutionary nationalism, became its spokesman. For different reasons liberal public opinion in Britain against the dynastic absolutism of the Holy Alliance also supported nationalism and constitutionalism among the peoples of Central Europe. Dynastic absolutism seemed equally distasteful to British constitutionalism and to revolutionary nationalism, though the two had little in common. In the Crimean War (1853-1856) France and Britain made common cause in the support of Turkey against Russia, whose Emperor Nikolai I (1825-1855) was regarded as the main supporter of dynastic absolutism all over Europe. In the course of the war Napoleon III encouraged the Italian kingdom of Sardinia to enter the Western coalition. Its Prime Minister, Count Camillo Cavour (1810-1861), seized gladly the opportunity though no immediate interest of his country was involved. But during the peace congress at Paris (1856) Cavour was able to voice Italian revindications against Austria and to cement his understanding with Napoleon III for the cause of Italian unification.

One of the factors leading to the Crimean War had been the occupation of the Danubian principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia (*see p. 47*) by Russian troops. In 1857 Napoleon III supported the demands of the diets of the two Turkish provinces for their autonomy and neutrality, their union under a foreign and hereditary prince, and the introduction of a constitution. The Turkish government rejected these demands, but in 1859 each of the principalities elected Alexandru Ioan Cuza (1820-1873) as ruler of the united principalities and he was recognized as such in 1861 by the Turkish government. When he resigned in 1866, Napoleon's support forced Turkey's acquiescence to the acceptance of Prince Charles of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen as hereditary ruler of united Romania. Only after Napoleon's downfall, however, the

complete independence of Romania was recognized by the Congress of Berlin (1878) and three years later Carol I assumed the royal title.

The Unification of Italy. The year 1859 was also of decisive importance in the unification of another "Latin" nation, Italy, and again Napoleon III acted as a godfather of this unification though its final stages, again, escaped his control. The 1840's witnessed the great debate about the ways and means of Italian unification. There seemed many insuperable problems: the multiplicity of historical sovereignties and traditions, the deep-seated differences in social structure between North and South, the fact that in a Catholic country the Pope, the head of the Universal Church, was a territorial prince and unwilling to have his more than one-thousand-year-old dominion included in a unified Italian nation. Was such a nation to be a federation or a unitarian state, a monarchy or a republic, founded with the cooperation of the Pope or against him? Carlo Cattaneo (1801-1869), a brilliant Milanese scholar, was a republican and a federalist. He clearly recognized that the autonomous development of the various parts of Italy alone could provide the soil for a fruitful development of democracy. Mazzini was a republican and a strict unitarian, pleading for a centralized Italy with Rome at its head. The Piedmontese Vincenzo Gioberti (1801-1852), a priest and philosopher, saw the future of Italy in a federation under the intellectual supremacy of the Papacy. Sardinian aristocrats like Count Cesare Balbo (1789-1853) and Cavour, who founded in 1847 *Il Risorgimento* as the organ for the Italian national movement, regarded Sardinia as its leader.

The events of 1848 disappointed all these hopes. In that year Charles Albert, king of Sardinia (1831-1849), took to the field against the Austrians. After the short-lived victory at Goito (*see p. 52*), he was acclaimed by his troops "*Viva il Re d'Italia!*" (Long live the king of Italy), but shortly thereafter his army was decisively defeated by the Austrians at Custozza (1848) and Novarra (1849). The restored Republic of St. Mark at Venice under Daniele Manin (1804-1857) was forced to capitulate before the Austrians in 1849. Pius IX, who reigned

as Pope from 1846 to 1878, at first seemed to embody the hopes put into him by the Italian liberals and Gioberti. But the events of 1848-9 turned him into a determined opponent of liberalism and nationalism. In the Papal capital of Rome the nationalists on February 9, 1849 proclaimed a Roman Republic. Among its leaders was Mazzini, a native of Genoa, and Giuseppe Garibaldi (1807-1882), a native of Nice. But the Roman Republic was put down with the help of French troops; the Pope returned to Rome and regained his secular dominion; all over Italy the *ancien régime* was restored and the influence of Austria continued. The various solutions offered before 1848 for the unification of Italy were all defeated by 1849.

Sardinian Leadership. The only Italian state, however, where a return to the *ancien régime* did not occur after 1849 was Sardinia. The new king, Victor Emmanuel II, who followed his father in 1849, retained upon the advice of Cavour and of the Marquis Massimo d'Azeglio (1798-1866) the constitutional regime introduced the previous year. As the only constitutional monarchy in Italy, Sardinia won the sympathy of the middle-classes all over the peninsula. Cavour's progressive economic reforms, inspired by the example of England, did even more to awaken confidence in Sardinian leadership. In 1858 Cavour concluded a secret alliance with Napoleon III against Austria. French arms helped Sardinia to receive Lombardy from Austria in 1859, but Cavour's subtle diplomacy outwitted Napoleon's more limited goals and succeeded in winning most of the rest of Italy for the Sardinian monarchy. 1860 was the critical year deciding the way of Italian unification. Under Garibaldi's leadership the famous expedition of the one thousand Red Shirts to Sicily, an island which formed part of the Kingdom of Naples, threatened to provoke a conflict between the radical republicans and the Sardinian monarchists. Cavour's energetic action decided the issue in favor of the latter and led to the annexation of most of the Papal states and of southern Italy to the Sardinian monarchy. As a liberal, and to please Napoleon III and English public opinion, Cavour arranged for plebiscites throughout the Italian states to make the unification of

Italy the democratic expression of the will of the people. At least in the South of Italy the plebiscites were far from corresponding to the people's desire, yet Victor Emmanuel II could assume the title of King of Italy (1861-1878) and the constitution of Sardinia became the constitution of the united kingdom. The triumph of Italian centralism and the high-handed methods of the Sardinians, however, could not integrate the South into the Italian nation or make democracy a living force throughout Italy.

When Cavour died in 1861, Venetia was still in the hands of the Austrians and Rome with the surrounding territory (*Latium*) under the sovereignty of the Pope. Cavour's successors concluded in 1866 an alliance with Prussia against Austria, and though the Italian forces were severely defeated by the Austrians at Custozza on land and at Lissa at sea, Prussian victory secured Venetia for Italy. Napoleon III had supported the Italian-Prussian alliance; but he alienated Italian nationalist opinion by his support of the temporal power of the Pope. Twice, in 1862 and in 1867, Garibaldi led expeditions for the capture of Rome which was defended by French forces. Only when the French withdrew from Rome as the result of the Franco-German War of 1870, did the Italian forces enter Rome on September 20, 1870. After a plebiscite Rome was annexed to Italy against the bitter protest of the Pope who regarded himself henceforth as "the prisoner of the Vatican," and Rome became the capital of the Kingdom of Italy. Even then certain Italian speaking territories remained outside the new nation-state: Trieste, Istria, and Trentino formed part of Austria, the Ticino was a Swiss canton, Nice and Corsica belonged to France. Many Italian nationalists regarded them as *terra irredenta* (unredeemed soil) and were eager to achieve their "redemption," while other Italian nationalists looked to the restoration of the Roman Empire and led Italy into warlike, costly, and futile adventures in Ethiopia and Libya.

The Unification of Germany. Italy's example in 1859 stimulated the revival of nationalism in Germany. The year 1848 had brought Germany bitter disappointments too. The nationalists there faced similar problems:

the multiplicity of historical sovereignties and traditions; the differences between North and South; and the religious problem expressed in the antagonism between Protestants and Catholics. The question whether Germany was to become a centralized state or a federation, a republic or a monarchy, was undecided. But there was in Germany one fundamental difference from the situation in Italy: no great foreign power played a decisive role in Germany, on the contrary, among the German states there were two great European powers, and their jealousies and competition added to the difficulties of finding a solution according to the hearts of the German nationalists. Some of them adhered to a *grossdeutsch* solution, a Great Germany, which would include the Austrian dominions, others preferred the *kleindeutsch* solution, a Little Germany which would exclude Austria and unite the rest of Germany around Prussia. In the 1860's Prussia imposed her solution upon Germany as Sardinia had done in the case of Italy.

Prussia's Leadership. Again there were important similarities in the two cases. Sardinia and Prussia were frontier territories which had played only an insignificant role in the cultural development of Italy and Germany. Turin, Sardinia's capital, was outshone by almost any other city in Italy as an intellectual and artistic center; Berlin, Prussia's capital, achieved intellectual distinction only very late in German history. Both countries were ruled by ambitious dynasties which looked for their chief support to the army and to the aristocracy. But there the similarities ended. Sardinia's army was weak and accustomed to defeats, Prussia's army was renowned for its military spirit. To accomplish the unification of Italy, Sardinia had to rely in every case, in 1859, 1866, and 1870, on foreign help; Prussia achieved her goal unaided from outside. Sardinia formed only about one-tenth of united Italy and the national center of gravity soon shifted from Turin to Rome. Sardinia was absorbed in Italy. Prussia formed about two-thirds of the united Germany and the center of the nation remained evermore strongly in Berlin; it was Prussia which absorbed the rest of Germany and filled it with its authoritarian and militarist spirit.

Therein lay another difference: Cavour was a liberal who looked admiringly to England and the West. He eagerly sought the cooperation of the middle-classes and legitimized his conquests by parliamentary resolutions and plebiscites. Otto von Bismarck (1815-1898), a scion of the Prussian agrarian nobility and Prussia's counterpart of Cavour, despised Western liberalism and parliamentary constitutionalism. He became Prussian Prime Minister in 1862 to support the Crown in its constitutional struggle with the Prussian House of Representatives over the control and the enlargement of the army. Against violent liberal opposition he upheld the king and the army against the parliament and the people. The liberal opposition waned when Bismarck succeeded in three short and victorious wars—which made wars appear profitable for national strength and well-being—in aggrandizing Prussia, ousting Austria from the German *Bund*, and establishing a new German Empire under Prussia's leadership. This new Empire (*Reich*) was created on the battlefield, and proclaimed—a case unique in history—on the soil of the defeated enemy by the victorious German princes assembled in the Hall of Mirrors of the famous royal palace of Versailles, at the gates of the French capital which was surrounded and besieged by German troops.

The leading historians of Protestant Germany, above all Heinrich von Treitschke (1834-1896), helped to mobilize national enthusiasm behind Prussia and to popularize Hegel's theory of the nation-state as the source of all law and ethics, as a super-personality, whose essence is power (*Macht*). When the war of 1870 broke out, Treitschke wrote: "It does not become the German to repeat the commonplaces of the apostles of peace and of the priests of Mammon, nor to shut his eyes to the cruel truth that we live in an age of wars." Bismarck's victories confirmed most Germans in their belief in the superiority of their conservative monarchy over Western democracy. The declaration by the grand old man of German historical writing, Leopold von Ranke (1795-1886), that Prussia's "true destiny is to be and to remain a military monarchy," seemed confirmed by the events. "It is impossible," Ranke had written, "not to submit to what is historically necessary." Bismarck's *Realpolitik* succeeded

not only in the field of diplomacy and war, but even more disastrously in the field of the German mind. German unity and power were achieved at the expense of liberal constitutionalism and political freedom.

Bismarck himself was primarily a Prussian monarchist, not a German nationalist. He rejected German "irredentism," the program of the pan-Germans or *Alldeutsche*, which worked to include all German-speaking peoples, who lived in the Austrian and Russian Empires, in Switzerland and Holland, in the new German Empire. But by the annexation of French Alsace-Lorraine in 1871 against the will of the population, who in spite of race and language wished to remain politically French, he inflamed French nationalism. The Germans based their claim upon Alsace-Lorraine on historical rights and ethnic solidarity. They rejected the principle of self-determination. "These provinces are ours by the right of the sword," Treitschke wrote; "and we will rule them in virtue of a higher right, in virtue of the right of the German nation to prevent the permanent estrangement from the German Empire of her lost children. We desire, even against their will, to restore them to themselves." It was against this theory that the French scholar, Ernest Renan (1823-1890), defined in 1882 the liberal concept of nationality in his famous lecture "*Qu'est-ce qu'une Nation?*" (See Reading No. 11.)

Nationalism in the Balkans. After the unification of Italy and Germany there came the turn of the Christian nationalities in the Ottoman Empire. The Greeks were not satisfied with their frontiers established in 1831. Greek irredentists fomented uprisings in Thessaly, Epirus, and on the island of Crete. In 1876 insurrections broke out among the Slav populations of the Turkish provinces of Bulgaria and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Serbia and Montenegro came to the help of the Bosnian insurgents and declared war against Turkey, But Serbia was decisively defeated. It was saved from the consequences by the intervention of Russia, which declared war on Turkey in April 1877 and officially espoused the cause of the Bulgarians. Russian military might and international diplomacy settled in 1878, in the Congress of Berlin, the fate of the Balkan peoples. Romania, Serbia, and Monte-

negro were declared independent nations. The Bulgarians became an autonomous principality under Turkish suzerainty; Austria was given a mandate to administer Bosnia-Herzegovina; Macedonia, which was disputed between Bulgarians, Serbs, and Greeks, remained part of Turkey.

Among the Turks the closer contact with the West produced a liberal nationalist reform movement which tried to modernize the medieval religious despotic empire. A new literature was created; Turkish writers like Ibrahim Sinasi (1826-1871), who was the first to translate French poetry and to pioneer in private Turkish journalism, and Namik Kemal (1840-1888), who wrote a stirring patriotic play *Vatan* (Fatherland), awakened in the Turks a modern national consciousness. Supported by these "Young Turks," Midhat Pasha (1822-1884) was able in 1876 to introduce a liberal constitution for the Turkish Empire and Western education was encouraged; but the first Turkish parliament which opened in March 1877 was quickly dissolved and the absolutist rule of the Sultan and the medieval character of the Empire were restored.

Some liberal Turkish patriots succeeded in escaping abroad and carried on their agitation from there, often in cooperation with the spokesmen of other nationalities of the Ottoman Empire living in exile. Though they had to wait for thirty years before they could realize some of their ideas—in a successful revolution in 1908 they reintroduced the Turkish constitution—they represented in the late 1860's and early 1870's the first indigenous movement for the modernization of an Asian state under the impact of European nationalism. A similar attempt though with much greater success was made during the same period at the opposite end of Asia, in Japan, where the Meiji Emperor (1867-1912) created a modern nation-state. The task of reform was much easier in Japan than in Turkey. In Japan it was done by a revolution from above and in a country which was ethnically and religiously homogeneous. The Japanese followed the model of Prussia both in the military and authoritarian character of the nation and in the efficiency of administrative, economic, and educational reforms. On the other hand, the Young Turks tried like the Italians before 1860 and

the Russians before 1905 to carry through nationalist reforms against their government. Most of them were intellectuals who found the source of their inspiration in the Third French Republic and in French literature. They were faced with the great difficulty that the Turkish Empire was inhabited by a great variety of peoples of different ethnic origin and religious allegiance. In the period of their rule (1908-1918) the Young Turks were unable to solve the contradiction between the multi-national Empire which they wished to preserve and the modern nation-state which they wished to create.

Nationalism in the United States. The period of the wars of Italian and German unification (1859-1871) coincided with a similar struggle for national unity in North America. National unity achieved in 1789 was by no means secure. During the war against Britain (1812), the New England States had voiced strong disaffection and the Hartford Convention (1814) emphasized the sovereignty of the states and the antagonism of sectional interests. The following decades brought two decisive developments. American westward imperial expansion was regarded by many American nationalists as the unfolding of manifest destiny. (*See Reading No. 12.*) It strengthened the consciousness of a common glorious future. In the same period, however, the antagonism between South and North grew: the North insisted above all on national unity, the South stressed the precedence of self-determination and of the liberty of the individual states. The South felt exploited by the economically stronger North. This antagonism was expressed at the Jefferson Day Dinner in 1830. President Andrew Jackson (1767-1845) offered the toast to "Our Union: it must be preserved." Vice-President John C. Calhoun (1782-1850) responded, "The Union, next to our liberty, most dear. May we always remember that it can only be preserved by distributing equally the benefits and burdens of the Union."

Thirty years later the conflict had become "irrepressible." The Southern states, conscious of their own nationality, based on the existence of a civilization and a social structure different from those of the North, claimed the right of self-determination which the thirteen states

had exercised in 1775. The North regarded the secession as "insurrection." When the North tried to impose unity the War between the States ensued. After four years of bitter struggle—the most protracted and costly war fought anywhere between 1815 and 1914—the superiority of the North in population and economic power decided the issue. In spite of its patriotism and its military valor the South was defeated, not only by the material superiority of the North, but by the obsolescence of its own national idea. In the climate of liberal opinion in which the United States originated in the eighteenth century (*see p. 19*) it was impossible to establish a nation based upon feudal ideas of hierarchical authority.

After the victory of the North the democratic and federal character of the Union was preserved, and the Southern states were soon readmitted to full constitutional participation. The reconstruction period under the leadership of Northern radicals kept Southern resentment alive and created serious problems for American democracy. Yet, the American national idea based upon individual liberty and tolerance proved in the long run strong enough to overcome not only sectional differences but to fuse millions of immigrants of the most varied ethnic and religious backgrounds into a national whole. Individual liberty and tolerance endowed America with a unique power of voluntary assimilation and of creating a spiritual homogeneity at a time when the European continent, with the exception of Switzerland, followed the opposite pattern. (*See Reading No. 13.*) In Europe peoples of different religious and ethnic backgrounds entered in the middle of the nineteenth century a period of bitter nationality conflicts which led to unending tensions and wars and impeded or destroyed the progress of liberty and tolerance.

NATIONALIST CONFLICTS AND PAN-MOVEMENTS

Austria-Hungary. Prussia's victory over Austria in 1866 eliminated the Habsburgs from Germany and Italy where they had exercised leadership for many centuries. Yet, the Habsburg monarchy reentered a closer relationship with Germany, when Bismarck in 1879 concluded his alliance with Austria. This alliance, directed at France, was extended in 1882 to include Italy; it established a Central-European axis, Berlin-Vienna-Rome, through which Bismarck hoped to maintain German hegemony on the European continent. He was careful to avoid antagonizing Russia; Prussian-Russian friendship had been an important traditional factor in the past. But Austria's exclusion from Germany and Italy turned her attention towards the Balkans, where it conflicted with Russian imperial ambitions. Austria's acquisition of Bosnia-Herzegovina (*see p. 62*) increased the tension between the two powers.

The defeat in the war of 1866 caused also an internal reorganization of the Austrian monarchy. Hungary achieved, under the leadership of Ferencz Deák (1803-1876) and Baron József Eötvös (1817-1871), independence in 1867, remaining connected with Austria only through the person of the monarch and a common foreign and military policy. However, within Hungary the Magyars who did not form a majority of the population, exercised supreme control over their Slav and Romanian subjects. The government under Kálmán Tisza (1830-1902, prime-minister 1875-1890) deprived the minorities even of the right of using their language in schools or in the administration originally conceded to them under the more conciliatory regime of Deák. The extreme policy of Magyarization was even followed in Croatia

which on account of its historical rights had received in 1868 an autonomous position within Hungary with its own Diet and the right of using the Croatian language. To strengthen the Croatian position, Bishop Josip Juraj Strossmayer (1815-1905) founded the Yugoslav Academy in Zagreb, the Croatian capital, and promoted co-operation between Croats and Serbs in opposition to the Magyars.

Different was the situation in Austria. There from the beginning the equality of nationalities and languages was constitutionally recognized and progressively put into practice. The long premiership of Count Edward von Taaffe (1833-1895, premier 1879-1893) was especially favorable to the progress of Austria's non-German population. But the nationalist radicalization of the Austrian Germans under Georg von Schönerer (1842-1921), and of the Czechs under the Young Czechs who assumed leadership in 1891, prevented the working of the democratic process in Austria despite the introduction of general suffrage in 1907.

The Russian Empire. Much less fortunate was the position of the various nationalities in the Russian Empire. The uprising of the Poles in 1863 was sternly repressed. A policy of extreme Russification followed not only towards the Poles, but also towards Ukrainians and all the other nationalities, even against the Baltic Germans and the Finns who until then had enjoyed a privileged position and the recognition of their historical rights. The Polish middle-classes under the leadership of Roman Dmowski (1864-1939) tried to arrive at a compromise with Russia and hoped to unite the Prussian dominated parts of Poland with Russian Poland as an autonomous and equal partner within the Russian Empire. On the other hand, Jozef Pilsudski (1867-1935) organized the Polish workers for a revolutionary nationalist fight for Polish independence from Russia. Polish literature prospered and had a great share in arousing the Polish national consciousness. A Polish scholar, Alexander Brückner, surveying the developments of a century concluded in 1901 his *History of Polish Literature*: "The national consciousness does not limit itself any longer, as it did in 1801, to the nobility and some isolated

middle-class men, it has penetrated into the peasantry, even to the Jews . . . In spite of the lack of political independence it is thanks to its literature that the Polish nation can proudly say of itself: *E pur si muove.*"

Whereas the Poles in Russia and Prussia suffered bitter oppression, they enjoyed full freedom in Austria. No higher Polish education was allowed in the two other countries; the Austrian government, however, maintained two Polish universities in Lemberg and Cracow and the latter historical city was also the seat of a famed Polish academy of sciences. Similarly, Ukrainian intellectual and literary life which was completely suppressed in Russia, found a refuge among the Austrian Ukrainians who founded in Lemberg in 1873 the Shevchenko Society to encourage the development of national literature. There Mykhailo Hrushevsky (1866-1934) began in 1898 the publication of his *History of the Ukraine*. But Russian oppression, although intensified after 1881, did not achieve its goal. In the second half of the nineteenth century a remarkable national awakening took place among many nationalities of the Russian Empire, especially among Finns and Estonians, Latvians and Lithuanians. The local peasant vernaculars were developed into literary languages and took their place besides Swedish (in Finland) and German (in the Baltic Provinces). Elias Lonnrot (1802-1884) founded in 1831 the Finnish Literary Society, edited the *Kalevala*, the Finnish national epic, and fought for the equality of Finnish with Swedish in Finland. The "fennomen" carried the day over the "svecomnen"; today the large majority of the population in Finland speaks Finnish, but the Swedish language though spoken only by a small urban minority retains full equality in democratic Finland.

Nationalism in Western Europe. The struggle for linguistic equality was also successfully carried on within the framework of a democratic society by the Flemish speaking Belgians against the formerly dominant French language. In the awakening of Flemish national sentiment a growing modern literature played a similar role as among the Catalans in northeastern Spain, where Bonaventura Carlas Aribau (1798-1862) published in 1833 his "*Oda a la Patria.*" Nationalist movements in Catalonia

and in the Basque provinces fought for the federal reorganization of Spain, a trend supported by Francisco Pí y Margall in his book *Las Nacionalidades* (1877). These hopes were partly realized in the short-lived Spanish republic (1931-1939) which brought regional autonomy to Catalans and Basques, but the victorious dictatorship of Generalissimo Francisco Franco reintroduced the oppressive centralization.

Nationality conflicts in democratic Northern Europe found their solution in peaceful separation: the Norwegians, united in 1814 with the Swedes, established themselves in 1905 as an independent nation; Iceland united with Denmark since 1380 became independent in 1918. The Nordic nations (Denmark, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, and partly, Finland) have preserved, in spite of their independence, a strong feeling of solidarity and an inclination to cooperation; a Pan-Scandinavian movement for closer integration of which the great Norwegian writer, Henrik Ibsen (1828-1906), was a leading spokesman has not been able, however, to establish a Nordic federation.

The Irish Problem. • While Irish leaders like Charles Stewart Parnell (1846-1891) and John Edward Redmond (1856-1918) fought successfully in cooperation with British liberals for Irish Home Rule by constitutional means—William Ewart Gladstone (1809-1898) introduced the First Home-Rule Bill in the British Parliament in 1886 and in 1914 the Third Home-Rule Bill became law—other Irishmen turned to violence to achieve the separation of Ireland from Britain. The Irish Republican Brotherhood—also called Fenians after legendary heroes of old—was widespread in the 1860's both in Ireland and among the Irish in the United States. But the progressive liberalization of the Irish administration and the rapid improvement in the economic situation of the Irish peasantry resulted in a sharp decline of the political nationalist movement before the turn of the century. Under these circumstances the nationalists turned to cultural and educational activities to arouse nationalist sentiments. The Gaelic Athletic Association was founded in 1884 to revive Irish games. More important became the efforts to revive the Gaelic language. In 1893 Douglas

Hyde (1860-1949), an Irish Protestant of English descent, became the first president of the Gaelic League, which stressed the necessity for "de-Anglicizing the Irish nation" and for resuscitating the Gaelic language and the ancient Celtic traditions. (*See Reading No. 14.*) Pride in the racial past was fanned by poets and orators. Had not the Celtic race once peopled most of Europe, "established itself in Greece and burned infant Rome?" Even a Pan-Celtic movement, to unite Gael, Welsh, and Bretons, was adumbrated in those years. Yet, the Gaelic League was unable to displace English as the leading language among the Irish. The great Irish literary renaissance (1890-1920) expressed itself in English: William Butler Yeats (1865-1939), John Millington Synge (1871-1909), James Joyce (1882-1941), and the Abbey Theater made Ireland and Dublin world famous. But by its emphasis on Irish separateness the Gaelic movement contributed to the revival of Irish nationalism in the twentieth century. In 1899 Arthur Griffith (1872-1922), a member of the Irish Republican Brotherhood, became editor of *The United Irishman* and helped found in 1905 *Sinn Fein* (Ourselves). The movement added an emphasis on economic nationalism (*see Reading No. 15*) to that on cultural and political nationalism. British initial defeats in the Boer War had helped this revival of the Fenian spirit in 1899; British initial defeats in World War I supplied the background for the Easter 1916 Uprising in Dublin and the proclamation of the Irish Republic. After British victory in World War I, Arthur Griffith could realize Sinn Fein's aspirations by signing the treaty of December 6, 1921, which created the Irish Free State as a virtually independent nation.

Balkan Nationalism. The disintegration of the Ottoman Empire and the ensuing struggles among its presumptive heirs did not come to an end with the settlement of 1878 (*see p. 61*). Nationalist unrest continued in the Balkans. The new Christian nations not only tried to undermine the continuous existence of Turkey in Europe but fought each other, each one desiring to expand according to the greatest limits of its past. Their principal object of discord was Macedonia. The Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (IMRO) in Bulgaria,

the nationalist aspirations of Premier Nikola Pašić (1845-1926) in Serbia, and of Prime Minister Eleutherios Venizelos (1864-1936) in Greece were instrumental in bringing about the two Balkan Wars (1912-1913), which became the immediate prelude to World War I. Having defeated the Turks in the First Balkan War, and the Bulgarians in the Second Balkan War, the Serbs regarded themselves as the Piedmont or Prussia for the unification of all Southern Slavs, of whom a great number lived in Austria-Hungary and in Bosnia-Herzegovina (*see p. 65*). The assassination of the Austrian heir to the throne in Sarajevo, Bosnia's capital, on June 28, 1914 by Serbian nationalists led to Austrian retaliatory measures. The Serb-Austrian clash broadened into a conflict between Pan-Germanism and Pan-Slavism. The Germans and Magyars in the Habsburg monarchy had been Germany's loyal allies since 1879. On the other hand, the Serbs were supported by the Russians who regarded themselves as the head of the Pan-Slav movement and as the protector of all the Slavs, especially against the German *Drang nach Osten* (Pan-German expansion eastward).

Pan-Germanism. The Pan-German Union (*All-deutscher Verband*) was founded in 1891 by Ernst Haase (1846-1908) and Heinrich Class (1868-1953). Many of their ideas were inspired by Arndt, List, and Treitschke. The Pan-Germans demanded above all a greater German *Lebensraum* (living-space), overseas colonies, and a big navy. Their emphasis on a policy of ruthless national egoism and expansionism influenced wide circles who did not become members of the union itself and did not look primarily toward the creation of a vast colonial empire. They were more concerned with the fate of their "racial brethren" outside the frontiers of the German Empire, especially in Austria-Hungary. Many Pan-Germans renewed Arndt's demands for the "union" of the Swiss, the Dutch and even the Scandinavians with Germany in a great racial Nordic brotherhood. The Austrian Pan-Germans under Schönerer (*see p. 66*) accepted and promoted this program; in their bitter fight against the racially "inferior" Slavs and Jews they became Hitler's teachers. World War I, when Germany, Austria-Hungary, Turkey and Bulgaria were allied, seemed to provide the

opportunity for the creation of a *Mitteleuropa* (Central Europe) unified under German leadership. After 1890, the date of Bismarck's dismissal, Pan-German thought exercised a growing influence upon the public opinion and even upon governmental policy in Germany. This influence reached its open climax in Hitler's Germany.

Pan-Slavism. Pan-Germanism was primarily a movement for the expansion of Prussian-German power through the incorporation of other German speaking peoples, even against their will, into a greater Germany, which in population, economic resources, and territorial size would afford a sufficient basis for German world leadership. Similarly, Pan-Slavism was primarily a movement for the expansion of Great Russian power by the incorporation of other Slav-speaking peoples, even against their will, into a greater Russia, which in population and economic resources would afford a sufficient basis for Russian world domination. or, as it was called in the nineteenth century, a Russian universal monarchy. (*See Reading No. 16.*) In both cases it was assumed that "racial" or linguistic affinity resulted in an affinity of civilization and political ideology and in a desire for union. In reality, no cultural affinity existed among the various Slav-speaking peoples. Polish civilization had less in common with Russian civilization than with that of Catholic Europe. In spite of all Pan-Slav theory, Slav peoples frequently felt more bitter hostility against each other than against non-Slav peoples. The feeling of Poles against Russians, of Ukrainians against Poles, of Serbs against Bulgars, supply convincing examples of *Erbfeindschaft* (hereditary and hateful enmity) between Slav neighbors. Though Pan-Germanism and Pan-Slavism were based on fictitious premises, nevertheless they exercised an emotional impact on many Germans and many Russians and were among the principal causes leading to the two World Wars in the present century.

Pan-Slavism started originally among the Slavs in Austria. The first Pan-Slav Congress with Palacký (*see p. 39*) in the chair met in June 1848 in Prague to demand the transformation of the Habsburg monarchy into a federation of equal peoples among whom the various Slav nationalities would have formed a majority.

Only after the Austro-Hungarian compromise of 1867 (see p. 65) had made clear the failure of federalization, did the Czechs whose leaders had been very critical of Russia (see *Reading No. 17*) turn to Russia, "the big brother." In 1867 the Second Pan-Slav Congress met in Moscow and claimed Russian leadership of the Slav world. Most Pan-Slavs shared the Slavophil faith of Russian messianism, according to which the Russian people were chosen by God to lead mankind to salvation. The Russians were proclaimed to be the truly Christian people, guardians of Orthodoxy (the true faith), devoted to peace and social justice, and called to spread this gospel to all the nations. The great Russian writer, Feodor Dostoevsky (1821-1881), was one of the many adherents of Slavophilism and Pan-Slavism. (See *Reading No. 18.*) The Russian communists, who in November, 1917, under the leadership of Lenin (Vladimir Ulyanov, 1870-1924), overthrew the short-lived democratic regime which the Russian Revolution of March, 1917, had established, revived Russian nationalist messianism. They proclaimed the Russians the truly Socialist people, guardians of Marxism (the true faith), devoted to peace and social justice, and called to spread this gospel to all nations. In 1945 they realized the most daring dreams of nineteenth century Russian Pan-Slavs, uniting all the Slavs under Russian leadership and extending their borders to the Oder River and the Adriatic Sea. They defeated the Pan-Germanism of Adolf Hitler (1889-1945), who as leader of the German nation, had in 1941 realized the most daring dreams of his Pan-German forerunners.

Pan-Asianism. The first Pan-Asian Empire was created by the Mongols, who at the death of Ghengiz Khan in 1227 ruled from the China Sea to the Dnieper River. Later on the Celestial Empire (China) appeared to its people identical with the world and civilization. "From within and from without, all lands are subject to China." At the end of the sixteenth century Hideyoshi Toyotomi decided to challenge Chinese world leadership on behalf of Japan. In a letter to the Portuguese Viceroy of Goa in India he promised that "after completing our heavenly mission of conquering China, we shall readily find a road by which to reach your country. Our warships

and fighting men will accomplish the work entrusted to them regardless both of distance and the sort of warriors they may conquer." In the twentieth century Japan set out again for the conquest of China and beyond, convinced that she was "a divine country ruled over by the Son of Heaven" and that the Imperial Principle must be propagated over the Seven Seas and extended over the five continents in fulfilling "Japan's mission of peace." It was under the slogan of Pan-Asianism or "Asia for the Asians" that Japan tried to organize the population and resources of the vast lands from the Eastern shores of Africa to the Western Pacific as basis of Japanese world leadership. After Japan's defeat in 1945 the mantle of Pan-Asian leadership has fallen again to China. Like the other two great Pan-movements of the twentieth century, Pan-Germanism and Pan-Slavism, Pan-Asianism completely broke with the Western liberal tradition and turned to totalitarianism.

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RACIALISM AND TOTALITARIANISM

Biological Nationalism. The latter part of the nineteenth century saw the rapidly growing prestige of the biological sciences. In a vulgarized form, they together with the Darwinian "struggle for survival," exercised a potent influence on nationalism. Whereas the Western concept of nationality was a political concept based upon free individuality, ancient "natural" tribalism was now revived in modern forms; it based nationality, and man's political and spiritual allegiance upon ancestry or "blood,"

supposedly most deeply imbedded in, and determining, human nature. Arthur de Gobineau (1816-1882) first systematized the new biological nationalism in his *Essai sur l'inégalité des races humaines* (1853-1855). According to him "blood" was of supreme importance; the human races were unequal in creative ability; civilization could not be communicated and, therefore, backward races could not reach a higher level. The "chosen" people was the Teutonic or German race; as racial ability depended upon "purity of blood," intermarriage was detrimental to civilization. Gobineau encouraged the cult of ancestor worship as a means for the preservation of purity of the higher races and the fulfilment of their leadership mission.

Anti-Semitism in France. The racial theory in Continental Europe manifested itself above all in anti-Semitism. It went hand in hand with a rejection of individualism and liberalism, which were thought responsible for the decline of Europe and which made Jewish emancipation and assimilation successful. The anti-Semites regarded the Jews as "alien" in their European homelands; Palestine was proclaimed their true fatherland; their exclusion from the political and cultural life of their countries was deemed beneficial to restore racial and spiritual integrity. In France Edouard Drumont published in 1886 *La France Juive*; the anti-Semites suspected the existence of a Jewish "plot," often in cooperation with the Anglo-Saxons, Germans or Protestants, to ruin traditionalist and Catholic France. The agitation came into the open in the Dreyfus Affair. Captain Alfred Dreyfus, the only Jewish officer on the French General Staff, was sentenced in 1894 for pro-German espionage. A bitter fight was waged about his innocence: his adversaries claimed that national self-interest and security (*sacro egoismo*) took precedence over "abstract" justice and objective considerations.

Charles Maurras (1868-1952) and Maurice Barrès (1862-1923) first formulated clearly the principles of integral nationalism which rejected humanitarian liberalism as old-fashioned in favor of exclusive national self-interest and speedy decisive action. Maurras demanded that French interests be considered paramount, *France d'abord* (France first), and proclaimed the necessity of

nationalist action, *action française*, against deliberation and compromise. Barrès believed that France's salvation lay in a close national community of thought and feeling, beyond all class divisions and individualist non-conformity. All Frenchmen must be fused into a living unity by the recognition of their common deep roots in ancestral generations and by a return to the ancestral soil. Men lost their ethical and spiritual bearing, when they became "uprooted," as Barrès called it in his novel *Les Déracinés*. Nationalism, according to nationalists who stress "blood" and ancestors, was a determinism; the individual was not free but inescapably motivated by his biological inheritance, by "*la terre et les morts*," as Barrès called it, by "*Blut und Boden*," as Hitler phrased it.

Jewish Nationalism. It was during the Dreyfus Affair, and as a result of the anti-Semitism experienced there, that Theodore Herzl (1860-1904), an Austrian journalist, wrote his pamphlet *Der Jude.istaat* (1896). In it he demanded for the "people without a land" a "land without a people." At that time he did not know that in Russia, as a result of the anti-Semitic pogroms of 1881, the *Hoveve Zion* (Lovers of Zion) had agitated for the return of the Jews to their ancestral soil in Palestine and the first pioneers had left to settle in that country to "redeem" (*geulah*) the land. Historical Zion became the goal of a modern nationalism. Herzl now assumed the leadership of the movement. A world-wide Zionist Organization was created and the first Zionist Congress met in Basel, Switzerland, in 1897 to demand the creation of a Jewish homeland in Palestine, secured by international law. Palestine was then a Turkish province; its people predominantly Arabs.

In World War I, twenty years after the first Congress, Arthur Balfour, on behalf of the British government, promised to use their best endeavors to facilitate "the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, it being clearly understood that nothing will be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country." The number of Jewish immigrants into

Palestine was small between 1919 and 1933. The new settlers succeeded in reviving Hebrew as a national language, and though there was no prospect of a Jewish majority in the country, Jewish cultural life was flourishing. The situation changed in World War II. Hitler's anti-Semitism after 1933 induced many European Jews to look for refuge in Palestine. Nazi massacres of millions of Jews strengthened Jewish nationalism. The existence of a large Arab majority, eager to defend the national character of their homeland and to exercise their right of "self-determination," was the main hindrance for the establishment of a Jewish state. The Palestinian Arabs were supported by the neighboring Arab countries and the Islamic peoples. The issue was decided in a war between the Palestinian Jewish settlers and the Arab states; in May, 1948, Jewish victory resulted in the creation of the state of Israel.

Anti-Semitism in Germany. Gobineau's racial theories had only a very limited influence in France. In the Dreyfus Affair the liberal forces prevailed. Few French intellectuals accepted racialism. Leading French historians like Michelet and Renan stressed racial intermingling as the fertile basis of French nationalism and the indispensable foundation of a liberal policy. Louis Joly wrote in his *Du Principe des Nationalités* (*On the Principle of Nationalities*, 1863) that stress on ancestors was contrary to the principles of 1789. "The idea of an association of men which is not constituted on the sympathies and hatreds stemming from common descent is superior to one based upon the recognition of these 'natural' sympathies and hatreds. The fusion of races, as it happened in France, Britain, and the United States, is one of the great beneficial factors of history. The leading powers in the world are the very ones where the various nationalities and racial strains which entered into their formation have been extinguished as far as possible and have left few traces." Alexis Comte de Tocqueville (1805-1859) wrote to Gobineau that his essay on the inequality of the human race was hostile to individual liberty and added prophetically that its ideas had a chance in France only if they came back there from abroad, especially from Germany. For the situation was different in Germany.

There leading artists and scholars espoused the cause of anti-Semitism and endowed it with an appearance of dignity. Richard Wagner (1813-1883) devoted great efforts to the spread of anti-Semitism (see *Reading No. 19*), and the most renowned historian of the period, Heinrich von Treitschke (1834-1896), published in 1879 an article *The Jews are our Misfortune*, which served as a rallying banner for the German anti-Semitic movement.

Germany became the fatherland of modern anti-Semitism; there the systems were thought out and the slogans coined. German literature was the richest in anti-Jewish writing. As early as 1815 Friedrich Rühs, professor of history at the University of Berlin, asked that the "Hebrew enemy" should wear a special sign on his garment to make him easily recognizable. In 1881 Eugen Dühring, a social philosopher, wrote a book, *The Jewish Question as a Racial, Ethical and Cultural Problem. With a World Historic Reply*. In it he suggested those "remedies" which Adolf Hitler was to apply. At the same time Adolph Stöcker, an influential Protestant cathedral and court preacher in Berlin, and Adolph Wagner, professor of political economy at the University of Berlin, led the "Christian Social Workmen's Party" in opposition to bourgeois liberalism and proletarian Marxism which they regarded both as inspired and dominated by Jews. In 1899 Richard Wagner's son-in-law, Houston Stewart Chamberlain (1855-1927), published his *The Foundations of the Nineteenth Century*, which became the "scientific source for Alfred Rosenberg's *Der Mythos des 20. Jahrhunderts* (*The Myth of the Twentieth Century*, 1930), in which he elaborated Hitler's racial theories. Anti-Semitism and a mystical anti-Western and anti-liberal concept of German *Kultur* (civilization) (see *Reading No. 20*) prepared the German people for the willing acceptance of Hitler's totalitarian and racial nationalism.

Totalitarian Nationalism. Charles Maurras' integral nationalism stressed the authority and absolute precedence of the national community over the individual and the need of determined action by a closely-knit, disciplined and well-armed vanguard, an élite which would seize power at the decisive moment. He believed the modern

West's liberal democracy, as developed in England, doomed. These theories had little influence in France except for the brief period of the regime of Marshal Henri Pétain which imposed itself upon France in 1940 in the wake of German victory. But they found a receptive soil in countries where Western democracy had scant opportunity for taking root. World War I caused the collapse of the traditional authorities and of the social order over most of Eastern and Central Europe. It opened the road to the rise of totalitarianism. In November, 1917, Nikolai Lenin (1870-1924) led a closely-knit, disciplined, and well-armed vanguard to overthrow the short-lived democratic regime which the Russian Revolution of March, 1917, had established in cooperation with the West. Lenin now erected the first totalitarian state directed against Western democracy. He was a follower of the internationalism of Karl Marx (1818-1883), who had expected a socialist world state based upon the union of the proletarian class of all countries. Under Lenin's leadership the Russian Empire was transformed into the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which it was hoped would expand to include the entire globe. Within the Soviet Union the various nationalities received territorial autonomy and the right to use and develop their own language. They were assured complete equality. But within a totalitarian state national liberty was as unthinkable as individual liberty: all persons and all groups had absolutely to conform to the one uniform pattern imposed by the Communist Party and doctrine. In the Soviet Union itself the Great Russian element numerically and culturally predominated. In the 1930's and 1940's it reasserted its dominant position more and more openly and in the later years of Josef Stalin (1879-1953), Lenin's successor, the Slavophil tendencies of stressing the unique and peculiar character of the Russian people and of its world mission (*see p. 72*) were revived. As a result the opposition of the many non-Russian nationalities of the vast Soviet Empire against Moscow's domination grew, especially among the Ukrainians in the west and among the Mohammedan peoples in Soviet Central Asia.

Fascism. Whereas Communism, the first and most

extreme totalitarian movement, was in its original ideology not connected with nationalism, Fascism, the other great authoritarian mass movement in opposition to modern middle-class civilization, was from the beginning an inflammation of nationalism. It came first to power in Italy under the leadership of Benito Mussolini (1883-1945) with the "March on Rome" in October, 1922. Fascism no longer believed as Mazzini did in the harmony of various national interests. It dedicated itself to the preparation for the "inevitable" struggle that forms the life of nations. It called for dynamic national growth, for an increased population for the sake of national strength, and for the military preparedness of the whole population. Mussolini called the Italian people to its mission of restoring Rome's ancient glories, and he stimulated the cult of the Roman imperial past in every possible way. Fascism absolutized nationalism. The nation became the supreme arbiter, its service the one supreme duty. Only actions, thoughts, and sentiments which help to increase the power of the nation are regarded as good by Fascism. The absolute devotion to the nation becomes the guiding principle of all Fascist education, which like Communist education wishes to determine every thought and every sentiment of the people. (*See Reading No. 21.*)

Fascism was originally regarded as an Italian phenomenon but by 1936 Fascist principles had become accepted, to a varying degree, by the governments of many countries in Central and Eastern Europe and had even penetrated into Latin America and Asia. There were variations in the doctrinal concepts and in the external symbols according to the peculiar national traditions of each country. In Romania Corneliu Zelia-Codreanu founded in 1927 a Legion of the Archangel Michael for the religious and racial renovation of Christian Romania; the Legion later developed into the terrorist organization of the Iron Guard, and when disbanded by the government constituted itself as a party *Totul Pentru Tara* (Everything for the Fatherland). In Greece General Joannes Metaxas established on August 4, 1936 a Fascist regime, inaugurating the "Third Hellenic Civilization," with the Spartan salute as its symbol. In the same year the Falangists in Spain revived the dream of recreating

the great Spanish Empire of the golden century, which had attempted to impress its Catholic civilization upon the whole world and which had ruled in the Americas and in the South Seas. Similarly, in Japan patriotic terrorist organizations of young officers and students tried to stamp out the influences of Western liberalism and commercialism and to bring Japan back to the old faith and the ancient virtues. In Latin America the Integralistas in Brazil and the Peronistas in Argentina fanned the flame of native nationalism and imperialism in opposition to the liberal and commercial civilization of the United States.

On October 25, 1932, Mussolini assured his audience at Milan of the coming world leadership of Fascist Italy. "Today with a fully tranquil conscience, I say to you, that the twentieth century will be the century of Fascism, the century of Italian power, the century during which Italy will become for the third time the leader of mankind." Mussolini thus shared Mazzini's hope for a "Third Rome," the Rome of the Italian People which would exercise world leadership as the Rome of the Caesars and the Rome of the Popes had done in antiquity and in the Middle Ages. But the hope for Italian world leadership was futile. The Third Reich of National Socialism, the German form of Fascism which had come to power under Adolf Hitler (1889-1945) in January, 1933; the Japanese brand of imperial Fascism which gained the upper hand there in 1936; Russian totalitarianism with its center at Moscow, the "Third Rome" of the Slavophiles (*see p. 72*) were more potent competitors for world leadership than Italy. In all these cases totalitarian nationalism widened into the ambition of world imperialism, fundamentally different from the limited and liberal nineteenth century imperialism. The new nationalism "justified" its merciless struggle with its passionate hatreds and cold-blooded liquidations by appealing to the necessities of history, to "God-ordained" nationalist missions, or to the evocation of a distant past.

WORLD-WIDE NATIONALISM

After the First World War. The Peace Congress of Vienna in 1814 tried to contain the revolutionary forces of nationalism. Yet throughout the following century these forces grew in intensity and expanded into ever new countries until the peace treaties of 1919 marked the complete breakdown of the system established at Vienna. All over Central and Central-Eastern Europe new nation-states sprang up and older nation-states which had come to existence in the nineteenth century were enlarged according to the principles of national self-determination. Yet, the hopes of the generation of 1848 that national independence would lead to peace and liberty—hopes largely shared by United States' opinion and by President Woodrow Wilson—were not fulfilled. Within the context of the intellectual traditions and the social structure of the modern West, nationalism had represented a movement for a more open society and the pursuit of individual happiness, for the security of civil liberties and the unfettering of thought. After the Second World War, nationalism lost much of its hold on the West. The trend toward supranational cooperation developed rapidly; Western European Union and the Atlantic Community held greater promise for securing peace and for broadening individual liberty than nationalism. On the other hand, in the East, Communism stressed national sovereignty as never before; there nationalism became the dominant and exclusive force. When nationalism spread to Eastern Europe and later to Asia, to lands with traditions different from those in the West and frequently hostile to modern Western ways, nationalism tended toward the closed society, in which the individual counted for less than the strength and authority of the national whole. Nationalism was considered a panacea for solving

all problems and its impatient penchant for action and violence made it susceptible to Communist influences.

The "liberation" of many nationalities in the twentieth century did not strengthen the trend to peace and liberty. Nationalities which had demanded release from oppression often became oppressors themselves. Innumerable disputes about historical and natural frontiers sprang up. Long established security systems disintegrated before new foundations for peace were laid on solid ground. Some new and enlarged nation-states—Poland, Czechoslovakia, Italy, Yugoslavia, and Romania—contained embittered minorities. A great and potentially fruitful innovation were the international agreements after the First World War which stipulated, for the assurance of protection of minorities, the right of supervision and intervention by the League of Nations. However, nationalism prevented this protection from becoming effective. Even the dominant nationalities of some of the new nation-states—Czechs and Slovaks in Czechoslovakia, Serbs and Croats in Yugoslavia—felt hostile to each other in spite of their close racial and linguistic affinity. The mutual animosities and jealousies among the new nation-states hindered their political and economic cooperation; this facilitated the conquest of Central and Central-Eastern Europe first by National Socialist Germany, then by Communist Russia. National independence and sovereignty multiplied and sanctified after, and as a result of, two World Wars, have not turned out to be reliable formulas for greater individual freedom and more secure international peace.

Nationalism in the Middle East. The First World War completed the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire. On its ruins Greek nationalism wished to recreate the Great Greece of antiquity and of the Byzantine Empire. Greek armies landed in 1919 in western Asia Minor (Anatolia), the site of famous Hellenic cities of the past and a country with a considerable and prosperous population of the Greek Orthodox faith. The invasion of this Turkish heartland aroused a new feeling of nationalism among the Turkish peasants. Under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal, later called Kemal Atatürk (1881-1938), they routed the Greeks in 1922. The victory secured for Turkey national independence and equality unknown for

a long time. As part of the peace treaty a compulsory exchange of populations was carried through, Greek subjects of the Mohammedan faith had to leave for Turkey, Turkish subjects of the Greek Orthodox faith, by far more numerous and wealthier, were removed to Greece. Even with the bitter memories left by war and expatriation, as well as the political and religious hostility of many centuries, the Turkish and Greek governments were able, by definitely abandoning expansionist aspirations and all ambitions for the restoration of former greatness, to establish friendly relations between the two nations and to secure their close political and military cooperation. Equally important were Atatürk's domestic reforms. He changed the medieval religious structure of state and society, transformed Turkey into a modern secular republic, introduced European codes of law, and laid the foundations for a progressive Westernization and democratization of Turkish life. His example was followed, as far as the much more backward conditions allowed, in neighboring Iran (Persia), and exercised an influence on other Islamic peoples, whose status changed rapidly after 1920.

On the eve of the First World War, only three independent Islamic states existed. Two of them, Turkey and Persia, were deeply "sick" and shaky, the third one, Afghanistan, was primitive and inaccessible. Forty years later Turkey and Iran were consolidated to a degree unforeseen in 1914, Afghanistan was on the way to modernization, and a whole string of independent Mohammedan nations, the existence of which few would have anticipated in 1914, had come into being from North Africa to the South Seas—Libya, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Syria, Iraq, Pakistan, and Indonesia. But in spite of a consciousness of Islamic affinity, politically nationalism was the stronger force. Attempts to revive the Caliphate (which Mustafa Kemal abolished in Turkey in 1924) as a pan-Islamic movement based upon the Mohammedan Holy City of Mecca and under Arab leadership—the Arabs were the original supporters of Islam and of the Caliphate—failed. Nationalism and jealousies among the various Islamic states and leaders were too strong for the political efficacy of the religious tie. Only among

the Arabic states was a closer relationship established based upon community of language and tradition and upon common hostility to, and fear of, Israel.

Nationalism in Asia. The Middle East had been in contact with the West for many centuries: Islam and Christianity have common foundations in Judaism and in the Hellenic civilization. Different was the case in India and the Far East. There real contact with the West is hardly two centuries old. It was a contact forced upon Asia by Europe. From the wars of the Persian Empire against Greece to the incursions of Huns and Mongols and finally to the siege of Vienna by the Ottoman imperial armies, Europe had been under attack by aggressive Asian powers. Only in recent times the trend has been reversed. Western progress and the lethargy which had befallen Eastern civilizations made it possible for European control to spread in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries over the globe, and with it came Western methods of political and economic organization. Western beliefs in freedom and rationality influenced the leading strata of non-Western populations, first in Russia, then in Asia, and aroused them from tradition-bound ways of life. Western skill in administration, integrity of the judicial system and ordered liberty were partly assimilated by non-Western elites; at the same time Western superiority, often arrogantly asserted, aroused deep resentment. Through contact with the modern West, Asian civilizations and peoples were revitalized. As the very result of Westernization and the resulting native renaissance the brief period of Western imperial expansion has recently reached its end.

In this historical process England was the leading power. Her liberal civilization, which in preceding centuries had influenced the growth of constitutional liberty in Europe, infused a new spirit into Asia and later into Africa. England introduced constitutional reforms in her colonies and increased the facilities for education and economic development. She set the example of complete emancipation of dependent peoples by giving independence to Egypt (1922, completed 1936) and to Iraq (1932), an example followed by the United States in 1934 when Congress promised to grant independence to

the Philippine Islands after a transitional period of twelve years. This process reached its fulfillment after the Second World War, when India, Pakistan, Ceylon, and Burma became independent. At home as abroad Britain offered the example of a political organization which adapted itself to changing public sentiment with flexibility and without doctrinaire theorizing, and which derived its vigor from ideas apt to promote orderly evolution and individual liberties everywhere.

Nationalism in India. British rule brought a powerful ferment above all to India, a sub-continent in which the Far Eastern and the Islamic civilizations met. There British policy and methods first aroused the desire for individual liberty and self-government, formerly unknown in the Orient. In 1835 the English historian, Thomas Macaulay (1800-1859), as chairman of the Committee of Public Instruction in India proposed to base Indian education upon the study of the natural sciences and of the growth of liberty from ancient Greece to modern England. "It may be that the public mind of India may so expand under our system that it may outgrow that system and our subjects having been brought up under good government may develop a capacity for better government, that having been instructed in European learning, they may crave for European institutions. I know not whether such a day will ever come but if it does come it will be the proudest day in the annals of England."

The Indian National Congress. Exactly fifty years later, at the end of 1885, the first Indian National Congress met in Bombay. It was founded upon the suggestions of an English liberal, a former member of the Indian Civil Service, in order to merge in one national whole all the different and hitherto hostile elements that make up the population of India; to direct the process of rebirth of the nation so evolved, intellectually, morally, socially, and politically; and to strengthen the tie that binds Britain and India by changing whatever is unjust or injurious to India. For the first time in Asia the Congress created a public platform for voicing political aspirations, representing the nation as a whole above all formerly unbridgeable differences of race and caste, religion, language, and province. For nowhere was racial

and caste segregation as strict and cruel as in Hindu India, a country without a common language, without a common political tie before the one created by British administration and education. Though the membership of the Congress was overwhelmingly Hindu, nevertheless in its first thirty years three Mohammedans, four Englishmen, and one Parsee were its Presidents, one Englishman twice and the Parsee three times. The invitation to attend the Congress declared: "Indirectly this Congress will form the germ of a Native Parliament, and, if properly conducted, will constitute in a few years an unanswerable reply to the assertion that India is still wholly unfit for any form of representative institutions." The President in his opening speech defined the aim of the Congress as "the eradication by direct friendly personal intercourse of all possible race, creed or provincial prejudices amongst all lovers of their country, and the fuller development and consolidation of those sentiments of national unity that had their origin in their beloved Lord Ripon's ever memorable reign." (Lord Ripon, the most popular nineteenth century viceroy, filled that office from 1880 to 1884.)

In the twentieth century the leadership of the Congress shifted from the liberal Westerners to the radical Indo-phils whose first leader was Bal Gandahar Tilak (1856-1920). They turned for inspiration to the Hindu past and to the orthodox masses and aroused a fierce and semi-religious nationalism. Tilak's work was continued, though with a shift to an emphasis on non-violence, by the Indian National Congress under the leadership of Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi (1869-1948). His way of life and his moral appeal succeeded in arousing the Indian peasant masses. By 1935 when the British for the first time officially envisaged dominion status for India, the Congress had truly become a "native Parliament" representing the nation and followed by the Hindu masses. Hardly more than a decade later India was an independent nation. (See *Reading No. 22.*) Yet, the Indian Mohammedans did not join it. They demanded their independence from Hindu rule. In opposition to the Congress they created the Indian Moslem League and adopted, under the leadership of Mohammed Ali Jinnah

(1876-1948), the policy of establishing a separate Muslim nation (Pakistan).

Nationalism in the Far East. In the half century from 1885 to 1935 the whole political outlook in Asia changed. The decisive event which caused the change was Japan's victory over Russia in 1905. It demonstrated the possibility of the triumph of a "backward" people, by means of Western technique and organization, over a great European military power which until then had conquered more Asian territory than any other "white" empire and threatened to control Mongolia, Manchuria, northern China, and all of Korea. This unexpected victory awakened new hopes and stirred the peoples of Asia and Africa into a new self-consciousness. The small Far Eastern island kingdom had after an effort of half a century attained an equal footing with the Western nations and now matched or outdid them in the pursuit of its own colonial and imperial policy. Should not other "backward" peoples follow this example? A number of nationalist reform movements swept Asia in the wake of Japan's victory. In Turkey (*see p. 63*), Persia, and China, age-old theocratic autocracies crumbled under the impact of nationalist revolutionary movements. Of the greatest importance was the Chinese Revolution led by Sun Yat-sen (1866-1925) who established the Kuomintang (National People's Party) and who formulated in his *San Min Chu I* the Three Principles of the People which were to guide the building-up of a Chinese nation. In January, 1919, he called upon "Chinese patriots" to follow his example in taking an oath: "I truthfully and sincerely take this public oath that from this moment I will destroy the old and build the new, and fight for the self-determination of the people, and will apply all my strength to the support of the Chinese Republic and the realization of democracy through the Three Principles, . . . for the progress of good government, the happiness and perpetual peace of the people, and for the strengthening of the foundations of the state in the name of peace throughout the world."

But in China as in other Oriental countries no foundations for liberal democracy and modern nationhood existed. The cohesive forces of the traditional order were

destroyed, before new ones emerged. A long period of chaos was to follow. The situation was different in Japan and Turkey where the old ruling class preserved its vitality and guided the transformation, and in India and Ceylon where many decades of British administration had trained a native civil service and a large educated class of high ability, of great learning and integrity. Even with the political chaos in China, the closer contact with the West produced there, in an atmosphere traditionally saturated with scholarship, a brilliant cultural renaissance. Students educated abroad initiated upon their return a "tidal wave" of creative thinking, which, though it lasted only for a decade, from 1916 to 1926, changed the face of Young China. Up to that time all Chinese instruction was on traditional classical lines conducted in a language that had not been spoken for two thousand years and that was unintelligible to the people. In an article in the monthly *Hsin Ching Nien* (The New Youth) Hu Shih, modern China's leading scholar, advocated the use of the spoken language for literary purposes. This living "national language" was first made popular by the Chinese students using it in 1919 in their patriotic struggle against the Japanese. It rapidly became the instrument of public instruction and of the mass education movement. At Peking National University, Hu Shih and his fellow scholars, young men trained in the West, started a critical scrutiny of China's cultural heritage. With an unusual openmindedness and insight they tried to fuse Western values with an appreciation of China's best heritage. "Despite the universal distress," Richard Wilhelm wrote in 1927, "a colossal work, which the rest of the world has hardly any notion of, has been accomplished in China in the course of a few years, namely, the formation of a uniform language and uniform schools. The Chinese schools now constitute a means for welding together the entire Chinese people by a single method, into a single cultural community such as has never yet existed in all the thousands of years of Chinese history."

Chinese nationalism under the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek (b. 1886), Sun Yat-sen's successor as leader of the Kuomintang, and Korean nationalism under the veteran nationalist Syngman Rhee (b. 1875) fought for

national independence and unity against Japanese attempts to establish domination over the whole Far East. The Japanese did not succeed, but the social and moral chaos in the wake of their conquests and defeats prepared the way for an authoritarian Communist nationalism. Was Communism not an ally against imperialism and Western capitalism? (*See Readings Nos. 22 and 23.*) Its authoritarian pattern fitted native traditions better than individual liberty; the underdeveloped peoples, wishing for full equality, rejoiced at the prospect of following Russia's road to heavy industrialization and economic independence.

World-Wide Nationalism. The twentieth century since 1945 has become the first period in history in which the whole of mankind has accepted one and the same political attitude, that of nationalism. Its rise everywhere implied an activation of the people and the demand for a new ordering of society. But everywhere nationalism differs in character according to the specific historic conditions and the peculiar social structure of each country. World-wide nationalism has, however, not simplified the task of creating a cohesive and cooperative human society. Ambitions among Asian and African peoples threaten to clash as they have among European nations. China has in no way been willing to grant national independence to Tibet or to the Mohammedan peoples in Sinkiang; on the contrary, it is trying to reassert its former imperial influence in Korea and Annam. Chinese settlers throughout Southeast Asia and Indian settlers in Eastern Africa, both enjoying the protection of their lands of origin, may create difficulties recalling imperial conflicts of the recent past. With the promotion under British leadership of new African nations in Nigeria and the Gold Coast to independence and with the cultural and social emancipation of the Indian element in many Latin American countries—a process in which Mexico through the new Constitution of January 31, 1917, and the "Aztec renaissance" has led the way—nationalism has become the determining political and cultural force among all the races and civilizations on earth.

Recrudescence of Nationalism. Nationalism in the late 1960's shows its strength not only among Asian,

African, and Latin American peoples. Britain set an example in Asia in 1947 by declaring India, Pakistan, Ceylon, and Burma independent, and within practically a decade the political map of Asia has been completely changed under the propelling force of nationalism. In Africa, Britain again set the example in 1957 with the independence of Ghana, the British colony of the Gold Coast, and within a few years more than twenty former African colonies achieved the status of independent nation-states, though in many of them the survival of tribalism complicated the formation of nations. The aggression against Egypt by Israel, France, and Britain in 1956 to overthrow the nationalist regime of Gamal Abdul Nasser strengthened the latter's hold on Egypt and on the imagination of Arab peoples from Iraq to Algeria. The "new" nationalism in the less developed countries became "socialistic"; the popular governments recognized the state's obligation to promote the welfare of the masses and to combat the age-old poverty and illiteracy.

But nationalism showed its surprising strength also in the Communist countries. The former monolithic character of a supra-national ideology directed and authoritatively interpreted by Moscow gave way to the desire and right of every Communist country and party to follow its "own" road to "socialism," independent from Moscow and often critical of Moscow, a road rooted in the national traditions and conditions of the country. The two great Communist powers, Soviet Russia and China, vied openly for leadership among the Communist nations and parties; their competition threatened at some time to lead to an open break. Smaller countries, like Yugoslavia and Rumania, declared their neutrality between Russia and the capitalist countries and pursued their purely national interests. Small Communist Albania openly attacked Soviet Russia in the most violent way. With Nikita Khrushchev's process of de-Stalinization, an irreversible process of disintegration, in the name of nationalism, of the formerly unified supra-national Communist bloc set in.

Among the Western nations the process of integrating non-Communist Europe and the Atlantic community suffered a setback in the mid-1960's because of the revival of nationalism. Nationalism became dominant in France

under President Charles de Gaulle (b. 1890), who stressed the absolute independence of his nation from West and East and claimed for it the leadership of Europe, and nationalism grew in strength in the German Federal Republic with the demand for the recognition of the frontiers of the German Reich of 1937. Greece and Turkey faced each other as adversaries over the future of Cyprus, where after December 1963 the Greek majority tried to control the Turkish minority. In Belgium the Flemish- and the French-speaking parts of the population renewed their mutual distrust and hostility. In Canada there was a strong separatist movement among the Catholic French-speaking Canadians of Quebec province.

The United Nations. The only recognized meeting ground for all races, nations, and ideologies is the United Nations, which in its twenty years of existence has shown a much greater vitality and universality than the League of Nations did. There all nations enter more and more into an open discourse, which follows the methods evolved by the Western parliamentary tradition, and where the small nations are heard on equal terms with the great powers. The United Nations represents the realization of the entirely new situation which has emerged from World War II, where nationalism has become world-wide but where the deadly destructiveness of total weapons and, thanks to the new means of communication, the neighborly interdependence of all peoples on this shrinking earth demand a new and less bellicose attitude.

Part II
READINGS

— Reading No. 1 —

MACHIAVELLI: AN EXHORTATION
TO LIBERATE ITALY FROM THE
BARBARIANS¹

In the famous 26th (final) chapter of The Prince, which Machiavelli wrote in 1513 while exiled from his native Florence, he appealed to the Medici rulers of Florence—a member of the Medici family was then Pope Leo X—to liberate Italy.

† † †

When I take a review of the subject matter treated of in this book, and examine whether the circumstances in which we are now placed would be favourable to the establishment of a new government, honourable alike to its founder and advantageous to Italy, it appears to me that there never was, nor ever will be, a period more appropriate for the execution of so glorious an undertaking.

If it was necessary that the people of Israel should be slaves to Egypt, in order to elicit the rare talents of Moses, that the Persians should groan under the oppression of the Medes, in order to prove the courage and magnanimity of Cyrus; and that the Athenians should be scattered and dispersed, in order to make manifest the rare virtues of Theseus, it will be likewise necessary, for the glory of some Italian hero, that his country should

¹ Niccolò Machiavelli, *The History of Florence together with The Prince*, a new translation, London: Bell and Daldy, 1872, pp. 483-87.

be reduced to its present miserable condition, that they should be greater slaves than the Israelites, more oppressed than the Persians, and still more dispersed than the Athenian; in a word, that they should be without laws and without chiefs, pillaged, torn to pieces, and enslaved by foreign powers.

And though it has sometimes unquestionably happened that men have arisen, who appeared to be sent by Heaven to achieve our deliverance; yet jealous fortune has ever abandoned them in the midst of their career; so that our unfortunate country still groans and pines away in the expectation of a deliverer, who may put an end to the devastations in Lombardy, Tuscany, and the kingdom of Naples. She supplicates Heaven to raise up a prince who may free her from the odious and humiliating yoke of foreigners, who may close the numberless wounds with which she has been so long afflicted, and under whose standard she may march against her cruel oppressors.

But on whom can Italy cast her eyes except upon your illustrious house, which, visibly favoured by Heaven and the church, the government of which is confided to its care, possesses also the wisdom and the power necessary to undertake so glorious an enterprise? And I cannot think that the execution of this project will seem difficult if you reflect on the actions and conduct of the heroes whose examples I have above adduced. Though their exploits were indeed wonderful, they were still but men; and although their merit raised them above others, yet none of them certainly were placed in a situation so favourable as that in which you now stand. You have justice on your side; their cause was not more lawful than yours, and the blessing of God will attend you no less than them. Every war that is necessary is just; and it is humanity to take up arms for the defence of a people to whom no other resource is left.

All circumstances concur to facilitate the execution of so noble a project, for the accomplishment of which it will only be necessary to tread in the steps of those great men whom I have had an opportunity of mentioning in the course of this work. For though some of them, it is true, were conducted by the hand of God in a wonderful manner, though the sea divided to let them pass, a cloud

directed their course, a rock streamed with water to assuage their thirst, and manna fell from heaven to appease their hunger, yet there is no occasion for such miracles at present, as you possess in yourself sufficient power to execute a plan you ought by no mean neglect. God will not do everything for us; much is left to ourselves, and the free exercise of our will, that so our own actions may not be wholly destitute of merit.

If none of our princes have hitherto been able to effect what is now expected from your illustrious house, and if Italy has continually been unfortunate in her wars, the evil has arisen from the defects in military discipline, which no person has possessed the ability to reform.

Nothing reflects so much honour on a new prince as the new laws and institutions established under his direction, especially when they are good, and bear the character of grandeur. Now it must be acknowledged that Italy soon accommodates herself to new forms. Her inhabitants are by no means deficient in courage, but they are destitute of proper chiefs; the proof of this is in the duels and other individual combats in which the Italians have always evinced consummate ability, whilst their valour in battles has appeared well-nigh extinguished. This can only be attributed to the weakness of the officers, who are unable to ensure obedience from those who know, or think they know, the art of war.

If therefore your illustrious house is willing to regulate its conduct by the example of our ancestors, who have delivered their country from the rule of foreigners, it is necessary, above all things, as the only true foundation of every enterprise, to set on foot a national army; you cannot have better or more faithful soldiers, and though every one of them may be a good man, yet they will become still better when they are all united, and see themselves honoured, caressed, and rewarded by a prince of their own.

It is therefore absolutely necessary to have troops raised in our own country, if we wish to protect it from the invasion of foreign powers. The Swiss as well as the Spanish infantry are highly esteemed, but both have defects which may be avoided in the formation of our troops, which would render them superior to both of

those powers. The Spaniards cannot support the shock of cavalry, and the Swiss cannot maintain their ground against infantry that is equally resolute with themselves.

It is necessary therefore to institute a military force possessing neither the defects of the Swiss or the Spanish infantry, and that may be able to maintain its ground against the French cavalry, and this is to be effected, not by changing their arms, but by altering their discipline. Nothing is more likely to make a new prince esteemed, and to render his reign illustrious.

Such an opportunity ought eagerly to be embraced, that Italy after her long sufferings, may at least behold her deliverer appear. With what demonstrations of joy and gratitude, with what affection, with what impatience for revenge, would he not be received by those unfortunate provinces, who have so long groaned under such odious oppression. What city would shut her gates against him, and what people would be so blind as to refuse him obedience? What rivals would he have to dread? Is there one Italian who would not hasten to pay him homage? All are weary of the tyranny of these barbarians. May your illustrious house, strong in all the hopes which justice gives our cause, deign to undertake this noble enterprise, that so, under your banners, our nation may resume its ancient splendour, and, under your auspices, behold the prophecy of Petrarch at last fulfilled.

*Virtù contr'al furore
Prendera l'arme et sia il combatter corto
Che l'antico valore
Ne gl'Italiani cuor non è ancor morto.*

When virtue takes the field,
Short will the conflict be,
Barbarian rage shall yield
The palm to Italy:
For patriot blood still warms Italian veins,
Though low the fire, a spark at least remains.

of Paris, which will presently produce the regular municipalities. . . .

Nothing of all this existed in the winter of 1789: there were neither any regular municipalities nor any departments: no laws, no authority, no public power. Everything, one would think, is about to fall into chaos; and this is the hope of the aristocracy . . . "Ah! you wanted to be free. Look about you, and enjoy the order you have created." To this what reply is made by France? At that formidable crisis, she becomes her own law; and, without any assistance, springs, with a powerful will, over the chasm between one world and the other, passes without stumbling the narrow bridge over the abyss, without heeding the danger, with her eyes fixed on the goal. She advances courageously through that dark winter, towards the wished-for spring which promises a new light to the world.

All that had been believed painful, difficult, and insurmountable, becomes possible and easy. People had asked themselves how the sacrifice of provincial sentiments, reminiscences, and inveterate prejudices, was to be accomplished. "How," said they, "will Languedoc ever consent to cease to be Languedoc, an interior empire governed by its own laws? How will ancient Toulouse descend from her capitol, her royalty of the South? And do you believe that Brittany will ever give way to France, emerge from her barbarous language and obstinate character? You will sooner see the rocks of Saint Malo and Penmarck change their nature and become soft."

But lo! the native land appears to them on the altar, opening her arms and wishing to embrace them. . . . And they all rush towards her and forget themselves, no longer knowing on that day to what province they belong. . . . Like children gone astray, and lost till then, they have at length found a mother; they had been so humble as to imagine themselves Bretons, Provencaux. No, children, know well that you were the sons of France; she herself tells you so; the sons of that great mother, of her who is destined, in equality, to bring forth nations.

Is all this a miracle? Yes, and the greatest and most

simple of miracles, a return to nature. The fundamental basis of human nature is sociability. It had required a whole world of inventions against nature to prevent men from living together. Interior custom-duties, innumerable tolls on roads and rivers, an infinite diversity of laws and regulations, weights, measures, and money, and rivalry carefully encouraged and maintained between cities, countries, and corporations,—all these obstacles, these old ramparts, crumble and fall in a day. Men then behold one another, perceive they are alike, are astonished to have been able to remain so long ignorant to one another, regret the senseless animosity which had separated them for so many centuries, and expiate it by advancing to meet and embrace one another with a mutual effusion of the heart. . . .

In those immense assemblies wherein people of every class and every communion have but one and the self-same heart, there is something more sacred than an altar. No special form of worship can confer holiness on the most holy of holy things,—man fraternizing in the presence of God. All the old emblems grow pale, and the new ones that are essayed have but little signification. Whether people swear on the old altar, before the Holy Sacrament, or take the oath before the cold image of abstract liberty, the true symbol is elsewhere. The beauty, the grandeur, the eternal charm of those festivals, is that the symbol is a living one. The symbol for man is man. All the conventional world crumbling to pieces, a holy respect possesses him for the true image of God. He does not mistake himself for God: he has no vain pride. It is not as a ruler or a conqueror, but in far more affecting and serious attributes that man appears here. The noble harmonious sentiments of family, nature, and native land, are sufficient to fill these festivals with a religious, pathetic interest. . . .

Dauphiné, the serious and valiant province which opened the Revolution, made numerous confederations of the whole province, and of the towns and villages. The rural communes of the frontier nearest to Savoy, close to the emigrants, and tilling the ground in the neighborhood of their guns, did but have still finer festivals. They had a battalion of children, another of women, and another

of maidens, all armed. At Maubec they filed along in good order, headed by a banner, bearing and handling their naked swords with that graceful skill peculiar to the women of France. I have related elsewhere the heroic example of the women and maidens of Angers. They wanted to depart and follow the young army of Anjou and Brittany marching for Rennes, to take their share in that first crusade of liberty, to feed the combatants, and take care of the wounded. They swore they would never marry any but loyal citizens, love only the valiant, and associate for life only with those who devoted theirs to France. . . .

Women are kept back from public life; and people are too apt to forget that they really have more right to it than any. The stake they venture is very different from ours; man plays only his life; but woman stakes her child. She is far more interested in acquiring information and foresight. In the solitary sedentary life which most women lead, they follow, in their anxious musings, the critical events of their country, and the movements of the armies. The mind of this woman, whom you believe to be entirely occupied with her household duties, is wandering in Algeria, sharing all the privations and marches of our young soldiers in Africa, and suffering and fighting with them. But, whether called or not, they took the most active part in the *fêtes* of the confederations. . . .

Nobody was able to absent himself from the festival, for no one was a mere spectator; all were actors, from the centenarian to the new-born infant; and the latter more so than any. He was carried like a living flower among the flowers of the harvest, offered by his mother, and laid upon the altar. But it was not the passive part of an offering alone that he had to perform; he was active also; he was accounted a person; took his civic oath by the lips of his mother; claimed his dignity as a man and a Frenchman; was put at once in possession of his native land, and received his share of hope. Yes, the child, the future generation, was the principal actor. At a festival in Dauphiné, the commune itself is crowned, in the person of its principal magistrate, by a young child. Such a hand brings good fortune. These youths, whom I now behold under the anxious eye of their mother, will, in two

years' time, at the age of fifteen or sixteen, depart in arms, full of military enthusiasm; the year '92 will have summoned them, and they will follow their elders to Jemmapes. These future soldiers of Austerlitz. Their hand has brought good fortune; they have accomplished the good omen, and crowned their native land; and even today, though feeble and pale, France still wears that eternal crown, and overawes nations.

How great and happy the generation born amidst such things, and whose first gaze was gladdened by that sublime spectacle! Children brought and blessed at the altar of their native land, devoted by their weeping, but resigned and heroic mothers, and bestowed by them on France. Oh! those who are thus born can never die. You received on that day the cup of immortality. Even those among you whom history has not mentioned, nevertheless fill the world with your nameless living spirit, with that great unanimous idea which, sword in hand, they extended throughout the world. I do not believe that the heart of man was at any period more teeming with a vast and comprehensive affection, or that the distinctions of classes, fortunes, and parties, were ever so much forgotten. In the villages, especially, there are no longer either rich or poor, nobles or plebeians; there is but one general table, and provisions are in common; social dissensions and quarrels have disappeared; enemies become reconciled; and opposite sects, believers and philosophers, Protestants and Catholics fraternize together. . . .

Man who, in our old churches, never saw his fellows' face, saw them here,—saw himself for the first time, and from the eyes of a whole people received a spark of God. He perceived nature, seized it again, and found it still sacred: for in it he perceived his God. And he called that people and that country by the name he had found,—Native Land. And however large this *Patria* may be, he enlarges his heart so as to embrace it all. He beholds it with the eyes of the mind, and clasps it with the longings of desire. Ye mountains of our native land, which bound our sight, but not our thoughts, be witness that if we do not clasp in one brotherly embrace the great family of France, it is already contained in our hearts.

. . . Ye sacred rivers, ye holy islands, where our altar was erected, may your waters, murmuring beneath the current of the spirit, go and proclaim to every sea and every nation, that, today, at the solemn banquet of liberty, we would not have broken bread, without having invited them, and that on this day of happiness, all humanity was present in the soul and wishes of France!

This faith, this candour, this immense impulse of concord, after a whole century of dispute, was a subject of great astonishment for every nation; it was like a wonderful dream, and they all remained dumb and affected. Several of our confederations had imagined a touching symbol of union, that of celebrating marriages at the altar of the native land. Confederation itself, a union of France with France, seemed a prophetic symbol of the future alliance of nations, of the general marriage of the world. Another symbol, no less affecting, appeared at these festivals. Occasionally they placed upon the altar a little child whom everybody adopted, and who, endowed with the gifts, the prayers, the tears of the whole assembly, became the relation of everybody. That child upon the altar is France, with all the world surrounding her. In her, the common child of nations, they all feel themselves united, and all participating heartily in her future destiny, are anxiously praying around her, full of fear and hope. . . . Not one of them beholds her without weeping. How Italy wept! and Poland! and Ireland! (Ah! sister sufferers. remember that day forever!). . . . Every oppressed nation, unmindful of its slavery at the sight of infant liberty, exclaimed: "In thee I am free!"

— Reading No. 3 —

HERDER: GERMANS AND SLAVS³

In the sixteenth book of his Ideas for the History of Mankind (1784-1791), Herder discussed the peoples of Northern Europe.

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As we now proceed, to discuss the peoples of the northern section of the Old World, who are our ancestors and from whom we have received our customs and constitutions, I think it necessary first to plead for the right to tell the truth. For what would be the use if we were allowed to write freely about the peoples of Asia or Africa, but would have to veil our opinion about peoples and periods, which concern us much more than everything that has been long buried in the dust beyond the Alps and the Taurus? History demands truth, and a philosophy of the history of mankind demands at least the love of impartial truth. . . .

Rather we shall look into the mirror of truth, we shall recognize ourselves in it, and if we find ourselves still covered with some of the barbaric ornaments of our ancestors, we shall exchange them for civilization and humanitarianism, the only true ornaments of the human race. Before we enter the edifice, which has become famous under the name of the European Republic and has become memorable or terrible by its effects upon the whole globe, let us first get acquainted with the peoples, who by their activities or suffering have contributed to the building of this great temple. . . .

(After discussing in section I the origins and character of the Basques and Celts, Herder took up in section II

³ Johann Gottfried von Herder, *Sämtliche Werke*, Stuttgart and Tübingen: Cotta, 1853, vol. XXX, pp. 3, 16 ff., 23 ff., 30 ff.

the Finns, Latvians, and Prussians. This section concludes:)

Surrounded by German, Slav and Finn peoples, the peace-loving Latvians could neither expand nor achieve a higher degree of civilization. Like their Prussian neighbors, they became ultimately most famous by the acts of violence which all these Baltic peoples suffered partly from the newly Christianized Poles and partly from the (German) Teutonic Knights. Humanity shudders at the blood that was shed there in long and wild wars, in which the old Prussians were almost entirely exterminated, while the Courlanders and Latvians were enslaved, a yoke which they still carry. Perhaps it will take centuries to free them from the yoke and to bring them instead of the horrors, by which these quiet peoples were robbed of their land and liberty, the enjoyment of a better liberty. But long enough have we dwelled with these displaced, subjected, or exterminated peoples: let us see now those who displaced and subjugated them.

German People

We pass now to the family of peoples which more than all others have contributed to the weal and woe of this continent—be it by reason of their tallness and bodily strength, their bold, enterprising hardiness and valor, their heroic sense of duty that moved them to march after their chiefs wherever they might lead and to divide conquered countries as spoils of war, or also by reason of their far-flung conquests and the constitution laid down everywhere after the German model. From the Black Sea throughout Europe German arms have spread terror: from the Volga to the Baltic there extended once a Gothic empire: in Thrace, Moesia, Pannonia, Italy, Gaul, Spain, even in Africa diverse German peoples had their seats and founded empires at diverse times. . . . Even now, thanks partly to the princes whom they have set upon all the thrones of Europe, partly to their own founding of these thrones, they rule, to a greater or lesser extent, all four continents of the earth, be it by outright possession or by means of industry and trade. Since there is no effect without a cause, this tremendous chain of effects must also have its cause.

(1) This cause must not be sought in the nation's character alone; the course of their achievements grew out of their position, both physical and political, and the combination of a host of circumstances unparalleled in any other northern people. Since early times Germans served in the Roman army and furnished the choicest men for the emperor's bodyguard; even more, when the sorely pressed empire was unable to maintain itself, it was German armies that fought for hire against anyone, even their own brethren. Through this service that lasted for centuries, many of their peoples acquired, not only a military expertness and discipline to which other barbarians had to remain strangers, but also a taste for conquests and expeditions of their own which were gradually suggested to them by the example of the Romans and by their own acquaintance with Roman weakness.

(2) The long resistance which many peoples of our German land had to offer the Romans, was bound to fortify them in their powers and in their hatred for an hereditary foe who gloried more in triumphs over them than in other victories.

(3) With such a permanently warlike constitution the Germans must necessarily be deficient in some other virtues, which they were not loth to sacrifice to their chief inclination, or their chiefest need: war. To agriculture they did not apply themselves too well; nay, in some tribes they redistributed lands every year to prevent anyone from finding some enjoyment in his own possessions and in the better cultivation of the soil. Some tribes, especially to the east, did long remain Tartaric people of hunters and herdsmen. The favorite idea of these nomads was the crude idea of common pastures and common property, which they introduced into the institutions of the countries and empires conquered by them. Thus Germany long remained a forest filled with meadows, swamps, and marshes, where the aurochs and elk, German hero-animals, now extinct, dwelt close to the German hero-man. Sciences they did not know, and the few arts indispensable to them were practised by women and largely by kidnapped slaves. People of this sort must be pleased when, driven by revenge, poverty, boredom,

social ties, or some other motive, they could leave their dreary forests, seek after better regions, or serve for hire. Thus it went on land, thus on the sea—rather a Tartaric manner of life. . . .

Having embraced Christianity, the German peoples fought for it with the same true warrior's fealty with which they fought for their kings and their nobles; some of their own peoples, the Alemans, Thuringians, Bavarians, and Saxons, and beyond these, the poor Slavs, Prussians, Courlanders, Livonians, and Esths have known this to their cost. It is the German's glory that they stood firm against the later barbaric incursions as well: a living wall against which the mad fury of Huns, Hungarians, Mongols and Turks dashed itself to pieces. Thus it is they by whom the major part of Europe has been, not only conquered, cultivated, and arranged after their own manner, but protected and defended: otherwise that which has sprung up there could never have sprung up. Their stature among other peoples, their warriors' leagues and inborn character have become the foundations of Europe's culture, freedom, and safety. Will not their political position make them a contributing cause in the gradual progress of this culture? A witness of spotless integrity, history will report on this question.

Slavic Peoples

The Slavic peoples occupy a larger space on earth than they do in history, the cause being, among other things, that they lived farther distant from the Romans. We know of them as having lived first along the Don, later along the Danube—there mingling with Goths, here with Huns and Bulgars. With these they would set out to harass the Roman Empire, serving in most cases as mere auxiliary or vassal peoples. Despite the deeds they accomplished here and there, they never were an enterprising people of warriors or adventurers like the Germans; they rather followed after the latter and quietly occupied the sites and countries left vacant by them till finally they encompassed the immense stretch of territory that reaches from the Don to the Elbe, from the Baltic to the Adriatic Sea.

Everywhere they settled to take possession of land

abandoned by other peoples, to cultivate and to use it as colonists, herdsmen or plowmen. Thus, after all the previous devastations, migrations, and evacuations, countries would benefit by their tranquil, industrious presence. They loved agriculture stores of grain and cattle, and manifold domestic arts, and everywhere they began a useful commerce with the products of their land and their industry. Along the Baltic shore, from Lübeck onward, they had erected maritime cities, among which Vineta, on the island of Rugen, was a Slavic Amsterdam; in this way they associated also with the Prussians, Courlanders, and Letts, as the language of these peoples still shows. On the Dniepr they built Kiev, on the Volkhov, Novgorod, both of which soon grew into flourishing merchant cities, uniting the Black and Baltic Seas and conveying the products of the East to northern and western Europe. In Germany they engaged in mining, they knew how to smelt and pour metals, they prepared salt, produced linen, brewed mead, planted orchards, and after their manner, led a merry musical life. They were charitable, hospitable to excess, lovers of free country ways, yet submissive and obedient, averse to pillage and robbery. All this was no use to them against oppression, it conduced to it. As they never competed for dominion over the world and, lacking hereditary warrior princes, preferred instead to pay tribute if this left them to pursue their quiet life on their land, they have been sinned against by many nations, most of all by those of the German family.

Already under Charlemagne there began those wars of oppression whose obvious motive was commercial advantage, though Christian religion was used as a pretext. Plainly the heroic Franks must find it quite convenient to hold in bondage a nation proficient in farming and commerce, rather than learning and exercising these arts for themselves. What the Franks had begun, the Saxons completed: through entire provinces the Slavs were wiped out or made serfs, and their lands were distributed among bishops and noblemen. Their Baltic trade was destroyed by Germanic Norsemen, Vineta was brought to a sad end by the Danes, and their remainder in Germany resembles that which the Spaniards have made of the Peruvians. After centuries of subjugation and deepest bitterness

against their Christian masters and robbers, is it any wonder that the soft character of this nation has been debased to the cruel, treacherous sullenness of the bondsman? And nevertheless one may still discern everywhere their ancient traits, more especially in countries where they enjoy some freedom. This people has grown unhappy, because in its love of tranquillity and domestic industry, it was unable to give itself a permanent warlike constitution, though in a hot defensive battle it may not have lacked for bravery. It was unfortunate that its location among the earth's peoples brought it so close to the Germans on one side, and on the other left its back exposed to all attacks of oriental Tartars, nay Mongols, under whom it has suffered greatly, endured much. Yet the wheel of transmuting time runs its irresistible circle. Most of these nations dwell in a region which, once fully cultivated and opened to trade, will be Europe's finest. Besides, one can hardly doubt that in European legislation and politics ever greater care must and will be given to quiet industry, not to the spirit of war, and peaceful intercourse will be promoted among peoples. Thus even you, O submerged peoples that were once happy and industrious, will finally rouse from your long, languid slumber; delivered from your chains of bondage, you will be able to possess and use your beautiful regions from the Adriatic to the Carpathians, from the Don to the Moldau, and will be free to celebrate there your ancient festivals of quiet industry and trade.

Since many fine and useful contributions have been made to the history of this people for several of its regions, it is desirable to fill the gaps in our knowledge of the others as well. The dwindling remnants of their customs, songs, and legends should be collected, and finally there should be painted a history of the family as a whole, a history appropriate to the canvas of mankind.

General Considerations and Consequences

This is more or less a picture of the peoples of Europe. What a multicolored and composite picture . . . Sea voyages and long migrations of people on land finally produced on the small continent of Europe the conditions for a great league of nations. Unwittingly the Romans

had prepared it by their conquests. Such a league of nations was unthinkable outside of Europe. Nowhere else have people intermingled so much, nowhere else have they changed so often and so much their habitats and thereby their customs and ways of life. In many European countries it would be difficult today for the inhabitants, especially for single families and individuals, to say, from which people they descend, whether from Goths, Moors, Jews, Carthaginians or Romans, whether from Gauls, Burgundians, Franks, Normans, Saxons, Slavs, Finns or Illyrians, or how in the long line of their ancestors their blood had been mixed. Hundreds of causes have tempered and changed the old tribal composition of the European nations in the course of the centuries; without such an intermingling the common spirit of Europe could hardly have been awakened.

. . . Like the geological layers of our soil, the European peoples have been superimposed on each other and intermingling with each other, and yet can still be discerned in their original character. The scholars who study their customs and languages must hurry and do so while these peoples are still distinguishable: for everything in Europe tends towards the slow extinction of national character. But the historian of mankind should beware lest he exclusively favors one nationality and thereby slights others who were deprived by circumstances of chance and glory. From the Slavs too the German learned; the Welsh and the Latvians could perhaps have become Greeks, if their situation had been geographically different. We can be very happy that the Huns and the Bulgars did not occupy the Roman world, but a noble, chaste and loyal people like the Germans. It would however betray the ignoble pride of a barbarian, to therefore regard the Germans as God's chosen people in Europe, destined by its innate nobility to rule the world and to enslave other peoples. The barbarian rules and dominates; the educated conqueror educates.

No European people has become cultured and educated by itself. Each one tended to keep its old barbarian customs as long as it could, supported therein by the roughness of the climate and the need of primitive warfare. No European people for instance has invented its

spiritual reality consists in this, that his own essence—Reason—is objectively present to him, that it possesses objective immediate existence for him. Thus only is he fully conscious; thus only is he a partaker of morality—of a just and moral social and political life. For Truth is the Unity of the universal and subjective Will; and the Universal is to be found in the State, in its laws, its universal and rational arrangements. The State is the Divine Idea as it exists on Earth. We have in it, therefore, the object of History in a more definite shape than before; that in which Freedom obtains objectivity, and lives in the enjoyment of this objectivity. For Law is the objectivity of Spirit; volition in its true form. Only that will which obeys law, is free; for it obeys itself—it is independent and so free. When the State or our country constitutes a community of existence; when the subjective will of man submits to laws—the contradiction between Liberty and Necessity vanishes. The Rational has necessary existence, as being the reality and substance of things, and we are free by recognizing it as law, and by following it as the substance of our own being. The objective and the subjective will are then reconciled, and present one identical homogeneous whole. For the morality (*Sittlichkeit*) of the State is not of that ethical (*moralische*) reflective kind, in which one's own conviction bears sway; this latter is rather the peculiarity of the modern time, while the true antique morality is based on the principle of abiding by one's duty (to the state at large.) An Athenian citizen did what was required of him as it were from instinct; but if I reflect on the object of my activity, I must have the consciousness that my will has been called into exercise. But morality is Duty—the substantial Right—a “second nature” as it has been called; for the first nature of man is his primary merely animal existence. . . .

For the History of the World occupies a higher ground than that on which morality has properly its position, which is personal character—the conscience of individuals—their particular will and mode of action; these have a value, imputation, reward of punishment proper to themselves. What the absolute aim of Spirit requires and accomplishes—what Providence does—transcends the obli-

gation and the ascription of good or bad motives, which attach to individuality in virtue of its social relations. They who on moral grounds, and consequently with noble intention, have resisted that which the advance of the Spiritual Idea makes necessary, stand higher in moral worth than those whose crimes have been turned into the means—under the direction of a superior principle—of realizing the purposes of that principle. But in such revolutions both parties generally stand within the limits of the same circle of transient and corruptible existence. Consequently it is only a formal rectitude—deserted by the living Spirit and by God—which those who stand upon ancient right and order maintain. The deeds of great men, who are the Individuals of the World's History, thus appear not only justified in view of that intrinsic result of which they were not conscious, but also from the point of view occupied by the secular moralist. But looked at from this point, moral claims that are irrelevant must not be brought into collision with world-historical deeds and their accomplishment. The Litany of private virtues—modesty, humility, philanthropy and forbearance—must not be raised against them. The History of the World might, on principle, entirely ignore the circle within which morality and the so much talked-of distinction between moral and politic lies not only in abstaining from judgments, for the principles involved, and the necessary reference of the deeds in question to those principles, are a sufficient judgment of them—but in leaving Individuals quite out of view and unmentioned. What it has to record is the activity of the Spirit of Peoples, so that the individual forms which that spirit has assumed in the sphere of outward reality might be left to the delineation of special histories. . . .

— Reading No. 5 —

GUIZOT: HISTORICAL STUDIES⁵

The study of history, especially that of documents and archives connected with national beginnings, plays a great role in the development of nationalism. François Guizot (1787-1874), who was himself a historian of renown, as minister of education played an important part in the establishment of the Society for the History of France.

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Our tastes easily become manias, and an idea which has long and powerfully possessed us, assumes an importance in our estimation to which vanity often lends too much faith. Nevertheless, the more I reflect, the more I feel convinced that I have not exaggerated to myself the interest which a nation ought to take in its own history; nor the advantage it gains in political intelligence as well as in moral dignity, by completely understanding and attaching itself to this subject. In the long course of successive generations, denominated a people, how rapidly each passes away! And in that short passage how narrowly is the horizon bounded! How insignificant is the place we occupy, and how little do we see with our own eyes! We require to magnify our thoughts, that we may be able to take a serious view of life. Religion opens the future and places us in presence of eternity. History brings back the past and adds to our own existence the lives of our fathers. When we turn to them, our perceptions rise and extend. When we thoroughly know them, we acquire a better knowledge and comprehension of ourselves. Our own destiny, our present situation, the circumstances which surround and the necessities which press upon us, become more clear and natural in our eyes.

⁵ François Guizot, *Memoirs to Illustrate the History of My Time*, tr. by J. W. Cole, vol. III, London: Richard Bentley, 1860, pp. 161-69.

We not only gratify science and imagination, by thus associating ourselves with the events and persons that have preceded us on the same soil and under the same heaven, but we take from the ideas and passions of the day much of their narrow sourness. Amongst a people interested and well instructed in their own history, we are almost sure of finding a more wholesome and equitable judgment on their present affairs, the conditions of their progress, and their chances for the future.

The same idea and hope by which I had been governed and animated in my course of lectures at the Sorbonne, on the development of French civilization, followed me to the ministry of Public Instruction, and regulated my efforts to revive and expand the taste for, and study of, our national history. From this source, assuredly, I looked for no rapid or widely-spreading effect, either as to the abatement of political passions or the correction of popular prejudices. I knew too well already how deeply they are rooted, and that powerful and repeated blows from the hand of God Himself are necessary to extirpate them. But I expected that in Paris, in the first instance, in the centre of studies and ideas, and subsequently in various parts of France, a certain number of intelligent spirits would acquire more correct and impartial notions of the different elements of what French society is composed, of their mutual relations and rights, and of the value of their historical traditions in the new social combinations of our own days. I was not disheartened by the inevitable slowness of this intellectual progress, nor by the still more tardy effect of its public influence. There is pride in the pretension of reforming the errors of our time; those who indulge in it must be content with even a glimpse of success. They preach patience to nations in the pursuit of their desires; let them learn to practice patience themselves in their own labours and hopes.

Before 1830, I had obtained, not only with the public and by my lectures, but in the general system of public instruction, some important results in respect to the study of history. This study was not even named in the law which, under the Consulate, in 1802, had re-established secondary education. "In the lyceums will be taught,"

says the tenth article, "the classical languages, rhetoric, logic, moral philosophy, and the elements of mathematical and physical science." A step was made in the statute, by which the council of the University, in 1814, regulated the discipline and course of study in the colleges; instruction in history and geography was then introduced, but in a very accessory form. . . .

I was more impatient than anyone else to open new sources of wholesome strength and prosperity to the studies to which I was so warmly attached, and which I saw seriously endangered. Public feeling came to my assistance. If superior instruction in history had suffered a considerable check, the taste for historical researches and reflections was evidently extending, and afforded intellectual gratification, with the chance of literary fame, local or general, to many active minds who were neither attracted nor encouraged by political life. Several of my friends communicated to me their project for founding, under the title of Society of the History of France, an association specially devoted to the publication of original documents relative to our national history, and with a view to disseminate, either by correspondence regularly carried on, or by a monthly Bulletin, a general knowledge of the scattered and neglected labors of which it was the object. I hastened to give this plan my assent and co-operation. We met together on the 27th of June, 1833, to the number of twenty institutors; we arranged the bases of the association, and a little more than six months later, on the 23rd of January, 1834, the Society of the History of France, reckoning already one hundred members, formed itself into a general assembly, adopted definitive regulations, appointed a council to superintend its labours, and took the field in full activity. What it has since accomplished during twenty-five years is well known. It has printed seventy-one volumes of memoirs and unpublished documents, nearly all of the highest interest to our history, and some containing authentic discoveries, equally curious and important for the amateur and the professional scholar. . . .

GREEK NATIONAL ASSEMBLY:
PROCLAMATION OF
INDEPENDENCE⁶

On January 27, 1822, "the first year of independence," the Greek National Assembly, which met in the ancient seaport of Epidaurus near Argos to work out a provisional constitution, issued the following manifesto to the peoples of Europe.

1 1 1

We, descendants of the wise and noble peoples of Hellas, we who are the contemporaries of the enlightened and civilized nations of Europe, we who behold the advantages which they enjoy under the protection of the impenetrable aegis of the law, find it no longer possible to suffer without cowardice and self-contempt the cruel yoke of the Ottoman power which has weighed upon us for more than four centuries,—a power which does not listen to reason and knows no other law than its own will, which orders and disposes everything despotically and according to its caprice. After this prolonged slavery we have determined to take arms to avenge ourselves and our country against a frightful tyranny, iniquitous in its very essence,—an unexampled despotism to which no other rule can be compared.

The war which we are carrying on against the Turk is not that of a faction or the result of sedition. It is not aimed at the advantage of any single part of the Greek people; it is a national war, a holy war, a war the object of which is to reconquer the rights of individual liberty, of property and honor,—rights which the civilized people of Europe, our neighbors, enjoy today; rights of

⁶*British and Foreign State Papers*, London: J. Harrison and Sons, 1829, vol. IX, pp. 629 ff.

which the cruel and unheard of tyranny of the Ottomans would deprive us—us alone—and the very memory of which they would stifle in our hearts.

Are we, then, less reasonable than other peoples, that we remain deprived of these rights? Are we of a nature so degraded and abject that we should be viewed as unworthy to enjoy them, condemned to remain crushed under a perpetual slavery and subjected, like beasts of burden or mere automatons, to the absurd caprice of a cruel tyrant who, like an infamous brigand, has come from distant regions to invade our borders? Nature has deeply graven these rights in the hearts of all men; laws in harmony with nature have so completely consecrated them that neither three nor four centuries—nor thousands nor millions of centuries—can destroy them. Force and violence have been able to restrict and paralyze them for a season, but force may once more resuscitate them in all the vigor which they formerly enjoyed during many centuries; nor have we ever ceased in Hellas to defend these rights by arms whenever opportunity offered.

Building upon the foundation of our natural rights, and desiring to assimilate ourselves to the rest of the Christians of Europe, our brethren, we have begun a war against the Turks, or rather, uniting all our isolated strength, we have formed ourselves into a single armed body, firmly resolved to attain our end, to govern ourselves by wise laws, or to be altogether annihilated, believing it to be unworthy of us, as descendants of the glorious peoples of Hellas, to live henceforth in a state of slavery fitted rather for unreasoning animals than for rational beings.

Ten months have elapsed since we began this national war; the all-powerful God has succored us; although we were not adequately prepared for so great an enterprise, our arms have everywhere been victorious, despite the powerful obstacles which we have encountered and still encounter everywhere. We have had to contend with a situation bristling with difficulties, and we are still engaged in our efforts to overcome them. It should not, therefore, appear astonishing that we were not able from the very first to proclaim our independence and take rank among the civilized peoples of the earth, marching

forward side by side with them. It was impossible to occupy ourselves with our political existence before we had established our independence. We trust these reasons may justify, in the eyes of the nations, our delay, as well as console us for the anarchy in which we have found ourselves. . . .

— Reading No. 7 —

MAZZINI: ON THE UNITY OF ITALY¹

"In the faith of the reawakening of that people to whom alone God has yet granted the privilege, in each epoch of its own existence, of transforming Europe," to quote Mazzini's own proud words about Italy, Mazzini wrote in 1861 the following lines to prove that "unity ever was and is the destiny of Italy."

† † †

(*The adversaries of Italian unity*) forgot the unanimous shout of Italy raised by the insurgents of every province ten years later, the earnest unitarian apostolate of our secret societies during the years following those insurrections, and the blood shed by the martyrs of every province of Italy, in the name of the common country. Above all, they forgot the principle that no peoples ever die, nor stop short upon their path, before they have achieved the ultimate historical aim of their existence, before having completed and fulfilled their mission. Now the mission of Italy is pointed out by her geographical conditions, by the prophetic aspirations of our greatest

¹ Giuseppe Mazzini, *Life and Writings of Joseph Mazzini*. London: Smith, Elder and Co., 1890, vol. I, pp. 226-90.

minds and noblest hearts, and by the whole of our magnificent historical tradition, easily to be traced by anyone who will but study the life of our people, instead of the deeds of individuals or aristocracy. . . .

The nation never has existed, said they; therefore it can never exist. But we—viewing the question from the height of our ruling synthesis—declare: The nation has not as yet existed; therefore, it must exist in the future. A people destined to achieve great things for the welfare of humanity must one day or other be constituted a nation. And slowly, from epoch to epoch, our people has advanced towards that aim. But the history of our people and of our nationality, which is one and the same thing, has yet to be written. It is sadder to me than I can say to be compelled to carry with me to the tomb the unfulfilled desire of attempting it myself according to my own design. He who shall write it as it ought to be written, without burying the salient points of Italian progress beneath a multitude of minute details, and keeping in view the collective development of the Italian element from period to period, will be rewarded by the fact of having sustained the unity of the country upon the firm basis of history and tradition.

Having proved, by the testimony of our ancient records, and the vestiges of past religions, the absolute independence of our primitive civilization from the Hellenic (considerably posterior), the writer will then proceed to trace the origin of our nationality from those Sabellian tribes, dwelling, as I have said, round the ancient Amiternus; who, along with the Osques, Siculians, and Umbrians, first assumed the sacred name of Italy, and initiated the fusion of the different elements spread over the Peninsula, by planting their lance—the symbol of authority—in the valley of the Tibur, in the Campagna, and beyond. This was the first war of independence sustained by the Italian element, against that element (probably of Semitic origin) called by the ancients Pelagic. . . . In the first period, Italy appears to assign to Rome her mission of unification, by declaring to her, I am yours, but on condition of your identifying your life with mine. . . .

The second epoch—initiated in the midst of the bar-

barian invasions—carried on with a pertinacity ensuring its triumph, that work of social fusion which has rendered us fit to be a nation at the present day. The unitarian movement continued even after the last liberties of Italy were destroyed by the fall of Florence, when all public life was silent and at an end, and all hope of country appeared extinguished beneath foreign domination, and the rule of the petty princes who were vassals of the foreigner. Yes; unity was and is the destiny of Italy. The civil primacy twice exercised by Italy—through the arms of the Caesars and the voice of the Popes—is destined to be held a third time by the people of Italy—the nation.

They who were unable forty years ago to perceive the signs of progress towards unity made in the successive periods of Italian life, were simply blind to the light of history. But should any, in the face of the actual glorious manifestation of our people, endeavour to lead them back to ideas of confederations, and independent provincial liberty, they would deserve to be branded as traitors to their country.

It matters little that it may not now be easy to determine what the mission—I believe it to be highly religious—of Italy is in the world. The tradition of two epochs of initiation, and the conscience of the Italian people, alike bear witness that such a mission exists; and even if the world did not indicate what that mission is, the fact of this instinct among the people of a national mission to be fulfilled, and a collective idea to be developed, would be enough to prove the necessity of one sole country, with one form of organization to embody and represent it. That form of organization is unity. Federalism implies a multiplicity of aims to be realised, and resolves itself, sooner or later, into a system of aristocracies or castes. Unity is the only security for equality, and the due development of the life of the people.

Italy therefore will be one. Her geographical conditions, language, and literature; the necessities of defence, and of political power; the desire of the populations, the democratic instincts innate in our people, the presentiment of a progress in which all the forces and faculties of the country must concur, the consciousness of an in-

itiative in Europe, and of great things yet to be achieved by Italy for the world; all point to this aim. There is no obstacle in the way that may not be easily overcome, no objection that may not be historically and philosophically met and confuted.

— Reading No. 8 —

ACTON: NATIONALITY⁸

In 1862 the British historian Lord Acton (1834-1903) published an essay criticizing Mazzini's concept of political nationality.

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Whenever great intellectual cultivation has been combined with that suffering which is inseparable from extensive changes in the condition of the people, men of speculative or imaginative genius have sought in the contemplation of an ideal society a remedy, or at least a consolation, for evils which they were practically unable to remove . . . The eighteenth century acquiesced in this oblivion of corporate rights on the Continent, for the absolutists cared only for the State, and the liberals only for the individual. . . .

The old despotic policy which made the Poles its prey had two adversaries,—the spirit of English liberty, and the doctrines of that revolution which destroyed the French monarchy with its own weapons; and these two contradicted in contrary ways the theory that nations have no collective rights. At the present day, the theory of nationality is not only the most powerful auxiliary of

⁸Lord Acton, *Essays on Freedom and Power*, Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1948, pp. 166-95.

revolution, but its substance in the movements of the last three years. This, however, is a recent alliance, unknown to the first French Revolution. The modern theory of nationality arose partly as a legitimate consequence, partly as a reaction against it. As the system which overlooked national division was opposed by liberalism in two forms, the French and the English, so the system which insists upon them proceeds from two distinct sources, and exhibits the character either of 1688 or 1789.

Napoleon called a new power into existence by attacking nationality in Russia, by delivering it in Italy, by governing in defiance of it in Germany and Spain. The sovereigns of these countries were deposed or degraded; and a system of administration was introduced which was French in its origin, its spirit, and its instruments. The people resisted the change. The movement against it was popular and spontaneous, because the rulers were absent or helpless; and it was national, because it was directed against foreign institutions. In Tyrol, in Spain, and afterwards in Prussia, the people did not receive the impulse from the government, but undertook of their own accord to cast out the armies and the ideas of revolutionized France. Men were made conscious of the national element of the revolution by its conquests, not in its rise. The three things which the Empire most openly oppressed—religion, national independence, and political liberty—united in a short-lived league to animate the great uprising by which Napoleon fell. . . .

At first, in 1813, the people rose against their conquerors, in defence of their legitimate rulers. They refused to be governed by usurpers. In the period between 1825 and 1831, they resolved that they would not be misgoverned by strangers. The French administration was often better than that which it displaced, but there were prior claimants for the authority exercised by the French, and at first the national contest was a contest for legitimacy. In the second period this element was wanting. No dispossessed princes led the Greeks, the Belgians, or the Poles. The Turks, the Dutch, and the Russians were attacked, not as usurpers, but as oppressors—because they **misgoverned**, not because they were of a different race. **Then began a time when the text simply was, that nations**

would not be governed by foreigners. Power legitimately obtained, and exercised with moderation, was declared invalid. . . . Now nationality became a paramount claim, which was to assert itself alone, which might put forward as pretexts the rights of rulers, the liberties of the people, the safety of religion, but which, if no such union could be formed, was to prevail at the expense of every other cause for which nations make sacrifices. . . . It was appealed to in the name of the most contradictory principles of government, and served all parties in succession, because it was one in which all could unite. Beginning by a protest against the dominion of race over race, its mildest and least-developed form, it grew into a condemnation of every State that included different races, and finally became the complete and consistent theory, that the State and the nation must be co-extensive.

The outward historical progress of this idea from an indefinite aspiration to be the keystone of a political system, may be traced in the life of the man who gave to it the element in which its strength resides—Giuseppe Mazzini. He found Carbonarism impotent against the measures of the governments, and resolved to give new life to the liberal movement by transferring it to the ground of nationality. Exile is the nursery of nationality, as oppression is the school of liberalism; and Mazzini conceived the idea of Young Italy when he was a refugee at Marseilles. In the same way, the Polish exiles are the champions of every national movement; for to them all political rights are absorbed in the idea of independence, which, however they may differ with each other, is the one aspiration common to them all.

In pursuing the outward and visible growth of the national theory we are prepared for an examination of its political character and value. The absolutism which has created it denies equally that absolute right of national unity which is a product of democracy, and that claim of national liberty which belongs to the theory of freedom. These two views of nationality, corresponding to the French and to the English systems, are connected in name only, and are in reality the opposite extremes of political thought. In one case, nationality is founded on the perpetual supremacy of the collective will, of which

the unity of the nation is the necessary condition, to which every other influence must defer, and against which no obligation enjoys authority, and all resistance is tyrannical. The nation is here an ideal unit founded on the race, in defiance of the modifying action of external causes, of tradition, and of existing rights. It overrules the rights and wishes of the inhabitants, absorbing their divergent interests in a fictitious unity; sacrifices their several inclinations and duties to the higher claim of nationality, and crushes all natural rights and all established liberties for the purpose of vindicating itself.

Connected with this theory in nothing except in the common enmity of the absolute state, is the theory which represents nationality as an essential, but not a supreme element in determining the forms of the State. It is distinguished from the other, because it tends to diversity and not to uniformity, to harmony and not to unity; because it aims not at an arbitrary change, but at careful respect for the existing conditions of political life, and because it obeys the laws and results of history, not the aspirations of an ideal future. While the theory of unity makes the nation a source of despotism and revolution, the theory of liberty regards it as the bulwark of self-government, and the foremost limit to the excessive power of the State. . . .

The presence of different nations under the same sovereignty is similar in its effect to the independence of the Church in the State. It provides against the servility which flourishes under the shadow of a single authority, by balancing interests, multiplying associations, and giving to the subject the restraint and support of a combined opinion . . . Liberty provokes diversity, and diversity preserves liberty by supplying the means of organization. This diversity in the same State is a firm barrier against the intrusion of the government beyond the political sphere which is common to all into the social department which escapes legislation and is ruled by spontaneous laws . . . That intolerance of social freedom which is natural to absolutism is sure to find a corrective in the national diversities, which no other force could so efficiently provide. The co-existence of several nations under the same State is a test, as well as the best

security of its freedom. It is also one of the chief instruments of civilisation; and, as such, it is in the natural and providential order, and indicates a state of greater advancement than the national unity which is the ideal of modern liberalism.

If we take the establishment of liberty for the realisation of moral duties to be the end of civil society, we must conclude that those states are substantially the most perfect which, like the British and Austrian Empires, include various distinct nationalities without oppressing them. Those in which no mixture of races has occurred are imperfect; and those in which its effects have disappeared are decrepit. A State which is incompetent to satisfy different races condemns itself; a State which labours to neutralise, to absorb, or to expel them, destroys its own vitality; a State which does not include them is destitute of the chief basis of self-government. The theory of nationality, therefore, is a retrograde step in history.

Nationality is more advanced than socialism, because it is a more arbitrary system. The social theory endeavours to provide for the existence of the individual beneath the terrible burdens which modern society heaps upon labour. It is not merely a development of the notion of equality, but a refuge from real misery and starvation. However false the solution, it was a reasonable demand that the poor should be saved from destruction; and if the freedom of the State was sacrificed to the safety of the individual, the more immediate object was, at least in theory, attained. But nationality does not aim either at liberty or prosperity, both of which it sacrifices to the imperative necessity of making the nation the mould and measure of the State. Its course will be marked with material as well as moral ruin, in order that a new invention may prevail over the works of God and the interests of mankind.

NAPOLEON: ON NATIONAL UNITY⁹

In the conversations which Napoleon, while a prisoner at Saint Helena, held with the Count de las Cases, he spoke about his plans to promote the nationalism of the European peoples and the unity of Europe. These words had a great influence on European nationalists in the 1830's and 1840's. They also affected the inclinations and policies of Napoleon III.

After alluding to some other subjects, the Emperor said, "One of my great plans was the re-uniting, the concentration, of those same geographical nations which have been separated and parcelled out by revolution and policy. There are in Europe, dispersed, it is true, upwards of thirty millions of French, fifteen millions of Spaniards, fifteen millions of Italians, and thirty millions of Germans; and it was my intention to incorporate these people each into one nation. It would have been a noble thing to have advanced into posterity with such a train, and attended by the blessings of future ages. I felt myself worthy of this glory!

"After this summary simplification, it would have been possible to indulge the chimera of the *beau ideal* of civilization. In this state of things, there would have been some chance of establishing, in every country, a unity of codes, principles, opinions, sentiments, views, and interests. Then, perhaps, by the help of the universal diffusion of knowledge, one might have thought of attempting, in the great European family, the application of the American Congress, or the Amphictyons of Greece; and then what a perspective of power, greatness, happiness, and

Count de las Cases, *Memoirs of the Life, Exile, and Conversations of the Emperor Napoleon*, London: Henry Colburn, 1836, vol. IV, pp. 104-08, 19 f.

prosperity! What a grand, what a magnificent, spectacle!

"The concentration of the thirty of forty millions of Frenchmen was completed and perfected; and that of the fifteen millions of Spaniards was nearly accomplished; for nothing is more common than to convert accident into principle. . . .

"With regard to the fifteen millions of Italians, their concentration was already far advanced: it only wanted maturity. The people were daily becoming more firmly established in the unity of principles and legislation; and also in the unity of thought and feeling, that certain and infallible cement of human concentration. The union of Piedmont with France, and the junction of Parma, Tuscany and Rome, were, in my mind, but temporary measures, intended merely to guarantee and promote the national education of the Italians. You may judge of the correctness of my views, and of the influence of common laws. The portions of Italy that had been united to France, though that union might have been regarded as the insult of conquest on our part, were, in spite of their Italian patriotism, the very parts that continued by far the most attached to us. Now that they are restored to themselves, they conceive that they have been invaded and disinherited; and so they certainly have been!

"All the South of Europe, therefore, would soon have been rendered compact in point of locality, views, opinions, sentiments, and interests. In this state of things, what would have been the weight of all the nations of the north? What human efforts could have broken through so strong a barrier?

"The concentration of the Germans must have been effected more gradually; and therefore I had done no more than simplify their monstrous complication. Not that they were unprepared for centralization: on the contrary, they were too well prepared for it, and they might have blindly risen in reaction against us, before they had comprehended our designs. How happens it that no German Prince has yet formed a just notion of the spirit of his nation, and turned it to good account? Certainly, if heaven had made me a Prince of Germany amidst the many critical events of our times, I should, infallibly, have governed the thirty millions of Germans

united; and, from what I know of them, I think I may venture to affirm that, if they had once elected and proclaimed me, they would not have forsaken me, and I should never have been at St. Helena."

Then, after some melancholy details and comparisons, he thus resumed: "At all events, this concentration will be brought about, sooner or later, by the very force of events. The impulse is given; and I think that, since my fall and the destruction of my system, no grand equilibrium can possibly be established in Europe, except by the concentration and confederation of the principal nations. The sovereign who, in the first great conflict, shall sincerely embrace the cause of the people, will find himself at the head of all Europe, and may attempt whatever he pleases."

Passing to other topics, he made many observations on the Russian war. Among other things he said: "That war should have been the most popular of any in modern times. It was a war of good sense and true interests; a war for the repose and security of all; it was purely pacific and preservative; entirely European and continental. Its success would have established a balance of power and would have introduced new combinations, by which the dangers of the present time would have been succeeded by future tranquillity. In this case, ambition had no share in my views. In raising Poland, which was the key-stone of the whole arch, I would have permitted a King of Prussia, an Archduke of Austria or any other to occupy the throne. I had no wish to obtain any new acquisition; and I reserved for myself only the glory of doing good, and the blessings of posterity. Yet this undertaking failed, and proved my ruin, though I never acted more disinterestedly, and never better merited success. As if popular opinion had been seized with contagion, in a moment, a general outcry, a general sentiment, arose against me. I was proclaimed the destroyer of kings,—I, who had created them! I was denounced as the subverter of the rights of nations—I, who was about to risk all to secure them! And people and kings, those irreconcilable enemies, leagued together and conspired against me!

mere hunter to the rearing of cattle—from that to agriculture, and from the latter to manufactures and commerce. There one may see how rents increase by degrees from nothing to important revenues. There the simple peasant knows practically far better than the most acute savants of the old world how agriculture and rents can be improved; he endeavours to attract manufacturers and artificers to his vicinity. Nowhere so well as there can one learn the importance of means of transport, and their effect on the mental and material life of the people.

That book of actual life, I have earnestly and diligently studied, and compared with the results of my previous studies, experience, and reflections.

And the result has been (as I hope) the propounding of a system which, however defective it may as yet appear, is not founded on bottomless cosmopolitanism, but on the nature of things, on the lessons of history, and on the requirements of the nations. . . .

I would indicate, as the distinguishing characteristic of my system NATIONALITY. On the nature of nationality, and the intermediate interest between those of individualism and of entire humanity, my whole structure is based. . . .

History everywhere shows us a powerful process of reciprocal action between the social and the individual powers and conditions. In the Italian and the Hanseatic cities, in Holland and England, in France and America, we find the powers of production, and consequently the wealth of individuals, growing in proportion to the liberties enjoyed, to the degree of perfection of political and social institutions, while these, on the other hand, derive material and stimulus for their further improvement from the increase of the material wealth and of the productive power of individuals. The real rise of the industry and power of England dates only from the days of the actual foundation of England's national freedom, while the industry and power of Venice, of the Hanse Towns, of the Spanish and Portuguese decayed concurrently with their loss of freedom. However industrious, thrifty, inventive and intelligent, individual citizens might be, they could not make up for the lack of free institutions. History also teaches that individuals derive the greater

part of their productive powers from the social institutions and conditions under which they are placed. . . .

Quesnay (from whom the idea of universal free trade originated) speaks of cosmopolitical economy, i.e. of that science which teaches how the entire human race may attain prosperity; in opposition to political economy, or that science which limits its teaching to the inquiry how a given nation can obtain under the existing conditions of (the world) prosperity, civilization, and power, by means of agriculture, industry, and commerce.

Adam Smith treats his doctrine in a similarly extended sense, by making it his task to indicate the cosmopolitical idea of the absolute freedom of the commerce of the whole world in spite of the gross mistakes made by the physiocrats against the very nature of things and against logic. Adam Smith concerned himself as little as Quesnay did with true economics, i.e. that policy which each separate nation had to obey in order to make progress in its economical conditions. Although here and there he speaks of wars, this only occurs incidentally. The idea of a perpetual state of peace forms the foundation of all his arguments. . . .

If, as the prevailing school requires, we assume a universal union or confederation of all nations as the guarantee for an ever-lasting peace, the principle of international free trade seems to be perfectly justified. . . . Unquestionably the idea of a universal confederation and a perpetual peace is commended both by common sense and religion. If single combat between individuals is at present considered to be contrary to reason, how much more must combat between two nations be similarly condemned? The proofs which social economy can produce from the history of the civilization of mankind of the reasonableness of bringing about the union of all mankind under the law of right, are perhaps those which are the clearest to sound human understanding. . . .

A universal republic (in the sense of Henry IV, and of Abbe St. Pierre) i.e. a union of the nations of the earth whereby they recognize the same conditions of right among themselves and renounce self-redress, can only be realized if a large number of nationalities attain as nearly as possible the same degree of civilization, industry, political

cultivation, and power. Only with the gradual formation of this union can free trade be developed, only as a result of this union can it confer on all nations the same great advantages which are now experienced by those provinces and states which are politically united. The system of protection, inasmuch as it forms the only means of placing those nations which are far behind in civilization on equal terms with the one predominating nation (which, however, never received at the hands of nature a perpetual right to a monopoly of manufacture, but which merely gained an advance over others in point of time), the system of protection regarded from this point of view appears to be the most efficient means of furthering the final union of nations, and hence also of promoting true freedom of trade. And national economy appears from this point of view to be that science which, correctly appreciating the existing interests and the individual circumstances of nations, teaches how every separate nation can be raised to that stage of industrial development in which union with other nations equally well developed, and consequently freedom of trade, can become possible and useful to it. . . .

From day to day it is necessary that the governments and peoples of Germany be more convinced that national unity is the rock on which the edifice of their welfare, their honor, their power, their present security and existence, and their future greatness must be founded. Thus from day to day the apostasy of these small maritime (German) states will appear more and more, not only to the states in the (German) Customs Union but to these small states themselves, in the light of a national scandal which must be got rid of at any price. Also, if the matter is considered intelligently, the material advantages of joining the Union are much greater for those states, than the sacrifice which it requires. . . .

The Union will foster their fisheries, secure special advantages to their shipping, protect and promote their foreign commercial relations by effective consular establishments and by treaties. Partly by their means it will found new colonies, and by their means carry on its own colonial trade. For a union of States comprising thirty-five million inhabitants (for the Union will comprise at

least that number when it is fully completed) owing to an annual increase of one and a half percent in the population can easily spare two or three hundred thousand persons annually. For provinces abounding with well-informed and cultivated inhabitants who have a peculiar propensity to seek their fortune in distant countries, people who can take root anywhere and make themselves at home wherever unoccupied land is to be cultivated, are called upon by Nature to place themselves in the first rank of those nations who colonize and diffuse civilization. . . .

From a national point of view, we say and maintain that in reference to its geographical position, as well as in respect to its commercial and industrial circumstances, and to the origin and language of its inhabitants, Holland is a German province, which was separated from Germany at a period of German national disunion, without whose reincorporation in the German Union Germany may be compared to a house whose door belongs to a stranger. Holland belongs to Germany as much as Brittany and Normandy belong to France, and as long as Holland constitutes an independent kingdom of her own, Germany can attain independence and power as little as France would have been able to attain these if those provinces had remained in the hands of the English. The commercial power of Holland has declined due to the unimportance of the country. Notwithstanding the prosperity of her colonies, Holland will and must continue to decline because the nation is too weak to support the enormous expense of a large military and naval power. In her present position Holland cannot profit nearly as much from her colonial possessions as she could if they became a constituent part of the German Union, especially since she is too weak in the elements necessary for colonization—in population and in mental powers.

Nothing at this time so greatly impedes a closer union of the continent of Europe as the fact that its center still has not taken the position for which it is naturally fitted.

If, on the other hand, Germany could constitute itself with the maritime territories which appertain to it, with Holland, Belgium and Switzerland, as a powerful commercial and political whole—if this mighty national body

could fuse representative institutions with the existing monarchical, dynastic and aristocratic interests, as far as these are compatible with one another,—then Germany could secure peace to the European continent for a long time, and at the same time make herself the central point of a durable Continental alliance. . . .

From this point of view we must also judge the extremely important question of slavery. We are very far from ignoring that much philanthropy and good motives lie at the root of the zeal with which England pursues the goal of the emancipation of the Negroes, and that this zeal does great honor to the character of the English nation. But at the same time, if we consider the immediate effects of the measures adopted by England in reference to this matter, we cannot get rid of the idea that also much political motive and commercial interest are mingled with it. These effects are: (1) That the sudden emancipation of the blacks, through their rapid transition from a condition of disorder and carelessness little removed from that of wild animals to a high degree of individual independence, the yield of tropical produce in South America and the West Indies will be extremely diminished and ultimately reduced to nothing, as the example of St. Domingo incontestably shows, inasmuch as there, since the expulsion of the French and Spaniards, the production has greatly decreased from year to year, and continues to do so. (2) That the free Negroes continually seek to obtain an increase in their wages, whilst they limit their labour to the supply of their most indispensable wants; that hence their freedom merely leads to idleness. (3) That, on the other hand, England possesses in the East Indies ample means of supplying the whole world with colonial products. . . . (4) Finally, it may be asserted, that by the emancipation of the slaves England desires to hang a sword over the head of the North American slave states, which is so much more menacing to the Union the more this emancipation extends and the wish is incited among the Negroes of North America to partake of similar liberty. The question if rightly viewed, must appear to be a philanthropical experiment of doubtful benefit towards those on whose behalf it was undertaken, and in any case must appear

as disadvantageous to those nations who rely on trade with South America and the West Indies.

If we only consider the enormous interest which the nations of the Continent have in common, as opposed to the English maritime supremacy, we shall be led to the conviction that nothing is so necessary to these nations as union, and nothing is so ruinous to them as Continental wars. The history of the last century also teaches us that every war which the powers of the Continent have waged against one another has led invariably to the increase of industry, of wealth, of navigation, of colonial possessions and of power to the insular supremacy. . . .

Thus, in a not very distant future, the natural necessity which now forces the French and Germans to establish a continental alliance against the British supremacy, will force the British to establish a European coalition against the supremacy of America. Then Great Britain will be compelled to seek and to find protection, security, and compensation against the predominance of America, and an equivalent for her lost supremacy, in the leadership of the United Powers of Europe.

— Reading No. 11 —

RENAN: THE MEANING OF
NATIONALITY¹¹

After the experience of the Franco-German War, Renan came to define nationalism and nationality according to the traditions of French liberalism. He did this in a lecture at the Sorbonne on March 11, 1882, "Qu'est-ce

¹¹ Ernest Renan, *Discours et Conférences*, Paris: Calman-Lévy, 1887, pp. 277-310.

qu'une Nation?" *In the introduction to his collected speeches, Renan wrote: "The piece in this volume to which I attach the greatest importance is the lecture 'What is a Nation?' I weighed each part with greatest care. It is my profession of faith regarding human affairs, and I hope that these twenty pages will be recalled when modern civilization founders as the result of the disastrous ambiguity of the words: nation, nationality, race."*

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I intend to analyze with you an idea which seems simple and clear but which lends itself to the most dangerous misunderstandings. . . . In our day one commits a serious error: one confounds nation and race, and one attributes to ethnographical or rather linguistic groups a sovereignty analogous to that of real peoples. Let us try for some precision in these difficult questions where the slightest confusion about the meaning of words, which are at the basis of our reasoning, can produce the most disastrous errors. . . .

Since the end of the Roman Empire, or rather since the dissolution of the empire of Charlemagne, Western Europe seems to be divided into nations. At certain times some of them have sought to exercise a hegemony over the others, without being able to arrive there in an enduring fashion. What Charles V, Louis XIV, Napoleon I could not achieve, nobody, probably, will be able to do in the future. The establishment of a new Roman Empire or a new empire of Charlemagne has become impossible. The division of Europe is too great for an attempt at universal domination not to provoke with speed a coalition which puts the ambitious nation back within its natural limits. . . .

Nations in this sense are something new in history. . . . What characterizes these various nations is the fusion of the populations which compose them. Nothing similar exists in Turkey, where the Turk, the Slav, the Greek, the Armenian, the Arab, the Syrian, the Kurd, are today as distinct as they were on the day of the conquest. . . . Even by the tenth century all the inhabitants of France are French. The idea of a difference of races in the population of France has completely dis-

appeared with the French writers and poets after Hugues Capet. The distinction between the noble and the serf is highly emphasized, but this distinction is in no way an ethnic distinction. . . .

These great laws of the history of Western Europe become obvious if we contrast them with the events in Eastern Europe. Under the crown of St. Stephan, the Magyars and the Slavs have remained as distinct today as they were 800 years ago. In Bohemia, the Czech and the German elements are superimposed as water and oil in a glass. The Turkish policy of separating nationalities according to religion has had the most serious consequences: it caused the ruin of the Middle East. For, the essential element of a nation is that all its individuals must have many things in common, but must also have forgotten many things. Every French citizen must have forgotten the night of St. Bartholemew and the massacres in the thirteenth century in the South. There are not ten families in France who could prove their Frankish origin, and such a proof would be deficient because thousands of unknown mixed breedings could derange all genealogical systems. . . .

According to certain political theorists, the nation is above all the work of a dynasty representing an ancient conquest which was first accepted and later forgotten by the mass of the people. . . . Has such a law absolute validity? Certainly not. Switzerland and the United States, which arose as agglomerations of successive additions, have no dynastic basis. . . . One must therefore admit that a nation can exist without the dynastic principle, and even that nations which were formed by dynasties can separate themselves from them without losing their identity thereby. Against dynastic rights, the right of nationality has emerged. On what tangible fact could it be based?

I. Some people say that it could be based upon race. The artificial divisions created by the feudal past, by princely marriages and diplomatic congresses, have lapsed. What remains firm and permanent is the race of the people. It constitutes a legitimate right. According to this theory the Germans have the right to take back the scattered members of the Germanic family, even if these members

do not seek annexation. Thus one creates a primordial right analogous to that of the divine right of kings. This is a very great fallacy whose dominance would ruin European civilization. . . .

To base one's policy on an ethnographical analysis means to establish it on a chimera. The noblest countries—England, France, Italy,—are those where the blood is most mixed. Germany is no exception. . . . Race as we historians understand it is something which is formed by history and undone by history. The study of race is of great importance for the study of the history of mankind, but it has no place in politics. . . . Will the Germans, who have raised the banner of ethnography so high, not see one day the Slavs analyze the names of the villages of Saxony and of Lusatia, seek the traces of populations long dead, and ask for an account of the massacres and the mass enslavement to which the Germans under their Ottonian emperors subjected their ancestors? It is good for all of us to know how to forget.

II. What we have said of race is as true of language. Language may invite us to unite, but it does not compel us to do so. . . . Languages are historical formations, which tell us very little about the race of those who speak them. In any event, they should not fetter human freedom when it concerns the fate of the group with whom we wish to unite for life or death. . . .

One abandons the great air which one breathes in the large camp of humanity in order to shut oneself up in conventicles of compatriots. Nothing could be worse for the mind; nothing could be more troublesome for civilization. Let us not abandon the fundamental principle that man is a rational and moral being before he is penned up in this or that language, before he is a member of this or that race, before he adheres to this or that culture. Above the French, German, or Italian culture, there is a human culture. Look at the great men of the Renaissance. They were neither French, Italian or German. By their intimacy with the spirit of antiquity, they had found the secret of the true education of the human mind, and they devoted themselves to it with all their heart. How well they acted!

III. Nor could religion offer a sufficient foundation for

the establishment of a modern nation. . . . One can be a Frenchman, an Englishman or a German, by being a Catholic, a Protestant, a Jew or an agnostic. Religion has become something individual; it concerns the conscience of each person. . . .

IV. The community of interests is certainly a strong tie among men. But are interests sufficient to create a nation? I do not believe it. The community of interests creates commercial treaties. Nationality is something sentimental too; it is body and soul at the same time; a custom-union is not a fatherland.

V. Geography, or as one says, the natural frontiers, certainly plays a considerable part in the division of nations. . . . Can we say, however, as certain people believe, that the frontiers of a nation are marked on the map, and such a nation has the right to adjudicate to itself what it regards as necessary to round off its contours, to reach some mountain or some river, to which one credits a kind of *a priori* quality? I do not know of any doctrine which would be more arbitrarily disastrous. With it one can justify all violence. One speaks of strategic reasons. Nothing is absolute; clearly, certain concessions must be made to necessity. But these concessions should not go too far. Otherwise everybody would demand what is strategically convenient to him, and a war without end would ensue. . . .

A nation is a soul, a spiritual principle . . . A nation is a great solidarity, created by the sentiment of the sacrifices which have been made and of those which one is disposed to make in the future. It presupposes a past; but it resumes itself in the present by a tangible fact: the consent, the clearly expressed desire to continue life in common. The existence of a nation is a plebiscite of every day, as the existence of the individual is a perpetual affirmation of life. I well know that this is less metaphysical than the divine right and less brutal than the alleged historical right . . . We have driven the metaphysical and theological abstractions from politics. What remains? Man remains, his desires and his wants. You will object to me that the secession and eventual crumbling of nations are the consequences of a system which praises the old organic entities at the mercy of the will

now been given to Party. It is time for the common duty of Patriotism to the Country to succeed;—or if this claim will not be recognized, it is at least time for common sense to acquiesce with decent grace in the inevitable and the irrevocable.

Texas is now ours. Already, before these words are written, her Convention has undoubtedly ratified the acceptance, by her Congress, of our proffered invitation into the Union; and made the requisite changes in her already republican form of constitution to adapt it to its future federal relations. Her star and her stripe may already be said to have taken their place in the glorious blazon of our common nationality; and the sweep of our eagle's wing already includes within its circuit the wide extent of her fair and fertile land. She is no longer to us a mere geographical space—a certain combination of coast, plain, mountain, valley, forest and stream. She is no longer to us a mere country on the map. She comes within the dear and sacred designation of Our Country; no longer a *pays*, she is a part of *la patrie*; and that which is at once a sentiment and a virtue, Patriotism, already begins to thrill for her too within the national heart. . . .

Why, were other reasoning wanting, in favor of now elevating this question of the reception of Texas into the Union, out of the lower region of our past party dissensions, up to its proper level of a high and broad nationality, it surely is to be found, found abundantly, in the manner in which other nations have undertaken to intrude themselves into it, between us and the proper parties to the case, in a spirit of hostile interference against us, for the avowed object of thwarting our policy and hampering our power, limiting our greatness and checking the fulfillment of our manifest destiny to overspread the continent allotted by Providence for the free development of our yearly multiplying millions. This we have seen done by England, our old rival and enemy; and by France. . . .

It is wholly untrue, and unjust to ourselves, the pretence that the Annexation has been a measure of spoliation, unrightful and unrighteous—of military conquest under forms of peace and law—of territorial aggrandizement at the expense of justice, and justice due by a double

sanctity to the weak. This view of the question is wholly unfounded, and has been before so amply refuted in these pages, as well as in a thousand other modes, that we shall not again dwell upon it. The independence of Texas was complete and absolute. It was an independence, not only in fact but of right. . . .

Texas has been absorbed into the Union in the inevitable fulfillment of the general law which is rolling our population westward; the connection of which with that ratio of growth in population which is destined within a hundred years to swell our numbers to the enormous population of two hundred and fifty millions (if not more), is too evident to leave us in doubt of the manifest design of Providence in regard to the occupation of this continent. It was disintegrated from Mexico in the natural course of events, by a process perfectly legitimate on its own part, blameless on ours; and in which all the censures due to wrong, perfidy and folly, rest on Mexico alone. And possessed as it was by a population which was in truth but a colonial detachment from our own, and which was still bound by myriad ties of the very heart-strings to its old relations, domestic and political, their incorporation into the Union was not only inevitable, but the most natural, right and proper thing in the world—and it is only astonishing that there should be any among ourselves to say it nay. . . .

California will, probably, next fall away from the loose adhesion which, in such a country as Mexico, holds a remote province in a slight equivocal kind of dependence on the metropolis. Imbecile and distracted, Mexico never can exert any real governmental authority over such a country. A population will soon be in actual occupation of California, over which it will be idle for Mexico to dream of dominion. They will necessarily become independent. Whether they will then attach themselves to our Union or not, is not to be predicted with any certainty. Unless the projected railroad across the continent to the Pacific be carried into effect, perhaps they may not; though even in that case, the day is not distant when the Empires of the Atlantic and Pacific would again flow together into one, as soon as their inland border should approach each other. But that great work, colossal as

appears the plan on its first suggestion, cannot remain long unbuilt. Its necessity for this very purpose of binding and holding together in its iron clasp our fast settling Pacific region with that of the Mississippi valley—the natural facility of the route—the ease with which any amount of labor for the construction can be drawn in from the overcrowded populations of Europe, to be paid in the lands made valuable by the progress of the work itself—and its immense utility to the commerce of the world with the whole eastern coast of Asia, alone almost sufficient for the support of such a road—these considerations give assurance that the day cannot be distant which shall witness the conveyance of the representatives from Oregon and California to Washington within less time than a few years ago was devoted to a similar journey by those from Ohio; while the magnetic telegraph will enable the editors of the "San Francisco Union," the "Astoria Evening Post," or the "Nootka Morning News" to set up in type the first half of the President's Inaugural, before the echoes of the latter half shall have died away beneath the lofty porch of the Capitol, as spoken from his lips.

Away then with all idle French talk of balances of power on the American Continent. There is no growth in Spanish America! Whatever progress of population there may be in the British Canadas, is only for their own early severance of their present colonial relation to the little island three thousand miles across the Atlantic; soon to be followed by Annexation, and destined to swell the still accumulating momentum of our progress. And whosoever may hold the balance, though they should cast into the opposite scale all the bayonets and cannon, not only of France and England, but of Europe entire, how would it kick the beam against the simple solid weight of the two hundred and fifty, or three hundred millions—destined to gather beneath the flutter of the stripes and stars, in the fast hastening year of the Lord 1945!

peaceable working of the great principles which called this Republic into existence, gradually and silently absorbed them. True Americanism, toleration, the equality of rights, has absorbed their prejudices, and will peaceably absorb everything that is not consistent with the victorious spirit of our institutions.

Oh, sir, there is a wonderful vitality in true democracy founded upon the equality of rights. There is an inexhaustible power of resistance in that system of government, which makes the protection of the individual rights a matter of common interest. If preserved in its purity, there is no warfare of opinions which can endanger it—there is no conspiracy of despotic aspirations that can destroy it. But if not preserved in its purity! There are dangers which only blindness cannot see, and which only stubborn party prejudice will not see.

Do not indulge in the delusion, that in order to make a government fair and liberal, the only thing necessary is to make it elective. When a political party in power, however liberal their principles may be, have once adopted the policy of knocking down their opponents instead of voting them down, there is an end of justice and equal rights. The history of the world shows no example of a more arbitrary despotism, than that exercised by the party which ruled the National Assembly of France in the bloodiest days of the great French Revolution. I will not discuss here what might have been done, and what not, in those times of a fearful crisis; but I will say that they tried to establish liberty by means of despotism, and that in her gigantic struggle against the united monarchs of Europe, revolutionary France won the victory, but lost her liberty.

Remember the shout of indignation that went all over the Northern States when we heard that the border ruffians of Kansas had crowded the free-State men away from the polls and had not allowed them to vote. That indignation was just, not only because the men thus terrorized were free-State men and friends of liberty, but because they were deprived of their right of suffrage, and because the government of that territory was placed on the basis of force, instead of equal rights. Sir, if ever the party of liberty should use their local predominance

for the purpose of disarming their opponents instead of convincing them, they will follow the example set by the ruffians of Kansas, although legislative enactments may be a genteeler weapon than the revolver and bowie knife. They may perhaps achieve some petty local success, they may gain some small temporary advantage, but they will help to introduce a system of action into our politics which will gradually undermine the very foundations upon which our republican edifice rests. Of all the dangers and difficulties that beset us, there is none more horrible than the hideous monster, whose name is "Proscription for opinion's sake." I am an anti-slavery man, and I have a right to my opinion in Massachusetts as well as in South Carolina. You tell me that for my opinion they would mob me in South Carolina? Sir, there is the difference between South Carolina and Massachusetts. There is the difference between an anti-slavery man, who is a freeman, and a slaveholder, who is himself a slave.

Our present issues will pass away. The slavery question will be settled, liberty will be triumphant and other matters of difference will divide the political parties of this country . . .

— Reading No. 14 —

HYDE: ON THE REVIVAL OF GAELIC¹⁴

Douglas Hyde in 1892 delivered to the National Literary Society of Dublin a lecture on the necessity for de-Anglicizing Ireland which outlined the conception of nationality that was to dominate twentieth century Eire.

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¹⁴Dr. Douglas Hyde, *Revival of Irish Literature and other Addresses*, London: Fischer Unwin, 1894, pp. 117-31.

When we speak of "The Necessity for de-Anglicizing the Irish Nation," we mean it, not as a protest against imitating what is best in the English people, for that would be absurd, but rather to show the folly of neglecting what is Irish, and hastening to adopt, pell-mell, and indiscriminately, everything that is English, simply because it is English . . . If we take a bird's-eye view of our island to-day, and compare it with what it used to be, we must be struck by the extraordinary fact that the nation which was once, as everyone admits, one of the most classically learned and cultivated nations in Europe, is now one of the least so. . . .

I shall endeavour to show that this failure of the Irish people in recent times has been largely brought about by the race diverging during this century from the right path, and ceasing to be Irish without becoming English. I shall attempt to show that with the bulk of the people this change took place quite recently, much more recently than most people imagine, and is, in fact, still going on. I should also like to call attention to the illogical position of men who drop their own language to speak English, of men who translate their euphonious Irish names into English monosyllables, of men who read English books, and know nothing about Gaelic literature, nevertheless protesting as a matter of sentiment that they hate the country which at every hand's turn they rush to imitate.

I wish to show you that in Anglicizing ourselves wholesale we have thrown away with a light heart the best claim we have upon the world's recognition of us as a separate nationality. What did Mazzini say? That we ought to be content as an integral part of the United Kingdom because we have lost the notes of nationality, our language and customs. It has always been very curious to me how Irish sentiment sticks in this halfway house—how it continues apparently to hate the English, and at the same time continues to imitate them; how it continues to clamour for recognition as a distinct nationality and at the same time throws away with both hands what would make it so. . . .

What lies at the back of the sentiments of nationality with which the Irish millions seem so strongly leavened? . . . Of course it is a very composite feeling which

prompts them; but I believe that what is largely behind it is the half unconscious feeling that the race which at one time held possession of more than half Europe, which established itself in Greece, and burned infant Rome, is now—almost extirpated and absorbed elsewhere—making its last stand for independence in this island of Ireland; and do what they may the race of to-day cannot wholly divest itself from the mantle of its own past. Through early Irish literature, for instance, we can best form some conception of what that race really was, which, after overthrowing and trampling on the primitive peoples of half Europe, was itself forced in turn to yield its speech, manners, and independence to the victorious eagles of Rome. We alone of the nations of Western Europe escaped the claws of those birds of prey; we alone developed ourselves naturally upon our own lines outside of and free from all Roman influence; we alone were thus able to produce an early art and literature, our antiquities can best throw light upon the pre-Romanized inhabitants of half Europe, and—we are our father's sons. . . .

What the battleaxe of the Dane, the sword of the Norman, the wile of the Saxon were unable to perform, we have accomplished ourselves. We have at last broken the continuity of Irish life, and just at the moment when the Celtic race is presumably about to largely recover possession of its own country, it finds itself deprived and stripped of its Celtic characteristics, cut off from the past, yet scarcely in touch with the present. It has lost since the beginning of this century almost all that connected it with the era of Cuchullain and of Ossian, that connected it with the christianizers of Europe, that connected it with Brian Boru and the heroes of Clontarf, with the O'Neills and O'Donnells, with Rory O'More, with the wild geese, and even to some extent with the men of '98. It has lost all that they had—language, traditions, music, genius and ideas. Just when we should be starting to build up anew the Irish race and the Gaelic nation—as within our own recollection Greece has been built up anew—we find ourselves despoiled of the bricks of nationality. The old bricks that lasted eighteen hundred years are destroyed; we must now set to, to bake new

humanity stands, and must continue to stand, a great fact—the nation. The nation, with its special language and literature, with its peculiar origin and history, with its special manners and customs, laws and institutions, with the claims of all these for existence, independence, perfection, and continuance for the future, with its separate territory, a society which, united by a thousand ties of minds and interests, combines itself into one independent whole, which recognizes the law of right for and within itself, and in its united character is still opposed to other societies of a similar kind in their national liberty, and consequently can, only under the existing conditions of the world, maintain self-existence and independence by its own power and resources. As the individual chiefly obtains by means of the nation and in the nation, mental culture, power of production, security and prosperity, so is the civilization of the human race only conceivable and possible by means of the civilization and development of individual nations . . .

How are we to accord protection to and procure the development of our manufacturing arm? First, by ourselves individually—secondly, through our county, urban, and district councils, and poor law guardians, thirdly, by taking over control of those inefficient bodies known as harbour commissioners; fourthly, by stimulating our manufacturers and our people to industrial enterprise; and fifthly, by inviting to aid in our development, on commercial lines, Irish-American capital. In the first case, every individual knows his duty, whether he practises it or not—it is, unless where fraud is attempted, to pay if necessary an enhanced price for Irish goods, and to use whenever possible none but Irish goods. As to our public elective bodies which annually control the expenditure of our local taxation, their duty is the same. The duty of our harbour bodies is to arrange the incidence of port dues so that they shall fall most heavily on manufactured goods coming into the country, and to keep and publish a table of all goods imported and to whom consigned.

luckily penetrated only the surface of the social structure. We can see such an event, or rather a whole series of events, endowed with a healthy dynamism, in the latest phase of the struggle known as the (Middle) Eastern question, whose origins are rooted in the general course of universal historical development. This struggle must shortly stamp its imprint upon an entire historical period. The importance of this inevitably approaching struggle forces us to try to understand the objections raised against the only decision useful to the Slav world—the full political liberation of all the Slav peoples and the formation of a Pan-Slav union under the hegemony of Russia. The Pan-Slav union will guarantee our success in this struggle.

Religious truth, in the eternal form of Christianity, was discovered and adopted with humility and exaltation by new peoples, who were rich in gifts of spiritual nature, among which one has to include ardent religious feelings. In this same religious doctrine there was, as its central tenet, the need to do away with slavery; and in reality, slavery appeared only as a transitory phase in the life of the Germano-Roman peoples. These peoples also revealed themselves richly endowed with political sense and an ability for cultural development: scientific, artistic, and industrial. They were not fated, however, to have these great gifts fully realized, due to the violence of their character. With them Roman love for power and Roman state structure fell upon a receptive soil. In this way, Christian truth was distorted, and the Church was transformed into the religiously political despotism of Catholicism. This church despotism in conjunction with feudal despotism, which took root in the violence of the German character, and with the despotism of scholasticism, which had taken its origin in a slavish attitude to the forms of ancient science, oriented all the history of Europe towards a severe struggle, ending in a three-fold anarchy. It comprised a religious anarchy, that is, Protestantism with the idea of basing religious truth upon personal authority; a philosophical anarchy, or an all-embracing skeptical materialism, which began to take on the character of a faith and little by little replaced religious conviction; and a socio-political anarchy, a contradiction

between an ever growing political democratism and economic feudalism. As these anarchies are substantially the forerunners and instruments of decay, they cannot, of course, be considered viable investments in the treasury of mankind; and the Germano-Roman cultural-historical type cannot be considered a successful representative of the religious, or of the socio-economic aspect of cultural activity. . . .

On the other hand, . . . from an objective, factua. viewpoint, the Russians and the majority of Slav peoples became, with the Greeks, the chief guardians of the living tradition of religious truth, Orthodoxy, and in this way they continued the high calling, which was the destiny of Israel and Byzantium: to be the chosen people. . . .

Whatever the future may bring we are entitled, on the evidence of the past alone, to consider the Slavs among the most gifted families of the human race in political ability. Here we may turn our attention to the special character of this political ability and show how it manifested itself during the growth of the Russian state. The Russians do not send out colonists to create new political societies, as the Greeks did in antiquity or the English in modern times. Russia does not have colonial possessions, like Rome or like England. The Russian state from early Muscovite times on has been Russia herself, gradually, irresistably spreading on all sides, settling neighboring nonsettled territories, and assimilating into herself and into her national boundaries foreign populations. This basic character of Russian expansion was misunderstood because of the distortion of the original Russian point of view through Europeanization, the origin of every evil in Russia. . . .

In the socio-economic sphere, Russia is the only large state which has solid ground under its feet, in which there are no landless masses, and in which, consequently, the social edifice does not rest on the misery of the majority of the citizens and on the insecurity of their situation. In Russia, only, there cannot and does not exist any contradiction between political and economic ideals. This contradiction threatens disaster to European life . . . The factors that give such superiority to the Russian social structure over the European, and give it an un-

shakeable stability, are the peasants' land and its common ownership. On this health of Russia's socio-economic structure we found our hope for the great socio-economic significance of the Slav cultural-historical type. This type has been able for the first time to create a just and normal system of human activity, which embraces not only human relations in the moral and political sphere, but also man's mastery of nature, which is a means of satisfying human needs and requirements. Thus it establishes not only formal equality in the relations between citizens, but a real and concrete equality. . . .

The political independence of the race is the indispensable foundation of culture, and consequently all the Slav forces must be directed towards this goal. Independence is indispensable in two respects; without the consciousness of Slav racial unity, as distinct from other races, an independent culture is impossible; and without fruitful interaction between the Slav peoples, liberated from foreign powers and from their national divisions, diversity and richness of culture are impossible. A well-known example of the beneficial influence of unity is the relationship and interaction between the spiritual developments of Great Russia and the Ukraine.

The requisite preliminary achievement of political independence has still another importance in the cultural as well as in all other spheres: the struggle against the Germano-Roman world (without which Slav independence is impossible) will help to eradicate the cancer of imitativeness and the servile attitude towards the West, which through unfavorable conditions has eaten its way into the Slav body and soul. Only now has the historical moment for this cultural development arrived: only with the emancipation of the peasantry can the period of Russian cultural life begin, and her purely state period of life (which consisted in leading the people from tribal will to civil liberty) end. But first, as a *sine qua non* condition of success, strong and powerful Russia has to face the difficult task of liberating her racial brothers; for this struggle she must steel them and herself in the spirit of independence and Pan-Slav consciousness.

Thus, on the basis of our analysis of the preceding cultural-historical types and of the peculiarities of the

other Slavs his brothers and was concerned for their well-being, at least as much as for the growth of his own nation; and those who were the most practical ones felt in their heart the firm conviction that as time went on all eighty million Slavs (and all the other millions who meanwhile would accrue) would have in common one literary language, the same sympathies and all the other matters, which it is presently not advisable to discuss; in short that they all would become a single nation in the same sense in which the French and others were single nations. . . .

The purpose of this article is to correct these errors as far as possible in the minds of my countrymen, to remove the harmful, and thereby to strengthen the useful, aspects of the Slav idea. I consider that my words will become more acceptable if I prove them from my own life experience: if we wish to combat prejudices we can do it best if we acknowledge that we shared them formerly. One always believes an experienced man more.

I learned to know Poland and I did not like it. With a feeling of hostility and pride I left the Sarmation country, and in the worst cold season I arrived in a sleigh in Moscow, being warmed mostly by the Slav feeling in my heart. The freezing temperature in Russia and other aspects of Russian life extinguished the last spark of Pan-Slav love in me. Cosmopolitanism was always completely alien to me, and so I returned to Prague as a Czech, a simple determined Czech, even with some secret sour feeling against the name Slav, which a better knowledge of Russia and Poland had made suspect to me. After some time, when I had somewhat forgotten the unpleasant impression, I again quieted down, and I was able to balance my unpleasant personal experiences and my former poetic enthusiasm. In short, I formed for myself principles about Slavdom and Czechdom, and these I now wish to put before my readers for their consideration.

No decent man should be a cosmopolitan (who says that he loves everybody, loves nobody), and it would be ridiculous to feel Indo-European patriotism and to write enthusiastic poetry about it; equally invalid, though to a lesser degree, is a Pan-Slav patriotism. Should somebody object that the differences among the Slav nations

are not so great as among the Romance or the Teutonic nations, then we must simply disagree. Even if there be slighter differences among the various Slav languages than among the various Teutonic and Romance languages (though the Dutch tongue is nearer to German than Russian is to Czech, and between French and Italian there is no greater difference than between Russian and Czech), we must not forget that nationality is determined not only by language but also by customs, religion, form of government, state of education, sympathies, and so on, and that the differences among the different nations are based upon these characters. If we take all that in due consideration, then we cannot say that Russians and Czechs, Poles and Russians, Illyrians and Poles, show a greater affinity than any two Teutonic or Romance nations. . . .

We cannot expect unity even among closely related Slav nations. On the contrary, the closer they live together the more disunity we may expect. Let us take the world as it is, and expect friendship and unity among people and nations only when this is advantageous for both sides. . . .

At the beginning, I sided with the Poles against the Russians. As soon as I recognized the true state of affairs in Poland, as soon as the veil which poetically hid from me the prosaic misery and corruption of the nation (that is, the Polish nobility) dropped from my eyes, my affection changed to dislike, and for a psychologically understandable reason the Russians appeared to me to be better than the Poles. This, however, did not last long. I soon recognized that Peter is like Paul, Russia like Poland. My Slav sympathy disappeared, and I learned to regard the Russians and the Poles, in spite of the affinity of language, origin, and customs, as nations alien to us Czechs. . . . We must not look on the Russian-Polish relations with such a blind eye as the greater part of Europe does; we should not think of an innocent lamb and a wolf, but know that there wolf meets wolf, and we shall say later that the lamb among them is the Ukrainian. The Poles themselves formerly tried to destroy Russia, and the Russians now try the opposite. . . . The Ukraine is the apple of discord which fate threw between these

two nations. . . . Thus the suppression of Ukrainian liberty revenges itself on Poland and Russia. . . .

The Poles and the Russians buried the national spirit of the Ukraine and began to divide the great body, and, as generally happens in such cases, they began to fight and have not yet ceased. Both the Russians and the Poles regard the Ukrainian language as a dialect of their own language. . . . Thus we have seen three great Eastern Slav nations, each one of which hates the other two, and also has a just reason for it. Nobody can speak reasonably of brotherhood there. Nevertheless, the Pan-Slav idea has been accepted even by these nations. That might seem to contradict me: in reality the way in which Poles and Russians understood and accepted Pan-Slavism will prove that they don't deserve our sympathy.

The Russians (and I do not speak here of the government, because I cannot know its trend of thought) have taken up the idea of Pan-Slavism. In the whole world, but above all in Europe, the Russians are either disliked or rejected (and that almost always for good reasons): it was therefore surprising but most agreeable to them to find at least some friends in the West. Thus they declared immediately their friendship and brotherhood with us and the Illyrians but regarded themselves as the older brother, as our commander. The Russian Pan-Slavs believe that we and the Illyrians would like to be under their domination!! They are firmly convinced that they will one day control all Slav lands!! They now look forward with joy to their future vineyards in Dalmatia. These gentlemen have started everywhere to say and write Slav instead of Russian, so that later they will again be able to say Russian instead of Slav. . . .

But let us be equally cool towards the Poles. They are like the Russians, but with tied hands. It is well known that formerly the Poles did not wish to know anything of the Slavs. Only when the Polish democrats and emigrants in France came upon the happy thought that perhaps the other Slavs could jointly with the Poles make light-hearted revolutions and thus serve them in their poorly calculated plans, did they begin to fraternize with us, and in their easy and sanguine temper they began to imagine how they would be the leaders among the Western liberal

Slavs and how we should fight for them against everyone they hate! . . .

Finally, it is also significant that the Russians and the Poles exclude each other from the ranks of the Slavs: Russian scholars have proved that the Poles descend from the non-Slav Sarmatians (and be it said quietly, that the Polish nobility thought so too, believing its blood superior to the Slav peasant blood), and the Poles on their part have proved that the Russians are of Mongol origin. . . .

What I wrote here stems from the reading of almost the whole literature on Pan-Slavism and from personal experiences. . . . and everything written here is my full conviction. The plain principles, once more summarized, are: the Slavs are not one nation but four nations as independent and unconnected as any other European nations. Each of these Slav nations stands for itself, and none is responsible for another; they share neither national honor nor national infamy. As the result of the great similarity of the Slav languages, it is useful and necessary for each Slav nation to pay as much attention to the literature of the others as possible, and to profit from their literature and languages and nationality. Only between the Czechs and the Illyrians can there be more far-reaching sympathies, because under present conditions one cannot be dangerous to the other but on the contrary useful. The Austrian monarchy is the best guarantee for the preservation of our and the Illyrian nationality, and the greater the power of the Austrian empire grows, the more secure our nationalities will be. It is impossible then for all Slavs to use one literary language, and therefore all efforts in this direction are meaningless, and, as a waste of time, harmful.

DOSTOEVSKY: RUSSIAN
MESSIANISM¹⁸

Dostoevsky expressed his Russian nationalism not only in his journalism (The Diary of a Writer) but also in his novels. In The Possessed, which he wrote 1870 to 1872, he made Shatov represent his Slavophil point of view in a famous discussion with the enigmatic Nikolai Stavrogin.

“Do you know,” he began, with flashing eyes, almost menacingly, bending right forward in his chair, raising the forefinger of his right hand above him (obviously unaware that he was doing so), “do you know who are the only ‘god-bearing’ people on earth, destined to regenerate and save the world in the name of a new God, and to whom are given the keys of life and of the new world. . . . Do you know which is that people and what is its name?”

“From your manner I am forced to conclude, and I think I may as well do so at once, that it is the Russian people.”

“And you can laugh, oh, what a race!” Shatov burst out.

“Calm yourself, I beg of you; on the contrary, I was expecting something of the sort from you.” . . .

Shatov interrupted, waving his hand.

“Do you remember your expression that ‘an atheist can’t be a Russian,’ that ‘an atheist at once ceases to be a Russian’? Do you remember saying that?”

“Did I?” Nikolai Vsyevolodovitch questioned him back.

“You ask? You’ve forgotten? And yet that was one of the truest statements of the leading peculiarity of the

¹⁸ Feodor Mikhailovich Dostoevsky, *The Possessed*, pt. II, chap. I. tr. by Constance Garnett, New York: Copyright by Macmillan Co., and used with permission.

Russian soul, which you divined. You can't have forgotten it! I will remind you of something else: you said then that 'a man who was not orthodox could not be Russian.'

"I imagine that's a Slavophil idea."

"The Slavophiles of to-day disown it. Nowadays, people have grown cleverer. But you went further: you believed that Roman Catholicism was not Christianity; you asserted that Rome proclaimed Christ subject to the third temptation of the devil. Announcing to all the world that Christ without an earthly kingdom cannot hold his ground upon earth, Catholicism by so doing proclaimed Anti-christ and ruined the whole Western world. You pointed out that if France is in agonies now it's simply the fault of Catholicism, for she has rejected the iniquitous God of Rome and has not found a new one. That's what you could say then! I remember our conversations." . . .

Shatov bent forward in his chair again and again held up his finger for a moment.

"Not a single nation," he went on, as though reading it line by line, still gazing menacingly at Stavrogin, "not a single nation has ever been founded on principles of science or reason. There has never been an example of it, except for a brief moment, through folly. Socialism is from its very nature bound to be atheism, seeing that it has from the very first proclaimed that it is an atheistic organisation of society, and that it intends to establish itself exclusively on the elements of science and reason. Science and reason have, from the beginning of time, played a secondary and subordinate part in the life of nations; so it will be till the end of time. Nations are built up and moved by another force which sways and dominates them, the origin of which is unknown and inexplicable: that force is the force of an insatiable desire to go on to the end, though at the same time it denies that end. It is the force of the persistent assertion of one's own existence, and a denial of death. It's the spirit of life, as the Scriptures call it, 'the river of living water,' the drying up of which is threatened in the Apocalypse. It's the aesthetic principle, as the philosophers call it, the ethical principle with which they identify it, 'the seeking for God,' as I call it more simply. The object of every na-

tional movement, in every people and at every period of its existence is only the seeking for its god, who must be its own god, and the faith in him as the only true one. God is the synthetic personality of the whole people, taken from its beginning to its end. It has never happened that all, or even many, peoples have had one common god, but each has always had its own. It's a sign of the decay of nations when they begin to have gods in common. When gods begin to be common to several nations the gods are dying and the faith in them, together with the nations themselves. The stronger a people the more individual their god. There never has been a nation without a religion, that is, without an idea of good and evil. Every people has its own conception of good and evil, and its own good and evil. When the same conceptions of good and evil become prevalent in several nations, then these nations are dying, and then the very distinction between good and evil is beginning to disappear. Reason has never had the power to define good and evil, or even to distinguish between good and evil, even approximately; on the contrary, it has always mixed them up in a disgraceful and pitiful way; science has even given the solution by the fist. This is particularly characteristic of the half-truths of science, the most terrible scourge of humanity, unknown till this century, and worse than plague, famine, or war. A half-truth is a despot such as has never been in the world before. A despot that has its priests and its slaves, a despot to whom all do homage with love and superstition hitherto inconceivable, before which science itself trembles and cringes in a shameful way. These are your own words, Stavrogin, all except that about the half-truth; that's my own because I am myself a case of half-knowledge, and that's why I hate it particularly. I haven't altered anything of your ideas or even of your words, not a syllable."

"I don't agree that you've not altered anything," Stavrogin observed cautiously. "You accepted them with ardour, and in your ardour have transformed them unconsciously. The very fact that you reduce God to a simple attribute of nationality. . . ."

He suddenly began watching Shatov with intense and peculiar attention, not so much his words as himself.

"I reduce God to the attribute of nationality?" cried Shatov. "On the contrary, I raise the people to God. And has it ever been otherwise? The people is the body of God. Every people is only a people so long as it has its own god and excludes all other gods on earth irreconcilably; so long as it believes that by its god it will conquer and drive out of the world all other gods. Such, from the beginning of time, has been the belief of all great nations, all, anyway, who have been specially remarkable, all who have been leaders of humanity. There is no going against facts. The Jews lived only to await the coming of the true God and left the world the true God. The Greeks deified nature and bequeathed the world their religion, that is, philosophy and art. Rome deified the people in the State, and bequeathed the idea of the State to the nations. France throughout her long history was only the incarnation and development of the Roman god, and if they have at last flung their Roman god into the abyss and plunged into atheism, which, for the time being, they call socialism, it is solely because socialism is, anyway, healthier than Roman Catholicism. If a great people does not believe that the truth is only to be found in itself alone (in itself alone and in it exclusively); if it does not believe that it alone is fit and destined to raise up and save all the rest by its truth, it would at once sink into being ethnographical material, and not a great people. A really great people can never accept a secondary part in the history of Humanity, nor even one of the first, but will have the first part. A nation which loses this belief ceases to be a nation. But there is only one truth, and therefore only a single one out of the nations can have the true God, even though other nations may have great gods of their own. Only one nation is 'god-bearing,' that's the Russian people, and . . . and. . . ."

"Certainly I'll ask differently," Nikolai Vsyevolodovitch looked coldly at him. "I only wanted to know, do you believe in God, yourself?"

"I believe in Russia. . . . I believe in her orthodoxy. . . . I believe in the body of Christ. . . . I believe that the new advent will take place in Russia. . . . I believe. . . ." Shatov muttered frantically.

"And in God? In God?"

"I . . . I will believe in God." . . .

"I'm sorry I can't feel affection for you, Shatov," Stavrogin replied coldly.

"I know you can't, and I know you are not lying. Listen. I can set it all right. I can 'catch your hare' for you."

Stavrogin did not speak.

"You're an atheist because you're a snob, a snob of the snobs. You've lost touch with your own people. A new generation is coming, straight from the heart of the people, and you will know nothing of it, neither you nor the Verhovenskys, father or son; nor I, for I'm a snob too—I, the son of your serf and lackey, Pashka. . . . Listen. Attain to God by work; it all lies in that; or disappear like rotten mildew. Attain to Him by work."

"God by work? What sort of work?"

"Peasants' work. Go, give up all your wealth. . . . Ah! you laugh, you're afraid of some trick?"

But Stavrogin was not laughing.

"You suppose that one may attain to God by work, and by peasants' work," he repeated, reflecting as though he had really come across something new and serious which was worth considering.

— Reading No. 19 —

RICHARD WAGNER: *THE JEWISH DANGER*¹⁹

In 1850 Richard Wagner published an (anonymous) article, "Judaism in Music." It first gave to extreme anti-Semitism the support of an artist of genius.

¹⁹ Richard Wagner, *Prose Works*, tr. by W. A. Ellis, London: Kegan, Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co., 1912, vol. III, pp 79-100.

If emancipation from the yoke of Judaism appears to us the greatest of necessities, we must above all prove our forces for this war of liberation. Now we shall never win these forces from an abstract definition of the phenomenon *per se*, but only from an accurate acquaintance with the nature of our involuntary feeling of an instinctive repugnance against the Jew's essential character. Through it, through this unconquerable feeling—if we avow it quite without ado—must there become plain to us what we hate in that essence; what we then know clearly, we can oppose; nay, through his very laying bare, may we even hope to rout the demon from the field, whereon he has only been able to maintain his stand beneath the shelter of a twilight darkness—a darkness we good-natured humanitarians ourselves have cast upon him, to make his look less loathsome.

The Jew—who, as everyone knows, has a God all to himself—in ordinary life strikes us primarily by his outward appearance, which, no matter to what European nationality we belong, has something disagreeably foreign to that nationality: instinctively we wish to have nothing in common with a man who looks like that. By far more weighty, nay, of quite decisive weight for our inquiry, is the effect the Jew produces on us through his speech; and this is the essential point about the Jewish influence upon music. The Jew speaks the language of the nation in whose midst he dwells from generation to generation, but he speaks it always as an alien. . . . Our whole European art and civilization, however, have remained to the Jew as a foreign tongue; for, just as he has taken no part in the evolution of the one, so has he taken none in that of the other; but at most the homeless wight has been a cold, nay more, a hostile on-looker. In this speech, this art, the Jew can only after-speak and after-patch—not truly make a poem of his words, an artwork of his doings. . . .

Alien and apathetic stands the educated Jew in the midst of a society he does not understand, with whose tastes and aspirations he does not sympathise, whose history and evolution have always been indifferent to him . . .

Now, our modern arts had likewise become a portion of this culture, and among them more particularly that art

which is just the very easiest to learn—the art of music, and indeed that music which, severed from her sister arts, had been lifted by the force and stress of grandest geniuses to a stage in her universal faculty of expression where either, in new conjunction with the other arts, she might speak aloud the most sublime, or, in persistent separation from them, she could also speak at will the deepest bathos of the trivial. Naturally, what the cultured Jew had to speak, in his situation, could be nothing but the trivial and indifferent, because his whole artistic bent was in sooth a mere luxurious, and needless thing. At present no art affords such plentiful possibility of talking in it without saying any real thing, as that of music, since the greatest geniuses have already said whatever there was to say in it as an absolute separate-art. After this there was nothing left but to babble after; and indeed with quite distressing accuracy and deceptive likeness, just as parrots reel off human words and phrases, but also with just as little real feeling and expression as these foolish birds. Only in the case of our Jewish music-makers this mimicked speech presents one marked peculiarity—that of the Jewish style of talk in general, which we have more minutely characterised above. . . .

— Reading No. 20 —

WAGNER: GERMAN ART²⁰

The following essay was written by Wagner in 1867, one year after Prussia defeated Austria at Königgrätz and set the stage for the Prussian unification of Germany. The

²⁰ Richard Wagner, *Prose Works*, tr. by William Ashton Ellis, London: Kegan, Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co., 1912, vol. IV, Art and Politics, pp. 43 f., 48 f., 58, 63, 107 f., 165 f.

last paragraph dates from 1878 and expresses Wagner's disappointment with the too "liberal" and "Judaized" new Germany of Bismarck.

† † †

It is good and most encouraging for us, to find that the German spirit, when in the second half of the last century it raised itself from its deepest decay, did not require a new birth, but merely a resurrection: across two desert centuries it could stretch its hands to the same spirit, which then strewed wide its lusty seeds through all the Holy Roman Empire of the German nation. . . . Hail Winckelmann and Lessing, you who, beyond the centuries of native German majesty, found the German's kinsmen in the divine Hellenes, and laid bare the pure ideal of human beauty to the powder-bleared eyes of French civilised mankind! Hail to thee, Schiller, thou who gavest to the reborn spirit the stature of the "German youth," who stands disdainful of the pride of Britain, the sensuous wiles of Paris! Who was this "*deutsche Jüngling*?" Has anyone heard of a French, an English "*Jüngling*?" And yet how plain and clear beyond mistake, we understand this "*German Jüngling*!" This youth, who in Mozart's virginal melodies beshamed the Italian capons; in Beethoven's Symphony grew up to courage of the man, for dauntless, world-redeeming deeds! And this stripling it was, who threw himself at last upon the battle-field when his princes had lost everything, Empire, country, honour; to reconquer for the folk its freedom, for the princes even their forfeit thrones. And how was this "*Jüngling*" repaid? In all history there is no blacker ingratitude, than the German princes' treachery to the spirit of their people; and many a good, a noble and self-sacrificing deed of theirs, will it need to atone for that betrayal. We hope for those deeds, and therefore let the sin be told right loudly! . . .

The only thing left over from the time of Germany's revival, was the military organization retained by Prussia: with this last remnant of the German spirit, uprooted everywhere else, the Prussian crown won the battle of Königgrätz, to all the world's amazement, after the lapse of half a century. So great was the terror at this host in

every European Ministry of War, that anxious longing needs must seize the French commander-in-chief himself, regarded as the mightiest of them all, to introduce a something like this "*Landwehr*" into his so rightly famous army. We have seen, not long ago, how the whole French people kicked against the thought. So that French civilisation has not accomplished what the downtrod German spirit so quickly and so lastingly succeeded in: the formation of a true folk-army. . . .

Ever since the regeneration of European folk-blood, the German has been the creator and inventor, the Latin the modeller and exploiter: the true fountain of continual renovation has remained the German nature. In this sense, the dissolution of the "Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation" gave voice to nothing but a temporary preponderance of the practically-realistic trend in European culture; if this latter now has reached the bottom of sordidest materialism, by a most natural instinct the nations turn back to the fount of their renewing; and, strange to say, they there find the German Reich itself in an almost inexplicable state of suspended animation, yet not a victim to advanced decay, but engaged in a very obvious inner struggle towards its noblest resurrection. . . .

Here came to consciousness and received its plain expression, what *German* is: to wit, the thing one does for its own sake, for the very joy of doing it; whereas utilitarianism, namely the principle whereby a thing is done for sake of some personal end, ulterior to the thing itself, was shown to be un-German. The German virtue herein expressed thus coincided with the highest principle of aesthetics, through it perceived, according to which the 'objectless' alone is beautiful, because, being an end in itself, in revealing its nature as lifted high above all vulgar ends it reveals that whose sight and knowledge alone makes life worth living; whereas everything that serves an end is hideous, because neither its fashioner nor its on-looker can have aught before him save a disquieting conglomerate of fragmentary material, which is first to gain its meaning and elucidation from its employment for some vulgar need. None but a great nation, confiding with tranquil stateliness in its unshakable might, could ripen

such a principle within itself, and apply it for the happiness of the whole world: for it assuredly presupposes a solid ordering of every relation that serves life's necessary ends; and it was the duty of the political powers to found that order in this lofty, world-redeeming sense,—that is to say: Germany's princes should have been as German, as were her great masters. . . .

After all that had gone before, it now had really become a difficult matter, to rule in Germany. As the governments made it a maxim to judge their German peoples by the measure of French events, there also soon arose adventurers to teach the downtrod German folk-spirit to apply French maxims to its estimate of the governments. Every new Parisian revolution was promptly 'mounted' in Germany: of course, for every new spectacular Paris opera had been mounted forthwith at the Court-theatres of Berlin and Vienna, a pattern for all Germany. I have no hesitation about styling the subsequent revolutions in Germany entirely un-German. "Democracy" in German is purely an alien and translated thing. It exists merely in the newspapers; and what this German press is, one must find out for oneself. But untowardly enough, this translated Franco-Judaico-German democracy could really borrow a deceptive cloak, from the misprised and maltreated spirit of the German folk. To secure a following among the people, "democracy" aped a German mien; and "*Deutschthum*," "German spirit," "German honesty," "German freedom," "German morals," became catchwords disgusting no one more than him who had true German culture, who had to stand in sorrow and watch the singular comedy of agitators from a non-German people pleading for him without letting their client so much as get a word in edgewise. The astounding unsuccessfulness of the so loud-mouthed movement of 1848 is easily explained by the curious circumstance that the German found himself, and found his name, so suddenly represented by a race of men quite alien to him. . . .

MUSSOLINI: THE DOCTRINE OF FASCISM²¹

Benito Mussolini himself expressed the political doctrines of fascism in an article in the Enciclopedia Italiana in 1932; it was republished in an official translation in a somewhat changed form.

↑ ↑ ↑

Thus many of the practical expressions of Fascism, such as party organization, educational systems, discipline, can only be understood when considered in relation to its general attitude towards life. Fascism does not see in the world only those superficial, material aspects in which man appears as a self-centered individual, standing alone, subject to natural laws and instincts which urge him towards a life of selfish momentary pleasure; it does not only see the individual, but also the nation and the country; individuals and generations bound together by a moral law, moral traditions and a mission which, repressing the instinct for life enclosed in a brief circle of pleasure, builds up a higher life founded on duty, a life free from the limitations of time and space, in which the individual may achieve that purely spiritual existence in which his worth as a man consists, by self-sacrifice, in the renunciation of self-interest, by death itself. . . .

Fascism wants men to be active and to engage in activity with all their energy; it requires that they should be manfully aware of the difficulties besetting them and ready to face them. Life is conceived as a struggle in which a man is bound to win for himself a really worthy place, first of all by fitting himself physically, morally and

²¹ Benito Mussolini, *The Doctrine of Fascism*, tr. by E. Cope, third edition, Florence: Vallecchi publishers, 1938, pp. 10-25, 30-40, 49.

intellectually, and to have the necessary qualities for winning it. As it is for the individual, so is it for the nation, and for all mankind. Hence the high value of culture in all its forms, religious, scientific and artistic, and the outstanding importance of education. Hence also the essential value of work, by which man subdues nature and creates the human world in its economic, political, ethical and intellectual aspects.

This positive conception of life is obviously an ethical one. It covers the entire field of reality as well as the human activities which master it. No action is exempt from moral judgment; no activity can be deprived of the value which a moral purpose confers on all things. Therefore life, as conceived by the Fascist, is serious, austere, religious; all its manifestations take place in a world sustained by moral forces and subject to spiritual responsibilities. The Fascist disdains an easygoing life.

The Fascist conception of life is a religious one in which man is viewed in his permanent relation to a higher law, endowed with an objective will transcending the individual and raising him to conscious membership of a spiritual society. Those who perceive nothing beyond opportunist considerations in the religious policy of the Fascist Regime, fail to realize that Fascism is not only a system of government, but also and chiefly a system of thought. . . .

Being anti-individualistic, the Fascist system of life stresses the importance of the State and recognizes the individual only in so far as his interests coincide with those of the State, which stands for the consciousness and the universality of man as an historic entity. It is opposed to classic Liberalism which arose as a reaction to absolutism and exhausted its historical function when the State became the expression of the consciousness and the will of the people. Liberalism denied the State in the name of the individual; Fascism reasserts the rights of the State as expressing the real essence of the individual. And if liberty is to be the attribute of living men and not that of abstract dummies invented by individualistic Liberalism, then Fascism stands for liberty and for the only liberty worth having, the liberty of the State and of the individual within the State. The Fascist conception

of the State is all-embracing; outside of it no human or spiritual values may exist, much less have any value. Thus understood, Fascism is totalitarian and the Fascist State, as a synthesis and a unit which includes all values, interprets, develops and lends additional power to the whole life of a people.

A nation, as expressed in the State, is a living, ethical entity only in so far as it is progressive. Inactivity means death. Therefore the State does not only stand for Authority which governs and confers legal form and spiritual value on individual wills, but it is also Power which makes its will felt and respected beyond its own boundaries, thus affording practical evidence of the universal character of the decisions necessary to ensure its development. This implies organization and expansion, potential if not actual. . . .

Fascism, in short, is not only a lawgiver and a founder of institutions, but an educator and a promoter of spiritual life. It does not merely aim at remoulding the forms of life, but also their content, man, his character and his faith. To achieve this purpose it enforces discipline and makes use of authority, entering into the mind and ruling with undisputed sway. Therefore it has chosen as its emblem the Lictors' rods, the symbol of unity, strength and justice. . . .

Yet if anybody cares to read over again the faded minutes of the meetings at which the Italian *Fasci di Combattimento* were founded, he will not find a doctrine, but a series of hints, pointers, forecasts which, after being freed from unavoidable contemporary confusion, were to develop in a few years' time into a series of theoretical positions entitling Fascism to rank as a political doctrine differing from all others, past or present.

"If the bourgeoisie"—I stated at that time—"believe that they have found in us their lightning conductors, they are mistaken. We must go towards the people. . . . We wish the working classes to accustom themselves to the responsibilities of management, so that they may realize that it is no easy matter to run a business. . . . We will fight both technical and spiritual rear-guardism. . . . Now that the succession of the Regime is open we must not be faint-hearted. We must rush forward; when

the present Regime is superseded we must take its place. The right to the succession is ours, for we urged the country to enter the war and we led it to victory. . . . The existing forms of political representation cannot satisfy us; we want direct representation of all separate interests. . . . It may be objected that this programme implies a return to the guilds. No matter! . . . I therefore hope this assembly will accept the economic claims advanced by National Syndicalism. . . ."

Fascism is definitely and absolutely opposed to the doctrines of Liberalism, both in the political and in the economic sphere. The importance of Liberalism in the XIX century must not be exaggerated for present-day controversial purposes, nor should we make of one of the many theories which flourished in that century, a religion for mankind for the present and for all time to come. It is symptomatic that throughout the 19th century the religion of Liberalism was totally unknown to so highly civilized a people as the Germans, except for a single case, which has been described as the "ridiculous Parliament of Frankfort" which lasted just one season. Germany attained her national unity outside Liberalism and in opposition to Liberalism, a doctrine which seems to be foreign to the German temperament, an essentially Monarchist one, whereas Liberalism is the historic and logical prelude to anarchy. The three stages in the achievement of German unity were the three wars of 1864, 1866 and 1870, directed by such "Liberals" as Moltke and Bismarck. And Liberalism played a very minor part in building up Italian unity, if we compare it to the contribution made by Mazzini and Garibaldi who were not Liberals. But for the intervention of the illiberal Napoleon III we would not have had Lombardy, and without that of the illiberal Bismarck at Sadowa and Sedan very probably we would not have had Venetia in 1866, nor would we have entered Rome in 1870. . . .

The Fascist negation of Socialism, Democracy, Liberalism should not, however, be interpreted as implying a desire to drive the world backwards to positions occupied prior to 1789. Monarchist absolutism is of the past, and so is Church rule. Dead and done for are feudal privileges and the division of society into closed, secluded castes.

Neither has the Fascist conception of authority anything in common with that of the police-ridden State.

The State educates its members to citizenship, makes them aware of their mission, urges them to unity; its justice harmonizes their divergent interests; it hands down to future generations the conquests of the mind in the fields of science, art, law, human solidarity; it leads them up from primitive tribal life to imperial rule, the highest expression of human power. The State hands down to future generations the memory of those who laid down their lives to ensure its safety or to obey its laws; it sets up as examples and records for future ages the names of captains who enlarged its territory and of the men of genius who have made it famous. Whenever respect for the State declines and the disintegrating and centrifugal tendencies of individuals and groups prevail, nations are heading for decay. . . ."

If Liberalism spells individualism, Fascism spells collectivism. The Fascist State, however, is an unique and original creation. It is not reactionary but revolutionary, for it anticipates the solution of certain universal problems which have been raised elsewhere in the political field by the disgregation of parties, the usurpation of powers by parliaments, the irresponsibility of assemblies; in the economic field by the increasingly numerous and important functions discharged by trade unions and trade associations with their disputes and agreements, affecting both capital and labour; in the ethical field by the need felt for order, discipline, obedience to the moral principles of patriotism.

Fascism desires the State to be strong and organic, based on solid foundations of popular support. The Fascist State lays claim to rule in the economic field no less than in others; it makes its action felt throughout the length and breadth of the country by means of its corporate, social and educational institutions, and all the political, economic and spiritual forces of the nation, organized in their respective associations, spread all over the State. . . .

Today I hold that Fascism as an idea, a doctrine, a realization, is universal; it is Italian in its particular institutions, but it is universal by reason of its nature.

Therefore anyone may foresee a Fascist Europe drawing inspiration for her institutions from the doctrine and practice of Fascism; Europe, in other words, giving a Fascist turn to the solution of problems which beset the modern State, the Twentieth Century State which is very different from the States existing before 1789, and the States formed immediately after. Today Fascism answers to universal requirements.

— Reading No. 22 —

NEHRU: SOCIALISM AND
NATIONALISM²²

Jawaharlal Nehru (b. 1889), Gandhi's successor as President of the Indian National Congress and first Prime Minister of the Republic of India (Bharat), published in 1936 his Autobiography in England, where the book went through fourteen printings within three years. In a shortened form it was published in the United States in 1941. In the following extract Nehru discusses socialism and nationalism, the importance of the Congress and of Gandhi.

/ / /

I had long been drawn to socialism and communism, and Russia had appealed to me. Much in Soviet Russia I dislike—the ruthless suppression of all contrary opinion, the wholesale regimentation, the unnecessary violence (as I thought) in carrying out various policies. But there was no lack of violence and suppression in the capitalist

²² Jawaharlal Nehru, *Toward Freedom*, New York: John Day, 1941, pp. 229-33. Reprinted by permission.

world, and I realized more and more how the very basis and foundation of our acquisitive society and property was violence. Without violence it could not continue for many days. A measure of political liberty meant little indeed when the fear of starvation was always compelling the vast majority of people everywhere to submit to the will of the few, to the greater glory and advantage of the latter.

Violence was common in both places, but the violence of the capitalist order seemed inherent in it; while the violence of Russia, bad though it was, aimed at a new order based on peace and cooperation and real freedom for the masses. With all her blunders, Soviet Russia had triumphed over enormous difficulties and taken great strides toward this new order. While the rest of the world was in the grip of the depression and going backward in some ways, in the Soviet country a great new world was being built up before our eyes. Russia, following the great Lenin, looked into the future and thought only of what was to be, while other countries lay numbed under the dead hand of the past and spent their energy in preserving the useless relics of a bygone age. In particular, I was impressed by the reports of the great progress made by the backward regions of Central Asia under the Soviet regime. In the balance, therefore, I was all in favor of Russia, and the presence and example of the Soviets was a bright and heartening phenomenon in a dark and dismal world.

But Soviet Russia's success or failure, vastly important as it was as a practical experiment in establishing a communist state, did not affect the soundness of the theory of communism. The Bolsheviks may blunder or even fail because of national or international reasons, and yet the communist theory may be correct. On the basis of that very theory it was absurd to copy blindly what had taken place in Russia, for its application depended on the particular conditions prevailing in the country in question and the stage of its historical development. Besides, India, or any other country, could profit by the triumphs as well as the inevitable mistakes of the Bolsheviks. Perhaps the Bolsheviks had tried to go too fast because, sur-

rounded as they were by a world of enemies, they feared external aggression. A slower tempo might avoid much of the misery caused in the rural areas. But then the question arose if really radical results could be obtained by slowing down the rate of change. Reformism was an impossible solution of any vital problem at a critical moment when the basic structure had to be changed, and, however slow the progress might be later on, the initial step must be a complete break with the existing order, which had fulfilled its purpose and was now only a drag on future progress. . . .

Russia apart, the theory and philosophy of Marxism lightened up many a dark corner of my mind. History came to have a new meaning for me. The Marxist interpretation threw a flood of light on it, and it became an unfolding drama with some order and purpose, howsoever unconscious, behind it. In spite of the appalling waste and misery of the past and the present, the future was bright with hope, though many dangers intervened. It was the essential freedom from dogma and the scientific outlook of Marxism that appealed to me. It was true that there was plenty of dogma in official communism in Russia and elsewhere, and frequently heresy hunts were organized. That seemed to be deplorable, though it was not difficult to understand in view of the tremendous changes taking place rapidly in the Soviet countries when effective opposition might have resulted in catastrophic failure. The great world crisis and slump seemed to justify the Marxist analysis. While all other systems and theories were groping about in the dark, Marxism alone explained it more or less satisfactorily and offered a real solution.

As this conviction grew upon me, I was filled with a new excitement, and my depression at the nonsuccess of civil disobedience grew much less. Was not the world marching rapidly toward the desired consummation? There were grave dangers of wars and catastrophes, but at any rate we were moving. There was no stagnation. Our national struggle became a stage in the longer journey, and it was as well that repression and suffering were tempering our people for future struggles and forcing them to consider the new ideas that were stirring

the world. We would be the stronger and the more disciplined and hardened by the elimination of the weaker elements. Time was in our favor. . . .

The policy of the British Government in India had resulted in ranging the socially reactionary classes in opposition to political independence. That was inevitable, and I welcomed the clearer demarcation of the various classes and groups in India. But was this fact appreciated by others? Apparently not by many. It was true that there were a handful of orthodox communists in some of the big cities, and they were hostile to, and bitterly critical of, the national movement. The organized labor movement, especially in Bombay and, to a lesser extent, in Calcutta, was also socialistic in a loose kind of way, but it was broken up into bits and suffering from the depression. Vague communistic and socialistic ideas had spread among the intelligentsia, even among intelligent Government officials. The younger men and women of the Congress, who used to read Bryce on democracies and Morley and Keith and Mazzini, were now reading, when they could get them, books on socialism and communism and Russia. The Meerut Conspiracy Case had helped greatly in directing people's minds to these new ideas, and the world crisis had compelled attention. Everywhere there was in evidence a new spirit of inquiry, a questioning and a challenge to existing institutions. The general direction of the mental wind was obvious, but still it was a gentle breeze, unsure of itself. Some people flirted with fascist ideas. A clear and definite ideology was lacking. Nationalism still was the dominating thought.

It seemed clear to me that nationalism would remain the outstanding urge, till some measure of political freedom was attained. Because of this the Congress had been, and was still (apart from certain labor circles), the most advanced organization in India, as it was far the most powerful. During the past thirteen years, under Gandhiji's leadership, it had produced a wonderful awakening of the masses, and, in spite of its vague bourgeois ideology, it had served a revolutionary purpose. It had not exhausted its utility yet and was not likely to do so till the nationalist urge gave place to a social one. Future progress, both ideological and in action, must therefore

be largely associated with the Congress, though other avenues could also be used. . . .

But Congress at present meant Gandhiji. What would he do? Ideologically he was sometimes amazingly backward, and yet in action he had been the greatest revolutionary of recent times in India. He was a unique personality, and it was impossible to judge him by the usual standards, or even to apply the ordinary canons of logic to him. But, because he was a revolutionary at bottom and was pledged to political independence for India, he was bound to play an uncompromising role till that independence was achieved. And in this very process he would release tremendous mass energies and would himself, I half hoped, advance step by step toward the social goal.

— Reading No. 23 —

SUN YAT-SEN: A MESSAGE TO
SOVIET RUSSIA²³

On his deathbed, in March 1925, the leader of the Kuo-mintang, Sun Yat-sen, addressed the following letter to the Central Executive Committee of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

† † †

Dear Comrades:

While I lie here in a malady against which men are powerless, my thoughts are turned towards you and towards the fates of my Party and my country.

²³ *The New York Times*, May 24, 1925.

You are the head of the union of free republics—that heritage left to the oppressed peoples of the world by the immortal Lenin. With the aid of that heritage the victims of imperialism will inevitably achieve emancipation from that international regime whose foundations have been rooted for ages in slavery, wars, and injustice.

I leave behind me a Party which, as I always hoped, will be bound up with you in the historic work of the final liberation of China and other exploited countries from the yoke of imperialism. By the will of fate I must leave my work unfinished, and hand it over to those who, remaining faithful to the principles and teachings of the Party, will thereby be my true followers.

Therefore I charge the Kuomintang to continue the work of the revolutionary nationalist movement, so that China, reduced by the imperialists to the position of a semi-colonial country, shall become free.

With this object I have instructed the Party to be in constant contact with you. I firmly believe in the continuance of the support which you have hitherto accorded to my country.

Taking my leave of you, dear comrades, I want to express the hope that the day will come when the U.S.S.R. will welcome a friend and ally in a mighty, free China, and that in the great struggle for the liberation of the oppressed peoples of the world both those allies will go forward to victory hand in hand.

With fraternal greetings,
Sun Yat-sen

— Reading No. 24 —

MAO TSE-TUNG: A NATIONAL
POPULAR CULTURE²⁴

In 1941 Mao Tse-tung issued a basic program "for the Marxists of China." It stressed the national character of Chinese Marxist culture.

1 1 1

The culture of New Democracy is national in character. It opposes imperialist oppression, and advocates the dignity and independence of the Chinese nation. It belongs to our nation, and possesses its characteristics. It unites with the socialist culture and New Democratic culture of other nations, establishes with them relations of mutual absorption and mutual development, and serves with them mutually as part of the new culture of the world. But it can never unite with the imperialist culture of other nations, because it is a revolutionary, national culture. To be sure, China should absorb abundantly the progressive culture of foreign nations as raw material for her own cultural food. Such absorption was not sufficient in the past. What we find useful today we must absorb, not only from the present socialist or New Democratic cultures of other nations, but also from ancient cultures, e.g., from the cultures of the various capitalist countries in the period of enlightenment. These foreign materials we must treat as we treat our food. We submit our food to the mouth for chewing

* Mao Tse-tung, "The Politics and Culture of New Democracy," January 15, 1941, section XV.

and to the stomach and intestines for digestion, add to it saliva, pepsin and other secretions of the intestines to separate it into the essence and the residue, and then absorb the essence of our nourishment and pass off the residue. In somewhat similar manner, we should subject our cultural materials to the process of discrimination and should absorb everything conditionally. The idea of "unconditional Westernization" is a wrong one. China has suffered a lot by blindly absorbing foreign materials before. Chinese Communists should never break this rule even in the application of Marxism. We must unify appropriately the general truth of Marxism and the concrete practice of the Chinese revolution, i.e., we must adopt the national form before we can find Marxism useful and should never subjectively or mechanically apply it. Subjective and formal Marxists are only playing with Marxism and the Chinese revolution, and there is no place for them in the revolutionary ranks of China. China's culture should have its own form, the national form. The national form, plus the New Democratic content, is our new culture today.

The culture of New Democracy is scientific in character. It opposes all feudal and superstitious thoughts, and advocates "searching for truth from concrete facts," it advocates objective truth as well as the unity of theory and practice. . . .

The culture of New Democracy is popular in character. It should serve the purpose of the toiling masses, which occupy more than 90 per cent of the whole Chinese population, and should gradually become their own culture. . . .

This national, scientific, and popular culture is the anti-imperialist, anti-feudal culture of the people, the culture of New Democracy, the culture of New San Min Chi I, the culture of the Chinese nation. . . .

— Reading No. 25 —

THE UGANDA FLAG²⁵

Characteristic of the new African nationalism is the stanza from the poem "Fly Higher and Higher the Uganda Flag."

 / / /

Our fight for land will never cease.
It was ours and it will be ours,
 forever and ever.
We do not fear those who speak
 behind our backs.
If they scorn us, they will not be
 here forever.
We look for the day to arrive
When great jubilation will reign
 everywhere.
And the children of black men
 throughout the world
Will know happiness in the
 return of their rights.

²⁵ *Uganda Renaissance*, vol. IV, no. 1, January 1961.

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