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SOURCE BOOKS FOR HISTORY TEACHERS

**VOLUME 1**

**THE COLD WAR (1944-1990)**

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


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# **THE COLD WAR (1944-1990)**

Edited by

**NEVEN BUDAK and ALEXEI KALIONSKI**

Series Editor

**CHRISTINA KOULOURI**

 **CDRSEE**  
Center for Democracy and  
Reconciliation in Southeast Europe

Thessaloniki, 2016



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*It is now 20 years since the Joint History Project (JHP) was proposed to the Center for Democracy and Reconciliation in Southeast Europe (CDRSEE) as its first and most urgent project, 17 years since the conference on the island of Chalki, near Rhodes, which set up the History Education Committee with Professor Christina Koulouri as its Chair and eleven since the four previous workbooks, entitled *The Ottoman Empire, Nations and States, The Balkan Wars and World War II* first appeared. These four workbooks have been translated into all but two languages of the region, and have also appeared in two languages outside the region, unsurprisingly one of these being English (the original version) and, most surprisingly, the other being Japanese. Why? Because there is appreciation in Japan both of the high quality the JHP has achieved and equally of the need for a similar project in the Far East. In 2013 the JHP was honoured to receive the Annual Human Rights Award of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung in Berlin, an event that gave us all great satisfaction.*

*In 1995 Southeast Europe was an area with particular and also particularly severe problems. In 2016, as the present two workbooks – *The Cold War 1944-1990 and Wars, Divisions, Integration (1990-2008)* – are appearing, it is becoming increasingly clear that even countries which considered themselves safe from racism, from nationalism, and from stereotyped bias against other European peoples, today need a JHP as much as any country in Southeast Europe. Southeast Europe can, however, now offer others both experience and expertise in facing this need. Our region is therefore no longer the problem or even just a part of the problem but also an example of a creative attempt to find solutions to a problem which is widespread and perhaps general. I would therefore like to express on behalf of the Board of the Center for Democracy and Reconciliation in Southeast Europe the wish that these two new workbooks should be welcomed for themselves with that critical eye which is always appropriate to historical study, but also the fervent hope that the example and precedent they embody should be greeted everywhere with enthusiasm and implemented with determination wherever possible. Both Europe and the teaching of history will surely be stronger as a result. If the effort the Centre began two decades ago and has consistently implemented ever since can be further strengthened both in our region*

*and beyond as a result of the European Cultural Heritage Year in 2018 the celebration of that Year will have proven not only to have honoured our European past, a past all the richer for being both common and diverse, but to have contributed positively to Europe's cultural, and probably also our political, future.*

*The central characteristics of the JHP workbooks are well known. First is the encouragement of a critical approach to history, something as essential for any conscientious citizen as for any professional historian. Second is the refusal simply to reverse – and hence effectively to follow – the well-worn pattern of national histories by which anything to our own credit is duly recorded and anything to another's credit omitted: the Joint History Project does not see it as its role to conceal the ugly episodes in history, whether our own or those which are the responsibility of others. Third, the workbooks display a broad and multilateral vision, broad because they include cultural and social history as well as political and economic; multilateral because they have been assembled from sources differing both in their nature and their provenance in a broadly based collective effort by historians from across the region and beyond it. Fourth, the Introductions, Keys and Questions are prepared with a view to opening students' hearts and minds to "the other", without any prior assumption that other is either better or worse than us.*

*The very nature of the exercise we have undertaken means that time, research and mature consideration will inevitably lead to some reconsideration of the work here presented. So too will it be, or rather already is, with the four workbooks first published in 2005, with a second edition in 2009. The nature of history and history teaching presented is however, the Board hopes and believes, a permanent acquisition, a beacon that will continue to shine brightly through an increasingly cloudy European landscape.*

*These two workbooks have been substantively more difficult to complete than the previous four. They cover contemporary history. Hence there has been little time for resentments and hatreds to settle but more than enough time, whenever and wherever it has proven convenient for some, to forget. The process of their creation has been complex but also remarkably creative, and to all those who have taken part, the Board wishes to express both gratitude and admiration.*

*It is right to begin with the Directorate-General for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations (DG-NEAR) which on the basis of experience of the previous four workbooks under the CDRSEE's then Director, Nenad Sebek, in 2014 gave us the necessary financial assistance to prepare the two new workbooks in an initial English version. We thank them for their unstinting support to date and trust that through subsequent support of the necessary translations of the two workbooks they will obtain that return on their investment they expect and fully deserve.*

*An impressive mobilisation of committed persons in and beyond Southeast Europe was required to bring these two workbooks to completion. On behalf of the Board I wish to thank each and every one of these persons, as for instance the contributors of sources in each country, the Source Committee members who oversaw the choice of sources and the translators and language editors who faced a daunting task, given the process involved translation and editing from no less than eleven languages into English. Good design will be as central to the success of these two workbooks as it proved for the previous four – and the six workbooks also share a publisher in Petros Ballidis. We warmly thank both our designers and our publishers.*

*A wide circle of friends, academic and non-academic, willingly made themselves available for discussion, re-drafting and provision of further source material, especially at the two most critical points in the whole procedure, first after the reports by the readers and, second, as problems emerged in the area of copyright.*

*The contribution of our readers was decisive, as it had been with the four previous workbooks. This is particularly true of Maria Todorova from the US, who had behind her the experience of having also acted as reader for the four previous workbooks. Both she and the other readers, Andreas Demetriou from Cyprus and Florian Bieber from Austria, provided a signal service to the JHP by pointing out that the very excellence of the treatment of some countries and issues created problems in respect of balance with some other countries in the region. We are very grateful to them for the acute nature of their comments and suggestions.*

*The staff of the CDRSEE in Thessaloniki, under the energetic direction and leadership of Zvezdana Kovac,*

*has responded magnificently to a long series of challenges in the course of the workbooks' preparation. The burden has been particularly heavy in the final months before publication, during which our staff has successfully overcome complex difficulties, something for which the Center is most grateful.*

*The central burden has inevitably been borne by six scholars. Two of those acted as advisors, namely Dubravka Stojanovic from Serbia and Niyazi Kızılyürek from Cyprus. They both worked with the same devotion and intensity as the four editors. The editors of the first (or perhaps we should say "fifth"!) workbook were Alexei Kalionski from Bulgaria and Neven Budak from Croatia, whereas of the second (or "sixth") Christina Koulouri from Greece and Božo Repe from Slovenia. Fortunately I have personal experience of the extraordinarily close and creative cooperation between all the editors and advisors. In my personal view the chapter on the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia represents an outstanding achievement, in which both accuracy and balance have been achieved to the degree possible so close to the events described. I also have personal experience of the sense of responsibility displayed by Christina Koulouri in guiding and leading the whole process as Series Editor with unflinching courtesy and determination, but also in facing numerous crises in the later stages of the volumes' preparation. Without her enthusiasm, knowledge and experience, the task would have been impossible.*

*To sum up, the production of these two workbooks demanded the coordinated commitment of a large number of people: on behalf of the Board of the CDRSEE I wish to thank and congratulate them all, but also to express the hope their completed work, the two workbooks, themselves now independent of their creators, will enjoy a successful, if inevitably sometimes stormy, voyage through the high winds and difficult waters of a still troubled region under the cloudy skies of an increasingly overcast continent. One excellent sign is the support the CDRSEE has received from all Education Ministries in Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, Montenegro and Serbia.*

*On the journey ahead our new JHP workbooks will find around them a whole flotilla of smaller boats, the numerous schools, private and public, in the region, whose teachers and pupils will use the material the*

*CDRSEE's collaborators in the JHP have assembled. To them, and particularly to the many teachers who have actively participated both in assessment and use of past workbooks, as of those now being presented, I also wish to express the Board's appreciation. It is for them the effort*

*has been made: in their support and in their enthusiasm rests both our greatest reward and our region's surest hope for the future.*

COSTA CARRAS

Rapporteur to the Board of Directors for the JHP



## THE PEOPLE'S YOUTH

OF JUGOSLAVIA INVITES YOU TO PARTICIPATE IN THE CONSTRUCTION  
OF THE HIGH-WAY OF FRATERNITY AND UNITY BEOGRAD-ZAGREB



### From 2005 to 2016: Continuities and discontinuities

The publication of two volumes with educational material on the history of Southeast Europe from 1944 to 2008 constitutes the anticipated continuation of the first four Workbooks (WB) that covered the period from the Ottoman conquest of the Balkans to the Second World War – save a small number of post-Second World War texts that documented the creation of the post-1990 new national states (WB2). The first English edition of the WBs, which came out eleven years ago, was translated on numerous occasions and was evaluated by history teachers in nearly all South-east European countries. The valuable knowledge gained at the teacher training workshops we organised has been put into good effect in each new national edition, which contained a number of improvements and a few additions, as well as in the present volumes.

These two new volumes are the end product of research carried out by a large team of historians who teach in Higher and Secondary Education. Quite a few have worked in previous volumes; most, however, are new contributors. The work of old and new alike has been instrumental. As with previous volumes, locating and recording sources has been the responsibility of Source Committee members at a national level. All in all, 33 historians have worked in these two volumes on supplementary educational materials for teaching History among 15 to 18 year-old High School pupils.

A decade has passed since the last WB was published, yet many features of the teaching of History in Southeast Europe remain the same. Curricula and textbooks have not been attuned to the sweeping changes that characterise those of other subjects, while in quite a few instances a certain regression is noticeable. Pupils in their majority still consider History a difficult or boring subject that requires sound knowledge of dates and names and the ability to memorise. At the same time, it is not clear whether school textbooks can rival Public History in the moulding of historical consciousness. The curricula continue to be ethnocentrically-based and ignorance still reigns as regards the history of neighbouring countries.

Of course during these ten years important changes have taken place both in geopolitical terms and as regards the teaching of History. New states declared their

independence, some joined the EU, and in many countries teaching methods were modernised – in some instances with the contribution of international bodies. Either way, the continuation of this CDRSEE project with the publication of two new volumes constituted a necessity. The new enterprise naturally had its own challenges, which in many respects differed from those of the first four WBs. The first challenge emanated from the historical period that the two WBs cover.

### The challenges of post-Second World War and post-Cold War history

The planning and production of educational material on the post-Second World War and post-Cold War period constitute indeed a great challenge for historians, primarily for three reasons:

1. Recent history has not been the subject of systematic scholarly research. Works of reference on which a school history textbook can rely are few and far between, particularly as regards Southeast Europe. It is common knowledge that school textbooks are not the result of primary research but works that condense and systematise existing academic knowledge. The shortage of academic history inevitably is reflected in the narratives of school history textbooks. Thus, for us editors, it has been a great challenge to carefully select sources and compose a history of the Balkans from the end of the Second World War to 2008, attempting in fact to carry out original historical research.
2. As a rule, this period is not taught in High Schools of the region, even if it is included in the relevant chapters of history textbooks. Teaching does not cover the post-1990 period for a number of reasons, not least because the teaching hours per week allocated to History are limited. Time constraints and a huge teaching material discourage teachers from dealing with recent history.
3. The biggest challenge was posed by the ideological and political baggage accompanying the narratives on the Cold War and especially the post-Cold War period, particularly in countries of the former Yugoslavia. The traumatic memory of the Yugoslav Wars is still alive; it would not be an exaggeration to say that it haunts the teaching of History. One is faced with a somewhat similar situation

in Cyprus, where the island's de facto partition in the wake of the Turkish invasion of 1974 has generated traumas that are still sustained through Public History and the ways the subject is taught in schools. The history of the communist regimes is also characterised by ideological distortion and blanket rejection that make it difficult to grasp the intricacies of historical reality and people's experiences. Thus, history teachers have to deal with the black-and-white interpretations that predominate in school textbooks, the subjectivity that abounds in the public sphere, and their own personal and familial histories.

These issues were discussed at the three teacher training workshops that the CDRSEE organised in Vukovar (Croatia, 5-7 December 2014), in Mostar (Bosnia and Herzegovina, 6-8 March 2015) and in Bujanovac (Serbia, 27-29 March 2015). The workshops aimed at recording school reality on the teaching of the history of the period 1944-2008 as well as on the needs of history teachers. They highlighted differences in curricula content, in interpretations on offer, and in the historical sources that are used. Teachers held different views on whether post-1990 history should be taught, on whether it could be taught, as well as on the teaching or not of general controversial and sensitive historical subjects. To this effect, the two new volumes endeavour to offer answers on the dilemmas concerning the proper method on the teaching of the "history of the present" and of the dark moments of the past.

In cases of traumatic memory, the historians' task is exceedingly difficult and sensitive. As with the first four volumes, we unequivocally hold that the dark sides of South-east Europe's common history should not be hushed up in the name of reconciliation. They should be recorded and rigorously documented through the cross-referencing of numerous and varied sources. In addition, only by applying a multi-perspective method can we develop pupils' critical thought and initiate them in the historians' work.

The teaching of the Cold War period raises different issues. It is hard for pupils who have not experienced the communist regime to comprehend the everyday life of those times. We moved beyond a mere presentation of the political features of these regimes in an attempt to convey, through the careful selection of sources, "socialist culture": public art, consumer goods, fashion, school life, entertainment, etc. In the translation of the sources, we

sought to keep the "socialist language"; a rigid language, familiar for those who lived through the period but incomprehensible to the youth of today. History teachers should therefore explain to their pupils that such texts (Party announcements, official speeches, and the like) also constitute linguistic evidence that allows for a better understanding of a regime system that collapsed in 1990, providing at the same time the opportunity to ponder on its nature. Likewise, we tried to show the vicissitudes of democracy and of the military regimes in Greece and Turkey, as well as the particularities of the Cyprus case. The juxtaposition of the countries of the "Eastern" bloc with those of the "Western" leads pupils to trace and compare not only differences but similarities as well – e.g., as regards youth culture and artistic creation.

### **Content selection and teaching methods**

In preparing these two new volumes we have followed the guidelines on content planning and on the educational aims of previous WBs, as formulated in the General Introduction of WB1. Briefly, we took into account the issue of compatibility with High School history curricula, the control that the state exercises over these curricula and over school textbooks, teachers' needs for supplementary educational material, and the multi-perspective approach in the teaching of History. Once more, we have followed a regional perspective in as much as all present-day countries of the Balkan Peninsula are represented. The issue of representativeness is, probably, the most arduous one for a project of this kind. In each country separately, pupils must be able to locate their own national history within a regional context and, in this way, become aware of the multiple levels on which the historical becoming is developed. Simultaneously, they will also have to trace their national history in sources on the history of other countries. Thus, through employing the comparative method, pupils are geared towards a better understanding of their own national history. For example, the status of women in society and the economy of socialist states need not be covered by sources from all communist countries; one or two examples suffice. In actual fact, we placed greater emphasis on the representativeness of themes so as to cover, when-

ever feasible, all aspects of political, social, cultural and economic history. And this at a time when the existing history textbooks offer almost exclusively narratives on political history based on a very limited number of sources. As was the case with the first four WBs, the proportional standing of each individual country differs from volume to volume in relation to the historical events. Sources from the former Yugoslav republics and provinces are much more numerous in Volume 2, which inevitably focuses on the wars of the 1990s. By contrast, in Volume 1 Yugoslavia is dealt with as a unitary state, as indeed it was, and therefore Yugoslav sources are proportional to those from Albania, Bulgaria and Romania. An overall balance has been attained only at the level of both volumes as a single aggregate. From the beginning the two volumes were conceived as such, and the editors' collaboration was constant irrespective of who was responsible for each volume. It is indicative that 1990 is covered in both volumes, providing the link between the two: in chapter VIII of Volume 1 the focus is on the fall of the communist regimes, whereas in chapter I of Volume 2 on the break-up of Yugoslavia.

The issue of representativeness was also raised in Volume 1 as regards the ratio of sources on each of the two Cold War blocs of Southeast Europe. As the Balkans constitute an exceptional example of Cold War divisions (NATO, Warsaw Pact, Non-Aligned Movement), the editorial group sought to capture all hues of the different political systems. Given that the number of non-communist countries (Turkey, Greece and Cyprus) fell short by far, it was difficult to attain a proportional balance. Our main concern was to show the two sides of the same phenomenon across the dividing line (the so-called Iron Curtain). It was also important to highlight the particularities of the historical trajectory of each country. The usage of the generic grouping "communist regime" does not imply that the historical trajectory of all communist countries in the Balkans was similar. It is crucial that differences are recorded and discussed in the classroom. Likewise pupils should be able to have a nuanced understanding of the post-1990 era groupings: EU member-states, non-EU countries, NATO member-states, "Western Balkans", etc.

As with previous WBs, the present volumes conceive of Balkan history as part of European and world history. Thus, they can be used for educational purposes in schools

(as well as in universities) across the globe where the language of instruction is English. Given that there is a dearth of accessible primary sources from Southeast European countries translated in English, the present volumes will undoubtedly be of use also to a wider international reading public.

The two new volumes comprise compilations of textual and visual sources accompanied by introductions and "keys", which concisely describe the historical context of each source, and "infos" with biographical data, short notes on definition of terms, etc. As we wanted to place greater emphasis on the teaching dimension of the project, questions and tasks were composed by two experts on History Didactics, Snježana Koren and Vassiliki Sakka. Teachers can either use these or develop their own. The use of educational materials is first and foremost based on the initiative and motivation of history teachers, who encounter a number of old and new challenges. The politicisation of History in public discourse, in which Secondary Education is often entangled; pupils' disinterest; and the vast teaching material are some of the persisting challenges.

The pace of technological developments poses new challenges. In the era of Wikipedia, how do we engage pupils with the historical method? Though patently lacking in credibility, pupils resort to the easy usage of entries in Wikipedia, which thus acquires the authority of voluminous encyclopaedias. Not only most entries are not composed by experts, but in theory everyone can contribute to the construction of historical knowledge. Thus, how can teachers initiate pupils in the research of historical sources? How can they show them to use the holdings of archives and libraries, even in digitised form?

It is obvious that the Internet should neither be demonised nor excluded as a rich reservoir of research material. Users of the present volumes will notice that many of our sources come from the Internet. Nowadays it constitutes a vast depository of digitised primary sources (e.g. texts of international treaties, statistical data and population censuses, newspapers), which are easily accessible through the web pages of libraries, universities, and public and private institutions and organisations with large archival holdings. As the Internet is an indispensable tool for teachers, in the present volumes we have provided a number of web page addresses, admittedly not as many

as we would have wanted, with open access to primary sources, as well as links to film and music web pages.

As already mentioned, the teaching of the post-1990 period covers controversial and sensitive issues that hitherto have not been the subject of scholarly studies. On most of these, international and national judicial authorities have reached a verdict, while independent international and national bodies have sought to record evidence on massacres and destruction. Irrespective of the evidentiary material, no historian can ignore the traumatic memory of the survived victims. For their part, teachers often find themselves in multi-cultural classrooms where many rival mnemonic communities coexist. How can they teach a textbook on national history in such a classroom? What do pupils make of such textbooks? And how successful can the teaching of History in Secondary Education be as a scientific field that distances itself from the object of study, articulates a “neutral” discourse, and “freezes” conflictual issues in post-traumatic environments? Teachers and school history textbooks alike are called upon to mediate between the little stories of pupils and Grand History. Such mediation cannot be realised either through the majority’s homogenising narratives, which ignore minorities, or through a “neutral” position, which does not take into account the sentiments of pupils. For these reasons, we have sought to make visible the social and ethnic minority groups that are absent from school history textbooks so that teachers can animate their pupils and sharpen their critical mind. In addition, the work as whole is a collection of sources on “others”, within and without national borders, about which there exists either enmity and ignorance or indifference.

As with previous WBs, the present two volumes are to be used as supplementary to school history textbooks in use, which comprise detailed accounts of the events. These textbooks are on national, European or world history – not on Balkan history. The WBs fill this lacuna and with their wide array of sources facilitate the teaching of a course on comparative history, which can cultivate the pupils’ critical skills.

### **The structure of the volumes**

The volumes cover the period from 1944 to 2008. Although there is a certain overlap with WB4, we chose

1944 as the starting date because a sound knowledge of the events that took place during the last year of the Second World War is vital for a nuanced understanding of the Cold War era, particularly in Southeast Europe. Teachers can of course combine sources from WB4 (chapters V & VI) with those of Volume 1. Choosing the closing date of Volume 2 was much more difficult given that many events were (and still are) in progress. We settled on 2008 because that year the independence of Kosovo was declared, a development that seemingly brought to an end the cycle of Yugoslavia’s break-up. It is also the year when the world financial crisis began, which hit hard especially Greece and Cyprus, though for obvious reasons the subject has not been covered in its entirety or to-date. Nevertheless, for a fuller understanding of a number of sources certain “keys” provide information on the post-2008 period as well.

The structure of the contents is common for both volumes despite the fact that Volume 1 has eight chapters and Volume 2 has six: political transitions and crises; new regimes; dissident trends; international relations; economic developments; demographic data; migrations and minorities; social inequalities; forms of leisure; mass culture; the Arts and Literature. We chose to highlight positive aspects of contemporary Balkan history, as in the case of the Southeast European recipients of international awards. Our stance on post-war history is guided neither by an ideological-based rejection nor by nostalgic idealisation. The last chapter of Volume 2, *Ways of Remembering*, was purposefully included in order to enable pupils to understand how collective memory, particularly as expressed by official channels, oscillates between these two extreme stances, without any chance of sober detachment. At the same time, we have included evidentiary material on instances of reconciliation and on examples of how traumatic memories can stop causing divisions.

As in the first four WBs, we have sought to give voice to unsung historical actors and subjects, like women, without ignoring however leaders and rulers. In addition, there are many sources on youth culture and on the lives of young people during the Cold War and post-Cold War period. We believe that subjects like cinematography, music and sports, which usually do not find their way into school textbooks, are more likely to attract pupils’ interest.

We chose our sources from a wide and varied gamut of evidentiary material: legal texts, political speeches, diplomatic documents, treaties, literary texts, memoirs, oral interviews, statistical tables, diagrams and graphs, cartoons, photographs, newspaper and journal articles, etc. We would also have liked to include a number of sources from the rich audio-visual material on the period but this would have been rather costly and, indeed, a huge enterprise on its own.

The completion of this publication signifies but the

end of the project's first stage. We trust that teachers will utilise creatively these two new volumes and that they will evaluate and enrich them. We also hope that Southeast European Ministries of Education and their officials will support our project and that the translated volumes will be used in the classroom. Last but not least, we believe that the completion of the new workbooks will lead to the furthering of transnational networks of cooperation at an academic and school level. The journey begins now.

CHRISTINA KOULOURI

## **CHAPTER I: OLD STATES, NEW REGIMES**

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## ► INTRODUCTION

Immediately after the end of the Second World War, the first priority of governments in all Balkan states was to establish control over the armed forces and the use of weapons. Soldiers waiting to be demobilised, with piles of arms and ammunition, were a common sight in the first post-war years. The end of the war, however, did not denote the end of ideological differences and political ambitions. The resistance against Nazism and Axis occupation was driven by different ideological motives and political convictions. It comprised diverse groups and forces, which in most cases were not directed by a single political centre. The will to dominate and the rivalries between them, which in some instances led to civil war, continued in these tough years, too. On the other hand, the occupation of neighbouring countries by Hitler's allies (e.g. Bulgaria) had left bitter memories to local populations, as had local collaborators of the Nazis, who had clashed with resistance forces and were now struggling for their post-war survival.

Thus, one may say that the political construction of post-war societies in the Balkans had already begun during the Second World War. In this respect, attitude towards the presence of the Soviet Army in some Balkan states was ambivalent. The joy of liberation from Nazism, as seen in the smiling faces depicted in old photographs, was sincere, but it was also used as a propaganda tool. For the countries along the route of the Soviet Army – Romania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia – the final expulsion of German troops was a continuation of the war. The call of the new, communist-dominated, Fatherland Front government in Bulgaria – “Everything for the front, everything for victory” (this time, together with Romania, against Nazi Germany) – aptly reflects this successive critical situation.

Ratified by the Yalta Conference, the Soviet Army's presence in these countries had a political effect with decisive consequences for their further development. It empowered the communist parties and assigned them a leading role in the establishment of the post-war social order, which they never had before the Second World War. Along with political statements based on Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist ideology and couched in utopian calls for justice, national brotherhood and equality, the communist parties also had to fulfil the traditional responsibilities of a functioning state. For example, the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CPY)

sought to sustain the new federal structure of the state, as well as to defend its post-war position as a potentially leading communist power in the Balkans. This, together with the agreements among the Great Powers, could explain the firm position taken by the CPY in its conflict with Stalin and Yugoslavia's independent foreign policy in the next decades. Before this conflict, the Soviet Union, which wanted to secure overall control of the communist parties and the domination of communism in the Balkans, outlined a plan for a new, large state formation – a “Balkan Federation” of Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, eventually including Albania – with the aim of settling the “Macedonian Question” and other old national disputes. However, the Tito-Stalin split of 1948 and the stance of its war allies, especially Great Britain, thwarted this plan.

The establishment of the dominant position of the communist parties in the post-war life of these countries also demonstrates another common feature in their development: the gradual elimination of political pluralism that hindered the rise of liberal social structures. The end result was the establishment of the communist parties as the sole and leading force in the imperatively imposed goal of the development of their countries: building communism and a society of justice and equality, and liberating the working classes from exploitation. The ultimate military triumph of the CPY in the war led to the political triumph of the communists in the Socialist Republics of the Yugoslav Federation and the total elimination of the adherents of an alternative political course. In Bulgaria, the sham equality of several coalition parties in the Fatherland Front, the rhetoric of political unity in the name of the people's interests, and the declarations of “friendly relations with the USSR, the Western democracies and the great American republic” were used as a cover by the Bulgarian Workers' Party (after 1948 – Bulgarian Communist Party, BCP) to seize total power and to become the only political force in the country, after it had eliminated its political opponents and established the purest form of Stalinism in the Balkan Peninsula as the most loyal Soviet ally. In similar fashion, from 1946 onwards the communists in Albania persecuted all “anti-revolutionaries” until the Communist Party of Albania (CPA) established itself as the leading political force. The course of events in Romania also

predetermined the domination of the communist party, despite its weak position in the political life and society in the pre-war years.

In addition to the suppression of legal political opposition in those Balkan states that had taken the path of communism, another common feature was the liquidation of the anti-communist armed resistance. Attempts at organising armed resistance were made in Bulgaria, Croatia and Albania. Their social impact was weaker than that of the legal opposition; isolated in their own countries, they were unable to secure external assistance and were soundly routed and wiped out. Conversely, Greece – which the Great Powers had agreed would remain outside the Soviet sphere of influence, but which had emerged from the war with a much stronger and popular Left, even in comparison with Bulgaria and, especially, with Romania – experienced the tragedy of a large-scale civil war. The Greek Civil War ended with the defeat of the communists, partly as a result of the active intervention of the USA, and left an imprint on the development of the country and on the dynamics of democratisation and authoritarian practices among the right-wing political elite until the mid-1970s.

The elimination of political pluralism in the Balkans, save Greece, went hand in hand with the eradication of all structures of free life and spontaneous social interaction that had emerged and functioned before WWII. As a result, the structure of the public sphere was transformed. All civic organisations (charity, mutual-assistance, social-security, social-care, etc.), organisations dealing with education, culture, and leisure time, as well as those concerned with civil rights protection (the multiple free associations for the protection of the professional rights and legal guarantees of professions, professional organisations, women organisations, minority groups organisations, etc.) were banned. Even everyday life was transformed radically in its most profound aspects – market, trade, individual tastes and preferences, daily routines.

Perhaps the best example in this regard is the fate of the churches in communist societies. All acquired a new status stemming from their forced collaboration with the communist regimes and even with the secret services apparatus. The persecution and physical elimination of sincerely devout clerics, the confiscation of church property and financial assets, and the destruction of charity and Christian education networks swiftly followed. The communists' efforts

to separate the churches in some of these countries from existing ecumenical structures were part of their attempt to gain total domestic control. The fate of the established religious minorities – Catholics, Muslims, multiple Protestant denominations – was even more dramatic.

A common outcome that the Second World War and the Cold War that followed it had for all Balkan countries was the end of their respective royal dynasties and the abolition of the monarchy as a form of government: in Albania in 1943 following the capitulation of Italy, in Romania, Yugoslavia, and in Bulgaria. Although it took longer and developed under different conditions, this process also occurred in Greece, where the monarchy was replaced by a republican form of government thirty years after the end of the war.

Another feature common to all Balkan countries was that their internal political structure was consistent with their chosen or imposed strategic geopolitical orientation. While the Soviet Union became the imperative political power in the building of communist societies, the Western democracies and especially the USA had a strong influence on the constitution of social relations and political order in Greece and Turkey, which had remained outside the sphere of Soviet influence. This also predetermined the domination of certain political forces in Greek and Turkish society and, generally, the isolation, exclusion and persecution of the Left.

Despite differences in terms of ideology and geopolitical orientation, the memory of all Balkan societies focused on common experiences of the war: hunger, misery, the vulnerability of the civilian population, the need for social assistance and protection, and the mass flows of post-war migrants. International organisations, such as the Red Cross and the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA), as well as financial assistance from the USA, the UK, and elsewhere contributed to the restoration and creation of old and new state structures and, above all, provided essential supplies to the survivors and the surviving – food, shelter, clothes, medicines and medical services. In practice, the complex geopolitical and ideological reconfigurations in the Balkans involved a multitude of outcomes for individuals as well as community and minority groups, which eventually became part of both the official and unofficial traumatic memory of the Second World War and of the Cold War that followed it.

## ► I.1. THE END OF WORLD WAR II

### ► I.1.1. Liberation

#### I-1. Extracts from the minutes of the meeting of the Council of Ministers of 28 September 1944 regarding the abuses of the Soviet army in Romanian territory

“All over Moldavia a large number of horned cattle, horses and animals (sheep, pigs, etc.) was seized. In northern Moldavia I believe there is only 30% left of the livestock we have. The practice of levying still goes on today, with no norm in some places, upon the categorical and urgent request of the local Soviet Headquarters, and in other places unfairly, by scattered units behind the lines [...]. The local headquarters have established excessive levying plans, calculated on the basis of erroneous statistical data [...]. Thus, in the county of Dorohoi 3,250 wagons of wheat were demanded, while production had not exceeded 3,000 wagons”. [General Dumitru Dămăceanu presents the situation from an administrative point of view and speaks of the Romanian soldiers, who were disarmed and taken prisoners after 23 August 1944]: “According to the information we have, the disarmed troops have already been moved east of the Pruth River. [At various sites] in Iași there are about 45,000 soldiers, out of whom 1,000 are officers [...]. From the information we have, their material and moral condition is deplorable. Until a few days ago, all they received as food was 100 g of boiled corn flour per day”.

National Archives of Bucharest, collection: Presidency of the Council of Ministers, file 2/1944, pp. 201-258.



In April 1944 the Red Army entered Romanian territory. The northern half of the region between the Carpathian Mountains and the Prut River was, for five months, under the control of the Soviet troops, thus causing great dissatisfaction among the population. On 31 August, when the Soviet troops entered Bucharest, the representatives of the Romanian Communist Party staged a sumptuous welcome, though many people were not at all enthusiastic about the new occupation.

#### I-2. Proclamation of Slovene organisations of 30 April 1945 on the Yugoslav Army entering Trieste

Yugoslav Army units are liberating Trieste. Fighting against the last remnants of Nazi fascists and their hirelings posing as anti-Germans, the united Yugoslav nations are fighting the final battle for Trieste and the last inch of the Slovenian Primorska Region.

Primorska Slovenes, you should be fully aware of the paramount importance of this moment! It is the final realisation of our age-old desire to be free and united with other Slovenes and Yugoslavs. For a fortunate future for us all and all future generations.

Primorska Slovenes, the moment of freedom has come. Rise up and join the Yugoslav army – our liberator! Let us do our best and help our fighters in their final efforts! Let us prevail and prevent the enemy from destroying our property, let us liberate our homeland! Our achievement attained through sacrifice cannot be taken away from us. Long live the Yugoslav Army, our liberator! Long live Marshal Tito, the leader of our liberation struggle! Long live democratic Yugoslavia!

*Provincial Committee of the Liberation Front for Slovenian Primorska; Slovenian Anti-Fascist Women's Association; Association of Slovenian Youth Workers' Unity; Action Committee for the Establishment of a United Yugoslav Workers' [Association]; Trade Union of Employees for Slovenian Primorska.*

Sedmak, 2002, p. 108.



Yugoslav Army units entered Trieste on 1 May 1945. Slovene and Yugoslav historiography refer to this event as the liberation of Trieste whereas Italian historiography as the occupation of Trieste. The following day, allied troops led by a New Zealand Division arrived as well, although the Yugoslav Army had complete authority in the city until 12 June. Then, Trieste came under a joint British-American administration. On the eve of the Yugoslav entry, the proclamation was displayed on public billboards throughout the villages in the hinterland of the city. Trieste came under Italian rule in 1954, but the border was confirmed only in 1975 by the Italian-Yugoslav Osimo Agreement.



Josip Broz Tito (1892-1980) was a Yugoslav revolutionary and statesman. During the Second World War he was the leader of the Partisan resistance movement that liberated most of Yugoslavia without the direct involvement of the Allies. He was responsible for mass executions of prisoners of war and political opponents immediately after the end of the war, as well as persecutions of political opponents following the break with Stalin in 1948. In 1951 he implemented a self-management system differentiating Yugoslavia from other socialist countries. He supported market socialism which brought economic expansion in the 1950s and 1960s. His international importance was strengthened when he became the principal leader of the Non-Aligned Movement. His political clout was attested by the presence of delegations from 128 countries at his funeral.



Read the above sources carefully. Then try to understand what the words “liberation” and “occupation” mean for people inhabiting the same area. Why do you think Slovenian and Yugoslav historiography refer to the entry of the Yugoslav army in Trieste as “liberation” and Italian historiography as “occupation”? Build arguments based on source material. List some reasons why national historiographies could interpret the same events differently. (see also ch. IV, doc. IV-19 A and B).

### I-3. Captured Croatian soldiers marching through Yugoslavia



Mate and Crnogorac, 2013, p.15.



In May 1945 the pro-Nazi NDH (Independent State of Croatia) was facing capitulation. The army and large numbers of civilians, joined also by Chetniks, were withdrawing towards the border with Austria in order to avoid capture by the Partisans and to surrender to the Western Allies, as did the German army retreating from Greece. Consequently, fighting continued even after the armistice between Germany and the Allies, causing heavy casualties on both sides. However, as the head of the kilometres-long column entered Austria, British officers did not allow them to continue and instead sent them back to Yugoslavia. Thousands of prisoners of war were executed immediately upon returning to Yugoslavia and many more perished during the long marches that took them all the way to the east of the country. Members of the Slovenian collaboration forces, the “Home Guard” (*Domobranci*), suffered a similar brutal fate.

### I-4. Albanian government and its allies, Soviet, British and Americans, Tirana, 28 November 1944



The Album of the Albanian State Archive “The Albanian Resistance during the Second World War”, Tirana 2014.



The communist armed forces, otherwise called the National Liberation Army, during the war had the assistance and support of several foreign missions, namely British, American and Soviet. After coming to power in November 1944, the communist government of Enver Hoxha embarked on a policy of gradual rapprochement with the Soviets and of cooling relations with the British and the Americans, who were considered “as the most powerful state representatives of world imperialism”. While post-war →

communist Albania cut off diplomatic relations with the British and the American missions in 1946, it would build a close alliance with Tito's Yugoslavia during 1945-1948, and later with the Soviet Union until 1960, when it would secede from the bloc of socialist countries in Eastern Europe.

### I-5. Welcoming the Red Army in Sofia, September 1944



<http://www.lostbulgaria.com/?p=1129>, accessed on 16.09.2016.



The Red Army was one of the names for the armed and air forces of the Soviet Union. It was created on 23 February 1918 under the name "Workers' and Peasants' Red Army", which evoked direct associations with the symbols of the communist idea – the colour red and the red five-pointed star (worn on Soviet military uniforms). In addition to symbolising the military might of the Soviet Union, the Red Army was also widely associated with Soviet foreign policy, which was most often based on direct military intervention. The Red Army's participation in the Second World War played a decisive role in the defeat of Nazism. In the context of the Cold War and as a continuation of the Stalinist industrialisation policy, it was one of the most advanced armies, having at its disposal research and development facilities and a military-industrial complex of its own.

### I-6. The December Events of 1944 and the Varkiza Agreement of February 1945

The Greek Government of National Unity, set up in Lebanon in May 1944, arrived in Athens on 18 October, shortly after the German withdrawal and the arrival of the first British units. It was led by George Papandreou, a progressive liberal already prominent in the inter-war period, and included ministers both from the traditional parliamentary parties and from KKE (Communist Party of Greece) and the communist-led EAM (National Liberation Front). With its military wing ELAS, EAM had emerged as the most powerful resistance organisation and controlled much of mainland Greece. It had agreed to follow the instructions of the Greek Government in September in Caserta. However, when Papandreou decided, on British insistence, to demobilise all irregular armed units formed during the Axis occupation, EAM/ELAS refused, its ministers resigned from the government, it ordered military reinforcements to move towards Athens and called for a mass unarmed demonstration on 3 December and a General Strike to begin on the following day. The demonstration was shot at by the police, leaving about 30 dead and many more wounded. From 4 December EAM/ELAS began a full scale assault on police stations and other government positions. There followed an armed conflict that lasted 33 days, which cost thousands of lives, particularly among civilians, and ended with victory for the government forces. The British Army's active involvement in the "December events" was of critical importance to the outcome of the battle.

The "December events" (*Dekemvriana* as they are called in Greece) constitute the only instance during the Second World War when hitherto allied forces clashed with each other for power in the post-war era. EAM/ELAS and behind them the KKE feared that demobilisation of all irregular armed units formed during the Axis Occupation would lead to the creation of a National Army whose composition would not reflect EAM's overall strength at that time, as its units would be dispersed and their members placed in battalions many of whose other members would be pro-government. On the other hand, the government would not accept to jeopardise its monopoly

of force nor compromise on its sovereignty. Moreover, the mistrust of EAM/ELAS by its rivals was related with its dominant position then exercised in large parts of Greece. Mistrust increased after its April 1944 attack on a resistance organization in the Parnassos region and the murder of its commander, Colonel Dimitrios Psarros, together with many of his fighters. The Varkiza Agreement of 12 February 1945, signed between the government and EAM, envisioned the demobilisation of all forces formed during the Axis Occupation of Greece. ELAS undertook to disband and did so in part but also retained substantial stores of fighting equipment.



George Papandreou (1888-1968) was a politician who served three terms as prime minister of Greece (1944-1945, 1963, 1964-1965). He was also the founder of the Papandreou political "dynasty". He returned to Athens (October 1944) as Prime Minister of the Greek Government of National Unity. He resigned in 1945, after the December Events, but continued to hold high office. His centrist party won the elections in 1963 and 1964 after he had led a determined campaign against the use of "force and fraud" in the 1961 elections. His progressive policies were strongly opposed by the Right and King Constantine II who finally dismissed the government in July 1965, leading to massive popular protests. George Papandreou died a year after the April 1967 military coup, still under house arrest.

### A. An eye-witness account of the mass left-wing demonstration held at Constitution Square (Athens) on 3 December 1944

[...] The procession approached: men, women and children marching eight to ten abreast, every third or fourth person carrying an Allied flag, a Greek flag, or a banner on which in neat red print were slogans similar to those which were being shouted by men and women through the tin and cardboard megaphones each side of the procession. It was a typical K.K.E.-E.A.M. demonstration. The ages of those who were taking part ranged from ten and twelve years of age to sixty and more. A few of the children were without shoes,

most of the people without overcoats, but there were many who were well dressed. [...] There was nothing sullen or menacing about the procession. Some of the men shouted fanatically towards the police station and the hotel, but there was a good deal of humorous banter, and many jokes were exchanged between demonstrators and those who watched from the kerbs. [...] What happened next was so fantastically unreal I might have been watching a film. The squad of police above emptied their rifles into the procession. [...] I thought at first that the police were firing blanks, or that they are aiming far above the crowd. Many other people thought that. But the worst had happened. Men, women and children, who, a few moments before had been shouting, marching, laughing, full of spirit and defiance, waving their flags, and our flags fell to the ground, blood trickling out of their heads and bodies either on the road or on to the flags they had been carrying.

[...] The shots continued to ring out, echoing and re-echoing among the high buildings, and between the volleys, there were screams of fear and cries of pain, a wild stampede of people who fell over bleeding bodies. [...] There was little shelter for the demonstrators, and while a few hid behind trees and walls most of them lay flat upon the ground while the firing continued over them. For over half an hour the shooting continued, all of it from the police, and the E.A.M. supporters still lay on the ground.

Byford-Jones, 1946, pp. 138-139.

### B. The signing of the Varkiza Agreement between the Greek government and EAM, 12 February 1945



Imperial War Museum, London.



Study the sources on Greece and the following phrase from the key: “The December Events constitute the only instance during the Second World War when hitherto allied forces clashed with each other for power in the post-war era”. Then answer the following questions:

1. Why do you think the British Army took part on the side of government forces in the “battle for Athens”?
2. Why was the National People’s Liberation Army (ELAS) forced to surrender their artillery?
3. Connect these events with the Greek Civil War (ch. I.3).

## I-7. Border changes as a result of World War II



Border changes were one of the consequences of World War II, but a rather minor one for the major part of Southeast Europe, when compared to the outcomes of WWI. Romania, Bulgaria, and Hungary, as former allies of Germany, unconditionally returned all occupied territories when they signed the armistice with the Allies. After the Paris Treaties, signed on 10 February 1947, the Soviet Union gained Moldova and Northern Bukovina (Romanian after WWI, annexed by USSR in 1940). Bulgaria kept Southern Dobrudja (annexed by Romania after the Second Balkan War in 1913, returned to Bulgaria



in 1940). Istria with Rijeka/Fiume and parts of Dalmatia went from Italy to Yugoslavia (Croatia and Slovenia), but the Trieste question and the border issues between the two countries were finally resolved in 1954 and 1975. The Dodecanese islands, occupied by Italy since the Ottoman-Italian War over Libya in 1912, were ceded to Greece. The peace agreement with Italy, which provided for the annexation of the islands, was also signed on 10 February 1947. The front page of the Greek newspaper describes the official ceremony of the event at Rhodes, in presence of the Greek royal couple on 7 March 1948. The title reads: “After six centuries of enslavement, [the Dodecanese islands] are again Greek”.



<http://efimeris.nlg.gr/ns/pdfwin.asp?c=108&dc=9&db=3&da=1948>, accessed on 12.10.2016.

### ► I.1.2. Returning home or being exiled

## I-8. An excerpt from the autobiographical account of Sara Römischer, an ethnic German deported to the Soviet Union shortly after the end of the war, from Biertan

I remember 1945, because many of us, Transylvanian Saxons, aged between 18 and 35, were forcedly taken to work in Russia. It was January 16, the weather was fine and warm, no snow. We were taken away from our loved ones, from children, parents, brothers and sisters. For those who did not experience it, it is quite hard to understand. [...] On 24 January 1945, we were all, men and women together, put on some filthy wagons for cattle, full of lice. We travelled by that train for seven days until it finally stopped. It was the night of 2 February 1945. I saw on the window and through the cracks

of the wagon that they were taking us off the train and mixing us up, then taking us on the train again. We were about 30 persons in one wagon. Ten steps away there was a soldier with [a rifle], so nobody could escape. [...] It is hard to describe how the first two years passed: starvation, cold, beetles, head lice, lice everywhere in our clothes as well, on us. Many died of starvation, Russians included, as they had nothing to eat, just like us. We caught several dogs and cats. Even I ate cat meat. Being hungry hurts, everything hurts when you're hungry. [...] Men especially fell sick, because

women knew better how to take care of themselves and how to go through. We could see men plucking the grass to relieve hunger. This is how it was. Me too I ate mallow flowers and leaves. I always thought I had to have something in my stomach because all they gave us was a piece of dry bread, at 4 in the morning and until the following day all we got was that cabbage salted poor soup.

<http://povestisasesesti.com/2013/11/22/in-lagarul-memoriei-o-marturie-despre-deportare>, accessed on 5.05.2015.



In January 1945, over 70,000 ethnic Germans from Romania (mainly Saxons from Transylvania and Swabians from Banat) were deported to the mines of Donbas, with a view to assist in the "reconstruction of the USSR". Deportation would last 5 years; over 20% of the deported died or disappeared.

### **I-9. Jelena Kurtnaker from Požega remembering her stay in the detention camp of Krndija, July 1945**

Mother and I were taken from Požega to the Krndija camp in July 1945. We felt we were Croats. I remember that the Church in Krndija was destroyed, but the altar of St. Anthony was preserved. There were 100 of us in a stable. We lay on old hay, one next to the other. They asked: do you know how to write? They saw that I had a fountain pen. I became the clerk. I kept the list of the inmates who were in the stable. When people from the administration came, we had to make a roll-call. A patrol came at midnight every night and took us outside. I only heard Croatian spoken in the camp. In my section, a young woman gave birth one night. An old granny helped her. The child was very weak. A day or two before the Feast of Assumption (it fell on a Sunday), we christened the child in the church. The child's Christian name was Marija. A day or two after the Feast of Assumption, Marija died. I remember two girls who got a rash and they both died one night. We were not given any medicine. One of the inmates was a doctor. One does not fear death there. There was only one well with potable water. The food was very bad. Through the wire, we once got bread and brandy from a girl who served at my cousin's. She came from Požega on foot. A girl called Ankica Bišof from Požega escaped

from the camp. I helped her. I do not remember any other names. There was a young priest in the camp. We only learned that he was a priest later on, in the camp. No one knew his name. We called him Nameless. After my cousin's ninth request, my mother and I were released in October 1945. She managed to prove that we were in fact of Hungarian origin, not German. When I came back home to Požega, I did not tell anyone for a long, long time about the camp. I described my days at the Krndija camp in my short stories *Bitter Memories: Accounts from a Camp and Nameless*. I did not mention the Krndija camp by name, but the memories are of Krndija.

Geiger, 2008, p. 371.



During the Second World War, a large part of the German ethnic minority from the territory of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia had embraced National Socialism and the ideas which were prevalent in the Third Reich. This was the reason why members of the German minority were declared collectively guilty by the communist authorities after the war. As a result, people were persecuted and their property was looted. Such an atmosphere affected also numerous members of the German minority, who did not support National Socialism and Adolf Hitler during the war.

### **I-10. Agrarian reform and colonisation in Vojvodina**

#### Article 16

Priority in land allocation shall be given to farmers without land or those with small plots of land, who fought in partisan detachments, the National Liberation Struggle, Partisan Liberation Units and the Yugoslav Army, disabled veterans of the liberation war as well as disabled veterans from previous wars (1912-18 and April 1941), the families and orphans of fallen soldiers of the Liberation War and the victims and families of victims of the fascist terror. Among them, veterans and volunteers shall be given priority.

Priority in land allocation shall be given to fighters mentioned in the preceding paragraph who are not farmers, who make a commitment to settle on the allotted land and cultivate it with their family.

#### Article 19

The size of allotted land according to the above-

mentioned plan shall be between 8 and 12 cadastre acres of arable land per farm community (household or family). Exceptionally, larger areas of land, but not exceeding 30% of the established maximum, shall be allotted to national heroes or their families and to officers of the Yugoslav Army who are farmers by profession, as well as to large families.

If the land is located near larger towns, in the form of gardens or land under intensive cultivation, the maximum allotted area shall be between 4 and 6 cadastre acres.

*Law on Agrarian Reform and Colonization, Službeni list/  
Official Gazette of the DFY, no. 64/45.*



On 23 August 1945 the Provisional National Assembly of Democratic Federal Yugoslavia (DFY) passed a Law on Agrarian Reform and Colonisation, on the basis of which about 40% of the land in Vojvodina became the property of the state. As a consequence, Vojvodina was colonised by 258,405 persons (37,616 families) from Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro. The colonisation was carried out on the basis of the Law on Agrarian Reform and Regulation which gave priority in land allocation to settlers who were participants in the National Liberation War and particularly to veterans who enlisted between 1941 and 1943. The estates that were allocated to the so-called *bezemljaši*, “people without land”, after the war were mostly those that used to belong to the expelled ethnic Germans. Scores of colonists moved into the villages that had been evacuated by the departing Germans. The settlements were given new names that corresponded to the ethnic composition of the colonists.

### **I-11. Request by several Jewish repatriates from Bukovina, former deportees to Transdnistria, to the Minister of Domestic Affairs to issue them identity cards without supporting documents, which were impossible to procure at the time (July 1945)**

Minister [of Domestic Affairs],

The undersigned, repatriated from Bukovina, in April and May 1945 as Romanian citizens, settled down in Botoșani, Roman, Bacău, Focșani, București, Brașov, Sibiu, Cluj, Oradea and Timișoara, [and] got everywhere the due identity documents from the civil registry office, except from the municipality of Timișoara.[...] They tell us the repatriation certificates are not sufficient and [that] we require additional documents, that we, as former deportees in Transdnistria, cannot have [...]. We have already been hit by fate with so many evacuation episodes, which have led to our complete impoverishment. We do not have the stamina or the financial means or the moral force to bear more vexations. [...] 1 August 1945 is approaching, the day when we will be kicked out from Timișoara if [the Police there] do not receive express orders to issue identity cards for us. [Therefore] we respectfully ask you to take into consideration that without civil identity cards we: 1) Do not receive ration food cards; 2) Cannot find employment; 3) Cannot rent houses; so we live in a school, on desks, where we have been tolerated until now. For all these reasons, we very respectfully ask you to send the necessary order to the Police Station of Timișoara so that we can be issued the due identity cards, and bring to end all these useless and deeply painful vexations.

National Archives of Bucharest, collection: Directorate General of Police, File 44/1945, p. 35.



Read sources I-9 and I-10. Why do you think the ethnic Germans living in countries of Southeast Europe were treated like this after the war? Were all of them sharing the same ideas and had adopted the same attitude towards the Third Reich during the war? Discuss in class the meaning of “collective guilt”, using more examples. Try to find cinematographic or literary representations (films and novels) on the topic, not necessarily referring to the above countries.



Transdnistria is the region between the Dniester and the Bug that Romania was awarded for its participation in the German offensive against Russia (August 1941). Jews deported from Bessarabia and Bukovina were moved by force there under particularly inhuman conditions. During their transportation, by means of ethnic cleansing and in the concentration camps of Transdnistria, on the whole, about 105,000-120,000 deported Romanian Jews died, along with about 115,000-118,000 local Jews (according to <http://www.inshr-ew.ro/ro/holocaustul-din-romania/etape-ale-holocaustului.html>, accessed on 29.01.2015).

### I-12. This letter by a survivor of the extermination camps conveys in a painful manner the difficulties that most Greek Jews encountered upon returning to their homeland, 1945

In your last issue, you published a letter from a survivor who rightly complains about the closure of the Centre's canteen. We all remember what the Centre offered. Each one of us had a meal at discounted prices and, more importantly, found at the Centre what we all sorely miss: the "familial atmosphere". Most of us are all alone, without a family, without a centre that would substitute, even momentarily, our lost homes. We say no to soup kitchens. We say no to queues that remind us of the concentration camps. Let there be a canteen where in peace the Israelites – indigents, workers, clerks and small-scale entrepreneurs – will find a hot meal, free of charge for the indigents, at discounted prices for the rest. Soup kitchens will not accommodate but a small number of our coreligionists. The majority, even if they are starving, will not go near them out of dignity, which most of us, thank goodness, have not yet lost. We hold the view that our efforts should aim to improve on a daily basis our lives rather than take us back to the dark days of 1941.

*Ισραηλιτικόν Βήμα* [Israelite Tribune], no. 3, Salonika, 7 December 1945, p. 2.



About the genocide of Greek Jews, see Workbook 4, 2009, doc. III-26, III-27.

### I-13. An "ark" transfers Greek students to France, 1945



Immediately after Greece's liberation from the Axis in autumn 1944, the director of the French Institute of Athens Octave Merlier suggested to the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs that it offers a number of scholarships to Greek students, men as well as women, to enable them to continue their studies in France. Most of the 200 or so who were chosen left Piraeus on board the troopship *Mataroa* in December 1945. By and large, they were of left-wing leanings, and their move to France saved them from likely persecution in the context of the impending civil war →

in Greece. In France many excelled in their studies and pursued a rewarding career in the Arts and Sciences. Because of the prevailing political climate in Greece, most were unable to return until the fall of the military dictatorship in 1974, while some chose to stay in France for good. The author Mimika Kranaki describes the trip in a text first published in French in 1950.

We could not imagine then that we were saying goodbye to Greece! It was a normal trip for "postgraduate studies", so we said to ourselves, and then we would return to the motherland of course, what else? How we were to see that slowly the road of return would be severed. [...] It is pitch dark now, the first night away from Greece has fallen. We are "scholarship recipients" of the French state, artists, scientists, technicians, etc.

We disembarked from the troopship *Mataroa* at Taranto, where we boarded a cargo train and continued the journey. It is December and the train cars have no windows. When it gets dark – the first, the second, the third night, my God how oblong Italy is – we struggle to make bed mats out of our luggage. Few left with real valises, which in any case will come apart before we reach Paris. Most carry rucksacks, baskets, bundles of clothes, whatever poverty and the love of those who waved at us with their handkerchiefs at the Piraeus dock could invent. [...] At last, a whole week after leaving Piraeus, we hear: Attention, attention we have reached Paris. It is midnight. We try to see something in the dark. Nothing, zilch. Only far away, in the distance, a light here a light there, more hermetically sealed, more unfamiliar than night itself.

Kranaki, 2008, pp. 13, 15.

### I-14. Briefing note from 1946 on the decision made by several leaders of Transylvanian Jews to immigrate to Palestine and America, an idea shared by a great majority of the region's communities, especially from rural areas

I beg to report: The leader of the Jewish community from the commune of Ileanda, county of Someș [Sălaj], i.e. Fridman Maurițiu, participated in a meeting of all Jewish leaders of the region of Transylvania, in Arad and Timișoara, which took place

on 4 and 6 May and dealt with the Jews' emigration to Palestine. In that meeting, the emigration of the Jews who want to leave for Palestine was decided. From the commune of Ileanda some 20 Jewish families are preparing to leave soon. Their departure is likely to occur in 14 days. [...] The remaining Jews are making different arrangements in Bucharest with a view to immigrating to America. With respect to this, the Hungarian population is happy that the Jews are leaving.

Commander of the Gendarme Legion of Someș-Dej,  
Captain Vasilescu Ionel

National Archives of Bucharest, collection: Police General  
Inspectorate, file 68/1946, p. 114.



The end of the Second World War did not bring to an end the sufferings for numerous Jews who survived the Holocaust. Many Jewish communities in Europe disappeared and survivors had nowhere to return. What were the problems and difficulties encountered by Jewish survivors and repatriates after the end of the war, as described in these sources (doc. I-11, I-12, I-14)? Explore further this issue and find out why many European Jews decided to emigrate to Palestine or the United States? Comment on the last source, i.e. attempts to use Jewish emigration for political (Cold War) purposes.

### ► I.1.3. Reconstruction

**I-15. Distribution of UNRRA food and care packages in Sarajevo. Bosnia and Herzegovina were areas most ravaged by famine and families were completely dependent on UNRRA aid**



United Nations Archives and Management Section: S-0800-0011-1-1.



The UNRRA Yugoslav mission began its operation in April 1945. At first it had to deal with hunger in Bosnia and Herzegovina and some parts of Croatia. It thus sent large quantities of food and medical equipment, as well as trained medical staff. Subsequently

it despatched technical equipment to kick-start the agricultural and industrial sectors. The needs of Yugoslavia were so great that it became the largest benefactor of UNRRA aid in the history of the programme, worth \$415 million.

## I-16. Distributing American aid in Greece



Photograph by Dimitrios Harissiadis. Distribution of relief parcels. Keramikos, January 1952.  
© Benaki Museum Photographic Archive [USIS.212-2].



Whether directly via the Marshall Plan or via international organisations lavishly supported by Washington, American aid to Greece was instrumental in the reconstruction of the country and the support of the indigenous and needy after

the Axis occupation and the civil war that followed in the second half of the 1940s. Between July 1948 and January 1952, and in addition to some \$560 million of military aid, the US provided \$1.3 billion worth of aid.



The Marshall Plan (European Recovery Programme) was an American initiative to support the rebuilding of Western European economies after the war. The plan was in operation by April 1948. The idea was to make Europe prosperous again and thus prevent the spread of communism. Among

others, the Marshall Plan encouraged an increase in productivity, labour union membership, as well as the adoption of modern business procedures. It was named after Secretary of State George Marshall (1880-1959), a prominent army commander, who received the Nobel Peace Prize in 1953 for his initiative.

## I-17. American Economic Aid to Turkey in US \$ (in millions)

1948-52	1953	1954	1955	1956	1957	1958	1959	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965
197.1	46.2	92.3	68.1	99.9	96.9	85.7	103.3	84.4	101.9	135.0	130.5	101.6	152.1

Oran 2002, vol. 1, p. 533.

## I-18. The Albanian government declares persona non grata an official of UNRRA, 1945

### A. A letter from the Albanian Council of Ministers (2 October 1945)

ON THE ENGLISH CITIZEN MISS PENNINGTON

Miss Pennington arrived in Albania as an official of UNRRA on 10 August 1945.

The above mentioned person, instead of fulfilling the task for which she arrived in Albania, deals with political matters; instead of properly supervising the delivery of relief, she criticises it, making her best to arouse among the population distrust about the leader, the Government, and to cause discontent. [...] The facts are as follows:

1) On 4 September 1945, while travelling to Shkodra, she asked Kosovo people who were in Mamurras: Which Government is best, the present one or that of Zog's period?

2) In QAZIM KASTRATI's house in Shkodra she sought to leave a letter but she did not manage to.

3) With regard to relief, she said to the inhabitants of the Shiroka area: We bring you plenty of relief but those you trust, such as Bedri Spahiu and Koç iXoxe, and greet you with clenched fists, do not like you. They want to [build] Socialism.

4) In the Shtoj area she said: Why is bread sold to you while we offer it for free to you?

5) She said to the accompanying officer: Your Government kills good Albanians and protects the interests of those who fought; Churchill in his programme has stated that all Albanians in England

will be brought here. As to the Greek question, she said to him that soon you will be at war with Greece [...]

6) She expressed sympathy for Zog, while insulting those heading the current Government, such as Bedri Spahiu and Koç iXoxe.

The above mentioned person is persona non grata, therefore we ask her to make official arrangements to leave our country.

AQSH [Central State Archive], F.490, v. 1945, d. 109. fl. 4.

### B. A letter from R.V. Pennington sent to the director of the UNRRA mission to Albania, in which she denies allegations against her activity in the country

To: Mr Oakley-HILL  
Chief of UNRRA Mission  
From: R.V. Pennington

2 October 1945

I have read the letter no. 82, dated 2 October 1945, of the Prime Minister's Office and in reply let me explain to you that I did not address any group of persons and that I have by no means criticised the Government, the aims and progress of which I support and praise.

As regards the statements in this letter:

1) On 4 September, we stopped to have a drink at the restaurant of Mamurras. My only conversation

there concerned the locals and events related to them. We were there only for 20 minutes, while on our way to Shkodra.

2) In Shiroka, the only person I have ever met was the baker and my sole aim was to examine the quality of the bread. We also visited the Catholic sisters to ask about the health of the children. In addition, we saw an old woman of over 60 years old, paralysed, who invited us and to whom I gave five francs. We also visited a poor family where we discussed about fishing.

3) In the Shtoj area, we visited three houses, where we liked a car brought by a young boy [...]. I also talked there with a woman and two small girls.

4) I find it very difficult to understand the Tosk dialect and similarly the Gheg dialect of the accompanying officer. Therefore I categorically deny every remark attributed to me, which not only I did not say but I have never thought of such a thing.

5) I categorically deny this statement because I did not make it either then or at any other time.

Let me add here that the only embarrassing moment during my journey to Shkodra was when we visited the house of Mrs Kastrati in Pllumb. A young cousin of the family asked me in the presence of [his] uncles and the Partisan Officer whether I had observed any changes in Albania compared to the pre-war situation. I replied: "I cannot discuss political matters. I see the same eyes, the same feet, the same arms, and I hear the same language I have heard previously. I do not see what you mean by this, and for this reason I will not speak at this point." When he kept on asking about my thoughts on future improvements and those currently made, I replied that, if he was holding a small child and someone asked him whether it would become good-looking or have a beard, what answer could one give. At that moment, the partisan and all other persons present burst out laughing, and then we discussed other things as well.

Is it possible that I – who during my work for Albania between 1924 and 1939 and during the war did my best, giving also money, for Albania, who even called anti-Zog, who sacrificed myself without seeing my daughter for one year – could have made such a harsh and unwise observation, as claimed in the above mentioned letter? No Albanian, who knows well my activity, can say that this is possible.

R.V. Pennington

AQSH [Central State Archive], F. 490, v. 1945, fl.5.

## I-19. Map of villages in Greece burned by the occupiers



Published by the Ministry of Reconstruction, this quadrilingual lavishly illustrated album depicts in no uncertain terms the damages that the country and its people suffered during the Axis occupation. The caption of the image about "Burned Villages" reads thus: "As if all other catastrophes were not sufficient, the occupying forces applied a systematic plan for the destruction of Hellenism: the burning of villages. 1,770 Greek villages lie in ashes. In certain parts of the country, particularly near the frontiers, destruction by fire reached the proportion of 90% of the villages of every region".



Study the key, the photograph (doc. I-16) and the map with burned villages in Greece (doc. I-19). What do you think the situation in Greece after the war was like, taking into consideration that a harsh civil war followed?




### TASKS ON CHAPTER I.1.3

1. What was the total financial aid that reached Southeast Europe after the war? Which were the main problems that had to be faced immediately? How was this aid (either through UNRRA officials and volunteers or through the Marshall Plan) instrumentalised by politicians and governments? Find information (reports, visual material, oral testimonies) on the fair or selective distribution and the use or misuse of aid.
2. Make a list of the difficulties faced by Southeast Europeans in their everyday lives immediately after the war.

Κ. Doxiadis (ed.), *Αι θυσίες της Ελλάδος στο Δεύτερο Παγκόσμιο Πόλεμο* [The Sacrifices of Greece in the Second World War], Athens 1946, image 53.





## ► I.2. NEW REGIMES

### ► I.2.1. Transition

#### **I-20. Declaration of the Tito-Šubašić government, 9 March 1945**

Our homeland has thus received a unified government, which is a necessary prerequisite for a quick and successful conclusion of the war and for the speedy planned reconstruction of our country. The Government, which presents itself to the people of Yugoslavia with this statement today, is the result of internal and external political needs. On the one hand, its establishment will give even more impetus to rally all the forces which are not dishonoured by having cooperated with the occupier or its lackeys, and on the other hand, in an atmosphere of confidence, the Government will greatly alleviate the efforts for reconstruction of our country and further strengthen friendly relations with our allies. The Government is confident that the full support of the people and its representatives will give it strength to meet the challenging tasks of present times.

*Politika*, Belgrade, year XLII, no. 11921, 10 March 1945, 1, in: Nešović and Petranović, 1983, pp. 657-661.



An agreement between the NKOJ (National Committee for the Liberation of Yugoslavia) and the Royal Government and its Prime Minister Ivan Šubašić was reached on the island of Vis on 16 June 1944 (the Tito-Šubašić Agreement), according to which the signatories recognised each other and agreed to act in unison. On 8 August the Šubašić government published a declaration which gave credit to units of the NOVJ (National Liberation Army of Yugoslavia) for fighting against the occupiers and recognised the interim administration of the AVNOJ (Anti-Fascist Council for the National Liberation of Yugoslavia) and the National Liberation Committees of Yugoslavia until the formation of regular people's assemblies in the country. In his speech on London Radio on 12 September, King Peter II dismissed General Mihailović as Chief-of-Staff of the Yugoslav Army and called on all Serbs to acknowledge the appointment of Marshal Tito in his place. The agreement between the NKOJ and the Royal Yugoslav Government of 1 November 1944 (the Belgrade Tito-

Šubašić Agreement) provided that the name of the future state would be Democratic Federal Yugoslavia (DFY), that "King Peter II shall not return to the country until the people so decide", that in his absence "royal authority would be carried out by the Regency", that an interim government would be formed, and that, until elections for a Constituent Assembly were held, the AVNOJ would carry out the legislative and executive functions of the government.

#### **I-21. Constitution of the Federative People's Republic of Yugoslavia (FPRY), 31 January 1946**

Article 1. The Federative People's Republic of Yugoslavia is a federal people's state, republican in form, a community of peoples equal in rights who, on the basis of the right to self-determination, including the right of separation, have expressed their will to live together in a federative state.

Article 2. The Federative People's Republic of Yugoslavia is composed of the People's Republic of Serbia, the People's Republic of Croatia, the People's Republic of Slovenia, the People's Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the People's Republic of Macedonia and the People's Republic of Montenegro. The People's Republic of Serbia includes the autonomous province of Vojvodina and the autonomous Kosovo-Metohija region.

Article 9. The sovereignty of the people's republics composing the FPRY is limited only by the rights which by this Constitution are given to the FPRY.

Article 12. The People's Assembly of the FPRY determines the boundaries between the people's republics. The boundaries of a people's republic cannot be altered without its consent.

Article 14. The means of production in the FPRY are either the property of the entire people, i.e., property in the hands of the state or the property of the people's cooperative organisations, or else the property of private persons or legal entities. Foreign trade is under the control of the state.

Article 15. In order to protect the vital interests of

the people, to further the people's prosperity and the right use of all economic potentialities and forces, the state directs the economic life and development of the country in accordance with a general economic plan, relying on the state and cooperative economic sectors, while achieving a general control over the private economic sector.

Article 18. Private property and private initiative in the economy are guaranteed.

Article 19. The land belongs to those who cultivate it. There can be no large landholdings in private hands on any basis whatsoever.

Article 24. Women have equal rights with men in all fields of state, economic and social-political life.

Article 25. Freedom of conscience and freedom of religion are guaranteed to citizens. The Church is separate from the state.

Article 26. Marriage is valid only if concluded before the competent state organs. After the marriage, citizens may go through a religious wedding ceremony. The registration of births, marriages and deaths is conducted by the state.

Government Gazette of the FPRY, no. 10/1946.



Pursuant to a decision of the Constituent Assembly, the constitution of the FPRY was promulgated on 31 January 1946. It was based on the 1936 constitution of the USSR. It proclaimed the sovereignty of the people and defined Yugoslavia as a "federal national state" made up of six republics. The state was organised on the principle of unity of authority and democratic centralism. The people's republics independently executed their powers and were limited only by the rights which they voluntarily bestowed upon the FPRY. However, the role of the federal organs of authority and their powers exceeded those of republican organs and thus authority was centralised by the constitution. National minorities enjoyed "the right to and protection of their own cultural development and the free use of their own language". Ownership was state, cooperative or private. Private ownership could be limited or expropriated if so demanded by "common interest". All citizens over eighteen years of age were given the right to vote. For the first time, women and soldiers were allowed to vote. Freedom of press, speech, association and of assembly, as well as public meetings and manifestations were guaranteed. Schools were separated from the church, and primary education was compulsory and free.

## I-22. Constitution 1946: Montenegro, a Republic in the Yugoslav Federation

Article 2. Having achieved its national state through its liberation struggle and the common struggle of the Yugoslav peoples, pursuant to every nation's right to self-determination, including the right to secession and unification with other peoples, and expressing its free will the people of Montenegro entered a union with other Yugoslav peoples and their people's republics based on the principle of equality [...] in a common, federal state – the Federative People's Republic of Yugoslavia.

Article 10. The People's Republic of Montenegro administers its state authority, transferring to the People's Republic of Yugoslavia only those rights under the auspices of the federal state by the constitution of the FPRY.

Article 13. National minorities in the People's Republic of Montenegro enjoy the right and protection of their cultural development and freedom to use their language.

Article 16. Publicly-owned property is the pillar of the state in the development of the national economy.

Article 18. Privately-owned property may be limited or expropriated if necessary for the good of all, but only according to the law. Certain branches of industry or enterprises may be nationalised under the same conditions.

Article 24. Women are equal to men in all aspects of state, economic and socio-political life.

Article 36. The state is responsible for promoting overall health of the people. The state is responsible for promoting the physical education of the people.

Article 38. Schools are state-run. Elementary education is compulsory and free.

Perović and Ilić, 1986, pp. 315-339.



Compare articles 1, 2, 9 and 12 of the Constitution of the Federative People's Republic of Yugoslavia (source I-21) with articles 2, 10 and 13 of the Constitution of Montenegro (source I-22). How was the Yugoslav federation composed, according to both of these constitutions?

## I-23. War of political symbols: Stalin versus King Mihai; two short fragments of notes sent from and to the Minister of Education

### A. Celebrating Stalin's birthday, 1947

MINISTRY OF EDUCATION. STATE SUB-SECRETARIAT FOR YOUTH EDUCATION. CIRCULAR NO. 2533/12 DECEMBER 1947.

On 21 December is the birthday of Generalissimus Stalin. On this occasion, a teacher will speak to the gathered students about Generalissimus Stalin. In the schools on holiday that day, the celebration will take place during the educational meeting of the groups of classes or of the classes.

National Archives of Vaslui, collection: "Cuza Vodă" High school of Huși, file 172/1947, vol. II, page 6.

### B. Festivals inspired by the Soviet Union, 1948

INTERSCHOOL COUNCIL OF HUȘI, [REPORT TO THE] GENERAL INSPECTOR, JANUARY 1948.

In schools they used the homerooms and the students' assemblies. Especially in high schools of general education for girls and boys these assemblies took place weekly and topics were taken from science and literature. The themes most resorted to have a progressive character and the result was a more and more accentuated adherence to the spirit of the times. If two years ago the students were ostentatiously wearing lapel badges with the portrait of former King Michael, now the spirit is quite different, so that on the occasion of the RSFSU festival, the students of the secondary school in the city organised an artistic event that started and ended with the Internationale, while the whole programme was made of songs and poems from Soviet literature and music. [...] As for the cultural and education activity in the country, we have no possibility to control this, due to the absence of means of transport.

National Archives of Vaslui, collection: "Cuza Vodă" High school of Huși, file 173/1948, p. 14.



The RSFSU (ARLUS in Romanian) stands for "Romanian Society for Friendship with the Soviet Union". This was a cultural organisation formed by a group of leftist intellectuals in the autumn of 1944. It quickly turned into a genuine propaganda tool, controlled and funded by the state, which was active for almost two decades in all public institutions.



King Mihai (Michael) I, Prince of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen (b. 1921), was King of Romania from 1927 to 1930 and again from 6 September 1940 to 30 December 1947, when he was forced to abdicate.



The homeroom/advisory classes [*diri-gentie* in Romanian] were classes during which the form tutor (each class had a form tutor, who was one of the teachers of that form) was discussing with the students different extra-curricular issues and class problems.



Schools are not only educational institutions, but also an important means of the socialisation of young people. They are supposed to transmit certain values and ideas that are dominant in society. Use the documents and your own knowledge and describe how the new ideology was introduced and spread in Romanian schools. Find in the source the main elements of the "new" that were promoted and the elements of the "old" that were rejected.

## I-24. The Communist Party of Albania discusses new national holidays

C[omrade] Tuk Jakova states that the first of May was left out of this project, therefore, as a member of the Unions, "I propose to add it as a holiday". C. Chairman called for a vote and the [proposal] was unanimously accepted. [...] C. Gjergj Kokoshi inquired about the criteria used in determining holidays: Were religious Communities consulted? C. Manol Konomi explains that religious Communities were consulted and have proposed them. From these religious holidays, one of them is abolished from the Muslim religion and is granted to the Bektashi. Also one day was abolished from Orthodox and Catholic holidays [...] C. Ramadan Çitaku: "The Liberation day of Albania has been omitted, [...] the day when the Great War waged by the Albanian people ended. This day should be remembered by the Albanian people and celebrated among generations [as] a historic day. The celebration of 28 November 1912 is correct, but also this day of the

Second War – the Great War – should be remembered. The only problem is the date. As far as I know, as of midnight 28 November 1944 there were no enemy troops in Albania, thus 29 November found Albania liberated. Accordingly I propose to add 29 November as one of the national holidays. We have accepted the final day of the world war, so if we do not insert the Liberation day of Albania, I think it would be wrong.” C. Hasan Pulo: “I am not against this. But I would like to know if the other states that have relentlessly fought, even more than we have, celebrate such a day”. C. Ramadan Çitaku: “In Yugoslavia, the Liberation day of Belgrade is celebrated as a public holiday. Even if other states have not recognised such a day, we can do it because we have fought more than the others”. C. Hasan Pulo: “All states have determined one day as their Independence Day”. C. Ramadan Çitaku: “In Bulgaria we noticed that although people there did not fight they have recognised their Liberation day as a holiday”. [...] C. Spiro Moisiu, sharing the same opinion with C. Ramadan Çitaku’s proposal, adds that not only is 29 November the liberation day of Albania but it is also the day that guaranteed a new regime for the Albanian People. C. Chairman presents the opinions expressed and highlights that Albania had lost its independence, therefore 29 November is the second liberation of Albania, which they achieved by a bloody war. He then calls for a vote and by majority the proposal is accepted. The 14th Meeting, Session 5 of the Steering Committee, Tirana, 9 November 1945.



**1.** Why do states establish national holidays? Which are the national holidays of Albania that are mentioned in the document? Why are these days chosen as national holidays? Which ones are new? Make the list of holidays in your country and reasons why they are celebrated.

**2.** In the well-known 1983 book *The Invention of Tradition*, edited by historians Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, the concept “invented tradition” was coined. The two historians argued that many “traditions” that appear or claim to be old are often quite recent in origin and sometimes invented, in order to create a national identity, to promote national unity or to legitimise certain institutions or practices. Could you find arguments to apply that concept on the creation of new national holidays in Albania after the Second World War? Build arguments from the evidence in the source.

## I-25. Decision by the Constitutional Assembly to turn itself into the first People’s Assembly in Albania, 16 March 1946

I. The Constitutional Assembly, resulting from the elections of 2 December 1945, turns itself into the People’s Assembly of the People’s Republic of Albania and will remain as such until the end of the four-year period, starting from 16 March 1946.

II. The Presidium of the Constitutional Assembly, elected in the meeting of 12 January 1946, turns into the Presidium of the People’s Assembly and will retain, for a four-year period, the same number of participants referred to in article 1 of Law no. 195/ 12.01.1946.

III. The People’s Assembly will observe the same regulation as the one of the Constitutional Assembly.

AQSH, F. 489, v. 1946, d. 10, fl. 1.

## I-26. Propaganda speech on referendum for the abolition of the monarchy in Bulgaria, 1946

In its two years in office, the Fatherland Front government has granted the broadest rights and freedoms to the Bulgarian people. It conducted a purge in the army and is conducting a purge in state institutions too, it adopted and is adopting laws against speculators, in defence of democracy and labour; laws on agrarian reform, confiscation of illegal properties, on agricultural pensions, on additional taxation of wartime profits, on labour-productive cooperatives, and so on and so forth. It concluded trade agreements with the USSR, Czechoslovakia and Poland. It saved the population from hunger, as well as the livestock in this lean year. It saved the lev from [devaluation]. It created a realistic budget; it created unheard-of labour enthusiasm, which is turning into labour heroism. Shock-work and emulation have developed on a wide scale. [...] In all villages and towns, in all shafts, workshops, factories, railways, thousands of voluntary work days are being carried out. Giving up their Sunday rest, thousands of enthusiastic Fatherland Front members from towns are going with volunteer work brigades to the villages and cementing the unity between workers and peasants. All this is thanks to the Fatherland Front. [...] The people, liberated from fascism with great sacrifices, want to tear down the citadel of fascism, its nest in our country – the monarchy – and to establish a people’s democratic

republic that will give the necessary material, political and moral guarantees against a return to the black and disgraceful past. A people's republic that will ensure the democratic development of our country. A people's republic in which there will be no place for speculators, saboteurs, plunderers and oppressors of the people. [...] Our working people want such a people's republic, which will realise the principle: Whoever is capable of working but does not want to work, does not wish to engage in socially useful work, must not eat, either; must not benefit from the people's material, cultural and spiritual wealth.

ТДА [Territorial State Archive] – Targovishte, f. 3Б, inv.1, a.u. 114.



1. What is emphasised in the speech as the achievements of the Fatherland Front? Which are the promises for the future? What title would you give to this speech?
2. Detect and comment upon the vocabulary used so as to justify the reference to "propaganda speech". What are the banal expressions used by the followers of the regime?

## I-27. Plebiscite on the regime issue in Bulgaria, 1946

### A. Propaganda cartoon of the plebiscite: "The people's broom - 8 September" 1946



ТДА [Territorial State Archive] – Targovishte, f. 3Б, inventory 1, archival unit 114.

### B. The Soviet model



Viktor Deni, *Comrade Lenin Cleanses the Earth of Filth* (1920).



On 8 September 1946 a plebiscite on the regime issue was held in Bulgaria. An overwhelming majority of 95.6% voted in favour of the republic. Even the leader of the anti-communist opposition, Nikola Petkov, declared: "The plebiscite was completely free and all people were unanimously in favour of abolishing the monarchy, which has brought only misfortunes and catastrophes to Bulgaria". Petkov's words are proof of the strong anti-monarchy sentiments in Bulgaria at the time, but the Communist Party used the occasion to conduct a systematic propaganda campaign to consolidate its power.



Compare these two cartoons. Bear in mind that cartoons transmit certain messages and opinions, not so much facts. What is the message of both? How do they reflect communist ideology? Which are the similarities, and which are the differences between them? Do you think that the Soviet one served as a model for the Bulgarian one? Give arguments based on the evidence from both sources.

## I-28. Parliamentary elections and plebiscite on the regime issue in Greece, 1946

### A. Proclamation of a branch of EAM calling for the boycotting of the parliamentary elections of 31 March 1946



The general election of 31 March 1946 was the first to be held following the establishment of the Metaxas dictatorship on 4 August 1936 and the Second World War. It took place in a highly polarised climate, amid constant complaints by the Left and the Centre as regards the terror that paramilitary armed groups and the security services exercised in much of the country. In the event, the KKE, as well as other smaller leftist and centrist political formations, decided to abstain. With the benefit of hindsight, the KKE's decision is considered a significant strategic, rather than merely tactical, error. It led to an overwhelming victory for the rightist United Camp of the Nationally Minded (55.1% of votes cast, 58.1% of seats in the Assembly), which thus obtained political legitimacy, both within and without Greece. It also legitimised the further persecution of both real and alleged communists and leftists by the security services.

NO HONEST PATRIOT AND TRUE GREEK WILL VOTE  
TO THE PEOPLE OF OUR PREFECTURE

Bevin ordered Sofoulis to hold elections in Greece on 31 March [1946].

No party of the Left will participate in these elections. Kafantaris's Progressive Party, Mylonas's Party as well as the other democratic parties have also

declared that they will not take part in this electoral travesty.

Prime Minister Sofoulis, all ministers, all English newspapers and the newspapers of the whole world recognise that in Greece the monarchofascists exercise such a reign of terror to the extent that, as Sofoulis himself declared, "only royalist candidates can go about in the countryside". [...]

Stay away from the polling stations. It is a national crime to vote. It will be a betrayal of our struggle and of our children's bread should we give our vote to our perpetual exploiters, who remember us only during elections in order to usurp our vote. No Democrat will take part in the new crime that the monarchofascists are preparing in our country with this electoral travesty.

*Proclamation of the Veroia (in central Greek Macedonia)  
branch of the Political Coalition of the Parties of EAM  
(March 1946), ASKI.*

### B. Plebiscite of 1 September 1946. A pro-monarchy campaign poster



Held five months after the parliamentary elections of 31 March, with the participation also of the parties that had boycotted those elections, including the KKE, the plebiscite recorded a 68.4% majority in favour of the return of King George II. According to the Allied Mission to observe the Greek Elections, which contained British, French and US but not Soviet representatives: "there is no doubt that the [right-wing] party representing the government view exercised undue influence in support of the return of the King, but without that influence we are satisfied that a majority of votes for the King's return could have been obtained."



King George II was King of the Greeks from 1922 to 1924 and from 1935 to 1947. In 1936 he supported the dictatorship of Ioannis Metaxas (1936-1941) which made him unpopular both on the left and in the centre. He died six months after his return to Greece.



The Hellenic Literary and Historical Archive, Athens.



The *Evzone* holds a placard that reads: "Ballot paper King George II". In the foreground two "uncouth" quiver-looking men, one wearing a red shirt with the insignia KK (Communist Party) the other holding a blood-stained dagger, are running away. The caption reads: "This is what they are scared of. This is what you should vote: the King".



*Evzone* – name of several historical elite light infantry and mountain units of the Greek Army. Today, it refers to the members of the Presidential Guard.



Compare I-27A and I-28B with regard to the presence of the monarchy in Bulgaria and Greece. Follow the following steps on "reading" these visual sources: describe the image, decipher the symbols, refer to the context, and discuss the meaning and the power of each one. Compare the situation in the two neighbouring countries. Try to find similar material.

### I-29. Law on the expropriation of large-size urban realty in Bulgaria, 15 April 1948

Article 1. Large-size urban realty [immovable property] shall refer to such corporeal realty within the limits of urban development plans, owned by private individuals or the State, that is not intended to satisfy the housing needs of its owners, to provide necessary additional income or to cover direct economic needs, but to yield rent income from capital invested in such realty.

Article 2. Any roofed corporeal realty (whether built-up or vacant), situated within the building-development limits of urban settlements, in excess of one or two, owned by the members of any single family, shall be expropriated and shall remain state property, i.e. all-people's property, as specified in the articles below. The corporeal realty of workers, acquired or built to satisfy the housing needs of their families or to provide additional income for the maintenance of their families shall not be expropriated.

*Държавен вестник* [State Gazette], no. 87, 15 April 1948.

### I-30. Transition from a one-party to a multi-party system in Turkey



Following the end of the Second World War, the Republican People's Party (*Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi*, CHP), which hitherto enjoyed a monopoly of power, began to take the first steps towards the gradual transition to a multi-party political system in order to demonstrate the country's adherence to Western democratic principles. In this context, it allowed the establishment of opposition parties so that a representative parliamentary system could be set up. The elections of 1950, which the CHP lost, constitute a turning point in Turkey's political history.

### A. Speech of İsmet İnönü, 1947

The control carried out by the Great Assembly over taxes and the spending income of the people in each tax year is precise and perceptive enough and does not lag behind that of the most advanced democratic nations. Our only shortcoming is the absence of a party against the ruling party.

Naturally, there will still be a time period of a year and a half until the new elections. [...] The majority vote of the people will determine the power that will prevail in the elections of 1947, hopefully after a single round. Until then, we cannot know if an opposition party can be established or not and if it is established whether it will first appear in or out of the Great Assembly. What we know is that it would be much more constructive for the interests and the political maturity of the nation if those who disagree in matters of principle and implementation take a stand openly according to their beliefs and programs within a political body, rather than operating in factions.

İnönü, 1946, vol. 1, pp. 388-389.



İsmet İnönü (1884-1973) was the first prime minister after the establishment of the Republic of Turkey (1923) and the second president after the death of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, enjoying the title of "national chief". As leader of the CHP, he lost the first free elections in 1950 but, after the military coup of 1960, he returned to power as prime minister in 1961. He stayed in office until 1965. In 1972 he lost the party's leadership to Bülent Ecevit.

### B. Election poster of the Democrat Party in Turkey, 1950



The Democrat Party (*Demokrat Parti*, DP) won the elections of 14 May 1950 with a 55.2% share of the vote (the CHP receiving 39.6%) and repeated its success at the elections of 1954 (57%) and of 1957 (47.87%). The DP espoused the principles of market economy and freedom of faith against the statism and harsh versions of secularism. Its electoral base comprised mostly the peasantry but also the middle classes. The religious rhetoric of the party and its dynamism resonated well with the electorate and led to the appearance and eventually the consolidation



of conservative Islam as the opposite pole to the Kemalist and military establishment. In the context of the Cold War, Islam along with economic liberalism was an important barrier to communism in the Middle East. The 1950s are considered by Kemalist intellectuals as the period of "counter-revolution".



Enough! The people will decide!  
DEMOCRAT PARTY.

Creator Selçuk Milar. Kerim Han Milar private collection.

## ► I.2.2. Opposition

### I-31. Main instructions and guidelines on the work of Croatian Resistance in the Homeland

The Mission of the Croatian Resistance Abroad considers the Croatian Armed Forces in the Homeland [guerrilla fighters] as the most important and most effective factor in the struggle for the defence of the Croatian people and the Croatian state against communism and Yugoslavia. The Croatian Armed Forces must be the avant-garde, that is, the only leader and organiser of armed resistance in the Homeland as well as the main supporter and regulator of Croatian activities abroad. When they become organised and effective, only then they can attract foreign attention to the Croatian cause and bring about effective assistance. For this reason, utmost attention and care should be devoted to the organisation of the Croatian Armed Forces.

1. THE MAIN TASK OF THE CROATIAN ARMED FORCES (WOODS) The main task of the Croatian Armed Forces is the political and military preparation of a general national uprising and its implementation. The indirect task is to disturb, corrode, destroy the occupier's present system, create disorder, confusion and fear within its ranks, and to boost and maintain the faith and morale of the Croatian people.

2. METHODS AND MANNER OF WORK The manner of work must be completely conspiratorial, i.e. based on complete secrecy, with respect to persons (code names), organisation and activities. This is why SECRECY is the most important prerequisite in its work, and betrayal of the secret is treason. Let our rule be: Do not speak or ask things that should not be spoken or asked! In keeping with this, one should exercise great caution with enemy informers and most robustly prevent enemy infiltration in our ranks.

Radelić, 2011, p. 59.



At the end of the Second World War, members of the defeated military formations fled from Yugoslavia. However, some of these (mainly Ustasha and Chetnik formations) remained in the country and continued to fight against the new authorities, while other units were occasionally infiltrated into the country over the next few years for the purpose of instigating an uprising against the communist authorities. The Ustasha formations also became known as the *Križari* (Crusaders). With a →

series of well organised military and police activities Yugoslav authorities prevented the development of the Crusaders' movement. However, although the Crusaders were mostly active in 1945-1946, the last guerrilla actions were recorded as late as 1952.



Which are the two goals of the Croatian Armed Forces in the Homeland highlighted in the instructions?

### I-32. Report of the Assistant-Minister of Internal Affairs General Yonko Panov on the Bulgarian Orthodox Church, 25 June 1949

1. Despite several changes in its composition and the resignation of former Exarch Stefan, from 9 September 1944 to-date the Supreme Authority of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church, the Holy Synod, has been reactionary and opposition-minded towards all measures of the Fatherland Front government. [...] This is apparent from the evidence submitted to the service, which show that metropolitans and priests are active disseminators of various malicious rumours, that they agitate for war, that they cultivate fear and uncertainty among the population, that they slander the government, that they campaign against the labour-cooperative farms, the brigades of voluntary workers, as well as against the educational policy, the economic plan, etc., while even resorting to extreme forms of resistance – banditry and espionage.

2. The Synod has become a place of concentration and a refuge for fascist elements. The Synod and the metropolitans have appointed under their authority many dismissed officers, discharged lawyers and other malicious enemies of the government. [...] In light of the above, we propose that the following measures be taken against the Church in order to neutralise its hostile attitude towards the government: a) In the first place, some changes should be made in the Holy Synod. A minimal purge in the top ranks will scare the rest of the metropolitans, from whom commitments to the Fatherland Front government could be extracted, and will encourage the progressive clergy.

[...] b) Dismiss four or five persons, who actively show themselves as reactionary clerics, from each eparchy by applying the Denominations Act. [...] c) Ensure that trusted Fatherland Front clerics and laymen obtain key positions in the Church.

[http://www.pravoslavieto.com/history/20/1949\\_doklad.htm](http://www.pravoslavieto.com/history/20/1949_doklad.htm), accessed on 16.09.2016.



During the communist period in Bulgaria there was a persistent tendency to replace the composition of the Church and its representatives, particularly those who were sincerely devout, with pseudo-religious structures directly connected to the security services, and with people who were trusted by the Party. This tendency was a direct consequence of the CPB's general cultural policy of cultivating secularism and atheism in line with the Marxist-Leninist fight against religious anachronisms and delusions. Anyone who was religious or active in religious affairs was regarded as suspect, reactionary, retrograde and as violating the ideological purity of the regime. That is why many devout clerics were persecuted, sent to labour camps, kept under surveillance by the security services and restricted in their preaching and ritual activities.

### I-33. Letter by Catholic bishops, Zagreb, 20 September 1945

We, the Catholic bishops, gathered at plenary conferences in Zagreb, believe it is our duty as shepherds to send out a few words to you, our beloved believers. [...] During the war, a large number of priests perished, not so much in combat operations as through death sentence by the present military and civilian authorities. When the war ended, death sentences of priests did not stop. According to our information, the numbers are as follows: 243 died, 169 languish in prisons and camps, and 89 are missing. In addition, 19 clergymen, three lay monks and four nuns were killed. [...] The agrarian reform, which was legalised in the Provisional People's Assembly, is a great injustice to the Catholic Church. Land owned by the Church was obtained in a legal and just manner. The Church did not use it for the illegal acquisition of new assets. The Church used it to support its employees. [...] That is why we ask, and we will never, under any circumstances, cease asking for complete

freedom for the Catholic press, complete freedom for Catholic schools, complete freedom for religious education in all junior grades of secondary schools, complete freedom for Catholic associations, freedom for Catholic charity work, complete freedom for individuals and their inalienable rights, full respect for the institution of Christian marriage, the return of all seized institutions. Only under these conditions will the circumstances in our country return to normal and lasting peace will be achieved.

Ranilović, 1997, pp. 17-31.



Because of allegations that Catholic priests had cooperated with the Ustasha authorities of the Independent State of Croatia, which in many cases were correct (though there were several priests also in the Partisan movement), after taking over power the communists embarked upon an ideological and economic showdown with the Catholic Church. Church property and land was seized and a large number of clergymen met a tragic fate. In view of the above, the Conference of Yugoslav Catholic Bishops sent a so-called Pastoral Letter to their flock in September 1945, warning them of the new circumstances facing the Catholic Church. It should be noted that the communist authorities treated in the same manner other religious communities as well, especially those whose members during the war had cooperated with the occupation forces or the collaborationist regimes.

### I-34. Changes in the State's financial support for the Church in Romania

#### A. Extracts from Law no. 77/1948 on the general regime of religious cults

Art. 33. The contravention to the laws regarding the democratic order of the People's Republic of Romania can entail a total or partial withdrawal of state subsidies. Religious officials with antidemocratic attitudes could be temporarily or definitively deprived of state remuneration [...]. Art. 35. The institution of ecclesiastical patronage, dealing with property coming from private persons or any institution, remains abolished. Art. 36. The wealth of the cults that disappeared or are no longer acknowledged belongs to the state de jure [...]. Art. 59. The churches and military

chapels, with their stocks, become the property of the parishes of the same cult to which they belong. The Episcopal cathedral of the military clergy from Alba-lulia, along with its patrimony, becomes the property of the Romanian Orthodox Bishopric of Cluj, Vad and Feleac.

Government Gazette, Part I, no. 178 (4 August 1948), pp. 6392-6396.

### B. Decision no. 34345/1948 of the Minister of Cults

Considering the stipulation of Art. 33 of Law no. 77 on the general regime of religious cults, we accordingly decide: [...] As of 7 September 1948, and because of their undemocratic attitudes, state remuneration is definitively removed in the case of the following priests: Simonich Maximilian, from the Roman Catholic parish of Freidorf, county of Timiș-Torontal [today county of Timiș]; Farkaș Ioan, from the Roman Catholic parish of Otelec, county of Timiș-Torontal [today county of Timiș]. Minister, Stanciu Stoian.

Government Gazette, Part I, no. 211 (11 September 1948), p. 7520.



Article 36 was mainly applied in the case of the Eastern Catholic Church (by decree no. 358/2 December 1948), which at the time had an estimated 1.5 million followers and represented the major target of communist repression.



1. What were the allegations against religious officials and clergymen in the cases of Croatia (Yugoslavia), Romania and Bulgaria?

Find the relevant expressions.

2. Why do you think the communist regimes opposed the religious sentiments of people? Were these allegations only a product of the clash between communist ideology and religion or were there other reasons stemming from specific events during the war?

3. Which are the similarities and differences between the above-mentioned countries? Present your ideas based on the source material and your knowledge.

### I-35. The Albanian Ministry of Interior reporting to the Council of Ministers on the “subversive activity” of Riza Dani, a leading member of the first anti-communist opposition, 26 September 1946

PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF ALBANIA  
MINISTRY OF INTERIOR  
DIRECTORATE OF STATE SECURITY  
Tirana 26 September 1946

No. 05-3416. Prot. Res.

TO THE PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE

On 9 September 1946, at 2 am, a group of opposition elements and several deluded peasants attacked unexpectedly Shkodra town with a view to overthrowing the state authority, seizing control of the town and ransacking it.

The undertaking failed. Our forces eliminated within a short period all opposition plans.

Under these circumstances, the State Security authorities commenced investigations, from which it turned out that the initiators of this criminal act are from the middle and high social strata, had already attacked the reforms [we have implemented], and are connected with war criminals and the people's enemies, such as Jup Kazazi, as well as with elements that are fully committed against the People's Power.

Pursuant to the [interrogation] of some of the main arrested individuals, it emerges that one of those responsible is Riza Dani, a representative of Shkodra town in the People's Assembly. This individual had participated in a meeting as a Muslim representative, given that also several other so-called representatives of certain Shkodra areas were participating. In this meeting, which was opened by Riza Dani himself, it was decided to overthrow the People's Power by force, to establish an opposition organisation called “Albanian Union” with foreign agents against the interests of our country, to lead such opposition activities by mobilising each of them in his own district and placing everything at the disposal of such an undertaking.

Taking into account the victims and the consequences of this criminal undertaking, taking into account the security and the true testimonies of the arrested individuals held accountable, taking into account the guilt and responsibility of Riza Dani and the need for fast legal proceedings, we submit to the Presidium of

the People's Assembly the request for lifting the parliamentary immunity of the above-mentioned person.

MINISTER  
(Koçi Xoxe)

AQSH, f. 489, v.1946, d. 170, fl. 4.



Riza Dani (1884-1949) was a politician and activist who had participated in politics since the Albanian revolt against the Ottomans. During the war he was involved in the Albanian

resistance (National Liberation Movement). In 1945 he was elected representative in the Constitutional Assembly. He criticised the constitution as non-democratic. Dani was one of the main figures of the so-called Group of Representatives. On 14 May 1947, after lifting their parliamentary immunity, ten members of the Group were arrested, including Dani. The court sentenced him to death. He was executed two years later.

### ► I.2.3. Repression

#### I-36. Draža Mihailović's trial and execution

Belgrade, 10 June 1946

##### INDICTMENT

##### 1. Dragoljub MIHAILOVIĆ - DRAŽA, [...]

From the investigation material, it can be seen that:

First, the accused Dragoljub Mihailović and his associates, initially covertly and then openly, collaborated with the fascist German occupiers in the struggle against the liberation movement of the peoples of Yugoslavia. Among Mihailović's associates are Slobodan Jovanović and others (from section 1/G of the deposition), who were abroad for the duration of the war, enjoying the hospitality of the allied countries. They too helped the occupiers in quelling the liberation struggle of the peoples of Yugoslavia, although seemingly this may appear paradoxical. They helped the occupier in view of the fact that, together with the accused Mihailović, they were in charge of the treacherous Chetnik organisation which, under their leadership, openly collaborated with the occupiers in the struggle against the liberation movement of Yugoslavia.

All efforts of these lackeys and aides of the occupiers during the war and the occupation had one and the same goal. Their common goal completely coincided with the goal of the German fascist occupiers: to crush the liberation struggle of the peoples of Yugoslavia.

[...] That is why today they stand together before the just court of the peoples of Yugoslavia and they will have to account for their treacherous and criminal deeds.

DEATH TO FASCISM – FREEDOM TO THE PEOPLE

Stand-in Military Prosecutor of the YUGOSLAV ARMY  
Colonel Miloš Minić

Zečević, 2001, pp. 110-232; <http://www.znaci.net/00001/60.htm>, accessed on 16.09.2016.



General Dragoljub (Draža) Mihailović (27 April 1893 – 17 July 1946) was the leader of the Chetniks in the Second World War and Minister of the Army, Navy and Air Force of the Yugoslav government-in-exile in 1942-1944. First he fought against the invaders and then against Yugoslav partisans in cooperation with the occupiers. His trial opened on 10 June 1946. Of 47 counts, Mihailović was convicted on eight counts, mainly for "crimes against the National Liberation Movement." He was executed on 17 July 1946. The process of his rehabilitation was initiated in 2006 before the High Court in Belgrade, and the first hearing was held in 2010. Finally, in 2015, he was rehabilitated.

#### I-37. Case against Stepinac

6/1946 IN THE NAME OF THE PEOPLE! The accused Dr Alojzije Stepinac, born on 8 May 1898 in Krašić, son of the late Josip and Barbara née Penić, a Croat, citizen of the FPRY, Archbishop of Zagreb and President of the Bishops' Conferences, currently in prison, has been found GUILTY: Of the crime under count 1 for establishing political cooperation with the enemy during the war and enemy occupation under Article 3, item 6 of the Law on Criminal Offences against the People and the State. Of the crime under count 2 for collaborating on the forced conversion of the peoples of Yugoslavia under Article 3, item 3 of the same Law. Of the crimes under count 3 for helping armed military formations, comprised of Yugoslav citizens, to serve the enemy and fighting together with the enemy against his country under Article 3, item 4 of the same Law. Of the crimes under count 4 for engaging in

political cooperation with the enemy during the war and enemy occupation under Article 3, item 6 of the same Law. And of the crimes under count 5 for helping the organisation of armed gangs and their infiltration in the territory of the state for the purpose of violently threatening the existing state order of the FPRY under Article 3, item 7 of the same Law as well as the crime of slander of the people's authorities. The accused Dr Alojzije Stepinac is hereby CONVICTED: Under Article 4, paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Law on Criminal Offences against the People and the State is hereby sentenced to 16 (sixteen) years imprisonment with hard labour and is deprived of his political and human rights for a period of 5 (five) years. Time spent in pre-trial detention, from 18 September 1946 to 11 October 1946, shall be deducted from his sentence.

<http://www.zupa-stepinac.org/sudjenje/105-blazeni-alojzije-stepinac/sudjenje/170-5-u-ime-naroda>, accessed on 15.03.2016.



Accused for supporting the Ustasha regime, forcefully converting Orthodox Serbs into Catholicism, as well as helping groups of "Crusaders" (see doc. I-31) after the end of the war, the Archbishop of Zagreb Alojzije Stepinac was in 1946 taken to court and sentenced to 16 years in prison. Five years later, he was placed under house arrest and died in 1960. In the meantime, Pope Pius XII made him cardinal, which resulted in worsening relations between Yugoslav communists and the Catholic Church and the breaking up of diplomatic relations with the Vatican. After the disintegration of Yugoslavia, the Holy See beatified Stepinac (1998). Stepinac remains a highly controversial historical figure since the dominant Croatian historiography considers him as a martyr of the communist regime and a victim of historical circumstances while Serbian historiography holds him accountable for cooperation with the Ustasha authorities. For the controversies about Stepinac see Workbook 4, doc. I-47 and I-48.

### I-38. The trial and fate of Nikola Petkov



In early 1945, Nikola Petkov expressed disagreement with the political line of the Bulgarian Workers' Party [renamed as Bulgarian Communist Party in 1948] and left the ruling Fatherland Front coalition. He became the leader of a new agrarian party, the Bulgarian Agrarian National Union-Nikola



Petkov (BANU-Nikola Petkov) which spearheaded the anticommunist opposition in Bulgaria a few months later. The agrarian political movement has deep traditions in Bulgarian social life. Its history before the Second World War is associated above all with the name of the founder and ideologue of the BANU, Alexander Stamboliiski. The BANU's political programme was based on his theory, according to which Bulgarian society was made up of several "estates", the main one being the so-called "working estate" of the peasantry and workers. Although it constituted more than 80% of the population at the beginning of the 20th century, the peasantry in Bulgaria was oppressed and exploited by the minority "urban estate groups" – the educated, the capitalists, the bureaucracy and the military. The peasant majority was assigned a leading role in Stamboliiski's utopian visions for a new social system and new political life in Bulgaria. Driven by those ideas, in the early 1920s the government of Alexander Stamboliiski undertook several important economic and social reforms which were cut short by the 9 June 1923 coup d'état and his assassination. The political conditions in Bulgaria after 9 September 1944 steered the ideological development of the opposition BANU-Nikola Petkov in a different direction: in its confrontation with the communists, the Union turned into a political formation that defended democracy and liberal values in general. On 5 August 1947 Nikola Petkov was put on a show trial on trumped-up charges. On 16 August he was sentenced to death by hanging on the principal charge of espionage. His death sentence was carried out on 23 September. The site of his grave remains unknown to this day. Nikola Petkov was rehabilitated posthumously on 15 January 1990.

#### A. Last plea by Petkov, on 14 August 1947

"Being certain that you will be guided exclusively by the truth and by your judicial conscience, I hope you will issue against me a verdict of acquittal. [...] I have never engaged or thought of engaging in illegal activity against the people's government after 9 September 1944, in the creation of which both the Bulgarian Agrarian National Union and I personally participated. [...] I have never been engaged in serving any reaction, be it internal or foreign. [...] For two years now, since 25 July 1945, a most vicious and merciless campaign has been waged against me. [...] No aspect of my public, personal and private life has been spared. I have been

buried symbolically three times in Sofia and dozens of times in the provinces. I have seen my own obituary at the entrance of the Sofia cemetery and I have attended one such burial..."

Vergnet and Bernard-Derosne, in Cvetkov, 1991, pp. 123-132.


### B. Two French journalists describe the atmosphere in which the death sentence was pronounced

As for the verdict, it was to be delivered any moment now. Undoubtedly, it had already been reached. A heavy silence had descended upon the courtroom. This is always the case when a bad premonition precedes a bad deed. Such an atmosphere was fitting for the judicial crime that was about to be committed. The judges concluded their deliberations. Everyone in the courtroom stood up, including the accused and their defence counsels. It was precisely in this tragic silence

that the presiding judge read the verdict in a solemn voice: "Nikola Petkov, in the name of the Bulgarian people, you are sentenced to death by hanging!" On the bench among the accused, it took the condemned man only an instant to recover all his courage as a fighter. His body crumpled, he tensed as if to jump, his face went red with fury. "In the name of the people?" Those words he couldn't accept. He could accept his own condemnation to death, but he couldn't accept those words which also condemned his country and insulted him. And he cried out in a loud voice: "No! Not in the name of the Bulgarian people! You are condemning me to death on the orders of your foreign masters, those from the Kremlin or elsewhere. Smothered under a bloody tyranny which you have disguised as justice, the Bulgarian people will never believe it..." The presiding judge made a sign. The militia pounced on Petkov and dragged him out of the courtroom.

Vergnet and Bernard-Derosne, in Cvetkov, 1991, pp. 123-132.

## I-39. The trial and fate of Traicho Kostov



Archive anamnesis.info.



The Tito-Stalin split of 1948 had a direct impact on relations between the Soviet Union and Bulgaria. In the autumn of 1948, a State Secrets Act entered into force in Bulgaria. Under its provisions, Traicho Kostov, a key figure in the country's post-war government, member of the Politburo of the Bulgarian Workers' Party (Communists) and Minister of Electrification, issued instructions that the provision of economic information to Soviet economic experts should no longer be direct, but should be channelled through him. Suspecting that Bulgaria might follow Yugoslavia's example, Stalin voiced strong displeasure with this situation. In December 1948, Kostov's position was officially censured at a meeting of the Politburo of the BWP (C). The trial against Kostov was part of the Soviet Union's international campaign launched in the early spring of 1949 against Tito and "Titoists" in all socialist countries. On 27 March 1949, a plenum of the CC of the BCP accused Kostov of anti-Soviet activity and decided that he was to be dismissed from the Politburo and the government. The trial opened on 7 December 1949, on fabricated evidence and trumped-up charges of "treason and espionage" in collaboration with British and Yugoslav intelligence services. Kostov was tried along with ten co-defendants; 51 witnesses were called and six expert commissions were appointed for the trial. On 14 December 1949 the court sentenced the chief culprit, Traicho Kostov, to death, with



deprivation of civil and political rights for life, a fine of 1,000,000 leva and confiscation of all his property. The others were sentenced according to the gravity of the offence: five were sentenced to imprisonment in close confinement for life, three to imprisonment in close confinement for 15 years, and two to imprisonment in close confinement for 12 years. All were also subject to confiscation of all their property, and fines ranging from 1,000,000 to 200,000 *leva* depending on the gravity of the offence. On that day Traicho Kostov made his last plea before the court in response to the charges: "In my last plea to the honourable court, I consider it the duty of my conscience to declare to the court, and through it to the Bulgarian public, that I have never been at the service of British Intelligence, that I have never taken part in the criminal conspiratorial plans of Tito and his clique, that I have always had an attitude of respect and esteem for the Soviet Union."

The death sentence was carried out on 16 December 1949. Following the change in the BCP's policy after the death of Stalin, and especially after the 20th Congress of the CPSU and the April Plenum of the BCP in 1956, Traicho Kostov was rehabilitated. In 1963 he was posthumously awarded the honorary title of Hero of Socialist Labour and the Hammer and Sickle Gold Medal.

## I-40. Treatment of Catholics in Albania

### A. Zef Pllumi on the closing down of a Catholic monastery

Before we got out of the Convent, one of the officials delivered a brief speech, addressed particularly to us, the young students. He stated that for us this was a day of freedom from these dark walls and that from now on we would become part of the proper youth enjoying the benefits of socialism. Hence, he claimed, you should not look back and be influenced by the reactionary opinions of the Franciscan clergy, because the Party follows you vigilantly in every step of your life. After registering all addresses of the places we would go in those first three days, they left us in the court before the Convent of the Franciscan Church. We could neither cry nor turn our head back just because of fear: the Party's eyes were watching us.

By midday, everything was over. All of us, humble and without whispering a single word, dispersed towards the places of which we had written down the

address. I went to Melgushe, where I had my uncle. It took three hours to go there on foot. It appeared as if all had their eyes upon me. It was likely to be true. But no one in the city had the courage to come near me and speak to me.

### B. Zef Pllumi on the starting of the communist persecution against Catholics

On 14 November 1946 the Franciscan Convent of Gjuhadol was surrounded early in the morning. Usually we friars woke up so early before dawn, that in Shkodra they used to say: "Friars wake up earlier than devils". As soon as Father Ferdinand Pali and Friar Ndou were ready to open the doors, they found partisan guards, who did not allow them either to go out or to open the doors. Before 8 am, Officer Dul Rrjodhi appeared with a military team. They ordered all to gather at the canteen. They themselves controlled the Convent. After finishing the first control by midday, they ordered us not to go out of the canteen without their consent, not even to the toilet. [...] Father Aleks Baqli acted as [our leader]. He spoke to Dul about religious service in the Church and community life. Dul decided that we should sleep each in his own room. Thus, after waking up according to the schedule of religious services that the people knew, the Church was to be closed, we should stay all day long in the canteen with a policeman at the door and another one across the corridor, while in the evening we had to turn back to our rooms and sleep. [...] In order to buy food, Father Aleks used to go to the market accompanied by a policeman. The chief guard was a certain Smajl Sheme; forgive me God, but he was half animal and half man. [...] When he wanted to shout at any of us, he used to say: "Christ! Hey Christ!". One day I asked him: "Do you know who Christ is?"; and he replied: "A filthy fascist just like you".

Pllumi, 1995, pp. 90, 106.



Father Zef Pllumi (1924-2007) was a Franciscan friar, publicist and writer. He served in the Shkodra district, in northern Albania. In 1946 he was arrested and sent to prison, where he stayed until 1949. In 1967, precisely the year when the communist power of Enver Hoxha would close down all religious institutions, churches and mosques, and when Albania would proclaim itself "the only atheist country in the world", Father Zef Pllumi was arrested again and remained in prison until 1989. The communist regime pursued a fierce policy against religious communities in



Albania (Muslim, Orthodox and Catholic) by completely banning their activities in 1967. Father Zef Pllum experienced an even harsher persecution, since the Catholic clergy was considered the “most dangerous secret agent of the capitalist West” taking into account also the direct relations it maintained with the Vatican.

### I-41. Decree abolishing the Faculty of Theology from the University of Ljubljana, 1952

Government of the People's Republic of Slovenia  
Council for Education and Culture, Ljubljana, 4 March 1952

Number I.1147/1

To the Dean's Office of the Faculty of Theology  
Ljubljana

Pursuant to constitutional provisions on the separation of the Church from the State, we hereby inform you that the Faculty of Theology shall cease to be a government institution as of 31 June this year and thereby, as of this date, all the budgetary and other obligations of the Council towards your Faculty shall cease. All ensuing problems in this regard should be resolved through the Committee for Religion of the Presidency of the Government of the People's Republic of Slovenia.

## ► I.3. THE GREEK CIVIL WAR

The Greek Civil War (March 1946 to August 1949) was one of Greece's bloodiest and most traumatic armed conflicts in the 20th century. It pitted the Greek National Army (GNA) against the Democratic Army of Greece (DSE), which was under the control of the Communist Party of Greece (KKE). The war began in spring 1946 with a number of scattered local clashes, chiefly between guerrilla bands and forces of the gendarmerie and paramilitary units. In December 1946 the guerrilla bands were amalgamated into a unified body, the DSE. The escalation of the clashes and the involvement of the GNA from spring 1947 onwards gradually led to a full scale civil war, a development aided by the transformation of the DSE from a guerrilla to a “regular” army and

Death to fascism - freedom to the people!

Secretary of the Committee for Science and Higher Education

Mirko Tušek

Archives of the Republic of Slovenia. Collection of the Presidency of Government of Peoples Republic of Slovenia. Box No. 19, Folder 442-52.



In the aftermath of the Second World War, one of the founding faculties of the University of Ljubljana, the Faculty of Theology constantly came under pressure. Immediately after the war, half of the lecturers at the faculty were barred from practising their profession while their publications were included in the list of banned books. As early as 1946, the first proposal for abolishing the faculty was put forward. Three years later, it became “independent” and was not allowed to participate in the university decision-making process. On 4 March 1952, the Council for Education and Culture sent a letter to the faculty, informing it that it would no longer be “a government institution”. In this way, the Faculty lost the right to issue graduation degrees, which were considered invalid in Yugoslavia; however, they were recognised abroad. Despite the fact that the faculty functioned as a private institution until 1991, the government, nonetheless, reserved the right to reject the faculty's officials and professors.

the establishment of the Provisional Democratic Government (PDG) by senior figures of the KKE in late December 1947.

The Greek Civil War was fought mainly in the provinces, in northern Greece and the Peloponnese, away from urban centres. The DSE comprised mostly men from the countryside, but as the war progressed and recruits dwindled, the forced recruitment of women became the norm – a unique phenomenon in Greek society.

The Greek Civil War was the first international armed conflict of the Cold War era with global dimensions. The GNA enjoyed the substantial organisational and material aid, initially of Britain and then of the United States. On the other hand, the DSE was supported by neighbouring socialist countries (Albania, Bulgaria

and Yugoslavia), which provided material aid as well as a safe haven for regrouping and a base from where fresh attacks against the GNA were carried out. A decisive factor in the war's progress was the Tito-Stalin split of 1948, which led Tito to close his country's borders with Greece on 10 July 1949 and discontinue Yugoslav support to the Greek communists.

The Greek Civil War ended in August 1949 with the defeat of the DSE at a human cost of more than 50,000 dead, thousands of political refugees, who initially took shelter in neighbouring socialist countries (Albania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia), before settling in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Rumania, and the Soviet Union, and hundreds of thousands of villagers relocated by the GNA to the outskirts of towns in a concerted attempt to deprive the DSE of manpower and resources in the mountainous areas it operated.

### I-42. Resolution Three on “Extraordinary measures concerning public order and security”, 1946

RESOLUTION III On extraordinary measures concerning Public order and security

Article 1 §1. Whoever, in order to detach part of [Greece's] territory or facilitate plans to that effect, conspired in or incited an insurrection or came to an understanding with alien nationals or set up armed bands or took part in such traitorous unions is sentenced to death.

Article 2 §1. Whoever sets up or participates in a group that uses force against the Authorities Public or Religious, the Security Services and local government employees or members of the allied armies is sentenced to death.

Article 9 §1. While the present [Resolution] is in force, the Police can: a) Undertake day and night searches [without a warrant] for the discovery of weapons, explosives, ammunition or the arrest of suspects; and b) Impose a curfew overnight.

Government Gazette, A-197 (18.6.1946).



Enacted by the right-wing dominated National Assembly, Resolution Three on “Extraordinary measures concerning public order and security” severely curtailed civil liberties and introduced the death penalty for “political crimes”. British officials in Athens estimated that between July 1946 and early

→

1950 some 3,000 political prisoners were executed following sentences by special courts-martial.

### I-43. General Tsakalotos on the organisation of the governmental defence against the communist guerrillas

Struggles by bandits or resistance struggles against internal enemies were widespread in the last world war. We have to admit that this will certainly be the case in a future one as well, in combination with [the use of] paratroopers and the supplying of the bandits by [enemy aircraft].

Carried out by small forces, these sui generis struggles have an advantage in that they cause disproportionate destruction, disruption, and general misery. In countries affected by such struggles, morale is shattered and there is a possibility that the front might disintegrate as result of the disruption of communication lines from the rear to the front. [...]

Therefore, the first measure of defence [one should take] is to timely and without mercy annihilate the leadership so that combat bandit units are left ungovernable and are swiftly crushed by the thunderous offensive of massive forces. Because however the communists do not easily get disappointed, even after they have been crushed, vigilance is of the utmost importance. They should be placed under the constant watch of special Gendarme units and properly equipped and staffed villagers so that even the slightest attempt at reorganisation is nipped in the bud. All the above purely military measures on dealing with the bandits will not be effective as long as the socio-economic aspects of the issue are not studied and addressed, given that the communist leadership recruits its supporters from the deprived classes and among underprivileged and malcontent citizens.

Tsakalotos, 1960, vol. II, pp. 327, 328.



Thrasylvoulos Tsakalatos (1897-1989) was a Greek Army Lieutenant General who saw action in the Asia Minor Campaign of 1919-1922, the Greco-Italian War of 1940-1941 and the December Events of 1944 in Athens. During the civil war he headed a unit that carried out demanding missions against DSE strongholds. As an army officer he maintained a special relationship with his troops, never failing to encourage them. In 1983 he met the leader of the DSE Markos Vafiadis in a gesture aiming at national reconciliation.

### I-44. Casualties of the Greek Civil War

General Total of Casualties

	Government Forces		Communists
	Officers	Privates	
Dead	651	7,789	38,421
Wounded	1,708	27,788	----
Missing	186	5,620	----
Prisoners	----	----	23,960
Surrendered	----	----	21,544
TOTAL	2,545	40,837	83,925

From the official data of the Army General Staff: Zafeiropoulos, 1946, p. 670.  
 Note: The Table depicts human casualties among combatants alone.

### I-45. Communist guerrillas attack the town of Naousa, 13 January 1949



DSE attacked and captured Naousa (northern Greece) on 11-13 January. After three days of fighting they were dislodged by government troops. In the fighting all the factories, many public

buildings and shops were destroyed. DSE forces selectively destroyed the houses which belonged to wealthy people and the "enemies". They also killed or executed 24 citizens, among them the mayor.



Associated Press (AP) Photo.

**I-46. Internally displaced persons, Epirus 1947-1948**

It is estimated that during the civil war more than 700,000 people (about 10% of the total population), mostly children, women and the elderly, moved or were moved from their communities

in the battlefronts. As internally displaced persons, the Athens government placed them in make-shift tin or wooden barracks and army tents in the outskirts of towns or in villages under its control.



Photograph by Voula Papaioannou. Displaced people from the Civil War in temporary lodgings. Epirus, 1947-48.

© Benaki Museum Photographic Archive [B.254.2].

## I-47. Displaced children



As in other instances of 20th-century fratricide struggles in Europe, during the Greek Civil War children at the battlefield experienced voluntary and forced separation from their families, as well as institutionalisation. As yet, there is no agreement on the exact numbers of displaced children. It is estimated that some 14,000 were “evacuated” by the DSE to communist countries, while another 18,000 were placed by the Greek government in the thirty or so Children’s Camps that were set up under the auspices of Queen Frederica. The fortune of these children constitutes one of the most confrontational and traumatising legacies of the civil war. For years on end each side accused the other of kidnapping children from their families, at the same time condemning the living conditions

the children had to endure and the education they received. For post-civil war governments, the KKE’s *paidomazoma* (mass kidnapping of children) aimed at their de-hellenisation and their becoming communists. The Greek government brought accusations against KKE to the UN Special Committee on the Balkans in February 1948. As a consequence, several UN General Assembly resolutions appealed for the repatriation of children evacuated by KKE to their homes. For its part, the KKE regarded the Children’s Camps as “Hitlerite sites”, as centres of brain washing and cheap labour. In the context of the Cold War, these accusations and counter-accusations were played out in a wide range of propagandistic material (pamphlets, photographs, press articles, etc.).

### A. Queen Frederica holding a child



Leaflet published by the Committee of Greek Women (Comité des Femmes Grecques), Thessaloniki, n.d. (probably in the early 1950s).

### B. Greek children in the People’s Republics



*If you really love us, bring peace to Greece*, leaflet issued by Greek Committee to Aid the Children (EVOP), 1950.

### C. World reunion of the former children refugees in Skopje, 1988



Of the 25,000 political refugees who settled in Yugoslavia, the majority came from the Slav-Macedonian minority<sup>1</sup> of the Greek region of Macedonia. In 1988, on the occasion of the 40th anniversary of these events, the capital of the Socialist Republic of Macedonia, Skopje, hosted the first world reunion of the former children refugees from “Aegean Macedonia”. During the three-day programme, a monument dedicated to the mothers who had been separated from their children was revealed in the *Park of the Fighting Woman*.

1. Regarding the name of the ethnic Macedonian minority, the KKE used different ethnonyms such as Slav-Macedonians, Macedonians and Slavs.



*Den na razdelenite. Prva svetska sredba na decata begalci od Egejskiot del na Makedonija Skopje 1948-1988* [The Day of Separation. The First World Reunion of the Children Refugees from the Aegean Part of Macedonia. Skopje 1948-1988], 1993, p. 19.

## I-48. The Greek Civil War and neighbouring countries

### A. An agreement between the Central Committee of the CPY (Communist Party of Yugoslavia) and the Central Committee of the KKE, 14 October 1946



In October 1946, the National Liberation Front (*Narodno Osloboditelen Front*, NOF), which had been formed in the People's Republic of Macedonia (a constituent republic of the Yugoslav Federation) a year earlier, joined its forces with the KKE and participated in operations in Greek Macedonia, a region which it called "Aegean Macedonia". For its part, and following its siding with Moscow in the Tito-Stalin split, in January 1949 the KKE issued a decision in favour of the inalienable right of the "Macedonian (Slav-Macedonian) people for its full national restoration as it wishes itself" (5th Plenum) in an effort to entice Slav speakers of Greek Macedonia to the ranks of the DSE. However, the KKE's new policy met with Tito's decision to cease support to the Greek communists, as well as with charges of "national treason" from within the KKE and Greece itself.

1. The Macedonian party organisation in Aegean Macedonia fully joins the KKE.

Comrade Paskal Mitrevski, who has thus far held the post of Secretary of the Aegean Committee (CPY), shall be appointed to the Bureau of the Local Committee for Macedonia and Thrace, whereas comrade Džodžo Urdov shall be appointed to the Plenum of the Local Committee. Following these co-optations, the local committee for Macedonia and Thrace shall reassign the remaining Aegean cadre.

2. A central party leadership of the National Liberation Front for Aegean Macedonia (NOF) shall be established. The central leadership, in addition to other individuals, shall comprise Mihailo Keramitčiev and Paskal Mitrevski. The NOF central leadership shall be accountable for its work to the Party Committee (PC for Macedonia and Thrace). The central leadership shall issue a publication which shall be printed in the Macedonian language and in the Greek language. Pavle Rakovski, who has thus far been member of the Aegean leadership and who has been responsible for agitprop, is to be appointed to the position redactor of the newspaper.

3. Mincho Fotev, who has thus far been the member of the Aegean leadership responsible for youth affairs,

shall join the regional committee of EPON (United Pan-Hellenic Organisation of Youth).

Kirjazovski, 1998, p. 223.

### **B. The central committee of the KKE issues a decision in favour of the “Macedonian (Slavo-Macedonian) people’s” self-determination, January 1949**

In northern Greece the Macedonian (Slavo-Macedonian) people gave all for the struggle and are fighting with heroism and great self-sacrifice that evoke admiration. There is no doubt whatsoever that, as result of the victory of the Democratic Army of Greece and of the people’s revolution, the Macedonian people will attain the complete national restoration which they desire, and for which they are offering today their blood. The Macedonian communists have always led their people’s struggle. At the same time, the Macedonian communists must beware of the disruptive activities that foreign-motivated chauvinistic and reactionary elements deploy in order to disrupt the unity [that exists] between the Macedonian (Slavo-Macedonian) and the Greek people, a split that will benefit only their mutual enemy – monarchofascism and Anglo-American imperialism. In parallel, the Communist Party of Greece must completely remove all obstacles and crush all “Greater Greece” chauvinistic manifestations and deeds, which cause discontent and discomfort among the Macedonian people, support in their traitorous activities those who disrupt the unity, and bolster the reactionaries. Only united can the Slavo-Macedonian and Greek people win. Disunited they can only suffer defeats.

*ΚΚΕ, Επίσημα κείμενα [Official Texts], vol. VI: 1945-1949, Athens 1987, p. 337.*

### **C. Protocol “A” no. 13 of the meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Bulgaria (CPB), 16 January 1968**



The civil war in Greece posed the problem of the admission, accommodation and integration of political refugees in the countries of the Soviet bloc. The Bulgarian authorities followed the common position of solidarity with the left-wing Greek resistance, and thousands of Greek refugees crossed Bulgaria on their way to the Soviet Union and other countries of the Eastern bloc. Hundreds of them remained in Bulgaria. They began to return gradually to their home country only after 1974, after the fall of the Greek military junta.

III. On the subject of handling Greek political emigrants 1. [The Politburo] assigns the Foreign Policy and International Relations Department of the Central Committee [CC] of the CPB, the Committee for State Security, and the Ministry of Internal Affairs to identify the exact number and place of residence of Greek political emigrants. The children of Greek political emigrants, born in the People’s Republic of Bulgaria and in other socialist countries, as well as their relatives and close ones who have come with regular passports and have received permission from the competent authorities to stay permanently in the country, will not be registered as political emigrants. For refugees, this issue will be addressed on a case-by-case basis. The authorities of the Ministry of Internal Affairs will [ensure] that those who have come from Greece to visit family and friends in Bulgaria will return to their home country after their entry visas expire. 2. Political asylum will be granted to new emigrants from Greece only after proper background investigation, acting on the written request of the CC of the Communist Party of Greece and by a decision of the Secretariat of the CC of the CPB on a case-by-case basis. 3. Political emigrants of Macedonian origin, resident in other socialist countries, will be given an opportunity to accept Bulgarian citizenship and will be permitted to resettle in Bulgaria. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs will instruct the respective Bulgarian embassies to conduct, very carefully, work among those who want to accept Bulgarian citizenship and to resettle in our country. Macedonian political emigrants who are already resident in Bulgaria may accept Bulgarian citizenship according to the established procedure. The political emigrants who have accepted Bulgarian citizenship, who participated in the resistance movement in Greece and have the necessary qualities, will be recognised as active fighters against capitalism and fascism. 4. The settlement of new and the resettlement of political emigrants in the cities of Sofia, Plovdiv and Varna will be discontinued. 5. Administrative, housing, employment and social-care matters concerning political emigrants will be addressed by the competent people’s councils, state authorities and the Bulgarian Red Cross under the control of Party committees.

ЦДА [Central State Archives], f.15, inv.35, a.u. 12.

## I-49. Women in the Greek Civil War



One of the novel features of the Greek Civil War was the quite large presence of women in the DSE working in auxiliary units and seeing action in a number of battles. After a brief period of training in the makeshift military schools of the DSE or simply because they had distinguished themselves in armed combat, many became officers. Women had also participated in the armed resistance against the Axis (1941-1944), but in much smaller numbers and solely on a voluntary basis. In the DSE as well there were some who had volunteered, but most had been conscripted from areas held by the DSE, even for a few days, especially after early 1948, when the shortage of reservists became particularly acute. Their so-called "assimilation" in combat units aimed at constructing a new identity, that of the woman fighter. In addition to any ideological and practical problems that such a process entailed, there were a number of traditional conceptions about the role and the position of women in Greek society that needed to be overcome.

### A. Maria Beikou describes women's military life



From a very young age Maria Ferla Beikou (1925-2011) joined the left-wing resistance and participated in the armed struggle against the Axis occupation forces. In 1945 she married journalist Georgoulas Beikos, while during the civil war she fought in the ranks of the DSE. After the communists' defeat in August 1949, she fled to Albania and thence moved with her husband to the Soviet Union, where she studied cinematography and worked at the Greek-speaking Radio Moscow. Following the fall of the junta in 1974, she returned to Greece.

The first thing I told them when we formed the platoon was that they should wear trousers, just like in ELAS. They didn't want to. They had got used to wearing skirts. I told Diamantis: "This is no good. They have to wear trousers and tress their hair". He ordered the sewing of women's uniforms. It was August, some kind of army fabric was found, and our seamstresses

measured us and made us uniforms... I told them: "It's an order. It's the army here. We will sew them and don't wear them" [...]. One morning a mortar hit our tent, we had just got out. If we were still in, we would have been killed. The tent was destroyed, but our haversacks were saved. Then the clashes with the army began and they were compelled to wear trousers. They couldn't have done otherwise. Thus the trousers issue was resolved.

With time and the incidents of military life, the men acknowledged us. They accepted us and there was orderliness. Wherever we went, we were together. [Everyday jobs] were apportioned. Women would clean and tidy up the site where we would stay overnight, and would sew – if need be; men would bring firewood and light a fire [...]. On marches, should a group have a weighty submachine gun, it was carried by all ten [fighters], men and women. There was no difference.

Beikou, 2010, pp. 83, 86.

### B. Interview with Uranija Jurukova

*- Undoubtedly, you and your husband were old and good friends when you decided to get married in July 1946. Again, from a gender studies viewpoint, I would like to know about the course of the events that shaped the story of your life. I know very well how torn you were between motherhood and patriotism.*

Uranija Jurukova: There, I was forced to leave my four-year old baby because I was summoned to return immediately. "You are needed here," they said, "We need every cadre! Leave the baby with someone and get over here!" I left the baby with Evdokija Foteva's mother who was in Bitola. [...] And so our ways parted. I weaned him and returned to active duty. But as soon as I arrived, I went down with a very high fever, I got ill, and so they had to send me back to Bitola. There I found out that my baby was very ill and that he was in hospital in Skopje.

Because of the aggravated relations between Greece and Yugoslavia, I had to introduce myself as my baby's aunt, not as his mother. I found the child nearly dead! He was wrapped in only one diaper; I pressed him against my bosom and closed my eyes firmly so that I wouldn't cry, but I couldn't stop myself from crying. [...] I called for the doctors immediately, I made a scandal! Then the treatment started and after four or five days the baby was finally better. [...]

After he'd recovered a little, we went to Bitola.

Stojanovic-Lafazanovska and Lafazanovski, 2002, pp.13-50.

### C. Uranija Jurukova and Vera Foteva



The private archive of Urania Jurukova's niece.



Evdokia Foteva (born 1926 in Dendrochori, Greece) and Uranija Jurukova (born 1924 in Poria, Greece; died 2012 in Skopje) were both members of the Kastoria regional SNOF (Slav-Macedonian National Liberation Front) and of the Regional Board of NOF (National Liberation Front). In the wake of the defeat of the DSE, in October 1949, Foteva and Jurukova, along with the entire NOF (led by Paskal Mitrevski), were accused by the KKE of being "Tito's agents". They were arrested and detained in Albania, from where they were transferred to Soviet prisons and camps. Following a lengthy trial in Moscow (at the Lubyanka Prison), they were sentenced to eight years of forced labour in Siberian camps. After Stalin's death, they were released and then interned in Alma Ata, Kazakhstan. In 1956, they returned to the People's Republic of Macedonia.



Women either in resistance or in revolutionary armies are expected to overcome a number of stereotypes regarding their capacity, maturity, integrity and effectiveness in conflict situation. Read carefully the above sources and the keys and answer to the following questions:

1. What kind of stereotypical attitude do we find in the way women are expected to behave (appearance, dress code, tasks and duties, etc.)? How can you describe women's social role?
2. What was the dilemma that Uranija Jurukova had to face? Did she have a choice? Discuss the subject of voluntary and /or forced recruitment in the communist army during the civil war.
3. Study the photo with the three ladies and discuss about their uniforms. Find more pictures of women in the DSE. Where do they mostly focus? What does the photographer want to show and underline in relation to their gender?
4. Find, study and discuss oral testimonies and media coverage about the way these women were faced by society during and after the civil war.
5. Discuss the conditions and means of women's emancipation during a war period.

#### QUESTIONS ON CHAPTER 1

Explain why the end of World War II did not lead to a lasting peace for so many people in Southeast Europe. Consider the following: The Greek Civil War, mass retaliation, repression, one-party dictatorship. Find examples in the sources from this chapter.

## CHAPTER II: THE COLD WAR

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## ► INTRODUCTION

“An iron curtain has descended across the Continent”. These historic words were pronounced by Winston Churchill in his speech at Westminster College in Fulton, Missouri, on 5 March 1946 – words that are regarded as marking the beginning of the Cold War era in post-Second World War international relations. For a long time, the Cold War was perceived as the irreconcilable conflict of two powerful political and military blocs, the democratic capitalist West and the authoritarian communist East, drawn into a relentless strategic nuclear arms race in the quest for world domination. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, the symbol of the division of Germany, Europe and the world from the 1960s onwards, the Cold War increasingly looks less like a prelude to a possible new world war than as a tense rivalry between the political elites of both sides designed to maintain and instil a sense of fear and insecurity about each other. The specific propaganda rhetoric of the “belligerents” was powerfully illustrated by a series of bipolar opposites: anticommunism versus antifascism, “the values of Western civilisation” versus “the global struggle for peace”, “Party bureaucratism” versus “the game of imperialists”, and so forth. Although it may sound surprising, in hindsight this feverish maintenance of a political and discursive balance increasingly looks like a system which ensured greater stability in a world that is always vulnerable to the “lesser” temptations of war.

The antagonistic political and military forces on either side of the “frontline” were represented by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the Warsaw Treaty Organisation (Warsaw Pact). The second half of the 20th century also saw the establishment, development and rivalry of various regional military-political pacts and economic inter-state alliances that reflected the lines of global division – such as the European Economic Community (EEC), the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON), and the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN).

A main worldwide feature of the Cold War was that intermittently it was played out on the backdrop of “hot” local and regional conflicts affecting countries that

were not members of the two military-political blocs. These proxy wars and conflicts are an integral part of the history of the world in the second half of the 20th century, especially in the context of decolonisation and the struggle for ideological, economic, and political influence in the countries of the so-called Third World. Most of these were sparked off by regime change and the possibility of exit from the respective sphere of influence, as well as by civil conflicts in a number of satellite or neutral countries, and occasionally led to the direct participation of Soviet, American, NATO and Warsaw Pact troops, as well as their allies. The most serious threat of a direct military conflict between the Soviet Union and the USA, which was on the brink of escalating into a Third World War, was the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. At that moment of extreme tension, US President John Kennedy explicitly warned the Soviet Union that American military power was defending the whole “Western hemisphere”. From the 1940s to the 1980s, both superpowers maintained significant military contingents in divided Europe and in other countries within their respective spheres of influence. Unlike the rest of East Europe, Soviet troops were not deployed in Bulgaria and Romania, despite some “deviations” of Nicolae Ceauşescu from the coordinated international policy of the Soviet bloc in 1960s – 1970s (his position in the 1968 crisis, flirtations with the West and with non-aligned countries). Tensions between the countries on either side of the “cold frontline” eased in two periods – in the early 1960s and in the mid-1970s – when there were negotiations on the mutual reduction of nuclear weapons and more lively cultural and economic relations, such as the Soyuz-Apollo joint space programme.

The series of aggressive moves, indecisions and twists in the conduct of the global military-political blocs were also played out on inter-Balkan relations. Turkey and Greece joined NATO in 1952, a move seen by communist countries as a direct military challenge that was met with commensurate political, military, and diplomatic counter-actions. Yugoslavia’s split with the Soviet Union led to a specific military-political alliance

beyond the ideological differences of its signatories. On 28 February 1953, Turkey, Greece and Yugoslavia signed a treaty in Ankara that marked the beginning of the so-called "Balkan Pact" and of the successive phase of military tensions on the peninsula. In 1968 Albania also left the Soviet bloc, turning towards communist China which had broken off relations with the Soviet Union. This marked the beginning of Albania's self-isolation.

Cold War tensions were also projected onto the internal political landscape in each of the Balkan countries. Suspicion, spy mania, absurd border and visa controls, a strict regime of "state and military secrets", and the constant persecution and isolation of dissenters were key features of the prevailing atmosphere in these countries until the end of communism. Yet, the projected military and political union of countries from the same bloc did not extinguish the traditionally smouldering hotbeds of ethnic and national conflicts. Perhaps the best example is the anti-colonial movement in Cyprus (the only British colony in South-East Europe), which evolved into a fierce intercommunal conflict between the Greek- and Turkish-Cypriots. Unsurprisingly, proposals for the resolution of the conflict were strongly influenced by the policies of Greece and Turkey even after Cyprus won its independence in 1960. In the event, the rivalry between two NATO members led to a divided Cyprus – a major source of friction between the two countries. A "colourful" page in the history of the Cold War in the Balkans was the so-called Non-Aligned Movement, founded in Belgrade in 1961 – one of the major successes of Yugoslav diplomacy. Its member states, including Cyprus, sought a "middle way", steering clear of the total conflict between "the East" and "the West".

Notwithstanding a number of important feats as

regards the socialist version of modernisation and the welfare state, the countries of the Soviet bloc gradually lost out in the field of the economy. Economic vulnerability, from within and without, exposed the limitations of their centralised, undemocratic and heavily bureaucratic system and also led to their defeat in the ideological "struggle for values". The ideas of US President Ronald Reagan about forcing a change in relations between the East and the West, and the crisis of the communist economy, politics and ideology brought about the final phase of the history of the Cold War. Although the bipolar system of international relations seemed as invincible as ever, now the rhetoric of the two superpowers became "flexible". This made possible the emergence of a dialogue that was based on concepts such as "tolerance", "mutual understanding", and "peaceful coexistence" – a dialogue to which the leading European politicians of the day (François Mitterrand, Margaret Thatcher and Helmut Kohl) also contributed significantly. Many of these concepts had been introduced already in the early 1960s due to the so called "balance of fear". However, in the context of the perestroika associated with the ideas and the determination of Soviet Party and state leader Mikhail Gorbachev to change the spirit of governance and to conduct an overall renewal of socialist societies, they had new, and sometimes unprecedented, radical consequences. This new dialogue, and the gradual opening up of the public sphere, led many citizens of socialist countries to publicly express their discontent with the politics of repression and economic privation, and to increasingly regard the "Western model" as a realistic alternative to the once widely shared communist utopia.

The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 was the symbolic end of the Cold War.

## ► II.1. THE COLD WAR BEGINS

### II-1. The Iron Curtain



Winston Churchill delivered this speech at Westminster College in Fulton, Missouri, after receiving an honorary degree. With typical oratorical skills, Churchill introduced the term "Iron Curtain" to describe the division between Western powers and the area controlled by the Soviet Union. As such, the speech marks the onset of the Cold War. Stalin replied to Churchill ten days later in an interview published in the *Pravda*.

#### A. The speech by Churchill, 5 March 1946

The United States stands at this time at the pinnacle of world power. It is a solemn moment for the American democracy. For with this primacy in power is also joined an awe-inspiring accountability to the future. [...] It is necessary that constancy of mind, persistency of purpose, and the grand simplicity of decision shall rule and guide the conduct of the English-speaking peoples in peace as they did in war. [...] I have a strong admiration and regard for the valiant Russian people and for my wartime comrade, Marshal Stalin. [...] It is my duty, however, to place before you certain facts about the present position in Europe. From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic an iron curtain has descended across the Continent. Behind that line lie all the capitals of the ancient states of Central and Eastern Europe. Warsaw, Berlin, Prague, Vienna, Budapest, Belgrade, Bucharest and Sofia; all these famous cities and the populations around them lie in what I must call the Soviet sphere, and all are subject, in one form or another, not only to Soviet influence but to a very high and in some cases increasing measure of control from Moscow. The safety of the world, ladies and gentlemen, requires a unity in Europe, from which no nation should be permanently outcast. [...] In a great number of countries, far from the Russian frontiers and throughout the world, Communist fifth columns are established and work in complete unity and absolute obedience to the directions they receive from the Communist centre. Except in the British Commonwealth and in the United States where Communism is in its infancy, the Communist parties or fifth columns constitute a growing challenge and peril to Christian civilisation.

[...] I do not believe that Soviet Russia desires war. What they desire is the fruits of war and the indefinite expansion of their power and doctrines. But what we have to consider here today while time remains, is the permanent prevention of war and the establishment of conditions of freedom and democracy as rapidly as possible in all countries. [...] This can only be achieved by reaching now, in 1946, a good understanding on all points with Russia under the general authority of the United Nations Organisation [...]. If we adhere faithfully to the Charter of the United Nations and walk forward in sedate and sober strength, seeking no one's land or treasure, seeking to lay no arbitrary control upon the thoughts of men, if all British moral and material forces and convictions are joined with your own in fraternal association, the high roads of the future will be clear, not only for us but for all, not only for our time but for a century to come.

<http://legacy.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/churchill-iron.asp>,  
accessed on 3.09.2016.

#### B. Stalin's response to Churchill's speech, 15 March 1946

It needs no particular effort to show that in this Mr. Churchill grossly and unceremoniously slanders both Moscow, and the above-named States bordering on the U.S.S.R.

In the first place it is quite absurd to speak of exclusive control by the U.S.S.R. in Vienna and Berlin, where there are Allied Control Councils made up of the representatives of four States and where the U.S.S.R. has only one-quarter of the votes. It does happen that some people cannot help in engaging in slander. But still, there is a limit to everything.

Secondly, the following circumstance should not be forgotten. The Germans made their invasion of the U.S.S.R. through Finland, Poland, Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary. The Germans were able to make their invasion through these countries because, at the time, governments hostile to the Soviet Union existed in these countries. [...]

It may be that some quarters are trying to push into oblivion these sacrifices of the Soviet people which insured the liberation of Europe from the Hitlerite yoke. But the Soviet Union cannot forget them. One can ask therefore, what can be surprising in the fact that the Soviet Union, in a desire to ensure its security for the

future, tries to achieve that these countries should have governments whose relations to the Soviet Union are loyal? How can one, without having lost one's reason, qualify these peaceful aspirations of the Soviet Union as "expansionist tendencies" of our Government?

<https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/stalin/works/1946/03/x01.htm> (first three paragraphs), accessed on 3.09.2016; Hanhimäki and Westad, 2003, p. 49 (last paragraph).



How did Churchill and Stalin perceive the other side and its intentions? How did Churchill describe the USSR's goals and intentions, and how did Stalin? Did Stalin offer a convincing reply to the accusations in Churchill's Iron Curtain speech?

## II-2. Demarcation stone with the cemetery in the background, Italian-Yugoslav border



Photo by Božo Repe.



The border between the West and the East, also referred to as the Iron Curtain, arose as a consequence of the Cold War. It significantly interfered with the lives of everyday people by severing their ties and relationships, as well as by changing their habits. The border also divided →

cemetery Miren (at the Italian-Yugoslav border) and, therefore, symbolically separated the dead as well. The cemetery became a symbol of an absurd border, which prior to the Cold War did not exist. Between 1947 and 1975 the borderline was extended between the graves by demarcation committees. This absurd situation was resolved in 1975 with the Treaty of Osimo between Italy and Yugoslavia.

## II-3. An excerpt from a CIA report on the "Greek Crisis", 28 February 1947

The fate of Greece may be decided within the next few months, if not weeks. Militarily, a demoralised, under-equipped army is losing ground to guerrilla forces backed by the Soviets and their satellites. Politically, a compromise government of Rightists, through inefficiency and political narrowness, is losing what little popular confidence it once possessed. Economically a country, unreconstructed from the devastations of war, is losing its fight against starvation, inflation, and internal and external debt.

Since the liberation, two factors have saved Greece from relentless attempts by the USSR, through its satellites and local Communist elements, to dominate the country: (1) The presence of British troops; and (2) Loans, including UNRRA aid, from the US and the UK. Now, in the face of an all-out Soviet effort to capitalise on the current crisis, British troops (except for a small token force) are being withdrawn, and the US and the UK are finding it increasingly difficult to obtain money to bolster Greece's economy. Because of the UK's own financial straits, economic aid from that source may cease completely.

Alone, Greece cannot save itself. Militarily, the country needs aid in the form of equipment and training. Politically, Greece's diehard politicians need to be convinced of the necessity of a housecleaning, and the prostrate Centre, which traditionally includes the majority of the population, requires bolstering. Economically, it needs gifts or loans of commodities, food, foreign exchange and gold to check inflation. Of these needs, the economic are the most vital.

If Greece withstands Soviet pressure during the next few months, and can contain the guerrillas, the Centre, which is ineffectual at the moment, may become sufficiently aroused by the increasing atrocities of the Leftists and the continued bungling of the Rightists to

reorganise itself and to take control of the Government, excluding both the Right and the Left. Such a move might be led by the moderate Sophoulis or the old republican Plastiras.

Without immediate economic aid, however, there would appear to be imminent danger that the Soviet-dominated Left will seize control of the country, which would result in the loss of Greece as a democracy of the Western type.

<https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/assessing-the-soviet-threat-the-early-cold-war-years/5563bod1.pdf>, accessed on 3.09.2016.



This CIA report on the “Greek Crisis” was written thirteen days prior to President Harry Truman’s speech before a joint session of Congress on 12 March 1947. Therein the President argued that Greece was “threatened by the terrorist activities of several thousand armed men, led by Communists”, and that it was the USA’s duty to support the country so that it could “become a self-supporting and self-respecting democracy” (see chapter II.3).



1. Which side in the Greek civil war is favoured in the report? Explain why, taking into the consideration the wider context of the Cold War.
2. Which concerns were expressed in the CIA report? How does this report reflect deteriorating relations between the USA and the USSR and the progression of the Cold War? Use your knowledge and information from the source and explain why the USA decided to provide aid for Greece and Turkey.

#### II-4. The Soviet Union chose not to renew the 1925 Treaty of Friendship and Neutrality with Turkey unless the following terms were agreed

1. The defence of the Straits is jointly undertaken by Turkey and the Soviet Union.
2. In addition to the provisions of the Montreux Convention Regarding the Regime of the Straits, states

not bordering the Black Sea will not enjoy access rights through the Straits.

3. The alliance talks with Britain and France will be downgraded to consultation talks.

4. In the event that Great Britain and France go to war with the Soviet Union, the Triple Alliance will be abrogated.

Ertem, 2010, p. 3.



Since 1939, the Soviet Union had objected to the Montreux Convention of 1936 which gave Turkey sole control over shipping through the Bosphorus, an essential waterway for Soviet exports. During WWII, Turkish armed non-belligerency led to Turkey’s allowance of German merchant ships to pass through the straits. Some of these ships turned out to be so-called auxiliary ships of the German navy and attacked Soviet ships and ports in the Black Sea. By the end of the war, Stalin was determined to use this and other issues as an excuse to force concessions from Turkey in the form of revision of the Montreux treaty. When the 1925 Soviet-Turkish Treaty of Friendship and Neutrality expired in 1945, Moscow chose not to renew the treaty. Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov told Ankara that Georgian and Armenian claims to Turkish-controlled territory would have to be resolved before the conclusion of a new treaty. The disputed territory around Kars and Ardahan, a region of ethnic complexity bordering Caucasus, was governed by the Russian Empire from 1878 to 1921, when it was ceded to Turkey. Molotov argued that, while Moscow reached an agreement with Poland regarding territorial cessions (which were a result of Soviet weakness in 1921), similar cessions to Turkey had never been legitimized. On 27 February 1946, Turkey signed a treaty of cooperation and aid with the USA. This was the beginning of a spectacular rapprochement.



What was at stake in the negotiations between the Soviet Union and Turkey over control of the Straits? How is it connected to the Cold War?

## ▶ II.2. THE 1948 TITO-STALIN SPLIT

### II-5. Extracts from the Resolution of the Communist Information Bureau (CIB) concerning the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, 28 June 1948

1. The CIB notes that recently the leadership of the CPY has pursued an incorrect line on the main questions of home and foreign policy, a line which represents a departure from Marxism-Leninism. In this connection the CIB approves the action of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union [CPSU], which took the initiative in exposing this incorrect policy of the Central Committee of the CPY, particularly the incorrect policy of Comrades Tito, Kardelj, Đilas and Ranković.

2. The CIB declares that the leadership of the CPY is pursuing an unfriendly policy toward the Soviet Union and the CPSU. An undignified policy of defaming Soviet military experts and discrediting the Soviet Union has been carried out in Yugoslavia.

3. In home policy, the leaders of the CPY are departing from the positions of the working class and are breaking with the Marxist theory of classes and class struggle. [...] The Yugoslav leaders are pursuing an incorrect policy in the countryside by ignoring the class differentiation in the countryside and by regarding the individual peasantry as a single entity, contrary to the Marxist-Leninist doctrine of classes and class struggle, contrary to the well-known Lenin thesis that small individual farming gives birth to capitalism and the bourgeoisie continually, daily, hourly, spontaneously and on a mass scale.


5. The CIB considers that the bureaucratic regime created inside the Party by its leaders is disastrous for the life and development of the CPY. There is no inner Party democracy, no elections, and no criticism and self-criticism in the Party. [...] The Information Bureau considers that such a disgraceful, purely Turkish, terrorist regime cannot be tolerated in the Communist Party.

8. (...) The CIB considers that, in view of all this, the Central Committee of the CPY has placed itself and the Yugoslav Party outside the family of the fraternal Communist Parties, outside the united Communist front and consequently outside the ranks of the CIB. [...] The CIB does not doubt that inside the CPY there are sufficient healthy elements, loyal to Marxism-Leninism, to the international traditions of the CPY and

to the United Socialist front. Their task is to compel their present leaders to recognise their mistakes openly and honestly and to rectify them; to break with nationalism, return to internationalism; and in every way to consolidate the united socialist front against imperialism. Should the present leaders of the CPY prove incapable of doing this, their job is to replace them and to advance a new internationalist leadership of the Party.

<https://esspressostalinist.com/2014/01/02/resolution-of-the-information-bureau-concerning-the-communist-party-of-yugoslavia-june-28-1948>, accessed on 3.09.2016.

### II-6. Stalin's bust as metal waste in a Slovenian factory



Dolenc et al, 1997, p. 138.



The feud between Tito's Yugoslavia and the *Informbureau* (Communist Information Bureau [COMINFORM]) began on 18 March 1948 when the Soviet Union first recalled its military counsellors and the following day its civil experts from Yugoslavia. The CPY responded by trying to avoid the worst case scenario and seeking to prove their true "orthodoxy" towards the Soviet

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vision socialism and Communist unity. Thus, they issued a law on the nationalisation of property. At the same time, politically-motivated court procedures commenced against former, particularly Slovene, internees from Dachau and Buchenwald. The internees were accused of collaborating with the Gestapo in the camps, as well as the Western allies after the war, and of becoming enemies of

the socialist system. Nonetheless, Stalin called the Yugoslav leadership liars, fools and anti-Soviets in his letter of 4 May 1948. Accordingly, Yugoslavia declined to participate in the COMINFORM council session at Bucharest, in the course of which it was expelled. In Yugoslavia, a state-run resistance emerged against the Soviet Union. Images and busts of Stalin ended up in trash bins.



**1.** Why did the COMINFORM expel Yugoslavia? Make a list of COMINFORM complaints and accusations against the Communist Party of Yugoslavia. Use your knowledge to account for these. Which Yugoslav leaders are accused by name for the “incorrect policy”?

**2.** How do you explain the following lines: “The CIB does not doubt that inside the CPY there are sufficient healthy elements, loyal to Marxism-Leninism, to the international traditions of the CPY and to the United Socialist Front. Their task is to

compel their present leaders to recognise their mistakes openly and honestly and to rectify them [...]. Should the present leaders of the CPY prove incapable of doing this, their job is to replace them and to advance a new internationalist leadership of the Party”.

**3.** Alternatively, students can complete the following table – they will be given the list of complaints and they have to interpret the meaning of each complaint. In addition to the Resolution, students can also use source II-8.

Resolution of the COMINFORM	Explanation and examples
<b>1.</b> The leadership of the CPY has pursued an incorrect line on the main questions of home and foreign policy which represents a departure from Marxism-Leninism.	
<b>2.</b> The leadership of the CPY is pursuing an unfriendly policy toward the Soviet Union.	
<b>3.</b> In home policy, the Yugoslav leaders are pursuing an incorrect policy in the countryside.	
<b>4.</b> A bureaucratic regime is created inside the Party by its leaders; there is no inner Party democracy, no elections, and no criticism and self-criticism in the Party.	
<b>5.</b> The Central Committee of the CPY, particularly Tito, Kardelj, Đilas and Ranković are accused for the incorrect policy.	



## II-7. Consequences of the 1948 split between Tito and Stalin in Romania: Deportations from Banat along Romania's borders with Yugoslavia (1951)

Mara Pantin, from the village of Checea: "The second day after the Pentecost, on 18 June 1951, the festival day of the church [village], we were woken up by knocks at the door. An officer rushed in and ordered us to get dressed. Then he cut half a piece of bread and half a piece of ham and told us that was all we could take with us [...]. We asked the militia [police] officer, who had arrived meanwhile, permission to take at least a bottle of water for the kids, but he said no. He [said]: we don't have permission for anything".

Ion Jurcă, from the village of Ciuchici: "In 1951, on 18 June, at four in the morning, the second day after the Pentecost, they came and knocked at the door [...] so hard that we thought they'd bring the house down. A militia officer and two *Securitate* men came in [...] took out a piece of paper and began to read: 'In accordance with the ordinance of 12 [June] of the Ministry of Home Affairs [...], both you and your family will leave this house within three hours. And you will take with you what fits in a wagon [...] and nothing more'. Imagine that, out of a whole house as big as that. The house remained fully furnished, we all cried, we didn't know what to do, what to grab, what to take, clothes or food or animals. It was a house with everything you need [...] like any prudent householder used to possess."

Mircea Rusnac, "Deportarea bănăţenilor în Bărăgan (1951), din perspectivă istorică" [Deportation of Banat Inhabitants to Bărăgan (1951) from a Historical Viewpoint], [http://www.banaterria.eu/romana/files/rusnac\\_mircea\\_deportarea\\_banatenilor\\_in\\_baragan\\_1951\\_din\\_perspectiva\\_istorica.pdf](http://www.banaterria.eu/romana/files/rusnac_mircea_deportarea_banatenilor_in_baragan_1951_din_perspectiva_istorica.pdf), accessed on 6.05.2015.



On the night of 18 June 1951, over 44,000 persons from the border area between Romania and Yugoslavia (the province of Banat) were deported for five years to Bărăgan, a thinly-populated area in the south of the country. The atmosphere of terror that reigned and the breaches committed by those in charge of the deportations increased the dramatic feeling of the moment. People were afraid they would go to Siberia (as had happened not long before with the Germans) or, worse still, that they would be shot. The deportations aimed not only at discouraging the traditional relations between people on either side of the frontier, but also at expropriating →

the land of the so-called "chiaburi" (wealthy peasants). When they came back home, they could recover but very little of their abandoned property.



The *Securitate* was the political police set up by the communist regime in 1948 in order to replace the service that until then had been in charge of the protection of "state security" (*Siguranța*). Designed as a domestic and external intelligence service, it had a direct contribution in the installation of a regime of terror, strictly surveying the population, making abusive arrests and investigations, blackmailing and harassing millions of so-called "enemies of the people". Due especially to the hundreds of thousands of informers, working under cover, it fed a regime of generalised denunciations and calumnies from which no one could escape. Over time, it became a state within the state, controlling all institutions – the Communist Party included. The fact that *Securitate* held a monopoly over certain activities, such as the surveillance of external trade and of the relations with other countries made possible major state frauds and enabled the *Securitate* officers to build up personal capitals, which they fully benefited from after the collapse of the communist regime, in 1989.



1. Account for the decision of the Romanian authorities to deport the population inhabiting the border area with Yugoslavia. How did the deportees feel? What was the regime afraid of? What were the consequences for the deportees?
2. Comment upon these events in the context of basic human rights adopted by the United Nations with its Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948).

## II-8. Extracts from a speech by Valko Chervenkov, the communist leader of Bulgaria after Georgi Dimitrov and Vasil Kolrov (1950-1956), on relations between the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, delivered at a Party meeting in Kardzhali on 11 June 1955

How, comrades, did the conflict between our parties arise? It is known that in 1948 the Yugoslav leaders

did not wish to review, together with the Soviet leaders and the leaders of the People's Democracies, the differences that arose over a series of principled questions. Which principled questions? On questions such as the laws concerning the development of the socialist revolution, or in other words, in what way the socialist construction should be carried out. Should we follow the experience of the All-Union Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the laws concerning the development of the Soviet revolution that were proclaimed by the October Socialist Revolution? The Yugoslav leaders began to claim that the development of socialism in Yugoslavia would occur in a specific way, that they had nothing to learn from the Soviet Union, they denied the experience of the Soviet Union. They denied the leading role of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in the international workers' movement. On the question of how to reform agriculture, they also declared that they have specific views, including, for example, that on the revolutionary role of the *kulak*. In 1948, at the meeting of the Cominform, we were supposed to agree on these with the Yugoslav leaders. They had been invited to come so that we could discuss whether those views were correct, and what should be done. It is known that they did not come to the meeting. They declared in advance that their views would not be understood, that decisions would be dictated to them there, and they did not come. Then, as you know, the first resolution of the Cominform, which criticised the views of the Yugoslav leaders on a series of important principled questions, was adopted. But the refusal of the Yugoslav leaders to come to this meeting meant that they were severing ties with our camp.

Kiriakov, Boyko et al. 2013, pp. 50-54.

## II-9. Detainees dancing "kolo" during the celebration of 1 May 1951 at the Goli Island camp



After the spilt between Stalin and Tito and following Yugoslavia's expulsion from the Cominform in 1948, it was likely that some communists in Yugoslavia might support the Soviet line and Stalin. In order to prevent such a scenario, the authorities began a persecution campaign of potential opponents. For this purpose, an extremely rigorous and inhuman camp was established on Goli Island. Together with a large majority of Stalin's supporters, other detainees on the island included numerous individuals who had nothing to do with Stalinism, but were victims of false

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accusations or of having made indiscrete statements. It was said that Goli Island represented the "Stalinist way to deal with Stalinists". From 1948 to 1956 approximately 13,000 Yugoslav citizens were imprisoned there. After 1956 the camp was turned into a regular prison.



Private collection (Martin Previšić).

## II-10. Torture in the camp and perpetual degradation

### A. Vukašin Popović, a senior police officer at the Montenegrin Ministry of the Interior, on the re-education system

I endured five and a half years in the [notorious] Cetinje and Kotor prisons, in concentration camps in Stara Gradiška, Sveti Grgur, Ugljan near Zadar, in Bileća and on Goli Island. [...] I was subjected to severe torture in Cetinje. It seems that those who did not pass through the basement of the "French Embassy" building in Cetinje do not know the meaning of Tantalus's suffering.

The beautiful building of the friendly state of France was turned into a place of torture in 1949. [...] A favourite method of conducting investigation was "dry drowning". The victim would lay on his back while several *udbaši* [State Security Agency officers] would keep him pinned down by sitting on his legs, stomach and chest. They would gag him so that he could not breathe and then they would pour water up his nose. [...] Instead of air, the victim would breathe in water and faint a few minutes later. I was subjected to this several times in the Cetinje and Kotor prisons. It is a surprise that I am still alive after all that torture I endured.

### B. The testimony of prisoner Dušan Lutovac

Goli Island was the epicentre of everything evil. All features of humanity were killed there. [...] It was inhabited by hungry, haggard, disfigured human ghosts, the living dead in rags, with bare bones and sunken eyes. It was inhabited by condemned generals, ministers, national heroes, convicts of various professions [...] And somehow we managed to survive and live to see the end of 1956 and the release of a large group, about 1,000 of us. When we set off, we were advised by someone from the Goli Island administration to return to our birth place, where we were known best and where people would help us get a job. I did that, exactly as told, and what happened? I was received with a fifth boycott – physically tolerable, but psychologically nearly as bad

as Goli Island. No one would visit me. The word spread like wildfire that the "traitor" had come back from Goli Island. Even my best friends and relatives did not come or would hesitate to come.

Stojanović, 1994, pp. 74, 79-80.



"Boycott" was a term used on Goli Island to describe the particularly harsh treatment of a prisoner by his inmates: nobody was allowed to talk to him; he received less food and had to work harder. He also had to spend the night standing up above the night pot.



1. Who were the people detained in Goli Island? Find the references in the source and in the key. Why were they detained? How were they treated (to answer this question, use visual and written sources)? What was the attitude of their fellow citizens when they came back to their place of birth, according to the testimony? Why do you think people behaved like this?
2. Explain the phrase in the key: "Goli Island represented the 'Stalinist way to deal with Stalinists'".
3. Find similarities and differences with the Makronisos Island camp in Greece (see source III-14A).

## ► II.3. GREECE AND TURKEY

### II-11. The Truman Doctrine, 1947



The Truman Doctrine, which was first announced in the course of a speech delivered by President Truman before a joint session of Congress on 12 March 1947, provided that the United States would offer political, military and economic assistance to Greece and Turkey. The Truman Doctrine effectively reoriented U.S. foreign policy, away from its usual stance of withdrawal from regional conflicts not directly involving the

United States, to one of possible intervention in faraway conflicts. After the announcement by the British government that it would no longer provide military and economic assistance to Greece, Truman asked Congress to support the Greek government in the civil war against Greek Communists. He also asked Congress to provide assistance for Turkey, since that nation, too, had previously been dependent on British aid.

#### PRESIDENT HARRY S. TRUMAN'S ADDRESS BEFORE A JOINT SESSION OF CONGRESS, MARCH 12, 1947

[...] The very existence of the Greek state is today threatened by the terrorist activities of several thousand armed men, led by Communists, who defy the government's

authority at a number of points, particularly along the northern boundaries. [...] Greece must have assistance if it is to become a self-supporting and self-respecting democracy. The United States must supply that assistance. We have already extended to Greece certain types of relief and economic aid but these are inadequate. There is no

other country to which democratic Greece can turn. No other nation is willing and able to provide the necessary support for a democratic Greek government. [...]

Greece's neighbor, Turkey, also deserves our attention. The future of Turkey as an independent and economically sound state is clearly no less important to the freedom-loving peoples of the world than the future of Greece. [...] Since the war Turkey has sought financial assistance from Great Britain and the United States for the purpose of effecting that modernization necessary for the maintenance of its national integrity. That integrity is essential to the preservation of order in the Middle East. [...] I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures. I believe that we must assist free peoples to work out their own destinies in their own way. [...] It is necessary only to glance at a map to realize that the survival and integrity of the Greek nation are of grave importance in a much wider situation. If Greece should fall under the control of an armed minority, the effect upon its neighbor, Turkey, would be immediate and serious. Confusion and disorder might well spread throughout the entire Middle East. [...] We must take immediate and resolute action. I therefore ask the Congress to provide authority for assistance to Greece and Turkey in the amount of \$400,000,000 for the period ending June 30, 1948. [...] In addition to funds, I ask the Congress to authorize the detail of American civilian and military personnel to Greece and Turkey, at the request of those countries, to assist in the tasks of reconstruction, and for the purpose of supervising the use of such financial and material assistance as may be furnished. [...] The free peoples of the world look to us for support in maintaining their freedoms. If we falter in our leadership, we may endanger the peace of the world -- and we shall surely endanger the welfare of our own nation. [...]

[http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th\\_century/trudoc.asp](http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/trudoc.asp), accessed on 21.09.2016.

## II-12. Rapprochement between Turkey and the USA



On 23 February 1945, Turkey signed a treaty of cooperation and aid with the USA. This was the beginning of a spectacular rapprochement.

However it was the Democratic Party which actually attached Turkey to the pro-American camp in the 1950s. Turkey was included in the Marshall Plan and received American civil and military aid. It also became a member of NATO (1952) and participated in the Korean War (1950-1953).

## A. Turkey joins NATO, 1952. A speech by Prime Minister Adnan Menderes

"The decision for the admission of Turkey to the Atlantic Alliance as a member with equal rights is gladly welcomed. This positive development should be considered as a result of the non-belligerent and determined politics of our government, also strongly supported by public opinion as national policy. This development constitutes a new and significant step to ensure the objective of mutual security in a democratic environment and consequently interdependency and unity. Within the framework of the Atlantic Alliance cooperation with other member states will be based on the essentials of our foreign policy, good intention, sincerity and pacta sunt servanda [agreements must be kept]"

Sarıнай, 1988 (<http://www.dunyabulteni.net/haberler/282594/turkiyenin-natoya-girisi-ve-yankilari>, accessed on 25.07.2016)



1. Use your knowledge and explain why the British had to abandon Greece in 1947.
2. What was the long-term American strategy in Southeast Europe and the Mediterranean in the 1940s and the 1950s?
3. Use your knowledge of 20th-century alliances and explain with reference to the Turkish case how the two world wars and the Cold War influenced power-relations and the re-positioning of some countries.

## B. Turkey and Greece in the Korean War



Headlines:

Yesterday's historic decision by the Cabinet

TURKEY SENDS FORCES TO KOREA

United Nations informed

4,500 Turkish soldiers to be sent to Korea

<http://www.dunyabulteni.net/haberler/282594/turkiyenin-natoya-girisi-ve-yankilari>, accessed on 25.07.2016.



The Korean War began in June 1950, when the armed forces of communist North Korea invaded South Korea with the intention to reunify the country. In the context of the Cold War, the conflict turned into a major conflict with the intervention of the United States, the Soviet Union and China. Under a UN resolution, troops from Western countries were also sent in to support South Korea. Seeking to bolster their relations with the Western camp, Turkey and Greece participated with a force of 4,500 and 1,000 respectively. The UN/US counterattack almost reached the Korean/Chinese border before the Chinese effectively counterattacked in their turn with the result that the present demarcation line is not dramatically different from that of 1950. The War ended in July 1953.

### II-13. Greece and NATO



In October 1950, the centrist Greek government applied for membership of NATO, a body that according to the Minister of Foreign Affairs guaranteed the “collective security of the free people”. Following the removal of British objections, a year later a NATO resolution provided for the accession of both Greece and Turkey. The treaty of accession was voted for by all parliamentary parties, save the United Democratic Left (EDA). The Communist Party of Greece (KKE) had been outlawed since late 1947.

#### A. Excerpts from Prime Minister Plastiras’s speech in Parliament on Greece’s accession to NATO (18 February 1952)

Gentlemen, today the government is pleased because with the near unanimous passing of the bill on the entry of Greece to NATO, a pleasing and very important fact is confirmed. With the country’s entry, the Greek people and their sacrifices are honoured, as is the Greek Army. It is a very significant fact because a new chapter opens [in Greece’s history], and because it protects the country from any attack from wherever it originates. One cannot but admit that Greek participation in NATO, which comprises countries inhabited by free and democratic people, makes the country feel safer. One cannot but admit that as of tomorrow Greece secures its [borders], it is

not isolated. It is impossible for Greece to follow any policy other than the one that is called for, more than ever, today. Greece must be among the nations that comprise NATO. Neutrality is hardly an option.

Dokos (ed.), 2013, pp. 38-40.



Comment on the above phrase: “Neutrality is hardly an option”. Do you agree with this statement, and why?

#### B. Excerpts from a broadcast of the KKE’s radio station “Voice of Truth” in Bucharest, 25 May 1955

##### THE TREASONOUS AGREEMENT OF 12 OCTOBER 1953 SHOULD BE ABROGATED

ATHENS. The majority of people are continuing to intensify their endeavours for the closure of the US bases in Greece, the abrogation of the treasonous agreement of 12 October [1953], and the extrication of our country from the current regime of foreign bondage and dependence. Recent international events have strengthened the resolution of the people as a whole – even of certain politicians and personalities, even of part of the bourgeois class – for a turn in the country’s course towards the salutary road of independence and peace, of coequal cooperation with all countries, without foreign bases and obligations to aggressive alliances. The people’s agitation against the regime of US occupation is causing real uncertainty in the [pro-US] camp, which is fearful even of the very thought that it might end up without its only foothold – US bayonets and dollars.

ASKI (Archives of Contemporary Social History), Athens.



The Greco-American Agreement on “Military Facilities” of October 1953 provided for the establishment of US air and naval bases in Greece “for the implementation of, or in furtherance of, approved NATO plans”. Ten years later four such US facilities were in full operation; two on the island of Crete and another two in the Attica region.



Why was the Greco-American Agreement on “Military Facilities” characterised by the KKE as “a treasonous agreement”?

## ▶ II.4. THE ANTI-COLONIAL MOVEMENT IN CYPRUS

### ▶ II.4.1. Demand for union with Greece and reactions

#### II-14. Rauf Raif Denктаş's views of British proposals on autonomy, 5 June 1948

For us Turkish Cypriots, a fate much worse than the present might come about indeed with self-government or annexation. We are certain that we will acquire multiple benefits for a short while within the framework of an administrative system recognising the rights of the Turkish minority. To be left to our own devices!... Isn't this what we have been longing for all those years? Not to be left under the administrative dominance of the Rum [Greek Cypriot] majority... And isn't it our duty to ensure this as much as possible in the event of this type of administration granted to the island? [...] We are a minority. We have to acknowledge the value of this fact. We want our proportional rights. [...] Our concern is not to emigrate from this land, but every passing day, despite being a minority, to strengthen our roots in this fatherland of ours. Our motto is to live as Turks and to die as Turks in this land which belongs to us. We strive for this goal, and nobody will manage to distract us from it.

Kızılyürek, 2016, p. 94.



In November 1947, the Governor of Cyprus Lord Winster of Witherslack asked the Greek and Turkish Cypriots to take part in a Constitutional Assembly. The British government's persistent refusal to accept AKEL's demand for complete self-rule led to the latter's withdrawal from the proceedings of the assembly, which subsequently was dissolved on 12 August 1948. On the other hand, the main issue for the Turkish Cypriots was not to fall under the domination of the majority Greek Cypriots. That is why they were objecting the idea of autonomy so much as of the Enosis.



AKEL: Anorthotiko Komma Ergazomenou Laou (Progressive Party of the Working People), Greek Cypriot Communist party.



Rauf Raif Denктаş, or Denktash (1924-2012), was a Turkish Cypriot lawyer and politician, one of the founders of TMT (Turkish Resistance Organisation). After the independence of the Republic of Cyprus (1960), Denктаş was elected as the President of the Turkish Communal Chamber, where he took a nationalist position. He served as president of the "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus" for more than 20 years. He was the chief negotiator of the Turkish Cypriots in the UN-sponsored peace talks from 1968 until 2004. In 2002 and 2003 he rejected the second and third versions of the Annan Plan, the settlement proposal drafted under the authority of the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan (see vol.2, ch.III.1). He unsuccessfully opposed Turkish Cypriot acceptance of the fifth version in April 2004.



1. How does Denктаş characterise the Turkish Cypriots? What kind of administrative system does he consider as suitable for them?

2. Find information on the anti-colonial movement in the 20th century. Which British colonies became independent states and when? Find on the world map the territories belonging to the British Empire after the Second World War.

#### II-15. The "plebiscite" on union with Greece, 1950



After the failure of the Constitutional Assembly, it was obvious that the vast majority of Greek Cypriots was demanding the union of the island with Greece. On 15 January 1950 a "plebiscite" on union (*Enosis*) was organised by the Orthodox Church of Cyprus: 95.7% of voters politically expressed their desire for union with Greece. The Turkish Cypriots responded to the holding of the "plebiscite" by staging a number of rallies and sending resolutions to the UN and governmental bodies in Britain and Turkey. They condemned Enosis on the grounds that it would lead to economic decay and civil war.

TODAY is the day, the great day, the day of the great national event: the Plebiscite. Comfort and hope rise in the darkness of tyranny. Everybody must vote in the Plebiscite. Every signature, every mark will act as a sword of rage and victory. The soil that gave birth to us, the Greek soil, is today being trodden by foreign oppressors. The roots of our people are alive today and have awakened within our souls the historical past of Hellenism.

*Ethnos newspaper, 15 January 1950.*



1. Why was the “plebiscite” organised by the Church of Cyprus? What was the status of the Church and how influential was it in politics?

2. “Every signature, every mark will act as a sword of rage and victory” (doc. II-15). To what does the “rage” refer? Comment on the language used by the newspaper. Who were the “oppressors” in Cyprus at the time?

## II-16. Greek stamp on Cyprus issue (1954)



A set of six stamps issued in September 1954 on the occasion of the Greek government’s recourse to bring before the United Nations General Assembly for discussion the issue “of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples in the case of the population of Cyprus”. The stamps show an inkblot on the minutes of the parliamentary discussion in the House of Commons concerning the British government’s statement of July 1954 to the effect that “certain territories in the Commonwealth”, including Cyprus, “can never expect to be fully independent”.



<http://greekstamp.blogspot.gr/2008/02/1954.html>, accessed on 3.09.2016.



Why did the Greek government choose to issue such a set of stamps? What does it symbolise? Which was its use? Can you find stamps from your country issued for propaganda purposes?

## ► II.4.2. Pogrom against Greeks and other non-Muslims in Istanbul, 1955

In the wake of the deadlock reached at the Tripartite Conference on the Eastern Mediterranean, held in London between Britain, Greece and Turkey from 29 August to 7 September 1955, Turkish secret service-inspired anti-Greek riots broke out in Istanbul and Izmir. These, in conjunction with the escalation of Greco-Turkish confrontation over British-held Cyprus, ushered into a period of strained relations

between these two NATO members. On 6 and 7 September 1955, 5,300 buildings according to official records (7,000 according to unofficial ones) were raided in Istanbul. The victims were mainly Greeks, but the members of the Armenian and Jewish communities were also affected. It seems that the riots were planned by the Turkish secret services and were executed in cooperation with the youth and students’

associations and the organisation “Cyprus is Turkish”. On 28 February 1956, the Turkish parliament voted in favour of compensating those whose businesses and homes had been raided. However, not only were the reparations on offer low but crucially those responsible for the riots were not brought to justice. As a result of the riots, thousands of non-Muslims – mostly Greeks – were forced to leave Turkey. After the military coup in 1960, Prime Minister Menderes and President Celal Bayar were charged for the “September events” in an attempt to show that Democrat Party members were exclusively responsible for the riots (see chapter III.2.1).

## II-17. Witness recollections

### A. “They came with a truck full of stones”

Very, very bad. I was married at that time, Lula was two years old. We were in the summerhouse in Yenimahalle [Sarıyer]. News came from Istanbul, Beyoğlu is burning. It was about eight o'clock, eight and a half. A truck arrived, full of stones. 10-15 people came out of the truck, they first broke into the taverna, nothing was left. We gathered together, the verger was there, with his wife and son; there was also the priest with his daughters and wife. They began to break the windows from the outside, to throw stones. Just when we were panicking and thinking what to do, it became dark. A Turkish family lived at the backside [of the summerhouse], they knew what was going to happen. They immediately took the priest's daughters through the window.

### B. “We have permission to destroy, not to kill”

I put Lula under the mattress, they will kill the child. It is raining stones. They came to the front door. They kicked it down. My father immediately opened the door of the room. He spoke Turkish like a Turk, my father. “We destroy”, he said. “For Cyprus; it's worth it, for the homeland”, the people storming in shouted. “Kill me, my wife, my daughters”, said my father. “No, we don't have permission to kill”, they replied, “we have permission to destroy”. They asked his name; “Kemal”, said my father. They said: “We apologise, brother Kemal”, and left. They went to the grocery

shop, the grocer said: “Kemal who? This is Koço, he is Greek”. They came back. They threw the radio and the fridge out of the window. The mattresses, the clothes; the wardrobe was left empty. [...] We were shivering. “Smash the place up”, said my father, what could he do? “Smash it, throw it away, it's worth it, throw it away!” They destroyed [everything and] left. They asked about the priest's daughters. We said: “They are not here”. They took the priest, they tied him on a motorcycle, and they pulled him all the way long.

Around the same time, F. S.'s husband was leaving Sirkeci in order to return home. “That night my husband was at work. He came at three o'clock; he came on foot from Sirkeci to Yenimahalle. On his way home, he was smashing up [anything he could find]; what could he do? Those that don't are gavur [non-Muslim]”. (From the interview with F.S., housewife, 74, within the scope of the project “A Thousand Alive Witnesses to History”).

<http://www.radikal.com.tr/haber.php?haberno=163380>, accessed on 3.09.2016.



1. Why did the man on his way home smash up anything he could find? What was happening around him and for what reason?
2. Find visual material for the pogrom against non-Muslims in Istanbul in September 1955.
3. Find literary or film representations of the September pogrom (for instance the film *Pains of Autumn*, by Tomris Giritlioğlu, trailer here <http://cine.gr/trailer.asp?id=712282>, accessed on 3.09.2016).
4. Find information on how these facts were presented by Turkish, Greek and international media and compare it with source II-18.
5. How are the “September events” connected to the Cyprus issue?

## II-18. The aftermath of the pogrom



Photo Archive of the General Secretariat of Media and Communication, Athens; [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OsUa078S\\_k0](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OsUa078S_k0), accessed on 3.09.2016.

## II-19. Muslim reactions during the riots

### A. Helping neighbours, attacking all others

Our house was on Kalyoncu Street at the Beyoğlu district [on the European side of Istanbul]. When the violence broke out, the porter Mehmet told my mother: “Don’t be afraid, you can hide in our apartment”. He got hold of a Turkish flag, shut the street door and stood in front of the block of flats. When the first assailants came, he told them that no Greeks live here and indeed the men left without ransacking the place. Then Mehmet, who had protected the Armenian Mrs Katina of the second floor, Maria of the third floor and Antonis of the fourth floor, went out, threw away the Turkish flag, got hold of a piece of wood and began to “attack” non-Muslim shops and houses on the other side of the street. I could see him from the window of our apartment.

Interview with M. Vassileiadis, in Güven, 2005, p. 48.



How would you characterise Mehmet’s behaviour? How do you explain the fact that he was rescuing his non-Muslim neighbours and at the same time attacking other non-Muslim people and their property? Why did he act like that?

### B. A Turk saving a church from destruction

The group of demonstrators came to the portals of the church [of Panagia] and attempted to open them with iron crowbars. Fortunately, however, a Turkish merchant with some associates, confronted them with shouts and repeated requests, and stopped them, and thus the beautiful church of the Diplokionion [Beşiktaş] community was saved by a miracle.

Vryonis, 2005, pp. 148-9.

### ► II.4.3. Intercommunal clashes

In 1955, the leaders of Greek-Cypriots decided to exercise armed pressure on British rule and created the secret organisation EOKA. General Grivas emerged as EOKA's leader. Turkish-Cypriots responded by creating the secret and armed organisation TMT which

claimed that "Cyprus belonged to Turkey" and demanded the partition of Cyprus. Küçük and Denktaş emerged as leaders of the Turkish-Cypriot community. During 1958 bloodstained confrontations took place, as well as tension inside each community.

#### II-20. Greek-Cypriot pupils demonstrating in favour of *Enosis*, 1957



Press and Communication Office, Private collection of Takis Ioannidis, Republic of Cyprus.



EOKA: Ethniki Enosis Kyprion Agoniston (National Organisation of Cypriot Fighters), a secret right-wing organisation that led the anti-colonial struggle in Cyprus from 1955 to 1959. On EOKA's policy see Workbook 2, 2009, p.117.



Why do you think that pupils participate in rallies about national issues? Have you ever participated in such a rally? If yes, write a report on your experience.

## II-21. A leaflet of a bi-communal committee, appealing for keeping peace and reconciliation 1956

### APPEAL BY THE COMMITTEE FOR KEEPING THE PEACE BETWEEN GREEKS AND TURKS

The undersigned, constituting the Committee for Keeping the Peace between Greeks and Turks, which was elected at the general and representative meeting of the two communities of our city held at the City Hall on 29 May.1956, hereby – by order of those present – make the following statement and appeal to all our fellow citizens:

We are deeply saddened by the regretful events that have taken place in our city, which resulted in the disruption of the harmonious relations between the two communities.

1. We strongly condemn any form of violence, regardless of its origin.

2. In principle, we believe that every Cypriot, whether Greek or Turkish, must act with the sole intention of preventing and hindering similar acts in the future.

3. We must all realise that there is no greater possession and blessing in a land than the peaceful coexistence of its inhabitants, even if there are political differences.

4. We appeal to our fellow citizens to realise the degree of destruction that will occur if they allow the repetition of such misrule, and we call on everybody to strive for the benefit of Cyprus and live by the motto: Away with racial hatred. Love, financial cooperation and peaceful coexistence between Greeks and Turks.



At the initiative of Greek- and Turkish-Cypriots, who believed in the peaceful coexistence of the two communities, a mixed committee was formed in Limassol in 1956 aiming at the re-establishment of peace in the wake of the intercommunal clashes that had erupted because of the execution of a Turkish Cypriot police officer by EOKA. Subsequent developments set aside any such efforts. The clashes took on a more general character and those who were in favour of an understanding between the two communities were isolated.



Taking into consideration the polarised situation and the tension between the two communities, how influential could the above appeal be in Cypriot society?

## II-22. Oath taken by new TMT members, 1957



The Turkish Resistance Organisation (TMT) was a Turkish Cypriot organisation established in 1957. Its main objective was to promote the island's partition through force.

To the life and liberty of the Turkish Cypriot, his spirit, wealth and all kinds of traditions and sanctities. I have dedicated myself to the Turkish nation to resist violations from wherever and by whomever they may come. Even in death, I will fulfil every duty assigned to me. Everything I know, see, hear, and given in confidence, I will value more than my life, and I will guard to the end. I will not reveal to anyone what I saw, heard, felt, and given in confidence. I know that disclosure is considered treason and the penalty is death. I promise and swear to the honour, dignity and to all that I hold sacred that I will abide faithfully by the above.

Keser, 2007, p. 443.



Compare the Appeal by the Committee for Keeping the Peace between Greeks and Turks and the Oath taken by new TMT members. Analyse the vocabulary of these two sources. Which words are most frequently used in each?

## II-23. Escalation of intercommunal and political violence in 1958



In 1958 intercommunal violence in Cyprus turned extremely vicious, culminating with the murder of eight Greek Cypriots near the Turkish Cypriot village of Günyeli on 12 June. The “massacre” was set off by the explosion of a bomb outside the Turkish Press Office in Nicosia, five days earlier, which was attributed to EOKA but was later shown to be the work of TMT members. In the collective conscience of the Greek Cypriots the events of 1958 were considered as the “September Events of Cyprus” in equivalence to the pogrom of Greeks in Istanbul in 1955.

### A. Mehmet Ali Tremeseli, one of the key instigators of the violence at the time, describes the events of 1958

Those days, as happens in football matches, all eagerly listened to the radio for their team's response to the goal it had just conceded. If a goal did not come, morale plummeted and harsh words were directed against the trailing team.

Kızılyürek, 2015, p. 13.



Why do you think the writer uses vocabulary from football to describe the intercommunal conflicts in Cyprus? What could be considered a goal in this context? Comment on the following sentence: "If a goal did not come, moral plummeted and harsh words were directed against the trailing team".

### B. The narration of Andreas Stavrou

My father Christodoulos and my uncle Petros were killed at Günyeli. At the time I was approximately a two-year old boy. My mother was 28 and she already had five children. The consequences of this story are more painful than the mere incident of the massacre. [...] In Cyprus every home has its own dead, missing and the like. I believe an effort should be made so that never again should such incidents take place, never again should families find themselves in mourning, never again should children lose their parents. A situation that all of us have, unfortunately, experienced with great intensity. Turkish Cypriots as well as Greek Cypriots. [...] The best way you can commemorate the dead is to create conditions of peace, of progress for our country; this is the most important and difficult [thing to do]. Hatred is instantaneous; creating peace is a laborious effort of many generations, not just a single one.

Kızılyürek, 2015, pp. 160-1.



"The best way you can commemorate the dead is to create conditions of peace, of progress for our country". Comment on this phrase. Why is this the most important and difficult thing to do? Discuss the subject.

### II-24. The anti-communist activity of the EOKA leader Georgios Grivas (*nom de guerre Digenis*)



In the context of the Cold War, EOKA's anti-colonial struggle had from the outset an anti-communist character, which became more evident over time. AKEL's opposition to the armed struggle was employed by the right-winger Georgios Grivas as the pretext for accusing the Left of treason. In the second half of the 1950s, left-wing Greek Cypriots were beaten up and murdered by EOKA members. Correspondingly, TMT, which was likewise anti-communist, persecuted left-wing Turkish Cypriot workers. 1958 was a year of both ethnic and political violence. In his letter, Grivas considers as his opponents the British, the Turkish Cypriots and the communists.

We have to confront the situation with bravery. The communists are our opponents; whether we like it or not it is advisable that we destroy them as a political entity, so that they are no longer a force that can influence the national question! [...] Either way, I'm preparing to forcefully confront all three opponents.

Grivas to Anthimos (25 January 1958), cited in Michail, 2012, p. 19.



Whom did EOKA consider as its opponents? What does this reveal as regards the complexity of the Cyprus issue?

## II-25. The “tomb” of the Cyprus Question, 1959




Following a four-year violent anticolonial struggle waged by the Greek Cypriots, in February 1959 the Zurich and London agreements between Britain, Greece and Turkey provided for Cyprus becoming an independent republic within the British Commonwealth. In Greece, the agreements were denounced by opposition parties as a “betrayal of Hellenism”.



Is there a connection between the activity of EOKA and the creation of the secret armed organisation TMT? Why did the TMT claim that “Cyprus belongs to Turkey” whereas EOKA fought the British? Explain and discuss how violence produced counter violence, creating thus a vicious circle, while the colonial authorities supported and benefited from such ethnic conflicts. See source II-23 and the corresponding key.



Prime Minister Konstantinos Karamanlis laying a wreath at the tomb of the “Cyprus Question”. Shaking his hand, the President of Parliament tells him: “Congratulations my prime minister. We have the nation’s confidence!” With his other hand, he is holding a placard which reads: “Greek Parliament: Votes 170 for, 118 against”. The Minister of Foreign Affairs Evangelos Averof, with shovel and hoe on hand, is the gravedigger. The cartoonist is Phokion Demetriades.



Hatzivassiliou (ed.), 2000, p. 143.


### ► II.4.4. Independence

## II-26. The structure of the Republic of Cyprus – 1960



The signing of the Zurich and London Agreements (Lancaster House, 19 February 1959) provided for the establishment of the independent Republic of Cyprus as a territorially integral state, albeit with strong federative aspects as far as its administration was concerned. Legislative, Executive and Judicial power was exercised by, and on behalf of,

the island’s two largest ethnic communities. However, the management of a series of crucial matters by the Greek- and Turkish-Cypriot Communal Chambers was completely separate. These two bodies, which enjoyed total independence, had dual powers (legislative and executive), functioning thus as parallel and independent state mechanisms.



Pavlou, 2015, p. 202.



Study the graph and describe the principles regarding the relation between the two communities according to which the Republic of

Cyprus was structured. Is this structure, as presented in the graph, effective according to your opinion? What could be non-functional or problematic?

### II-27. The view of a Turkish-Cypriot newspaper on the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus, 1960



The Turkish Cypriot community adopted a positive stance towards the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus. The union of the island with Greece had been prevented and political equality with the Greek Cypriots secured. The article recognises the historical importance of the new-born state as well as its significance for the lives of the Turkish Cypriots.

### *Halkın Sesi* [Voice of the People] newspaper, 15 August 1960

Today is the last day of colonial administration in Cyprus. [...] The night of 15-16 August has a historical importance for Cyprus. First, the colonial administration of 82 years is coming to an end and the island will be immediately governed by a government consisting of Cypriots. In this administration, the Turkish Cypriots are given partnership rights on equal terms. 30% of the officials of the public service will be Turkish Cypriots. [...]

Despite all coercions, the Turkish community did not collapse; it kept its character and national conscious-

ness. If it keeps on with the same excitement and the same struggle, it is possible for that it will preserve its existence and keep on living in these lands. At the same time, if there is cultural and financial assistance from our motherland, we can say that our future definitely looks promising.




What was the Turkish-Cypriot reaction on the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus? Was it positive or negative? What had been the situation of Turkish Cypriots so far? Find references in the source and the key and build your arguments.

### ► II.4.5. Breakdown and escalation of violence

The period from 21 December 1963 to 10 August 1964 was the most violent of the inter-communal conflict. According to the official view of the Greek Cypriot side, this period witnessed a rebellion of Turkish Cypriot extremists aiming at partition (*Taksim*). For their part, the Turkish Cypriots read

the events as a Greek Cypriot attack, in accordance with the Akritas plan, aiming at the revision of the 1960 treaties and, ultimately, the declaration of union with Greece. Contrary to the 1958 events, in this conflict by and large casualties came from the Turkish Cypriot side.

## II-28. Ethnographic map of Cyprus at the time of the independence (1960)



Reproduced from the map prepared by the Department of Lands and Surveys with the sanction of the Government of the Republic of Cyprus, State Copyright Reserved.



The most adverse consequence of the breakdown of the bi-communal state was the transfer of the Turkish Cypriot population to “safe areas”. Prior to the conflict of 1963-64, Turkish Cypriots were scattered across the whole of the island (see map). Almost 25,000 Turkish Cypriots were forced to move to “safe areas”, which were created within – and in the surroundings of – purely Turkish villages or in the Turkish sections of the island’s four largest cities (Nicosia, Famagusta, Larnaka and Paphos). These

areas usually were under Turkish military control and were called “enclaves”. Life in these enclaves was especially harsh, as large numbers of Turkish Cypriots were sheltered in temporary sheds built with the support of the Red Crescent and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). With time, many of the restrictions were relaxed, and most were abolished for good in March 1968 and the re-opening of bi-communal talks.

## II-29. Life in the enclaves (a description of a circumcision)

A “Pasha” arrived at the village. He was the “Commander of the Fighters”, came from Turkey and worked with TMT. This “Pasha” was the absolute authority. Despite the systematic campaign that Rauf Denktaş had undertaken since 1958 with the motto “Patriot, Speak Turkish” (*Vatandaş Türkçe Konuş*), the inhabitants of Louroujina [Akinclar] continued to speak little Turkish. Naturally the “Pasha” fretted a lot about this: “You Apostates [*Ulen Murtatlar*; not pure Muslims]!” he yelled, and everybody shivered. [...]

I was approaching school age when the “Pasha” decided that a grand “Circumcision Fête” [*Sünnet*] would take place for all refugee children. Because of the bi-communal troubles of 1964 and the subsequent transfer of people, many boys had not been circumcised. Indeed, many of them were over the age when the *Sünnet* normally takes place. In the patriarchal Turkish Islamic tradition, the circumcision ceremony symbolises the entrance to “masculinity”, and in the military environment where we lived it was associated with the image of “man as soldier”.

At a park in the village Turkish flags were raised and balloons were hung up. Gradually the boys who were to be circumcised gathered with their families. The boys were dressed in a white uniform and wore a white cap. They were arrayed in a line, the one next to the other. Their excited facial expression could not hide their anguish for what was going to happen. Yet, not one would care to admit it, not even to himself, that he was trembling with fear.

Listening to the orchestra music, people hung around. Proud fathers and mothers, dressed up, could not hide their enthusiasm. By all means, it was a truly festive atmosphere. Yet, as the “big moment” approached, we children were edgy as animals are

before a quake. Accompanied by the tunes of tabors and clarinets, we awaited our turn to vie with the menacing blade that the “connoisseur in circumcisions” held. As our turn came nearer, we were overcome by fear. The moment the blade was raised in front of us we had completely forgotten the “blessings” and the wishes that we would “become men and fighters”. A *lokum* [Turkish delight] was given to the boys who endured the “snip”, before having their wound trussed. The “Pasha” inspected us one by one (I don’t recall whether he left a present) and we, the circumcised boys, were now considered to be “Fighters”.

“Τα Πέτρινα Χρόνια των Τουρκοκυπρίων, 1964 – 1974”  
[The stone years of the Turkish Cypriots, 1964-1974],  
a personal testimony by Niyazi Kızılyürek.




1. How do the boys in the source feel, and why? Why was this “Circumcision Fête” so important for them? How is the incident connected to the period described?
2. Explain why the boys were considered to be fighters after circumcision. How do you comment the equating of manhood with being a fighter?

## II-30. Daily Express cartoon on the Greek-Cypriot side prevailing in the inter-communal clashes of 1963-64



Published in the London *Daily Express* in early 1964, this cartoon can be considered prophetic in light of what happened during the next few years.



Cartoon by Michael Cummings, *Daily Express*, 2 March 1964.



Describe the cartoon. What is its narrative? Why are the Turkish Cypriots sinking? How are Greek-Cypriots represented? Whose

side is the cartoonist taking (if any) and why? Could his nationality play a role?

## II-31. The Kofinou “incident”, 1967



The Kofinou “incident” in November 1967 constitutes one of the turning points of Cypriot history. Members of the National Guard, under the instructions of Georgios Grivas, entered the Turkish Cypriot village of Kofinou and killed 24 Turkish Cypriot men, women and children. The Greek division illegally sent to Cyprus in 1964 was withdrawn. In January 1968 President Makarios declared for the first time that union with Greece, although desirable, could not be realised. On the basis of this policy, he won re-election with a large majority (95%). Bi-communal negotiations for the settlement of the Cyprus Question began in 1968 and they continue until today.

### Testimony of Commando Marios Tempriotis, who participated in the operations for the “elimination” of the Kofinou enclave (15-16 November 1967)

I was doing compulsory military service in the [Greek-Cypriot] National Guard during the Kofinou crisis. Our company was stationed in the area of Skarino before the incident, waiting for orders. Our commander told us: “Go into the village and don’t leave even a lame chicken alive, kill them all”. Meanwhile, the Turkish Cypriots had evacuated the village, save for a few young “warriors” and most women, children and the elderly. We mercilessly attacked the village and made a clean-up operation by raiding each and every house. I took a fifteen year-old wounded warrior and delivered him

to my commander. "Here, take him and finish him off", he said. "He's a wounded soldier, we cannot kill him", I protested. I could not consent to the killing of this warrior; I admired him for his courage. The sergeant was pointing his gun at the young man and wanted to kill him. I went in front of him and said: "You'll have to kill me first." Eventually, I think he [the warrior] was sent to a hospital. Terrible things happened during the attack. [...] The [Greek-Cypriot] soldiers looted all houses. I have to admit, I took two small ashtrays and a Turkish flag. The savagery I saw in Kofinou changed my life. In its aftermath, my views changed dramatically. At the time of the attack, the appellation "Turk" represented barbarism and backwardness for us. They had no rights on this island. They moved here during the period of

Ottoman rule and had to go back to Turkey. They were our national enemy. They had no rights on the island. After the Kofinou incident, there was a sea change in my views.

Marios Tempriotis interviewed by Niyazi Kızılyürek at Kofinou village on 18 April 2014.



Why did the Kofinou attack have such a deep impact on Marios Tempriotis? What do you think made him change his views on the Turkish Cypriots? Having read his testimony, would you say that the Kofinou attack also changed his views on his own people, the Greek Cypriots?

## ▶ II.5. NATO, THE WARSAW PACT AND THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT

NATO was founded on 4 April 1949 in Washington with the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty by Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, France, the UK, the USA, Canada, Portugal, Italy, Norway, Denmark and Iceland. The NATO headquarters are in Brussels. A key point in this treaty is Article 5, which provides for collective defence in the event of an armed attack against one or more of the treaty's signatories. Although it was not pointed out explicitly, at the time the "prime suspect" was the Soviet Union and the communist states of the so-called "Iron Curtain". The Warsaw Pact was a

military-political alliance of these states, which was established on 14 May 1955 with the signing of the Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation, and Mutual Assistance – hence its official name, Warsaw Treaty Organisation. It was founded in direct response to the perceived military threat posed by the "Capitalist West" and its "re-militarisation" and inclusion of West Germany in NATO. The Warsaw Pact comprised the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, East Germany, Poland, Romania, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and (until 1968) Albania. The Warsaw Treaty Organisation was officially dissolved in June 1991.

### ▶ II.5.1. NATO vs. the Warsaw Pact

#### **II-32. Extracts from the report of the Hungarian ambassador in Bucharest on the effect of the "Hungarian events" in Romania and especially the Hungarian ethnic minority, January 1957**

The events in Hungary have had a significant effect [...]. It is known that [...] all the population of Transylvania listen to the news from Hungary all the time, and that most of them have subscriptions to Hungarian newspapers. [...] Immediately after the start of the academic year, the Romanian students used the meetings intended for the election of the

Union of Working Youth leaders [...] to ask for the improvement of their living standards [...], as well as for an assurance that young engineers would find employment and their salary raised [...]. The students' demonstration surprised the boards of the universities and the party organisations. They promised to take the appropriate measures [but eventually the students were told that] the current economic situation of the country demanded sacrifices from the youth [...]. Articles in the Press openly raise the complaints of Transylvanian Hungarians, as well as the mistakes that were made in the policy of nationalities. Many parents ask whether it is possible to send their children

to Hungarian schools and universities [...]. More Hungarian schools were established [... and] the publication of a cultural and a children's magazine in Hungarian was approved. The militia arrested several students [...]. The government summoned back to work most of the employees of the Ministry of Home Affairs that had been dismissed a few weeks earlier. Industries hired workers that had been employees of the Ministry of Defence. In the streets the police forces were strengthened and the employees of the Ministry of Defence that owned bicycles organised patrols. Foreigners and diplomats were denied access to Transylvania and surveillance in the whole region was doubled.

In some areas of Transylvania, the local leaders made the Hungarian population suspicious, telling them to be vigilant as the capitalists wanted to re-establish their authority, while among the Romanian population a rumour circulated to the effect that vigilance was mandatory because Hungarians were seeking to regain Transylvania. Besides some prompt and tough measures it took, the Romanian government made also some concessions. On 29 October a decision was adopted concerning rises in wages and pensions and the introduction of a family subsidy [...]. These had a strong impact upon the population. There were voices saying that all of these were obtained by Hungarians for Romanian workers. [...] Considering the real situation, the Romanian government felt obliged [...] to be lenient with the discontented crowd, while applying drastic measures in the case of those who disturbed public order [...].

Andreescu et al, 2003, pp. 246-249.



The strain in Transylvania (a region that was traditionally disputed by Romania and Hungary) had several implications: The leaders of the Romanian Labour Party were afraid that the students' protests might lead to the loss of Transylvania to Hungary and to the loss of Soviet trust in Romania's leaders. The Romanian leaders relentlessly offered their services with a view to repressing the anti-communist Hungarian rebellion of 1956 (called "Hungarian Revolution" in the West, and "Hungarian events" in the East). The student unrest in areas other than Transylvania (Bucharest, Iași) ended in hundreds of arrests and convictions. The repressive actions continued the next year as well.

### II-33. Bulgarian responses to the attack against Czechoslovakia, 1968

Top secret!

The Commander, 12th Motor Rifle Regiment  
Battle Order No. 4

General Staff of the Bulgarian People's Army, Sofia,  
20:00 hours, 19 August 1968

The attacks of the counter-revolutionary elements in the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic against the people's power are becoming ever fiercer. There has arisen a serious danger to the fate of the Communist Party and the socialist system in the country. Special efforts are made by reactionary forces to sever Czechoslovakia from the Warsaw Treaty and place it in opposition to the rest of the socialist countries. To liquidate the counter-revolution, I order that the regiment proceed to perform the combat tasks assigned to it by the Commander-in-Chief of the Joint Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact (JAF) and to crash the hostile elements within timelines and regions according to the action plan. All orders and commands of the Commander-in-Chief of the JAF connected to these tasks will be carried out accurately and unquestioningly.

Minister of National Defence  
Army General Dobri Dzhurov  
Chief of the General Staff  
Colonel Gen. Semerdzhiev

[http://1968bg.com/index.php?option=com\\_content&task=view&id=33&Itemid=20](http://1968bg.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=33&Itemid=20), accessed on 4.09.2016.

### II-34. Nicolae Ceaușescu condemning the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, 21 August 1968



The principles of this speech were included in an official document by the Romanian Great National Assembly that was sent to all governments in the world and to the United Nations. In Romania itself, the fear of a military threat led to the re-establishment of the patriotic guards, which had been abolished in 1962, and to the inclusion in the Constitution of an article stipulating that no state agency can recognise the secession of a region that is part of the national state. Ceaușescu's refusal to join the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia was regarded by the Soviet leadership as disloyalty and as a sign of an increasingly nationalist policy. Under such circumstances many people, reluctant until then, joined the Communist Party or at least adhered to its politics.

### A. Ceaușescu delivering his speech at the balcony of the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party



Foto #G512, Fototeca online a comunismului românesc [Online photo library of Romanian Communism] (17.02.2016) (ANIC, fondul ISISIP-fototeca), published on <http://fototeca.iicr.ro/picdetails.php?picid=34548X125X170>, accessed on 17.02.2016.

### B. Extract from Ceaușescu's speech

The invasion of Czechoslovakia by troops from the five socialist countries constitutes a big mistake and a serious endangerment of peace in Europe and of the fate of socialism in the world. It is unconceivable in today's world. When the people stand up to fight for their national independence, for equality of rights [...] no reason can be accepted, even for one second, in support of a military intervention in the affairs of a brother socialist state. Our Party and the state delegation that visited Czechoslovakia last week are convinced that the Czechoslovak people, the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, the Czechoslovak working class, old people, women, young people, all unanimously

support the party and the state leaders in their efforts to ameliorate the negative state of affairs inherited from the past in order to guarantee the triumph of socialism in this country. The issue of choosing how socialism is realised concerns each party, each state, each people. No one can assume the role of counsellor, of adviser about how socialism should be built in another country. We believe that in order to settle the relations between the socialist countries, between the communist parties on a genuine Marxist-Leninist basis, we have once and for all to end any interference in the affairs of other states, of other parties.

*Scântea* newspaper, 22 August 1968, p. 1.

**II-35. An Albanian cartoon in the satirical magazine *Hosteni* denouncing the Warsaw Pact's invasion of Czechoslovakia**



*Hosteni*, 25 October 1968, p. 5.



Study Battle Order No. 4 (II-33), the extract from Ceaușescu's speech (II-34B) and the Albanian cartoon (II-35). Use your knowledge to address the following questions:

- Why did the USSR invade Czechoslovakia in 1968? Which countries joined in the invasion? Explain why the Bulgarian Minister of Defence issued Battle Order No. 4. What does he mean by "counter-revolutionary elements" and "reactionary forces" in the USSR?
- Compare Ceaușescu's speech with the so-called Brezhnev doctrine ("When forces hostile to socialism seek to turn the development of a socialist country towards capitalism, it becomes not only a problem of the country concerned, but a common problem that concerns all socialist countries", 1968). Explain why Romania did not take part in the invasion of Czechoslovakia.
- Does the fact that Albania did not participate in the invasion of Czechoslovakia help to explain the cartoon's message? How does the cartoon express his disagreement with the invasion of Czechoslovakia? Which elements of the cartoon convey this message (take into consideration both visual and textual messages)?

### II-36. Statement by Todor Zhivkov upon the ratification of the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques, signed in Geneva on 18 May 1977

Comrades,

We could hardly imagine the spiritual history of the Bulgarian people without its deep attachment to the native land, to the natural environment, to the mountains and forests, to the fields and the sea. They live on in folksongs. When the Bulgarian says "O, forest, green forest", he expresses his love and respect for natural beauty, his gratitude to this eternal land that has nurtured us.

Today, in the new conditions of constructive labour for building a developed socialist society, our respect and admiration of the natural environment are becoming ever greater, ever more active. We are taking and will take care of its preservation. We have created laws on its protection and are exercising strict criticism

towards anyone who attempts to destroy our lovely valleys or centuries-old forests.

This implacability is naturally and deeply connected to the cardinal question of our times – the struggle for safeguarding peace, for banning nuclear weapons and terminating all nuclear weapons tests, for total and universal disarmament. Our natural environment, the Earth, must be protected from every form of poisoning or destruction.

That is why, comrades, it is certainly no accident that it was precisely the USSR that launched in 1974 the initiative that led to the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques. As it is known, on [16 May] this Convention was ratified by the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union.

Today we are taking the decision to ratify the same Convention [...].

The Convention closes the door to the spread of the arms race into the sphere of the so-called "meteorological" or "geophysical" war, which has an unprecedented destructive potential for the annihilation of people and material property. And it closes it before someone, figuratively speaking, could "sneak inside".

*Външната политика на НРБ, vol. 4, pp. 422-424.*



Zhivkov, then Chairman of the State Council of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, made this statement at the meeting of the State Council of the People's Republic of Bulgaria on 25 May 1978. The Convention was ratified by the People's Republic of Bulgaria on 31 May 1978.

### II-37. The military-strategic exercise code-named "Shield-82", 1982



Between 14 June and 30 September 1982, a military-strategic exercise codenamed "Shield-82", the biggest of its kind in the history of the Warsaw Pact, was held in the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of Bulgaria. Western military experts dubbed it the "seven-hour nuclear war" because it simulated military operations following a nuclear strike on the whole of Europe. This large-scale combined-arms exercise of the Joint Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact tested out the entire strategic arsenal of the Soviet Army and of the armies of the then socialist countries in Europe, including that of the Bulgarian People's Army.

## A. Tanks



<http://socbg.com/2014/01/%D1%89%D0%B8%D1%82-82-%D0%BD%D0%B0%D0%B9-%D0%B3%D0%BE%D0%BB%D1%8F%D0%BC%D0%BE%D1%82%D0%BE-%D0%B1%D0%BE%D0%B9%D0%BD%D0%BE-%D1%83%D1%87%D0%B5%D0%BD%D0%B8%D0%B5-%D0%B2-%D0%B8.html>, accessed on 21.09.2016

## B. Badge: "Shield'82 – Bulgaria"



Compare the sources II-36 and II-37. Where is the controversy here? Discuss on the issue of disarmament of the rival organisations under the pressure of dangers of the use of nuclear arms.

## ► II.5.2. The Non-Aligned Movement

In the context of decolonisation following the Second World War, many Asian and African countries gained their independence. In order to avoid affiliation with one of the blocs, the said countries got together and formed the Non-Aligned Movement, which held its first conference in Belgrade in 1961. Besides Cyprus,

Yugoslavia was the only non-aligned country from Europe and one of the movement's co-founders. The movement was formed with the aim of promoting political and economic cooperation among its members, as well as a policy of peaceful and active coexistence in light of the Cold War.

### II-38. Belgrade conference of Non-Aligned Movement

#### A. Declaration of the Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries

The Conference of Heads of State or Government of the following non-aligned countries:

1. Afghanistan, 2. Algeria, 3. Burma, 4. Cambodia, 5. Ceylon, 6. Congo, 7. Cuba, 8 Cyprus, 9. Ethiopia, 10. Ghana, 11. Guinea, 12. India, 13. Indonesia, 14. Iraq, 15. Lebanon, 16. Mali, 17. Morocco, 18. Nepal, 19. Saudi Arabia, 20. Somalia, 21. Sudan, 22. Tunisia, 23. United Arab Republic, 24. Yemen, 25. Yugoslavia and of the following countries represented by observers: 1. Bolivia, 2. Brazil, 3. Ecuador, was held in Belgrade from September 1 to 6, 1961, for the purpose of exchanging views on international problems with a view to contributing more effectively to world peace and security and peaceful co-operation among peoples.

[...] The Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries noting that there are crises that lead towards a world conflict in the transition from an old order based on domination to a new order based on co-operation between nations, [...] considering that a lasting peace can be achieved only if this confrontation leads to a world where the domination of colonialism-imperialism and neo-colonialism in all their manifestations is radically eliminated; [...] to eradicate basically the source of conflict is to eradicate colonialism in all its manifestations and to accept and practice a policy of peaceful co-existence in the world; [...]

Relying on this and on the will of their peoples, the Governments of countries participating in the Conference resolutely reject the view that war, including the "cold war", is inevitable, [...]

However, the existing military blocs [...] necessarily

provoke periodical aggravations of international relations. [...]

[...] 13. The participants in the Conference reaffirm their conviction that:

(a) All nations have the right of unity, self-determination, and independence [...]

15. The participants in the Conference consider that disarmament is an imperative need and the most urgent task of mankind. A radical solution of this problem, [...] can be achieved only by means of a general, complete and strictly internationally controlled disarmament. [...]


17. The participating countries call upon all States in general, and States exploring outer space at present in particular, to undertake to use outer space exclusively for peaceful purposes. [...]

21. The participants in the Conference consider that efforts should be made to remove economic imbalance inherited from colonialism and imperialism. They consider it necessary to close, through accelerated economic, industrial and agricultural development, the ever-widening gap in the standards of living between the few economically advanced countries and the many economically less-developed countries. [...]

24. The participating countries consider it essential that the General Assembly of the United Nations should, [...] find a solution to the question of expanding the membership of the Security Council and of the Economic and Social Council in order to bring the composition [...] into harmony with the needs of the Organisation and with the expanded membership of the United Nations.

Butković and Petković (eds.), 1979, p. 679.

## B. Message to US President Kennedy by heads of state or governments of Non-Aligned Countries, 5 September 1961



Papers of John F. Kennedy. Presidential Papers. President's Office Files. Subjects. Non-Aligned Nations summit meeting, Belgrade, 1. September 1961. *Notification to John F. Kennedy by Heads of States or Governments of the Non-Aligned Movement, 5 September 1961*, p. 1, 7.: <http://www.jfklibrary.org/Asset-Viewer/Archives/JFKPOF-104-004.aspx>, accessed on 3.09.2016.

## II-39. Extracts from a *New York Times* article on the Non-Aligned Movement (1975)

UNITED NATIONS, N.Y., Sept. 3 – The United Nations seems destined to become the principal arena where the United States and the other industrial powers grope for a new relationship with the countries that describe themselves as non-aligned. Most of these countries are poor, some desperately so, and a few are newly rich through the windfall of enormous earnings from oil. But their mood is similar – a deep-seated feeling of grave injustice that 70 per cent of mankind has to get along on 30 per cent of the world's income.

As the non-aligned movement grows – it now has 82 full members, almost three-fifths of the United

Nations roster – it is increasingly compelled to seek compromises between conflicting tendencies in its midst.

*The New York Times*, 4 September 1975.



Read sources II-38A, II-38B and II-39:

- What prompted these countries to form the Non-Aligned Movement?
- What were the aims of the movement?

## II-40. The three leaders of the Non-Aligned Movement: Gamal Abdel Nasser (Egypt), Josip Broz Tito (Yugoslavia), Makarios III (Cyprus)



Press and Communication Office, Republic of Cyprus.



Contrary to the Great Powers' expectations, Makarios sought to establish close relations and to cooperate with the Non-Aligned Movement as a means of promoting and demonstrating the independence of Cyprus (Belgrade Conference, 1-6 September 1961). Vice-President Küçük and the Turkish Cypriot leadership ardently opposed Makarios' initiative. For a biography of Makarios, see Workbook 2, p. 117.



Why do you think President Makarios chose to join the Non-Aligned Movement while Greece, Turkey and Great Britain were NATO members?

### ▶ II.6. BALKAN ALLIANCES

#### ▶ II.6.1. Plans for a Yugoslav-Bulgarian Federation

The old idea of establishing a South Slav federation was revived at a meeting between Stalin and the communist leaders of the Balkan countries in Moscow in 1943. Under Soviet pressure, at the beginning of 1945 Tito and Georgi Dimitrov agreed to start preparations for the creation of a Yugoslav-Bulgarian federation. In June 1946, Stalin called for "cultural-national autonomy of Pirin Macedonia" as the first step towards the incorporation of the region into the People's Republic of Macedonia (PRM) as a constituent unit of the future Yugoslav-Bulgarian federation. This new large federative state was expected to resolve the existing national contradictions along the lines of the Soviet model. It was in this context that the Bulgarian side agreed to the relocation of the remains of the common national hero, Goce Delčev, from Sofia to Skopje. The Yugoslav side took the lead in the process of bilateral negotiations, in which a series of open or unclear issues emerged around the structure, functioning and even the name of the planned federative state. The Yugoslav leadership proposed including Albania into the future federation and expressed aspirations towards Greek Macedonia,

which were met with resolute opposition from the Western Great Powers. This opposition was clearly expressed, in particular by Britain, with regard to the entire federative project. The British called on Stalin, demanding that all territorial changes in the Balkans before the signing of the peace treaties formally ending the Second World War should be postponed. Bulgaria, as a former ally of Nazi Germany, signed the Paris Peace Treaty on 10 February 1947. During the peace negotiations, Yugoslavia officially supported Bulgaria against Greece's territorial claims to some border areas, including to part of the Pirin region. After Yugoslav-Bulgarian agreements at Bled, Slovenia (30 July – 1 August 1947), followed by the treaty of mutual friendship, cooperation and assistance signed by Tito and Dimitrov at Evksinograd, Bulgaria (27 November 1947), the newly standardized Macedonian language was introduced in schools in the Pirin region. This policy caused contradictory reactions among the local population, 63.6% of which was registered administratively as Macedonian nationality. As a sort of compensation, the Bled agreements provided that in return for the

incorporation of Pirin Macedonia into the PRM, Bulgaria would be given, within the federation, the border territories with a majority Bulgarian population, which it had lost under the 1919 Peace Treaty of Neuilly. All this was not officially approved by the Soviet side, and, ultimately, the Stalin-Tito split in June 1948 put an end to the plans for a Yugoslav-Bulgarian federation.

### II-41. A personal testimony on the coordination of Bulgarian and Yugoslav plans for a federation

In the midst of a ruined, sleepy and shivering Belgrade, the Bulgarian legation was almost the only place that was heated. Without a living soul around, without servants and guards, with unlocked doors, I stood by the small wall lamps and studied the fateful documents for the hundredth time. According to my abridged shorthand notes, the key points of the two drafts were the following:

**Bulgarian draft:** The two governments declare that they are proceeding towards the unification of the South Slavs by creating a federative state consisting of the two federal units – Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. Name of the state: Federation of the South Slavs – FSS. Common institutions: Foreign affairs and army. Final constitution: After a referendum and elections. Transitional forms: An interim body shall be established, the Council of South Slav Unity, based in Belgrade. Composition of the council: On the basis of parity, it would comprise representatives of the two countries.

**Yugoslav draft:** The federative state shall unite seven federal units: Bulgaria, Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Macedonia, Montenegro, and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Name: Unspecified. Common institutions: Foreign affairs, army, and customs office. Final constitution: After a referendum and elections. Transitional forms: Bulgarian-Slav commission based in Belgrade and called “Commission of Slav Unity”, authorised to elect a government and to draft a constitution. Composition of the commission: An equal number of representatives from Bulgaria and the six federal units of Yugoslavia.

Todorov, 1999, p. 338.



Explain the historical context of this source. Compare different ideas for a South-Slav Federation. Explain Tito’s role. Analyse differences in Bulgarian and Yugoslav views about the federation. Explain Stalin’s views in the context of the Cold War.

### II-42. A delegation from the People’s Republic of Macedonia in Sofia takes over the remains of Goce Delčev, 1946

#### A. “Many thousands pay tribute to the bright memory of Goce Delčev throughout Pirin Macedonia as his remains are carried [to Skopje]”

Petrič, 8 October (via telephone)

Our correspondent from Petrič reports:

Today, on its way from Sofia to Skopje, the delegation of the People’s Republic of Macedonia carrying Goce Delčev’s remains passed through Pirin Macedonia. The sarcophagus made especially for this occasion, covered with Yugoslav flags and with the flag of the People’s Republic of Macedonia, lay on an artillery caisson. The sarcophagus was guarded by fighters and officers of the Yugoslav Army. A procession of the Delegation of the People’s Republic of Macedonia, the delegation of the Macedonian emigration [refugee organisations] to Sofia, Goce Delčev’s close ones and others follows the sarcophagus. Many thousands paid tribute to the bright memory of Goce Delčev in the towns and villages throughout Pirin Macedonia as the remains of the Macedonian revolutionary were carried.

*Nova Makedonija* newspaper, 8 October 1946.

#### B. “Macedonia’s capital solemnly welcomes Goce Delčev’s earthly remains”

Skopje, the capital of Macedonia, welcomed the earthly remains of the great fighter and apostle of freedom, Goce Delčev. Thousands of people bowed to the bright memory of the revolutionary, paying tribute to his deeds and immortal achievements [...]. Skopje’s residents gave Goce’s remains a dignified welcome. A several-thousand-strong crowd of people stood in incessant rain for over an hour awaiting the solemn procession and, when Goce’s earthly remains arrived, accompanied them to their final resting place – to the

national historical monument, the Church of the Holy Salvation.

[...]

The President of the Presidium of the People's Assembly, Blagoja Fotev, spoke about Goce Delčev's deeds and ideals. Among other things, he said: "Forty-three years separate us from the tragic but heroic death of this great son of our people. The Macedonian land has waited for 43 years to take in its womb Goce's earthly remains. For as many as forty-three years the bright and loved image of our national hero has lived and grown greater in the souls of the Macedonian people."

*Nova Makedonija* newspaper, 11 October 1946, p. 3.

### **C. Interview with former teacher Kostadin Yakovliev, from the town of Goce Delčev, Pirin Macedonia, February 2009, about imposing Macedonian national, then again Bulgarian national identity on the local population**

In 1946 the communists had already taken power and there was talk among the people that we were to unite with the Serbs, that is, with Yugoslavia. And that Tito and Georgi Dimitrov had reached some sort of agreement on a Party basis that the Pirin region would merge with Macedonia, Serb Macedonia. I didn't pay

particular attention to this rumour, but many people were alarmed. "We escaped from the Greeks and the Serbs, but now we're about to be given to Tito" – that's what many people were saying at the time.

And then at some point it turned out that this wasn't a rumour, it would really happen. They began summoning us to the Town Hall and changing our Bulgarian passports, where we were identified as Bulgarian, with new ones where they identified us as Macedonian. Many people at the time couldn't believe their eyes, but because we're, you know, cowards, this passed somehow unnoticed, although there were quiet revolts in some places. Some people were sent to prison, but let me note again that – unlike what happened to the Pomaks [Muslim Bulgarians] in 1972 – there were no excesses. And then, why be angry? After all, I know I'm Bulgarian and Orthodox Christian, so it doesn't really matter who will identify me as what, does it? That's what most of us told ourselves.

But in 1947-48 everyone was identified as "Macedonian" – Bulgarians and Turks and Pomaks... And that's how it was right up until 1964, when the regime came to its senses and began restoring the Bulgarian names again, recording them in passports once more as "Bulgarian".

Gruev et al., 2011, pp. 193-194.

## ▶ II.6.2. The Balkan Pact, 1954: Turkey, Greece and Yugoslavia



In order to strengthen its own geostrategic position and to prevent the USSR from reaching as far as the Mediterranean, in 1953 Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey signed a political and in 1954 a military alliance. The interesting part of this Pact was the fact that Greece and Turkey were members of NATO at the time,

while Yugoslavia was a communist country. This meant that Yugoslavia was indirectly included in the Western defence system. When relations between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union were normalised, and particularly after the Greek-Turkish conflict over Cyprus, the Balkan Pact de facto ceased to exist.

### **II-43. The Balkan Pact**

#### **A. A Yugoslav journalist reporting from Athens**

##### **ASSAULTS ON THE BALKAN ALLIANCE**

Athens, 29 May (by telephone) – Numerous Greek dailies have given extensive coverage to President Tito's forthcoming visit to Greece. [...]

Greeks are working on the erection of a triumphal arch at the end of the Piraeus-Athens road, on the eastern foothills of the Acropolis. This spot is considered as the city gate and that is where Greeks greet important guests. [...]

Today's issues of the Athenian Press particularly emphasise two interesting foreign policy-related news items in connection with President Tito's upcoming visit.

The first concerns the conspicuous activity of the new Italian Ambassador in Athens, Mr Caruso. This gentleman has already made inquiries through the Greek Foreign Ministry on the possibility of presenting his letters of accreditation to Prince Paul before the

arrival of President Tito. His insistence on urgency is unusual in these matters. As a result, this has naturally allowed for jumping to various conclusions, typical of Italy's position towards the Balkan Pact, which is on the agenda of President Tito's talks with Greek officials. It is common knowledge that after Tito's meeting with Turkish President Bayar, Italy tried to sway Greece towards thwarting this still non-existent Balkan Pact. Rome tried to use NATO to make Greece back down, but these attempts were unsuccessful. [...] The Greek Press carried a blunt message to Italian imperialism: Hands off the Balkans!

The second event that has attracted the attention of the local Press is the passage of Russian warships from the Black Sea en route to Albania. [...] Moscow has sent its destroyers at exactly the same time when the Yugoslav ship *Galeb* carrying President Tito will be in the same waters. [...] In Greece, this is interpreted as an expression of Moscow's interest in the Balkans, in Albania at the moment, and that any future Balkan Pact should bear this in mind. It is also seen as a pressure of sorts on the three countries as they are nearing a final agreement to form the pact. The fact that the Greeks' understanding of the situation concurs is obvious in the articles of Athenian dailies.

The pressure which Rome and Moscow are putting on the three countries, novel in their form in view of their relations, are just a passing dark cloud like the one that brought an afternoon shower in Athens, which darkened the skies for a brief moment, and shortly afterwards the Acropolis again glistened in all its resplendence in the brilliant Mediterranean sunshine.

Joško Palavršić

*Vjesnik* newspaper, 30 May 1954, p. 1.

### **B. Extracts from Foreign Minister Professor Fuat Köprülü's speech after signing the Ankara Agreement, 28 February 1953**

This agreement is the fruit of the realistic stance of three countries that are deeply committed to the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and the ideal of peace

in the spirit of cooperation and sincere friendship, as well as determined to defend their own independence in the face of a common enemy. Hence, this agreement which, in terms of geopolitics, concurs with the ideals and common interests of all peaceable governments appears suitable as a solid and dependable document. [...] While we point in a decisive manner to the direction of friendship and cooperation, we also provide a new foundation for peace and authority in the light of realism and the peace-promoting developments in the free world. Turkey is proud to host the signing of this deed of cooperation and security which was envisioned in Belgrade and drawn up in Athens.

*Milliyet* newspaper, 1 March 1953, pp. 1, 7.

### **C. Statement made by Hulusi Köymen, Member of Parliament for the Democrat Party during the parliamentary discussion for the approval of the agreement**

In the case of war in Europe, the strategic importance of the Balkan Peninsula and the Turkish geography will become self-evident. In order to ensure victory, forces on the attacking side will be obliged to extend their operations on land and sea in three continents and control the resources in these areas. The main routes of expansion pass through the Balkans, the Straits and our own country. Given this strategic fact, the common decision of the three countries that play a leading role in determining the fate of this geographical area, taken in order to protect peace and coordinate their efforts in order to defend it, undoubtedly will dissuade any belligerent attempt and disrupt their plans.

*Milliyet* newspaper, 19 May 1953, p. 7.



Why was this Pact formed? What was the unusual element here? According to source II-43A, how do you explain Italy's interest and what is the meaning of the reference to Italian imperialism in the Balkans? Why was the Pact short-lived?

## ► II.6.3. Albania's path

In 1949 Albania was in a rather difficult situation. The breakup of relations with Yugoslavia, the suspension of loans and the removal of Yugoslav

specialists was a heavy blow to the weak Albanian economy. Under such circumstances, there was but one alternative for Enver Hoxha:

To require Soviet full support and protection, and thus to accept Soviet tutelage. On the other hand, following the breakup of Soviet-Yugoslav relations, even Stalin needed Albania to be positioned against Tito's Yugoslavia so as to narrow the circle of isolation for the Yugoslav heretic leader, who had dared to oppose him. After the official condemnation of the crimes of Stalinism in 1956, Albanian-USSR relations soared. In 1961 Albania ceased to be a member of COMECON and participate in the Warsaw Pact (it officially withdrew from the latter in 1968, in protest over the invasion of Czechoslovakia) and allied itself with Maoist China until 1978.

## II-44. Albania and the USSR, 1961

PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF ALBANIA

MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

No. 12

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of Albania [...] has the honour to present to the Embassy of USSR in Tirana the following [document], kindly asking to forward it to the Soviet Government:

I. The Government of the People's Republic of Albania was informed with great astonishment and regret of the decision of the Government of the USSR, whereby it withdraws its ambassador currently in the People's Republic of Albania on the ungrounded and fictitious pretext that the People's Republic of Albania has created certain conditions that deprive him of every possibility to exercise his diplomatic functions.

The Government of the People's Republic of Albania rejects in the most determined way this false accusation, which is another one of the numerous slanders and other unfriendly actions undertaken continuously and systematically by the Soviet leaders against the People's Republic of Albania, who pursue one and only one goal: To aggravate and sever the brotherly relations between our two friendly peoples and our two socialist countries.

The Ambassador of the People's Republic of Albania in the Soviet Union, comrade Nesti Nase, has always carried out scrupulously his duties as a diplomat, as an Albanian and communist, rigorously respecting laws and rules in force in the Soviet Union. He has worked with all his energies to strengthen and forge increasingly the everlasting friendship between our

two brotherly peoples and our two socialist countries.

It should be noted that in carrying out his noble mission as a socialist diplomat, not only he has not been assisted, but he was also impeded by the Soviet authorities by all means, even those of the most intolerable, including open and disguised surveillance. Actually, it is a known fact that for several years, the Embassy of the People's Republic of Albania in the Soviet Union has been under constant surveillance through specific technical equipment, already installed since its construction, and from that time onwards it has been under direct police control.

The Government of the People's Republic of Albania protests most vigorously about the decision of the Soviet Government to expel the Ambassador of the People's Republic of Albania from the Soviet Union, a decision wholly unfair, unjustified and in open opposition with the fundamental principles of international law [and those guiding] relations between socialist countries. It lays the blame on the Soviet Government for [the effect that such a decision] will have on relations between the People's Republic of Albania and the Soviet Union.

Tirana, 4 December 1961

MPJ [Ministry of Foreign Affairs], 1961, file 37, pp. 22-25.

## II-45. *Washington Post* article, 1975: "Albania Isolated and Likes It. Stands Firm in Its Opposition to U.S. and Soviet Union"

TIRANA – This city's international airport has a ghost-like atmosphere and the terminal only temporarily springs to life five times a week when a flight from the outside world touches down at the capital of what must rank as one of the world's most isolated states.

Albania, with a population of 2.4 million, is the only country in Europe which has refused to establish diplomatic relations with either the United States or the Soviet Union.

Foreign visitors are infrequent – fewer than 10,000 are admitted annually – and Albania has resisted the temptation to transform its Adriatic beaches into resorts that would earn foreign exchange by attracting European sun-worshippers.

Most visitors are members of sympathetic political groups, mainly Communists from Western Europe who have been disillusioned with the turn of events in the Soviet Union and have come to view Marxist-Leninist Albania as a haven.

Albania's foreign guests come on its own terms. As its leader, Enver Hoxha, recently emphasised, the

country refuses to listen to its enemies who “advise us to turn our country into an inn with doors flung wide open to pigs and cows, to people with pants on or without pants at all, to the hirsute and long-haired to supplant with their wild orgies the beautiful dances of our people”.

Tirana airport has a barber who trims all male passengers arriving with any trace of hair hanging

over their ears. The souvenir shop sells not only the usual tourist trinkets but also trousers for women whose skirts are too long or too short. Albania is determined to keep out the values of Western individualism – even its most superficial manifestations – in an attempt to preserve the purity of its revolution.

*Washington Post* newspaper, 8 September 1975, p. A11.

## II-46. Chinese poster on the Chinese-Albanian Alliance, 1956




<https://www.marxists.org/history/erol/albania/>, accessed on 24.08.2016.



A rare Chinese poster hailing Chinese-Albanian friendship on the occasion of the meeting between Mao and Enver Hoxha in 1956. The great figure of Mao and its far greater importance in the alliance between giant communist

China and small communist Albania can be detected from the position of the body of Enver Hoxha, slightly bent in front of Mao and shaking Mao's hand with both hands.

## II-47. A cartoon ridiculing the Chinese leader Teng Tsiao Ping following the Chinese-Albanian split in 1978



<https://www.marxists.org/history/erol/ncm-5/>, accessed on 24.08.2016.



1. Study the key and the poster (II-46) and describe the body language of the figures of Mao and Hoxha. What kind of alliance was the one between China and Albania?
2. Describe the cartoon (II-47). Who are the persons depicted? What is the political message it carries?

## II-48. Albanian leaders explaining the split with China, 1978

TO THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA  
TO THE STATE COUNCIL OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

On 7 July 1978 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China forwarded to the Embassy of the Socialist People's Republic of Albania in Beijing an official communication whereby it noted that the Chinese Government had decided "to suspend economic and military assistance to Albania, to suspend assistance payments related to Albania and to withdraw economic and military specialists" hitherto operating in Albania.

The Central Committee of the Party of Labour of Albania and the Albanian Government denounce your brutal

[action] before all world public opinion as a reactionary one, as an action that repeats both in form and content the cruel and chauvinist methods of Tito, Khrushchev and Brezhnev, which China itself had once denounced.

For each and every ordinary person it is unbelievable and it goes beyond reasoning that Albania, a small country which fights against imperialist-revisionist siege and its blockade, which has embarked on a wide and comprehensive work for the speedy economic and cultural development of the country, and which works tirelessly to strengthen the defence of its socialist Fatherland, would try to ruin the economic collaboration with China and would refuse its civil and military loans and assistance.

When the Party of Labour of Albania defended the Communist Party of China from the attacks of Khrushchevite revisionists at the meetings of Communist and People's Parties in Bucharest and Moscow in 1960, it did so fully aware that it was defending Marxism-Leninism principles and not in order to receive from China certain factories and tractors. When socialist Albania defended the rights of People's China at the United Nations against the American complot for consecutive years, it did so not in order to make material gains, but to defend a fair and principled cause. When the Party of Labour of Albania and our working class supported the strategic goals of the Cultural Revolution of China, they did so not in order to receive anything in return, but to help the Chinese working class, the Chinese people and the communists to save the country from capitalist elements that had usurped power in China.

The Socialist People's Republic of Albania and the Albanian people, under the leadership of the Party of Labour of Albania headed by comrade Enver Hoxha, will fulfil to the end and with honour its historical mission for the building of socialism based on its own forces, thereby showing before the world proletariat and people worldwide the inexhaustible and invincible vitality of Marxist-Leninist ideology, which makes it possible even for a small country, surrounded by imperialism and revisionism, such as Albania, to build successfully socialism, to protect it and move it always forward.

Albania will never surrender itself to anyone. It will always remain faithful to Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism. It will constantly march on the road of socialism and communism guided by the teachings of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin.

COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF THE SOCIALIST CENTRAL COMMITTEE

PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF ALBANIA OF THE PARTY OF LABOUR OF ALBANIA

Tirana, on 20 July 1978

MPJ [Ministry of Foreign Affairs], 1978, file 284, pp. 73-119.



## **CHAPTER III: DICTATORSHIPS AND DEMOCRATIC TRANSITIONS**

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## ► INTRODUCTION

After the end of the Stalinist revolutionary period of fighting against “the fascists, reactionaries and *kulaks*” (wealthy peasants), the communist regimes in Southeast Europe were faced with the need of finding new ideological metaphors to explain the postponement of “communist society” to the more distant future, as well as to justify state control over both the social and the economic sphere. Thus, the concept of “Real Socialism” was invented and developed as a response to the need for a general historical norm in propaganda and the human and social sciences, and became part of a generally valid periodisation of the different stages in the development of the regime that could sustain and defend the prospect of the “final victory of communism”. As a term for the condition of socialist societies, Real Socialism (the terms “Mature Socialism” and “Advanced Socialist Society” were also officially used as synonyms) referred to the late 1950s and, particularly, the first half of the 1960s when, according to the dominant communist ideology, the first, more radical and brutal period of the socialist revolution came to an end; a period that had witnessed the takeover of political power, the elimination of the “exploiting classes” and the expropriation of the private ownership of the means of production. The following period ushered in a new “higher stage”, in the course of which the advantages of the new social order would be manifested fully and completely – that is, “actual”, “mature” socialism.

During the period of Real Socialism, the planned economy was expected to triumph over capitalist production and labour productivity. In October 1958 Todor Zhivkov, probably inspired by the Chinese experience, expounded his view of Bulgaria’s “great leap forward”. The resolutions of the 22nd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in October 1961, as well as of the subsequent congresses of the “fraternal parties”, forecasted something even better than the goods awaiting those living in “actually existing socialism”. They promised the advent of communism and complete prosperity by 1980 – a most unrealistic and unfounded “prophecy” that was quickly

forgotten and removed from public circulation in the following years. Guided by the postulation of Real Socialism, socialist countries actually conducted multiple experiments in modernising their economies in the 1960s and 1970s by “implementing scientific and technological progress”, “concentrating production” in large enterprises and “intensifying the production process”. Now the socialist countries concentrated their efforts on adapting to changes in the world economy and the technological development, as well as on aligning their own economic structures to the changing world by adjusting them to the new consumer attitudes of the population and the effects of mass culture in their societies. The propaganda slogan “everything in the name of man, for the good of man” summed up the key ideological construct of “actually existing socialism”.

The communist dictatorships of Southeast Europe reproduced the most essential characteristics of twentieth-century authoritarian dictatorships; namely, mass mobilisation and politics aiming at the entire organisation of social life. After eliminating “bourgeois” political pluralism (the bourgeois multiparty system), they developed in its stead the so-called “mass movements”, controlled and directed by their respective communist parties. All multiple human groups and social communities were organised at the lowest and widest possible level so as to leave no space for the “informal” networking of people, for independent initiatives and for the manifestation of any public opposition to the leading political force. Communist regimes portrayed the “mass movements” and their organisations as centres of civic activity, although they were in fact instruments for the total control of society. They constituted the basis of the new hierarchical social structure, the highest posts of which were occupied by the new social elite – the communist leadership and, at the very top, “the leader and teacher” (until the mid-1950s) and later the communist party and state leader.

Following this logic, after their “victory” all communist regimes began to expand the base of their own parties, reaching a membership of several million by 1989. Their growth was interrupted by

“purges” and the repression of party members as a well-tested system of keeping the national elites in a state of submission. The main forms of organisation of the “mass movements” were several and, despite local specificities, in principle they were common to all communist countries in the Balkans. Most notably, they involved the formal preservation of a large number of creative associations and civic organisations that had been formed freely in the pre-communist era (various artistic, sportive, hiking, minority, feminist, etc.). The general condition for their continuing existence was the replacement of their leaders by people who were close to the communist regimes. This also guaranteed the replacement of the principles that had guided their free existence prior to the establishment of the communist regimes. After the victory of the latter, all such organisations and associations accepted “the leading role of the Party”. A usual practice in the establishment of “mass movements” and “organisations” was to unite – in a single, large formation – the former political parties that had been co-opted by the regime, the pre-existing civic organisations, as well as non-party members on the basis of place of residence. Each member, whether as an individual (as in the case of non-party members) or as a collective (as in the case of parties and civic organisations), could act only within a pre-established organisational framework. A case in point was the United People’s Socio-Political Organisation “Fatherland Front” in Bulgaria. Such mass organisations provided overall support in the conduct of elections, and served as a mass propaganda background of economic, social and international initiatives. At the same time, strict communist party control predetermined their total formalisation.

Trade unions were another type of mass organisations whose importance was posited by the ideological postulation of the leading role of the working class in the social relations of the new society. However, considering that there existed total state ownership of the means of production and no freedom to employ workers, their actual role was absurd from a trade-union point of view. They were in fact part of the mechanism that ensured the constant mobilisation of the working masses in tune with the Party postulations on the daily over-fulfilment of production quotas and plans. Thus, the trade unions in fact performed anti-trade-union functions. In all

Balkan communist countries, they were modelled on the Soviet example – “one class, one party, a unified trade union” – and membership of all the “working people” was compulsory. It is no accident that the beginning of the crisis that led to the end of socialism in the 1980s was associated with the creation of Solidarity in Poland in 1980, which defined itself as an “Independent Self-Governing Trade Union”; that is, Solidarity was everything the official trade unions in the communist countries neither were nor could be.

One of the most important mass organisations was the communist youth organisation, the *Komsomol* in Soviet parlance. It was based on compulsory membership of all young people between 14 and 28 years old, and was meant to be a “school of communist education” and to ensure the constant political mobilisation of youth. One of its specific, but very important, functions was to provide new leading Party cadres. In general, the structure of the communist youth organisation was modelled on that of the communist party. It had its own budget, a full-time administrative-management apparatus and a pyramid structure, starting from local *Komsomol* organisations and moving up to the district and higher levels, with a central committee at the top. The communist organisations of children and adolescents up to 14 years of age were also under the tutelage of the *Komsomol*. Their activities aimed at encompassing all aspects of youth life, including work, presence in the public sphere, individual behaviour and expression.

By and large, the general periodisation of the communist dictatorships in the countries of the Soviet bloc followed the key events of the history of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), on which they were modelled: the death of Stalin in 1953; the 20th Congress of the CPSU in 1956, and the subsequent denunciation of “the cult of personality” and the crimes of Stalinism; 1968 and the intervention of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact in Czechoslovakia; and, finally, the election of Mikhail Gorbachev as General Secretary of the CPSU and his attempts to “restructure” socialism (*perestroika*). The Stalinist-type dictatorship of Enver Hoxha continued in Albania after its split with the Soviet Union, its alliance with China (1960-1978), and then during the period of Albanian self-isolation. In Yugoslavia, after the initial years of orthodox Stalinism, the “softer”, albeit undisputed, dictatorship of Tito was

established. All the communist dictatorships in the Balkans were also characterised by the establishment of the leading role of the communist party in all state and economic institutions – the fusion of the Party and the state that is common to all totalitarian regimes. Each administrative level of state government and each level of economic management had a party organisation of their own and all their decisions were always synchronised with the respective party leadership. This fusion of the Party and the state is also evidenced by the fact that the heads of all administrative and economic units were always also “responsible Party cadres”, whose appointment was based above all on their Party status, and not always on their expertise. Notwithstanding some specific variations, the Party leadership supervised the work of the government, of government ministries, of parliament, of the armed forces, the police and the security services, of the media, of the education system and all other institutions – a feature common to all Balkan communist dictatorships. Even Yugoslavia, which had deviated from the “correct path” and split with the Soviet Union in 1948, was not an exception in this regard. Common to all Balkan communist regimes was the Soviet-type repression in all its forms: repression of communists in the struggle against “the enemy with a Party card”; violence directed against owners during the forced collectivisation of agriculture and the expropriation of property; farcical show trials with a predetermined verdict of death; imprisonment and placement in forced labour camps; internal exile; forced labour mobilisation; dismissal from work – to name the most obvious. Other key features of communist rule in the Balkans were its various forms of disenfranchisement and disqualification (in access to education, in employment, in travelling abroad, in individual life paths, and so on), as well as a variety of hostile campaigns against “hooliganism”, “ideological subversion”, dissenting intellectuals and the like.

From the late 1960s onwards, a common characteristic of all communist regimes in the Balkans was the consistent substitution of key Marxist-Leninist concepts with nationalistic ideological constructs, the parallel association of official rituals and the re-orientation of major events in public life with key events and figures from the national pantheon of each country (or republic/nation in the Yugoslav case). The festivities for the 2050th anniversary of the creation

of the Dacian state and the 1300th anniversary of the foundation of the Bulgarian state in the 1970s and early 1980s, respectively, epitomised this tendency in its most theatricalised form.

Until the early 1980s the gestures of resistance against the communist dictatorships in the Balkans were random, isolated and inconsistent. This was due to the character of the regimes themselves, as well as to the fact that quite often the most critical opinions about “the system” came from people who were connected to the communist parties and their ideologies. In this respect, the case of Milovan Đilas in Yugoslavia, who criticised from a Marxist point of view various shortcomings of the real version of socialist society (particularly the gulf between the ruling communist elites, the *nomenklatura*, and the masses, is quite indicative. The tragic fate of the Bulgarian dissident Georgi Markov also epitomised this trajectory. In the 1980s, the idea of change that came from these circles followed the vague messages of the Soviet *perestroika* about humanising socialist society and building “socialism with a human face”, as Alexander Dubček famously described it in 1968. Genuine “informal” dissident organisations emerged in Bulgaria only a year or two before the collapse of communism, and they were concerned with the problems of the late 1980s – environmental pollution, and the political and civil rights of the country’s Turkish minority.

After the end of the Stalinist-type dictatorship, a somewhat different model was put in place in Yugoslavia. On the backdrop of a federal structure, it combined state control over the economy and society and the political monopoly of the Communist Party with the doctrine of collective self-management at different levels and – especially in comparison to Albania, Bulgaria and Romania – greater openness to the West. Thus, in the 1960s and early 1970s, the growing criticism of various problems in society became ever more public and was voiced by a host of eminent intellectuals, organisations and groups, mirroring the debates and efforts to liberalise, humanise and democratise the existing social conditions that were epitomised by the reforms in Czechoslovakia. Ultimately, the “Croatian Spring” was also quashed after the end of the “Prague Spring”, as were the Slovenian and Serbian “liberals”. The deepening crisis, however, continued to affect all communist countries, and in the 1980s authorities in

Yugoslavia again began to look for viable solutions to the burning issues of a more effective economy and political decentralisation.

On the other side of the Iron Curtain in the region, both internal and international factors again predetermined the struggles for more human rights and freedoms and for the restoration of the democratic parliamentary system and constitutional order, periodically violated or suspended by authoritarian military regimes in Turkey or the right-wing dictatorship of the colonels in Greece (1967-1974). Of course, here the spectrum of political resistance or legal opposition was much more wide and diverse, including left-wing as well as right-wing or centrist parties, radical and liberal movements and groups with diverse visions and ideologies. Undoubtedly, it was conditioned by the ideological, strategic or other considerations of the USA and its Western allies. This did not in any way rule out various means of intervention, although these did not take the form of the open intervention of the Soviet Union in Hungary and Czechoslovakia. Actually, in Greece, the legacy of the civil war shed a heavy shadow on the country, one that accounted for a regime of "weak" or "controlled" democracy until 1967. Nevertheless, until 1967, elected governments had always to listen to the voices of elected politicians and a free media, which started from very different political presuppositions compared to those held by the palace, the military or the security services. For instance, in the early 1950s there was a widespread demand for a general amnesty, in 1958 a large increase in the left-wing vote, in 1961 a centrist outcry against "force and fraud" in that year's elections, and in 1963-64 centrist triumphs at the polls. Anti-communist oppression in the first

years after the end of the civil war, as illustrated by the detention camp of Makronisos, was gradually replaced by measures of "pacification" in the 1950s and of democratisation in the early 1960s, which were cut short by the military dictatorship. The junta came to rely heavily on the military and security services, as had the post-civil war elected governments from the 1945 Treaty of Varkiza onwards, whereas it kept in place the late 1947 decision of the centre-right government to outlaw the Communist Party. After the fall of the junta in 1974, the Communist Party was legalised, monarchy was abolished and Greek society was democratised.

Cyprus followed a different path since, despite the anti-communist actions of both the Greek Cypriot organisation EOKA and the Turkish Cypriot TMT, the Greek Cypriot communist party AKEL had been legal since the island's independence in 1960. However, inter-communal disagreements leading to violence and to the breakdown of the bi-communal state (as described in chapter II.4) determined the development of Cyprus and culminated in the Greek junta's coup against Makarios and the Turkish invasion of July/August 1974.

Turkey adopted political pluralism in the aftermath of the Second World War, but experienced political, social and economic instability that led to military coups and authoritarian regimes either under direct military regimes (1960 and 1971) or under the indirect rule of a National Security Council dominated by the military. In the 1980s the country experienced the most conservative and more brutal military regime headed by the Chief of Staff, General Kenan Evren. Ultimately, despite the successful administration under Prime Minister Turgut Özal after 1983, Turkey failed to consolidate democracy in the 1980s and 1990s.

## ▶ III.1. COMMUNIST REGIMES

### ▶ III.1.1. Real Socialism

#### III-1. Extracts from Todor Zhivkov's report to the Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Bulgaria, 11 December 1972

An important place in the natural process of democratisation is occupied by the question of the attitudes of officials towards workers [...]. In this connection, it is necessary to point out the need for nurturing valuable qualities in contemporary leaders, irrespective of rank and position, such as: a) Political qualities: Being loyal to the class and the Party; possessing a deep understanding of the Party and state policy, and fighting for its implementation; following a creative approach towards the concrete policy that is elaborated and conducted by the Party in his sector of work; educating the masses in a communist spirit, being able to work with them and to organise them; possessing high moral qualities and leading by example; b) Management qualities: Being able to direct and work with collectively; having the necessary qualifications in line with the contemporary achievements of science and technology; knowing how and being able to manage production; being skilled in contemporary methods and means of taking decisions and carrying them out. These requirements necessitate a radical change in the existing system of training, and especially of retraining, leading cadres.

Zhivkov, 1978, vol. III, pp. 319-322.



With the development of socialist society and the growing complexity of social life, governance and management by means of political coercion became increasingly problematic. Calling for the professionalisation of governance and administrative services, Zhivkov's speech shows that it was impossible to continue governing the country through direct political coercion. It attests to an attempt to overcome the inertia of the established ideological discourse that had permeated all spheres of social life, and to ensure that administrative services were performed by experts communicating with the citizens in plain, transparent professional language, and not by ideologically indoctrinated bureaucrats looking to ensure that the institutional rules and regulations were implemented in a "communist spirit".

#### III-2. Extracts from an interview with a former worker at a factory in Iași, explaining why he joined the Communist Party of Romania

I didn't want to be a Party member [...] that was one of the problems. But at some point, why should I be a hypocrite, I understood that if I was not a Party member, I would have no chance to get somewhere, to earn some more money, no one, absolutely no one could be a workshop chief and not be a Party member. When they made me a Party member they also made five other workers [...], you had to learn [...] all kind of political things that you had to say [...]. I cannot say I shouted slogans, I have always been a little reserved, I didn't come to the fore, I didn't have, how should I say, relations with those people [...]. I was surprised when they let me travel to the West under Ceaușescu.

Pintilie, 2015, p. 118.



Why did the interviewee join the Communist Party of Romania? What does this tell you about the society in which he lived?

#### III-3. Extracts from the decisions of the Fifth Plenum of the Communist Party of Albania, condemning the "opportunistic" activity of the former communist leader Sejfulla Malëshova



The Fifth Plenum of the CPA marked the end of internal debates inside the Party and the triumph of the Stalinist dogma.

#### A. Report held prior to the plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Albania (21 February 1946)

The Plenum found that the one who gave the tone to this line of thought, the one who formulated and expressed until the end opportunistic tendencies, is

Sejfulla Malëshova, who even in the meeting of the Plenum displayed his reservations, in particular as regards economic policy as well as the Front.

The Plenum unanimously decided to expel Sejfulla Malëshova from the Central Committee.

### B. Decisions of 3 March 1946

The working masses became the main force of the National Liberation War. In the course of the war, a major development occurred in our country, as the ruling classes joined forces with the occupiers. The war was directed against them as well. Accordingly, the National Movement was also turned into movement against the ruling classes and in favour of People's Power. Under the leadership of the Communist Party, the People's revolution was waged, which was finalised with the liberation of Albania, the creation of the People's Army and the seizure of power by the working masses.

We have in our country a Revolutionary Democratic Dictatorship of workers and peasants headed by the Communist Party.

Now the point is to place the foundation of power, which is the economy, under the control of the working masses. The Party must lead the working masses in the struggle against the classes which used to hold power, feudal and bourgeoisie, and which still retain important positions under their control.

Subject to its line, the Party must conduct its work especially in terms of the following two objectives:

1. *The reconstruction of the country.* The country was



The writer and poet Sejfulla Malëshova (1900-1971) was among Albanian communists who had spent time as political refugees in the Soviet Union in the 1930s. After the liberation of Albania, he became a Politburo member, chairman of the Writers' Association of Albania, President of the National Bank and chairman of the Economic Council. In 1946, he was severely criticised at the Fifth Plenum of the Communist Party in light of his view that the Albanian economy of the time ought to develop through the combination of the public with the private sector. Malëshova was against the artificial aggravation

destroyed by the war, production fell, and the standard of living has dropped. Our challenge is not only to restore what the war destroyed but also to build a better life.

Apart from economic reconstruction, we must develop every social and cultural aspect of our society.

Our people need more food, more culture. The whole work must aim to favour the working masses and to liquidate the classes hitherto in power. It must bear the stamp of our views on the construction of socialism.

Our people must be mobilised in voluntary work, which is crucial for the reconstruction of our country.

We should render it clear that, insofar as the working classes are aware that the work carried out is to their benefit, they are committed to any sacrifice.

2. *The question of personnel.* Without capable officials, our Party will not manage to fulfil its tasks.

Officials must be required to be wholeheartedly devoted to socialism. They must be aware how to fight the old spirit and work for our aims.

The education of officials must be placed under the highest aegis of the Central Committee. Officials must be selected prudently and they must be educated and supervised while working. We must provide them even more with culture and specifically with Marxist culture. We must be clear that those who understand better what Stalin teaches us work better and commit fewer mistakes.

It must be clear that in order to serve well the Party today one should be able to serve the new Power, our new economy, our new Army, our culture and our country.

Central Committee of the Communist Party of Albania AQSH, F.489, v.1946, d.10, fl.1

of class struggle, and he maintained that in early post-war Albania it would be wiser to integrate the different social strata in the economic and cultural reconstruction of the country. The Communist Party leadership considered his thesis as opportunistic and liberal, and consequently he was expelled from the Party and deported. The Fifth Plenum of the Communist Party marked the beginning of harsh measures against private property by recognising the predominance of the state-owned sector and embarking on a campaign of severe persecution of merchants and private entrepreneurs.

## ► III.1.2. Yugoslavia and self-management

During the conflict with the Information Bureau, the Communist Party of Yugoslavia decided to

reject all USSR-made models of economic development, primarily affecting the role of the state,

and create an entirely new system. This new system was called self-management, and its creators were Boris Kidrič and Milovan Đilas. Supposedly, self-management bestowed the management of firms and enterprises on the workers themselves, while enterprises became social (not state) ownership. The main body of self-management was the council of workers. The first such council was elected on 31 December 1949 at the cement factory Prvoborac in Solin near Split. During 1950, when the National Assembly voted the Basic Law on Workers' Corporate Governance by which self-management was officially introduced, as many as 250 councils were formed, comprising between 15 and 120 members. As a collective body, these councils were supposed to make the most important decisions about the operation of any firm, plant, enterprise, company and the like. Law-makers were working in the "spirit of the three Ds: de-bureaucratisation, democratisation, and decentralisation". The law was supposed to institutionalise Marx's idea of the dictatorship of the proletariat. However, the real power in the firms remained in the hands of the Party and the top managers.

### III-4. Milovan Đilas's criticism of the Party monopoly, 1957

Unlike previous revolutions, the communist revolution, which was carried out in order to abolish all social classes, has resulted in the absolute rule of one class, a new class. The rest is just an illusion. [...] In communism, power is swiftly distributed among a handful of party leaders. What is left from the so-called dictatorship of the proletariat is mere rhetoric. [...] The communist state, that is the authorities, strives towards the complete depersonalisation of both individuals and nations, including even its own representatives. It seeks to turn a whole nation into a kind of clerks, and to control, either directly or indirectly, salaries, living and housing conditions and, ultimately, even religious pursuits. [...] History will excuse the communists of many things, seeing that they did what they did in view of the circumstances and in order to defend their survival. But quelling all opposition or, rather, having a monopoly of opinion so as to defend even their most selfish interests is something that will place them on history's pillar of

shame, alongside the inquisition and burning people at the stake, and perhaps guarantee them top position. [...] Modern communism is a totalitarian system where the three main pillars for the domination of the people – power, possession and ideology – are the monopoly of a single political party; that is, as previously mentioned and to use the same wording, of a new class, the oligarchy of the Party. No totalitarian system in history, including the present one, except communism, had managed to control simultaneously all three pillars for the domination of the people. [...]

Đilas, 1990, pp. 40, 79, 94, 138, 156.



1. Who was Milovan Đilas?
2. What did Đilas mean when he spoke about the "new class"? Who comprised this new class?
3. Which phenomena did Đilas criticise?

### III-5. Workers' council elected in Solin's Prvoborac cement factory

At the proposal of the Central Board of the Alliance of Trade Unions of Yugoslavia, the labour collective of the cement factory Prvoborac in Solin has elected its 13-member Workers' Council. For the first time workers' leadership was formed in the district of Split. It will carry out the planned tasks and will be very beneficial to the enterprise. [...] The duty of the workers' council is to constantly monitor the work of the enterprise and deal with all issues in depth. The Council will devote particular attention to promoting new personnel, controlling the execution of monthly and annual plans and the utilisation of surplus material, reducing overall production costs, applying socialist competition and work discipline, and rewarding the best workers. It will also take care of innovators and those working on rationalising the production process. The forming of the Workers' Council has not diminished the role of the company director because, as the head of the company, he is a member of the council and together they deal with company affairs. The Council also includes workers who are best acquainted with the production process. They are now in a position to obtain even more professional knowledge, help the enterprise and train to become future managers in the enterprise. That is why the collective of the Prvoborac cement factory formally elected its first workers' management.

Vjesnik newspaper, 10.01.1950.



1. Which were the characteristics of the Yugoslav model of socialism?
2. How would you define concepts such as self-management and Workers' Councils? Who were members of the Workers' Councils?

### III-6. Children involved in ideological education



The establishment of the Union of Pioneers of Yugoslavia during the war, in 1942, demonstrates the importance that the future socialist authorities attached to youth. The Union rallied children between the ages of 7 and 15, after which they became members of the League of Socialist Youth of Yugoslavia. The induction ceremony of first-grade pupils in elementary schools was a very formal occasion which took place in all schools on Republic Day, 29 November. During the ceremony, the pioneers took a solemn pledge in unison and received a membership booklet, a red scarf and a blue cap with a red star, called *Titovka*. This was a way to include children in the ideological and political system, where they played a significant propaganda role.

#### A. Symbols



*Pioneer's cap and scarf*



*Pioneer's badge*

Private collection.

#### B. The Pioneer's Pledge

Today, as I become a Pioneer,  
I give my Pioneer's word of honour –  
That I shall study and work diligently,  
Respect my parents and my seniors,  
And be a loyal and honest comrade and friend.  
That I shall love our homeland, our self-managed  
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.  
That I shall disseminate brotherhood and unity  
And the principles for which comrade Tito fought.  
And that I shall value all peoples of the world who  
respect freedom and peace!



Study carefully the sources of ch.III.1 (textual and visual). Then note:

1. The particular vocabulary related to the kind of political regime of the states mentioned.
2. The obligations of citizens towards the regime and the way they are expressed.
3. The elements showing that the regime resembles a dictatorship.
4. The procedure followed by citizens to express loyalty and dedication to the regime.
5. The ceremonial aspect of this process.
6. The way people who express different opinions are treated.
7. Define and discuss the term Real Socialism.

## ▶ III.2. MILITARY REGIMES

### ▶ III.2.1. Military dictatorships in Turkey

Turkey adopted the principle of political pluralism and was incorporated into the Western Bloc in the second half of the 1940s. In 1950, the Republican People's Party (CHP) of İsmet İnönü lost the elections after 27 years of uninterrupted rule. Bet-

ween 1950 and 1983, however, the country experienced either heavily authoritarian right-wing regimes or political, social and economic instability, which led to military coups. The Democrat Party (DP) of Adnan Menderes and Celal Bayar,

which had taken a most repressive turn after the elections of 1957 and was unable to deal with the economic crisis and a series of student protests, was overthrown in 1960 in the first military coup against an elected government. In 1971, after three years of violence between radical left- and radical right-wing militants, and a deepening financial and economic crisis, the army forced the resignation of conservative Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel. The military relinquished power following the October 1973 elections. Yet, soon afterwards, Turkey entered into a period of substantial political and economic turmoil. Between 1975 and 1980 as many as 5,000 citizens lost their lives in acts of political violence, while, in a context aggravated by the consequences of the invasion of Cyprus in 1974, the country faced a series of harsh devaluations (the last one by 48%) and very high rates of inflation (106% in 1980). These conditions facilitated a third military coup, in September 1980, headed by the Chief of the General Staff, Kenan Evren. Evren's regime, which officially lasted until the elections of November 1983, was not only the most brutal but also the most conservative of the three. While presenting himself as the "Second Atatürk" and aiming at the restoration of what he perceived as "genuine Kemalism", Evren transformed the so-called "Turkish-Islamic Synthesis" into the new official state doctrine.

### III-7. The coup of 27 May 1960. Declaration of the National Unity Committee



On 27 May 1960, a military committee headed by General Cemal Gürsel seized power after weeks of political unrest. The coup gained the support of students and intellectuals and established the army as an institutional agent in politics, which personified the Nation and the State. Menderes, Bayar and leading figures of the Democrat Party government were arrested. Menderes and two of his ministers were hanged a year later.

#### A. Declaration made by the Turkish Armed Forces

Dear Citizens, Today because of the crisis that our democracy is facing and in order not to cause further fighting

between brothers due to the latest regrettable events, the Turkish Armed Forces have assumed the administration. The Armed Forces have undertaken this operation in order to rescue the parties from the uncompromising state they have descended. After holding fair and free elections as soon as possible under the supervision and arbitration of a non-partisan impartial administration, they will transfer and deliver the administration to the winner of the elections, regardless of which side.

This initiative is not undertaken against any person or group. Our administration will not take any menacing actions against any individual and will never tolerate the implementation of such actions by others. Regardless of individual and party affiliation, every citizen will be treated according to the principles of law. It is essential for the ceasing of our troubles and the welfare of our national existence that all citizens remember that we are the offspring of the same nation, that we are above parties, and that we should treat each other with respect, understanding and without hatred.

We kindly ask cabinet members to take shelter in the Turkish Armed Forces. Their personal safety is under the guarantee of the law.

We appeal to our allies, our neighbours and the whole world. Our aim is to fully comply with the Constitution of the United Nations and the human rights principles. The principle "Peace at home, peace in the world" of Great Atatürk is our standard. We are loyal to our allies and our commitments. We believe in and are committed to NATO and CENTO. Our conviction is "Peace at home, peace in the world".

[https://tr.wikisource.org/wiki/27\\_May%C4%B1s\\_Darbe\\_Bildirisi](https://tr.wikisource.org/wiki/27_May%C4%B1s_Darbe_Bildirisi), accessed on 25.08.2016.

#### B. Menderes seconds before being hanged



<http://alchetron.com/Adnan-Menderes-1318013-W>, accessed on 8.09.2016.



The Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO), originally known as the Baghdad Pact or the Middle East Treaty Organisation (METO) was established in 1955 by Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, Turkey and the United Kingdom. It was dissolved in 1979.



Adnan Menderes (1899-1961) became a leading figure of the emerging political opposition to the CHP after the Second World War and was one of the founders of the Democrat Party (DP). After the victory of the DP in the 1950 elections, President Celal Bayar chose to appoint him as prime minister. In the 1950s Menderes was one of the most powerful political leaders in Turkey. Under his government, Turkey experienced a “green uprising” (the social and political mobilisation of rural areas) and an Islamic revival. The Turkish military ousted him from power through a bloodless coup in 1960. He was sentenced to death and hanged for violating the Constitution and for ordering the pogrom of non-Muslims (mainly the Greek minority) in Istanbul in 1955 (see ch. II.4.2).

Celal Bayar (1883-1986) was a member of the Committee of Union and Progress (Young Turks), participated in the war for Turkish independence and served as prime minister (1937-1939) and President of the Republic (1950-1960). He was a founding and leading member of the Democrat Party. Persecuted by the leaders of the 1960 coup, along with Adnan Menderes and other members of the government, he was sentenced to life imprisonment. Bayar was pardoned in 1966.



**1.** What is the driving spirit of the declaration of the Turkish Armed Forces?

Where do they place emphasis?

**2.** Consider the reasons they put forward for their intervention, their aims and their commitment to democratic principles. Why are they trying to justify their intervention in political affairs? What do they try to do and what to prevent? Discuss the controversy.

### III-8. Ultimatum of 12 March 1971



The military delivered an ultimatum on 12 March 1971, forcing Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel to resign. Turkey entered into a period of “White Terror”, during which the main leaders of the radical Left were either executed or killed.

1. With its behaviour, opinions and deeds, the government has led our country to anarchy, brotherly fighting, and social and economic unrest. It has not been able to carry out the reforms that the Constitution foresees, thus placing the very future of the Republic of Turkey in danger. Public opinion has lost its hope of attaining the level of civilisation that Atatürk has set us as a target.

2. It is deemed necessary to form a powerful, trustworthy and non-partisan government that will eliminate the reigning anarchy, carry out the reforms foreseen in the constitution from a Kemalist point of view, implement the laws of the revolution, and work with parliament in finding the appropriate solutions so as to bring to an end the sadness and despair that the Turkish nation and the armed forces are feeling about this desperate situation.

3. In case such a government is not immediately formed, the Turkish Armed Forces are determined to uphold their sacred duty of protecting the Republic of Turkey according to the laws in place, and assume directly the administration. For your information.

[http://dosyalar.hurriyet.com.tr/haber\\_resim\\_3/12\\_mart\\_raporu.pdf](http://dosyalar.hurriyet.com.tr/haber_resim_3/12_mart_raporu.pdf), accessed on 25.08.2016.

### III-9. The coup of 12 September 1980



On 12 September 1980, the National Security Council led by General Kenan Evren toppled Süleyman Demirel’s minority government. Under the new military regime, which officially lasted until 1983 (but continued in fact until the end of the decade), some 50 militants were executed, hundreds were killed, and 650,000 people were taken into custody, while speaking Kurdish in public was banned.

### A. Front page of *Hürriyet* newspaper



Translation: MARTIAL LAW IMPOSED IN THE WHOLE COUNTRY  
The Army has seized power.

### B. First communiqué of the National Security Council, 12 September 1980

Great Turkish Nation,  
The Republic of Turkey which is a whole as country and nation entrusted to us by Great Atatürk, recently is under treacherous intellectual and physical attacks by external and internal enemies, directed against its existence, its regime and its independence.

The State has been rendered unable to operate anymore with its main agencies; constitutional bodies were brought to internal strife or silenced; political parties, with unfruitful disputes and intransigence, failed to ensure the unity and togetherness necessary in order to rescue the State and failed to take the necessary measures. Thus, destructive and separatist powers increased their activities to the utmost and endangered the citizens' lives and properties.

Instead of Kemalism, reactionary and other per-

verse ideologies were produced to exert pressure on educational institutions from elementary schools up to universities, on the administration system, the judicial bodies, the internal security agency, labour organisations, political parties, and even on our citizens in the most faraway corners of our country, bringing them to the brink of civil war and partitioning. In short, the State was left powerless and driven to impotence.

Glorious Turkish Nation,

It is in this environment that the Turkish Armed Forces decided to perform the duty assigned by the Internal Service Law, to protect and safeguard the Republic of Turkey, in the name of the great Turkish Nation, within the framework of command and control, and undertook the administration of the country.

The purpose of the above operation is to protect the integrity of the country, to ensure national unity, to prevent possible civil war and brotherly fight, to re-establish the state authority and presence, and to eliminate the causes hampering the function of the democratic order.

The Parliament and the Government have been dissolved. The immunity of Members of the Parliament has been revoked.

Martial law has been declared throughout the country. Travelling abroad is prohibited. In order to safeguard the life and property of citizens, until further notice curfew will apply from 17:00. Detailed information about this operation for the protection of the nation will be announced by me in the news bulletin of Turkish Radio Television at 13:00. I expect from the citizens to listen in tranquillity to the communiqués announced through radio and television, as well as to fully obey and trust the Turkish Armed Forces that are indeed a part of the people.

Kenan Evren

[https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanaklar/TUTANAK/MGK\\_/d01/c001/mgk\\_01001001.pdf](https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanaklar/TUTANAK/MGK_/d01/c001/mgk_01001001.pdf), accessed on 25.08.2016.



1. What vocabulary do the Turkish Armed Forces employ when referring to the suspension of parliamentary politics?

2. How do they address the Turkish people? In their view, which is the major danger facing the Republic? How do you understand the references to Kemalism in the above sources?

### ► III.2.2. The Colonels' dictatorship in Greece

The coup of 21 April 1967 marks the end of a period that is called “controlled democracy” in historiography. It began in 1946 and was characterised by the strong presence of the military and by a peculiar blending of democratic and authoritarian practices in the country's political and administrative life. Staged a few weeks prior to the holding of parliamentary elections that were widely predicted to lead to a Centre Union victory, the coup interrupted the strained process of democratisation that had begun in the early 1960s, thus sinking the country into seven years of fear and silence.

#### III-10. Extracts from the opening remarks of Colonel Georgios Papadopoulos at a press conference held in Athens on 27 April 1967



Attended by Greek and foreign journalists, the press conference was held less than a week after the coup. There, Colonel Georgios Papadopoulos, the undisputed leader of the self-styled “Revolution”, referred to the communist threat as the main reason for the army's intervention.

The country was going through a crisis, looking for a way out of the political deadlock it had come into [due to] the inability of the responsible political elements to reach an understanding, despite repeated appeals by the Sovereign. No political leader undertook to assist the Sovereign, who in vain searched for a solution within the constitutional framework. No one was willing to sacrifice his interests for those of the nation. Together with an anarchic conception [of things], which had been imposed upon most of society, this situation had created the ultimate danger of communism halting the Country's forward direction.

Faced with this situation, the National Army, the country's armed forces, the only neutral force that existed, judged that it ought to intervene in order to halt the road towards the precipice.

Never did the fathers of Greek philosophy identify democratic freedoms with impunity. Inherent in the concept of democracy are the ideas of discipline, order,

hierarchy and respect for the law. From this viewpoint, we are entitled to characterise ourselves as democrats and to ask that you recognise us as such. Some may take exception to a few restrictions that are in place. Gentlemen, do not forget. In front of us there is a patient that we have placed on the operating table. If the surgeon does not sedate him during the operation, there is the possibility that he might lead him to death instead of rehabilitation. This is the response you should expect [from us] if, talking about democracy and freedom, you were to refer to the restrictions in place. The restrictions constitute the tying up of the patient on the operating table so that he undergoes the operation harmlessly.

Papadopoulos, 1969, vol. I, pp. 10-11.

#### III-11. Introduction to an anthology of Greek writings published after the suspension of censorship (1970)



Following the suspension of preventive censorship, which the junta had introduced upon usurping power in April 1967, established Greek writers who hitherto had refrained from publishing under such conditions brought out a short anthology of new writings. Under the plain title *Eighteen Texts*, the anthology comprised poems and short stories the subject matter of which was repression and censorship.

For the first time presenting original work of literature in this volume, after three years [of silence], we believe that we contribute to the effort to reappraise the problem that Greek authors face at this point in time.

The lifting of preventive censorship is not enough for the emancipation of a country's literary life, when large vital areas are still surrounded by a nexus that renders unfeasible their thorough description and evaluation. Nonetheless, after considered weighting [of the situation], we seek to reiterate our belief in some fundamental values, foremost of which is the right to intellectual and artistic freedom; one we will never desist from asserting, as it is integrally associated with the [principle] of respecting the opinion and integrity of all authors as well as of all people.

This common belief and claim, which unites us beyond differences in viewpoint and style, is underscored by this collective [volume].

Δεκαοκτώ κείμενα [Eighteen Texts], 1970, introduction.

### III-12. The junta



Amalia Fleming, the wife and assistant of Nobel Prize winner Alexander Fleming, was a microbiologist by trade. On account of her public struggle against the junta, she was arrested and tortured, before being expelled and stripped of her Greek citizenship.

[...] the boys and girls of student age started writing slogans on walls and distributing leaflets with information from foreign radio stations [...]. Some of the active young, most of whom were students, were arrested and subjected to terrible tortures. The torturing stopped only when they fell into a coma or broke down and spoke and gave away the name of a friend. Then this friend would be arrested and treated in the same way until he also spoke. The department of security police headquarters that specializes in beating up students is called the "Intellectual Department".

The most common torture is *falanga* – beating the soles of the feet [...]. Starvation, deprivation of water, standing for days and nights, electric shocks, the torturing of the victim's girlfriend, cigarette burns – all these were used. The details have been written a hundred times. Why repeat them? Because they still continue. Because I have met some victims and listened to their stories and seen their scars.

Fleming, 1972, pp. 34-5.

### III-13. Resistance against the junta: Alexandros Panagoulis



On 13 August 1968, Alexandros Panagoulis, a former activist in the Centre Union youth movement, attempted to assassinate the strong man of the Greek junta, Colonel Georgios Papadopoulos. Following his arrest and after weeks of interrogation and torture, in November of the same year he was sentenced to death (commuted to life imprisonment). His trial highlighted the regime's appalling track record on human rights, whose practices included the torture and rape of dissidents carried out by the notorious military police.

## ΑΛΕΚΟΣ ΠΑΝΑΓΟΥΛΗΣ

ΠΡΟΣΦΟΡΑ ΤΗΣ ΝΕΑΣ ΓΕΝΙΑΣ

ΚΑΤΑ ΤΩΝ ΤΥΡΑΝΝΩΝ ΤΟΥ ΛΑΟΥΜΑΣ

Η  
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Η



Η ΖΩΗ ΤΟΥ ΑΚΑΤΑΒΛΗΤΟΥ ΑΓΩΝΙΣΤΗ  
ΤΗΣ ΔΗΜΟΚΡΑΤΙΑΣ ΣΥΝΕΧΟΣ ΑΠΕΙΛΕΙΤΑΙ  
ΠΡΕΠΕΙ ΝΑ ΣΩΘΗ Ο ΗΡΩΑΣ ΠΑΝΑΓΟΥΛΗΣ  
ΑΠΟ ΤΑ ΧΕΡΙΑ ΤΩΝ ΤΥΡΑΝΝΩΝ

Greek Resistance. Alekos Panagoulis. A contribution of the new generation against the tyrants of our people. The life of the indomitable fighter of democracy is under continuous threat. Hero Panagoulis has to be saved from the tyrants' hands.

Private collection.



1. Referring to the civil war between democrats and oligarchs in the island of Corfu in the summer of 427 B.C., Thucydides (*Ιστορία* 3, 82-83-Pathology of War) notes: "They changed the usual meaning of words and gave them not the real one but the one that suited them". Can you find this happening in the above speech of the dictator Papadopoulos (III-10)?

2. Which is the main enemy and danger for the Greek nation according to Papadopoulos? How was "fear and silence" imposed upon Greek citizens by the junta?

3. Compare the situation described by the above sources with the one described by the following 1981 Annual Report of Amnesty International on Turkey (source III-15). Then mark the words used with a distorted meaning. Discuss.



	Turkey	Greece
References/ Words used by juntas		

4. Compare political developments in Southeast European countries with communist regimes with those

in Turkey and Greece. Find similarities and differences in both.

### ► III.3. POLICING CITIZENS: CAMPS AND PRISONERS

#### III-14. The legacy of the Civil War in Greece

##### A. The camp of Makronisos (1947-1950). A propaganda photo



"Re-educated" soldiers on Makronisos island, 14 June 1949; Associated Press.



During the civil war, the uninhabited island of Makronisos, off the coast of Attica, served as a camp for the indoctrination of thousands of political left-wing dissidents, including party members, intellectuals and draftees. The latter, following their successful “re-education”, which included denouncing communism and all it stood for with the signing of a declaration of repentance, were sent to fight against their former comrades. In September 1947 there were some 12,000 soldiers and officers incarcerated in what was characterised by the government in Athens as the “New Parthenon”. World famous composer Mikis Theodorakis, International Lenin Peace Prize winner poet Giannis Ritsos and other artists and intellectuals were among the exiled in the infamous island. The camp was shut down in 1950, one year after the end of the civil war.



Describe the photo. Why is this a propaganda photo? Read the key and explain the content of “re-education” of communist prisoners.

### B. Extracts from a letter of political prisoner Avgi Charalampidi to her son on the plight of released prisoners, October 1959



Although their number had dropped considerably following the closing down of the Makronisos concentration camp and the introduction of the so-called “pacification measures” in 1950 and 1952, by 1962 there were still more than 1,500 political prisoners languishing in exile camps and prisons, not all of whom were cadres of the Communist Party of Greece (KKE). As Avgi’s letter suggests, in some instances prisoners were released from places of exiles, in this case the island of Agios Efstratios, and moved to towns in mainland Greece far away from their homes. There they were “placed” under police surveillance, and had to find accommodation and earn a living without receiving any kind of state support.

Learn, my dear, that I am in Sparta. From [the island of] Agios Efstratios we left on 23 October and arrived at Piraeus on 26 October. Six times we came face to face with death, but were saved. All my belongings are soaked. I sleep on a camp bed, which has somewhat shrunk, with my coat on and a little pillow. As the saying

goes, I live a Spartan life in Sparta. I have been here three days, and still they have not resettled me. I am held at the detention room of the police station. I complain to the constable, I complain to the chief-constable, I complain to the adjutant. And their response is: “Go and rent a house, find a job, and live... You are free. They brought you here and placed you under our surveillance”.

I am at their mercy. Where can I find the money to rent a house? And how can I find a job in a foreign place and live? Still, I do not despair nor do I lose my nerve – not at all, not even for a second. Every vicissitude emboldens and strengthens me.

Archives of Contemporary Social History (ASKI),  
EDA archive, file 124.

### C. Extracts from an electoral speech of Nikolaos Plastiras promising amnesty and “pacification”, September 1951



Nikolaos Plastiras (1883-1953) was a military officer who rose to the rank of general. He distinguished himself in the Balkan Wars (1912-13) and the campaigns in the Ukraine (1919) and Asia Minor (1919-22). A staunch Venizelist, in the interwar period he led a military revolt after the Asia Minor Catastrophe (1922) and two coups (in 1933 and 1935). He became active in politics after the country’s liberation from the Axis powers and held the premiership from January to April 1945. In 1949 he established the Progressive Liberal Centre Party, which contested the elections of 1950 in alliance with the Democratic Progressive Party as the National Progressive Centre Union (EPEK). Between March and August 1950 he headed a coalition government with the Liberal Party and the George Papandreou Party. Although in the elections of 1951 EPEK came second, Plastiras again headed a coalition government with the Liberal Party from October 1951 to October 1952.

I promise to the Greek People that from the moment that I will form a homogeneous government – and there is no doubt that I will do so – within two or three months I will pacify the country by granting amnesty. Unity cannot be realised as long as the past is not pardoned, as long as the people’s children do not return home. I have repeatedly said so, and I underline it once more: It is disgraceful that sites of exile exist. It is disgraceful that there are detainees who never go through trial. It is disgraceful to proclaim that we are Democrats and yet not a trace of Democracy is detectable. When

the People give me the power, I will do away with the remnants of the Police State, as I have proclaimed in the party manifesto. I will treat all Greeks equally.

*Προοδευτικός Φιλελεύθερος* [Progressive Liberal] newspaper, 6.09.1951.



**1.** Study sources III-14A, B and C carefully. What kind of “sites of exile” is described here? What was the purpose of their existence and who was sent there? Do you think that the procedure of placing people to places of exile was legal? Use argumentation based on the text.

**2.** Discuss the phrase “Unity cannot be realised as long as the past is not pardoned”. What past is Nikolaos Plastiras referring to?

**3.** Organise a debate in class, based on the above statement by the Greek prime minister. Students should discuss if it is possible to forgive past crimes.

**4.** Places bearing a painful historical memory, like Makronisos, are used as open museums. They attract a lot of visitors who combine paying tribute to a painful past with attending cultural events related to this memory. Find examples of memory places of this kind and debate the issue of their current use. What are your views on “memory tourism”? Compare with source III-16 and also with vol.2 ch. VI (the Romanian prison etc.)

#### FURTHER ACTIVITIES

Watch the film: “Comme des lions de pierre à l’entrée de la nuit” by Olivier Zuchuat. [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9MSOtL\\_2j34](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9MSOtL_2j34), accessed on 26.08.2016.

### III-15. Extracts from the annual report of Amnesty International on Turkey, 1981

The main concerns of Amnesty International were torture, executions and death sentences, and the holding of prisoners of conscience. Political violence, which has resulted in thousands of deaths since 1975, continued. Martial law, imposed in December 1978 in 13 of Turkey’s 67 provinces, had been renewed at two-monthly intervals and extended to cover 20 provinces, but assassinations by both right and left-wing groups had mounted to over 5,000 by 12 September 1980 when Turkey’s military leaders abolished parliament after a coup and imposed martial law on the whole country. General Kenan Evren, the Armed Forces Chief

of Staff, announced that legislative and executive powers would be held by the National Security Council headed by himself. Later in the month a government was appointed under a retired admiral, Bülent Ulusu.

Thousands of people were detained, including members of parliament, members of political parties and trade unionists. The duration of detention without charge under martial law was increased from 15 to 30 days and then in November 1980 to 90 days. All political and trade union activity was banned and three newspapers, *Aydınlık* and *Demokrat* on the left and *Hergün* on the right, were closed down. Subsequent changes in the martial law regulations extended the powers of martial law commanders, giving them control over mail, communications, press censorship and all labour and trade union activities. Under the new law people could be sentenced to six months’ to two years’ imprisonment for propagating “erroneous, unfounded or exaggerated information in a manner to create alarm or excitement among the public”. The penalty would be doubled if the offence was committed through the news media, and if a foreigner was involved the sentence was to be not less than a year. Another change made sentences of up to three years passed by military courts not subject to appeal.

Amnesty International Annual Report 1981, pp. 322-323, <https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/pol10/0001/1981/en/>, accessed on 26.08.2016.

### III-16. The Romanian case

#### A. Tourist poster of the Cetatea Făgăraşului in the 1970s



Photo from Ştefan Petraru, Constantin Catrina, *Braşovul memorial*, Bucureşti, Editura Sport-Turism, 1976.



The Fortress of Făgăraș was taken over by the Directorate General of Prisons in 1950 and functioned as a prison for ten years. Its first inmates were members of the departments of State Police and Security in the interwar period, followed by members of anti-communist organisations and opponents of collectivisation. The precarious hygiene, health and sustenance conditions that convicts had to endure led to high rates of mortality. In 1960, when the prison was shut down, the fortress became the museum of the Country of Făgăraș. In 1976 the communist regime began promoting the fortress as an important historical monument, completely overlooking its function as a prison in the 1950s.

### **B. Extracts from Decree no. 221/1948 of the Presidium of the Great National Assembly on the establishment of the Directorate General for the People's Security, August 1948**

Art. 1. Within the Ministry of Home Affairs, the Directorate General for the People's Security is established.

Art. 2. The Directorate is charged with defending the democratic achievements of the People's Republic of Romania and with guaranteeing the people's security against the intrigues of domestic and external enemies.

Art. 3. The organisation, responsibilities and functioning of all central and external services of the Directorate will be regulated by the internal decisions and instructions of the Ministry of Home Affairs. These decisions and instructions are not made public. Following their recording in a special register and their communication to those concerned, they become executive orders.

Art. 4. Only security officers are entitled to take action against offences endangering the democratic regime and the people's security.

Art. 6. The norms for the appointment, management and dismissal as well as for the rights duties of the personnel of the Directorate are set out in the Statute of Officers and Warrant Officers of the Directorate, which is not published in the *Official Gazette*.

Art. 7. Notwithstanding the stipulation of the public accountancy law, the budget of the Directorate will only be published as a total sum, without detailed breakdowns, in the budget of the Ministry of Home Affairs.

*Official Gazette*, part I, no. 200 (30 August 1948), pp. 7245-7246.



1. Study the decree carefully. Focus on Article 2: Why was the Directorate General for the People's Security established? What was its declared aim?


2. Comment on and discuss the following phrases: "These decisions and instructions are not made public" (Art. 3), and "the budget of the Directorate will only be published as a total sum, without detailed breakdowns" (Art. 7). Now describe and discuss the function of the Directorate.

## **III-17. The Bulgarian case**

### **A. Decision II, no. 17 of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Bulgaria, 27 July 1977, on limiting and neutralising the activities of hostile Bulgarian emigration, and on improving the selection and instruction of Bulgarian citizens going abroad**

In the context of a détente in international relations, the opponent's intelligence services and subversive-propaganda centres are focusing their efforts on a more active and diverse use of the different categories of emigrants engaged in subversive activity against the People's Republic of Bulgaria [...]. The Politburo consider it advisable to improve and stimulate further the work aiming at the political, ideological and organisational discrediting and isolation of hostile Bulgarian emigration and at depriving it of the possibility to conduct subversive activity against the People's Republic of Bulgaria. The activity of the Ministry of Home Affairs against hostile emigration will focus mainly on discrediting and corrupting its organisations; intensifying the existing contradictions among them and creating new ones; preventing their unification; discrediting and countering the activity of the most active emigrant leaders; and on instilling distrust in the opponent's intelligence services towards [Bulgarian emigration] and their followers; preventing the uncontrolled establishment of criminal contacts with persons on the territory of the country.

<http://desebg.com/2011-01-13-09-23-35/1406-2013-08-26-07-52-55>, accessed on 26.08.2016.

**B. Propaganda poster celebrating the fifth anniversary of the People's Militia and State Security, 1950**

НБКМ [St. St. Cyril and Methodius National Library], Гр VI 4387.

**C. Extracts from a letter by Georgi Markov to his parents**

Dad tells me that the court in closed session (why not open session?) has sentenced me to half a dozen years in prison, and a bit more on top. Given the black reputation of the Bulgarian courts, which have condemned countless of innocent people to death and imprisonment, this is no surprise to me. It only reminds me how right the path I have chosen is. In answer to the charges against me, I can say that on both counts they are wrong. First of all I did not flee, but the authorities artificially and deliberately created the circumstances that placed me in the position of an "expelled" person. Some people in Bulgaria clearly have to justify their salaries by inventing enemies. The stopping of my plays, the accusations against me, my dismissal [as scriptwriter of the TV series] *At Every Kilometre*, which is my creation, the threats and blackmail against me started long before I had undertaken anything whatsoever and without any cause on my part.

Obviously, the purpose was to make my return to Bulgaria impossible. Secondly, I have never served and I do not serve any foreign state or organisation. The BBC, where I broadcast a cultural programme, is an independent radio station in which people from all over the world work and which on many occasions has broadcasted objective and positive commentaries about Bulgaria. My colleagues from the Hungarian, Polish, Romanian and Yugoslav sections visit their homelands several times every year without anyone imagining that they may be charged with working for the BBC. Even people from the Russian section go to Russia. Don't the Bulgarian militiamen think that they are overdoing it a bit? Thirdly, until the present day, no-one here has ever told me what to write and what to say. Everything which I have written and said has been my personal opinion. According to our own Constitution and the UN Charter on Human Rights, no-one can take away from me the right to my own opinion. Only the wordless do not have their own opinion.

Hristov, 2006, p.193.



Georgi Ivanov Markov (1929-1978) was a Bulgarian dissident novelist and playwright. He published his first novel in 1957. Markov also wrote a number of plays, but most of them were never staged or were removed from theatre repertoire by the censors. In 1969 he left for Italy. He planned to return after his relation with the Bulgarian authorities improved, but in September 1971 the Bulgarian government refused to extend his passport and he decided to stay in the West. He moved to London where he learned English and started working for the Bulgarian section of the BBC World Service. He also worked with Deutsche Welle and Radio Free Europe. In 1972, Markov's membership in the Union of Bulgarian Writers was suspended and he was sentenced to six years and six months in prison for his defection. His works were withdrawn from libraries and bookshops and his name was not mentioned by the official Bulgarian media until 1989. In the West he continued his career as a successful writer. Between 1975 and 1978, Markov's *In Absentia Reports* analysis of life in Communist Bulgaria were broadcast weekly on Radio Free Europe. Their criticism of the Communist government and the Party leader Todor Zhivkov led the regime to decide to silence him by all means. Markov was murdered in London by an agent connected to the KGB and the Bulgarian secret police.

#### **D. Extracts from a biographical interview about the internment of a rich and highly educated family (the Markovs) from the town of Yablanitsa to the village of Batoltsi**

Mum pulled out the carpet – one of those carpets weighs 12 kilos – and when she spread it out, the naphthalene shone like snowflakes. And Rada Todo-rova said, “Oh this is beautiful! Here, comrade,” and she pointed to one of the corners of the carpet, “here’s where the tag with your name will be fastened, and we’ll send it to comrade Stalin, because it is his birthday.” And my mum said, “Oh, no, I’m not giving you this one. Send three women over, and give me one week and I’ll make you one just like this one. I’ve got the wool, I’ve got everything.” “But you have

two of these.” “Well, I have two daughters.” “But your name will be in the Kremlin!” I’ll never forget this scene. She started pulling the carpet and my mum started pulling at the other end. We got really scared. It’s a large one – we still have it! So, she did not give it. And they left.

And on the following day here and there on the walls of our house somebody had written *kulak* [...].

One morning soon after that, we found huge tar letters on the gate saying kulak. My dad came into the room, woke us up, it was 4 o’clock in the morning, and he said: “Mimmi, Tsatsi, get up, my girls, we’re getting resettled.” “What’s *resettled*?” “They are driving us out of the house, we have to leave by the evening. Get up and start packing.” And when we got up and looked outside, we saw the cellar doors were open, and everything was outside – wheat, hides, cheese, flour, bags, everywhere, and I’ll never forget how the old Bible was lying around open, and, I think it was Ioshko, he ran and grabbed it: “But that’s the Bible.”

Daskalova et al., 2004, pp. 65-66.



1. How is Bulgarian emigration defined in Decision II, no. 17 of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Bulgaria? What measures do they suggest to eliminate the consequences of this emigration?
2. Why was Georgi Markov sentenced to imprisonment? What was his activity and how is it connected to Decision II mentioned above?
3. Find in this book sources with personal experiences of expelled persons, deportees, political prisoners, people who were forced to change their identity, etc. How did different regimes in Southeast Europe violate human rights in the second half of the twentieth century? Which basic human rights were constantly in danger?

## ▶ III.4. YOUTH MOVEMENTS

### III-18. Student demonstrations in Belgrade, 1968



The 1968 student demonstrations in Belgrade (which also echoed at the universities of Zagreb, Ljubljana, Sarajevo and Novi Sad) were part of the wave of demonstrations that hit many countries in 1968. The first demonstration broke out at the university campus on 2 June, after students were prohibited from watching a theatre performance at the Workers' University in Novi Belgrade. Students clashed with the police, and on the next day a group of policemen entered the campus and fired shots so that the gathered students disperse. After an urgent meeting of the deans of all university faculties and academies, it was decided to organise a general strike and to suspend all classes and examinations. Students and professors, with the support of the faculties' self-governed bodies, barricaded themselves inside university buildings that were cordoned off by the police. During the seven-day strike, police stormed these buildings a number of times, beating up students. Extensive political discussions

were organised at the Faculty of Philosophy, criticising the regime as well as the LCY's monopoly on power. A series of demands were voiced on the democratisation of all socio-political organisations, particularly of the League, on freedom of choice and assembly, on free elections and on the abolition of censorship. At the initiative of students, the university was renamed to "Red University of Karl Marx". A revolutionary anthem was also composed, with the refrain "To the left, left, left". The most popular slogan was "Down with the red bourgeoisie". Finally, in a televised address to the students on 9 June, Tito promised the urgent resolution of all "burning issues" and the implementation of student demands. The university sit-ins ended with students and professors singing, hailing Tito, and dancing the *kozarsko kolo* (a traditional folk dance). Thereafter, the main leaders of the demonstrations and sit-ins, such as Vladimir Mijanović, were dismissed from service at the university and their passports were seized.

#### A. Proclamation of the university council of the students' alliance of Belgrade University, 3 June 1968

Workers, citizens and students of Belgrade,  
The press, radio and other media grossly misinformed you about last night's and today's student demonstrations.

Why are the students demonstrating? What are their slogans and what do they stand for? First of all, they want social disparities in our society to be diminished. They want the problem of unemployment to be urgently resolved so that our workers no longer have to go abroad to work. [they want] to ensure real democracy in all spheres of social life and, alongside that, to enable quicker and more fundamental establishment of self-management relations. The police waited for the students near the underpass in Novi Beograd, and broke up the demonstrations both times with the use of force and truncheons, as a result of which very many of our colleagues were injured. The police acted savagely, mercilessly hitting students and professors, who were together with us.

Because of all that has happened, we demand the following:

The immediate release of all our imprisoned colleagues and the erasing of their files.

The dismissal of everyone who is in any way responsible for the unspeakable police cruelty.

The urgent convening of a session of the presidency of the federal assembly, which would discuss the students' stances with representatives of the students and the university.

The dismissal of the directors and editors of Belgrade dailies, Belgrade radio and TANJUG (Telegrafaska Agencija Nove Jugoslavije) for having falsified the events [of 2 June].

*Juni '68. Studentski protest u Beogradu*, Katalog, Izložba Biblioteke grada Beograda, [June '68: Student Protests in Belgrade/, Catalogue, Belgrade City Library Exhibition], 2008.

#### B. Shorthand notes of the Executive Committee of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY), 4 June 1968

Stevan Doronjski: "We had a rather charged situation yesterday. I was there and talked for a long time to the students who set off for the demonstrations, and we saw and noticed that a group of extremists, who were students of philosophy, together with Ljuba Tadić, Mićunović and Sveta Stojanović, was in fact dominant [...]. During the night, we had non-stop discussions at the Faculty of Philosophy, involving around 350

students who made speeches from a balcony all night long [...]. Yesterday we were successful in immediately isolating the students from the people because their basic intention was to link up with the workers and take them to the streets. [...] That is why we assess the situation as extremely serious and we decided during the night, between three and four this morning, to ban all demonstrations and outdoor rallies [...]. Should the workers take to the streets, we believe that the army should be used. It has come to that”.

AJ [Archives of Yugoslavia, Belgrade], Savez komunista Jugoslavije [League of Communists of Yugoslavia], 507-IV-41.

### III-19. Conclusions adopted by a students' assembly of the University of Zagreb on 22 November 1971

We, the students of the University of Zagreb, accept the changes in the socio-political system that recognises the Socialist Republic of Croatia as a sovereign national state of the Croatian people. In doing so, we uphold the conclusions of the General Assembly of the city of Zagreb.

We fully support the views expressed in the report presented by Dr Savka Dabčević-Kučar at the 22nd session of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Croatia. We believe it constitutes a realistic platform of action for all revolutionary and progressive forces in our society.

We condemn all attempts to depict certain “exaggerated excesses” as the norm and a key feature of the current socio-political situation in Croatia.

We point out that revolutionary and radical changes in our society cannot be achieved without making radical cadre changes in all existing socio-political and other structures, both in Croatia and the whole of Yugoslavia.

Since we cannot only in words express our support to the League of Communists of Croatia, the League of Communists of Yugoslavia and to Comrade Tito, we have decided to take concrete steps and suspend all classes at the University of Zagreb.

*Hrvatski tjednik*, 26 November 1971.



During 1971, numerous demands for reforms of the Yugoslav federation were voiced in Croatia. Changes were initiated by the League of Communists of Croatia, which were supported by cultural institutions, individuals and, ultimately, students of the University of Zagreb. In order to express their support to the Croatian political leadership and reforms →

aimed at improving Croatia's position in Yugoslavia, the students organised a mass strike at the university at the end of 1971. The strike would be used as the pretext for dismissing Croatia's political leadership.

### III-20. The Polytechnic uprising in Athens, November 1973



Extracts from a radio broadcast by the students occupying the Athens Polytechnic (14 to 17 November 1973). The students' radio publicised their demands and their overall opposition to the junta, thus mobilising thousands of citizens who gathered outside the Polytechnic to manifest their support. The radio was “silenced” as soon as the junta's tanks invaded the Polytechnic compound. Many of its broadcasts became emblematic of the anti-junta struggle abroad.

Attention, attention!

This is [radio] Polytechnic, this is [radio] Polytechnic!

The free struggling university students, the free struggling Greeks from within the Polytechnic, who are fighting for freedom, address you!

People! During the six and a half years of fascist dictatorship they sought to weaken every democratic movement! Today the students began a struggle for the restoration of Democracy in our country, for Greece's independence from the interests of the International Capital!

We have all seen that the price of bread is rising, that education is for the few and the chosen, and that Greece is governed by foreign interests.

We call upon all people to resist the junta with the sole effective weapon they have at their disposal: a general strike! Down with the junta's elections, Power to the People! All united against the junta!

Greek working people, this is the radio station of the free struggling students, of the free struggling Greeks! The students commenced a struggle against the junta for their rightful demands. However, all working people face problems, and for this reason all should struggle to overthrow the junta; this is a precondition for the settlement of any basic demand! The students' strike sets the example. Workers, the junta must be overthrown, now! Fight for the holding of the general strike, which is the sole weapon with which we can overthrow the junta!

Archives of Contemporary Social History (ASKI), Athens.



Compare the demands of students from the University of Belgrade in 1968 with those of students from the University of Zagreb in 1971 and the Athens Polytechnic in 1973.

Is it a coincidence that all these students' movements occurred in the late '60s and early '70s? Do research on

youth and protest movements in the US in the 1960s. Compare with "May 1968" in France. Then explain the existence of youth movements in Southeast Europe in a global context.

Why do you think that students lead youth movements? Compare with similar cases in your country.

## ▶ III.5. DEMOCRATIC TRANSITIONS: SUCCESSFUL AND FAILED

### ▶ III.5.1. Greece

#### III-21. The change of 1974

The collapse of the seven-year dictatorship in July 1974 and the change of polity (*metapolitefsi*) that followed were confirmed with the formation of a government of national unity. It was headed by Konstantinos Karamanlis, who was seen as the most suitable politician to guide the country to democratic stability. Among the first measures of this government were the legalisation of the Communist Party of Greece, outlawed since 1947, and the abolition of the certificates of "healthy social beliefs". In the elections of 17 November 1974, which were also contested by a coalition of left-wing parties under the name United Left, Karamanlis's right-wing party of New Democracy won a landslide with an unprecedented 54% of votes cast. Less than month after the elections, a plebiscite on the constitutional issue was held. Despite the traditionally close ties of the Right with the Palace, the New Democracy government of Karamanlis held a neutral stance on the issue. 69.2% voted in favour of the republic and against the restoration of the monarchy, bringing to a close the longstanding constitutional issue of the monarchy and opening an era of republican government.

#### A. Konstantinos Karamanlis returns to Greece from his self-imposed exile in France as the Colonels' dictatorship collapses, 24 July 1974



With fourteen years as prime minister (1955-1963, 1974-1980) and another ten as president of the republic (1980-1985, 1990-1995), Kon-



stantinos Karamanlis (1907-1998) stands out as the leading conservative politician of 20th-century Greece. He was instrumental in the smooth return of parliamentary politics to Greece following the fall of the junta in the wake of the Turkish military intervention in Cyprus in July 1974; his firm belief that Greece "belongs to the West" and his staunch Europeanism were eventually realised in May 1979 with the signing of Greece's treaty of accession to the EEC.



Konstantinos Karamanlis Photographic Collection/Konstantinos G. Karamanlis Foundation.

## B. The abolition of the monarchy in Greece, December 1974



Caricature by Sp. Ornerakis.



1. How does the cartoonist approach the issue of the plebiscite? Why do you think he depicts the institution of the monarchy in such a way?

2. Find information about the role of the royal family and the sovereign in Greek politics during the 20th century. Read sources in chapter I (plebiscite on the return of the king, I-28).

3. Compare with Balkan countries that had (or have) a King. How has the institution of the monarchy been perceived in the region?


## C. Andreas Papandreou and the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK)



This PASOK election poster on the “movement’s” last pre-election rally of 15 October 1981 depicts a confident-looking Andreas Papandreou as prime minister in waiting. Papandreou (1919-1996) was one of the most popular politicians in post-junta Greece.

→

Credited with the first ever socialist government (1981-1985), his second term in office was marred by charges of nepotism and a series of financial scandals, for which he was put on trial. Following his acquittal by the Special Court, Papandreou returned to office as prime minister, after winning the elections of September 1993.



Translation: THE PEOPLE WANT, PASOK CAN BRING THE CHANGE. With PASOK in power, Spring will finally come to Greece for a peaceful democratic future; for a free socialistic future. PASOK FOR CHANGE. PASOK IN GOVERNMENT; THE PEOPLE IN POWER.

Archives of Contemporary Social History (ASKI), Athens.



The main PASOK slogan during the 1981 election campaign in Greece was “change”, and it proved quite powerful. What is the meaning of such a slogan? What kind of change did Greece need at the time? Are you aware of the existence of such a political slogan in your own country?

### ► III.5.2. Turkey

#### III-22. Left-wing protests and political instability

 In the late 1960s and early 1970s Turkey developed a strong working-class movement and became a theatre of incessant left-wing protests, the quelling of which by radical right-wing militants and the security forces claimed many lives. The most important events were the “Bloody Sunday massacre” on 16 February 1969 and massive workers’ demonstrations on 15-16 June 1970, both in Istanbul.

**A. “Bloody Sunday: This was not a meeting, but a fight among brothers – 2 dead, 100 injured”, *Hürriyet*, 17 February 1969**



#### B. Celebrating May Day 1977 in Istanbul before the “massacre”

 From 1974 to 1980, Turkey experienced a massive phenomenon of violence that claimed the lives of some 5,000 people. The radical Right and the radical Left were the main protagonists of this quasi-civil-war, but the conflict also had a sectarian dimension. In 1977, 34 people were killed during the “massacre of 1 May” in Istanbul, one of the bloody events on the way to the coup of 1980.



<http://www.barikat-lar.de/tarih/77.htm>, accessed on 1.10.2016.

### III-23. A testimony on the beginning of the PKK's guerrilla warfare



The Kurdistan Workers' Party (*Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê*, PKK) was formed by Abdullah Öcalan in 1978. After the coup of 1980, the suppression of Kurdish identity intensified, and even the usage of the Kurdish language in the private sphere was proscribed. On 15 August 1984 the PKK launched its first military operations in Turkey, thus starting a long guerrilla warfare that still goes on. Some 45,000 people (among them an overwhelming majority of Kurds) have been killed and more than 4,000 villages have been destroyed. The Turkish authorities have set up a Kurdish paramilitary force called "Village Protectors", which however has largely failed in challenging the PKK. In the late 1980s, a legal Kurdish political movement was also formed. In spite of a massive state coercion, this movement is today by and large dominant in Kurdistan and constitutes the fourth major political force in the Turkish parliament. Öcalan was arrested in Kenya in 1999 and sentenced first to death, thereafter to life imprisonment.

Agit put down his rifle, stood in front of the troops and gave a short speech. "I will not give a long speech. Soon, we will commence our attack on targets that symbolise the Turkish occupation and exploitation of Eruh [...]. Regardless of the result [...], it is certain that we will be mentioned in history. We know that many such raid operations [have taken place in the past]. However, we do not want to make history repeat itself. This time there will not be an assessment like 'they revolted like heroes, but they were hit early and the operation ended in defeat', as is written in all Kurdish revolts. We will definitely not allow this. We will do away for good with the logic of defeat that, like a black mark, stains the forehead of every Kurd.

You know that the first raid operation plays a determining role for the fate of the guerrilla war. History will record the 14th July Armed Propaganda Union as a monumental victory. We took an oath to succeed. We will seize enemy targets, we will give to the world the message that 'we have started the guerrilla war', and at the same time we will offer this most significant victory as a gift to the Kurdish people. I congratulate you in advance of your success, our success".

<http://www.kurdistan-post.eu/tr/kurdistan/15-agustos-atilimi-nizamettin-tas>, accessed on 20.09.2016.

### ► III.5.3. Yugoslavia

#### III-24. Opposition from within the regime

##### A. Who needs *Praxis*?

*Praxis* journal is published by the Zagreb-based Croatian Philosophical Society [...]. In view of its orientation, the journal will not just discuss topics that are specific only to Croatia or Yugoslavia, but also general problems that concern man and philosophy. Topics will be approached from both a socialist and Marxist standpoint, that is, an essentially international approach in character [...]. Together with the Yugoslav edition of the magazine (in the Croato-Serbian language), we will also publish an international edition (in English and French). The intention of the latter is not to "present" Yugoslav ideas abroad, but to stimulate international philosophical cooperation in discussing the most pressing matters of our times [...]. We believe that a critical approach that goes down to the very root of the matter, regardless of consequences, is a very important characteristic of real philosophy [...]. Together with critically highlighting the general problems of the modern world, we believe that the primary task of Marxists and socialists should

be to do the same with regard to problems in their own countries. The primary task of Yugoslav Marxists, for example, should be to engage in a critical discussion of Yugoslav socialism. In so doing, they will contribute not only to their own socialism, but to international socialism as well.

*Praxis*, no. 1 (1964), p. 3.

##### B. Extracts from a speech by Vladimir Bakarić on *Praxis*, 12 July 1968

*Praxis* has been on our agenda over the past few years. I would say that it mainly expresses the modern American, anti-communist trend that is trying to find a footing in the socialist world. The given formulations are, for example, pro-Đilas [...]. Their key platform is the platform of discussion, dialogue and free democracy. That is, so to speak, a return to old-fashioned bureaucratic democracy, which in turn only makes bureaucracy stronger, regardless of what those fighting for it believe it to be [...]. Second, we must deal with these aspirations on two fronts: On the one hand, with *Praxis* – in a nutshell, with modern anti-communism – and, on the other, with the left-wing [...].

About five years ago, we broke off with *Praxis* members. We have not dealt with their ideological trends to the extent of preventing new ideas from emerging. Within our ranks, there are people whose views resemble those of *Praxis*, but not in the political sense.

Bakarić, 1983, pp. 528-536.



The specificity of Yugoslav socialism was also reflected in the (limited) opportunity of criticising the ruling ideology. This primarily referred to so-called left-oriented criticism. The journal of philosophy *Praxis* was first published in Zagreb in 1964. Collaborators were Marxist philosophers, sociologists and political scientists who in their texts uncovered the inconsistencies of the Yugoslav socialist order. On the island of Korčula "Praxists" established the famous Korčula summer school, attended by outstanding intellectuals from both the East and the West. Despite sometimes very strong attacks by leading Yugoslav politicians (like Vladimir Bakarić), *Praxis* and the Korčula school survived for a good ten years.



**1.** How do you think it was possible to publish for ten years a journal like *Praxis* which criticised the Yugoslav government? (Connect your answer with the changes that occurred in Yugoslavia following the Tito-Stalin split.)

**2.** How do you understand the following statement: "Together with critically highlighting the general problems of the modern world, we believe that the primary task of Marxists and socialists should be to do the same with regard to problems in their own countries. The primary task of Yugoslav Marxists, for example, should be to engage in a critical discussion of Yugoslav socialism. In so doing, they will contribute not only to their own socialism, but to international socialism as well".

**3.** How do you explain the fact that the philosophers gathered around *Praxis* described their views as socialist and Marxist, while Vladimir Bakarić portrayed them as part of "the modern American, anti-communist trend"?

**4.** Do you think that Bakarić expresses a positive or negative view when he says that the key platform of the *Praxis* people is "the platform of discussion, dialogue and free democracy"?

### III-25. Decisions of the Central Committee of the LCY on state security and Aleksandar Ranković, 1966

The Central Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia [...] adopts the political assessment of the commission [set up to examine] the causes and possible consequences of the state security services becoming a force that would be above society. Following discussion of the commission's proposals, the Central Committee hereby recommends to immediately embark upon a reorganisation of state security organs so that they better serve the changes in our society and the developed system of self-management. Factual social control of the state security, based on constitutional norms, laws and regulations, needs to be ensured by representative bodies and their executive organs. Also, relevant organs are advised to elect political officials as heads of internal affairs organs before the reorganisation of the state security is completed in order to facilitate it and as staffing reinforcements [...]. Comrade Aleksandar Ranković's resignation from the Central Committee of the LCY and the Executive Committee of the Central Committee is hereby accepted. It is recommended that he resigns as Vice-President of the Republic since his political responsibility for the work of state security organs was such that he can no longer hold this post.

Petranović and Zečević, 1988, pp. 1108-1109.



At the Fourth Plenary Session of the Plenum of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, held at Brijuni on 1 July 1966, Aleksandar Ranković, a leading Serbian communist, was relieved of all his Party and state functions. The formal reason for his dismissal was an alleged scandal involving the wiretapping of Tito, about which Ranković had been accused as one of the key figures in the secret police. The actual reason was his demands for the further centralisation of Yugoslavia as a means of dealing with the growing demands that the autonomous province of Kosovo become a republic. The Plenum was seen as a victory of the forces that urged the decentralisation of the federation, and led initially to the adoption of constitutional amendments and, in 1974, to the promulgation of a new constitution. Ranković was portrayed by his followers as a fighter for Serbian national interests which, in their view, were defeated by those favouring decentralisation. His funeral in 1983 was attended by nearly 100,000 people. In many circles in Serbia, the fall of Ranković is seen to this day as the beginning of the end of Yugoslavia.

### III-26. Kosovo Demonstrations of 1968



Following the Brijuni Plenum in 1966, police and army violence against Kosovo Albanians diminished to a certain extent, while calls for the granting of extended autonomy to the region increased. During October and December 1968 massive demonstrations were organised in Priština and Tetovo, calling for self-determination, union, a constitution

and a university, and above all for Kosovo gaining the status of a Republic. As a result, several improvements in the status of the Kosovo Albanians were made: a university was founded in Priština, the Constitution of Kosovo which provided a broader autonomy was passed, the Academy of Sciences and Arts of Kosovo was founded, etc.

#### A. Priština demonstrations, October 1968



Agjencioni Shtetëror i Arkivave të Kosovës, Fondi Fotografitë në versionin bardhë e zi [State Archives Agency of Kosovo, Photo collection].

#### B. Albanian protesters during the Priština demonstrations



Agjencioni Shtetëror i Arkivave të Kosovës, Fondi Fotografitë në versionin bardhë e zi [State Archives Agency of Kosovo, Photo collection].

### III-27. The Croatian Spring. Savka Dapčević addressing a rally in Zagreb, 1971



Institute of Lexicography, Zagreb; <http://www.enciklopedija.hr/Natuknica.aspx?ID=26516>, accessed on 20.09.2016.



By the end of the 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s, the Croatian political leadership demanded the reform of the Yugoslav federation, claiming that the existing format did not enable full equality of all Yugoslav nations and republics. The demands were supported by numerous cultural institutions, students and the public. Because the Croatian leadership received substantial support, the term "Mass Movement" (*Maspok*) began to be employed by Yugoslav politicians, mainly in a negative context. Years later it was replaced with the term "Croatian Spring". The most important demands called for the equal distribution of incomes (particularly of foreign currency earned through tourism, in which Croatia had the lion's share), for the right to use the Croatian language as a standard different from Serbian, for a just share in state offices in which the Croats felt that they were under-represented, etc. Under accusations of supporting nationalism and separatism, the Croatian leadership was dismissed in late 1971, and many intellectuals and students were sentenced to long term imprisonment. Savka Dabčević Kučar, who from 1969 headed the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Croatia, was the leader of the reformist section of Croatian communists and a key figure of the Croatian Spring. Her public appearances attracted large audiences, which expressed their support for the Croatian political leadership's demands. The large banner in the photo (first row, on the right) reads: "A sovereign [Croatian] state is the right of the Croatian people, as well as of the other people of the SFRY".

### III-28. The fall of liberals in Serbia, October 1972

The Central Committee of the League of Communists of Serbia yesterday issued the following statement, from its session held on 26 October 1972:

The Central Committee has accepted the resignations of its hitherto president and secretary, comrades Marko Nikezić and Latinka Perović, considering it as a move that will enable it to act swiftly along the lines of the letter and the speech of comrade Tito and, in this sense, as a politically correct and responsible decision.

It is vital that the communists of the Socialist Republic of Serbia decisively strive to strengthen the role and influence of the working people in society. The implementation of the tasks contained in the letter and the speech of comrade Tito constitutes the best barrier

in dealing with the activities of anti-self-management forces, which oppose the League of Communists from nationalistic, Ranković-like, anarcho-liberal, bureaucratic and centralistic positions.

*Politika*, 28 October 1972, p. 1.



The Serbian Party leadership (the so called "liberals") was criticised for "technocratic management of the economy" (meaning that professional managers had more power than the workers' councils), for liberalism in science, culture and especially the Press, for opportunism in the struggle with the class enemy, for abandoning democratic centralism in the Party, for distancing itself from Tito, and for its Soviet-phobia and pro-Western attitude. In October 1972 the CC President Marko Nikezić and Secretary Latinka Perović were forced to resign, as did other leading Serbian political figures. Perović maintained that between 5,000 to 12,000 officials were dismissed, while the lawyer Rajko Danilović estimated that as many as 20,000 "liberals" were "shifted" after 1972. In some instances during the first half of 1973, the entire leaderships of municipalities and labour organisations were deposed.



According to the sources, during the late 1960s and the early 1970s Yugoslavia experienced much turmoil and dispute. Which were the main issues that the demonstrators and reformists questioned? What kind of criticism was expressed towards the state and the regime?



## CHAPTER IV: IDEOLOGY

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## ► INTRODUCTION

After the end of the Second World War in Europe, the survivors and witnesses of the Holocaust, of the rise and fall of dictatorships, of the long and relentless conflict between Communism and Nazism and Fascism expected that peaceful life would begin. In those days of victory, many people expected that there would not be any fresh attempts to establish a monopoly over truth and total control over the public and private spheres. A large number of people who had participated in resistance movements hoped that the communist utopia of the promise for a just world would materialise. On the other hand, there were those who supported a Western democratic model of government as a response to the Nazi totalitarian regime. However, the advent of the Cold War and global polarisation around two rival economic, political and ideological models had its inevitable impact on Southeast Europe. The region was divided in two ideological camps which, despite internal variations, were propagating two opposite interpretations of the past, the present and the future.

In the communist bloc, state propaganda employed the emerging new social inequalities in order to justify normative visions about a just, advanced society in which everyone would be treated equally and rewarded according to their contribution and abilities, and on the other side of the Iron Curtain there was a conservative right-wing rhetoric of the “salvation of the nation”, which required strict measures against every encroachment on national traditions, religion and language. The main goal of state propaganda was to constantly maintain, through planned and systematic pressure, its ideological explanations of the world and to force them upon every individual as a norm of “the correct way of thinking”. These explanations were imposed primarily through the education system, Media and the Arts, which often grossly beautified or distorted existing social realities, and attempted at permeating the entire public and private life of individuals. They underwent metamorphoses and renegotiations according to the need for constant re-legitimation of the irremovable and unlimited power of the Party in the East, or of ge-

nerals and populist politicians in the West, as well as in the opposition struggle against the respective regimes. The hard core of the official state propaganda comprised the main postulations of Marxism-Leninism – capitalist property relations as a source of all social evils, the emancipation of labour and the working people from oppression by the propertied classes, the establishment of collective ownership of the means of production, and so on – and of the cult of personality: That is the heroisation and sacralisation of the Party leader, which stemmed directly from the postulation about the leading role of workers (i.e. the communist party) in imposing the socialist system. In the case of Yugoslavia, celebrating the role of Tito’s partisans and their victories in important battles during the Second World War, with its built-in message of a revolutionary change of power, assumed a special function in strengthening the regime as well as the unity of the Yugoslav peoples. The Yugoslav case stands out from the very beginning because there communist organs of power were formed in territories liberated by the partisans themselves, which in turn gave the state leadership power to implement policies independently of the other Eastern bloc countries.

How did the main ideological messages of communist regimes in Southeast Europe evolve from 1945 to 1989? In the first “revolutionary” years, immediately after the communists came to power, the focus was on the struggle against “the class enemy”: The bourgeois, the *kulaks* (affluent land-owners) and the dissident or independent-minded intellectuals. Their images were manipulatively equated with those of the Nazis, the fascists and Western imperialists. Such a struggle condemned thousands to death, led to the creation of forced labour camps with inhumane working and living conditions, condemned whole families to internal exile and many others to forced migration. At the same time, there was also the “struggle for peace” and the international cooperation of communist countries under the guidance – and following the example of – the Soviet Union. In the case of Yugoslavia, the Tito-Stalin split of 1948 marked a turning point, as the country embarked

upon its “own socialist path”. Those opposing, as well as those charged with opposing, such a move ended up in prison on Goli Otok island and elsewhere.

As the “peaceful construction of socialism” unfolded, the “struggle” became one for lofty labour successes, for realising five-year plans of accelerated economic development, for opening industrial plants and modernising agriculture, etc. In the so-called era of “real socialism”, the post-war rhetoric gave way to metaphors of social well-being and prosperity, to the quest for “raising the material and cultural level of the working people”, to examples of juxtaposing the progressive “people’s culture” of the socialist “artistic-creative intelligentsia” with the decadent “mass culture” of the West, to the significance of the “scientific and technological revolution”, to calls for cooperation with the fraternal peoples of the Third World, etc. Yugoslavia developed its own model of socialist self-management, which differed from that of “real socialism” countries, while in the sphere of foreign policy it was a founding member of the Non-Aligned Movement which was against the division of the world into blocs. The country’s borders were open and its citizens could travel both to the East and to the West as of the early 1960s, while during the 1970s they enjoyed a significant rise in living standards.

In some countries, the regime’s internationalist discourse gradually combined with a nationalistic one, which included even topics that were incompatible with scientific atheism and the modernisation programme, such as the Church and customs and traditions. Thus, in July 1977 Nicolae Ceaușescu’s mother was buried with a sumptuous Eastern Orthodox procession and funeral service. Towards the end of the communist era, the idea of “democratic pluralism” began to be promoted. Slogans such as *glasnost* and *perestroika*, which until only two or three decades ago (e.g., during the Hungarian Spring of 1956 that was crushed by the Red Army, and the Prague Spring of 1968 that was suppressed by the invasion of all Warsaw Pact countries save one) had been condemned as a retreat from the ideals of the Party, were now being put forward.

The cult of personality underwent a similar type of development. As a whole, it illustrated the historical optimism of the working people and the working class, synthesising the different ideological postulations about the personality of the communist leader as a

supreme expression of knowledge, humaneness and of an unswerving commitment to the ideals of justice and integrity. In the countries of the Eastern bloc, the cult of the leader followed the Soviet model. Until the death of Stalin, the Party leader was a veteran of wars or of the resistance against fascism (Georgi Dimitrov, Tito, Hoxha), a fierce but fair avenger of traitors to the proletarian idea, while his image was strongly sacralised. After the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1956, when, at the initiative of Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev, the cult of personality was officially denounced as a perversion of the communist ideal and the mass repression of millions of people was officially condemned, the cult figure of the leader unofficially spilled over into a ubiquitous, compulsory and almost absurd display of “the love of the working masses” for “the first man in the Party and the state”. At every parade in honour of Labour Day, or any other of the major official holidays celebrated with mass parades, smiling Pioneer children presented flowers to Todor Zhivkov, Tito or Enver Hoxha on a special tribune (in Bulgaria, at the platform of the Mausoleum of Georgi Dimitrov), while work-worn peasants told how a meeting with Ceaușescu had cured someone of cancer. Of course, the cult of personality was not an exclusive trait of communist regimes. In Turkey, Kemal Atatürk (d. 1938) is an impressive example of a leader whose cult has been rooted in every aspect of public life and whose legacy has determined post-war Turkish history.

In authoritarian and totalitarian regimes, state-controlled and centralised education has always been an institution of political indoctrination. In the immediate aftermath of the Second World War, Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist ideology permeated the field of education in the countries of the Eastern bloc. First came the removal of the “old”, “bourgeois” teaching personnel, with purges ranging from educators in pre-school kindergartens to university professors. In the following years, regulations were introduced to monitor the social composition of the student population, and especially of students at secondary and post-secondary schools, as well as to control access to the latter. These measures were directly related to the communist regime’s policy of “social engineering” aimed to create a new “real people’s intelligentsia”. By the end of the 1940s, all communist countries had adopted laws on national education and curricula in tune with the doctrine of Marxism-Leninism

and with the grand objective of “forming the citizens of the socialist state”. To this end, “dialectical materialism” was also introduced indiscriminately into the teaching material of subjects taught at school and university, regardless of whether they fell within Humanities or Sciences. Among all disciplines, particular priority was given to History, which was entrusted with justifying the epochal significance and eternity of the communist regime. It turned all social revolts of the distant past into harbingers of the socialist revolution and heroised the political trajectories of Party leaders.

The use of culture as an ideological tool was another key feature of communist societies. Its function was derived from the classical Marxist concept of culture as a “superstructure to base (economic and social) relations”, which therefore had to show the profound changes that had occurred in societies that had taken the path to communism. Its main instrument and “correct method in all the arts” was the so-called “Socialist Realism”. The definition of this method was formulated in the Statutes of Soviet Writers adopted at their First All-Union Congress in 1934: “Socialist Realism [...] demands of the artist the truthful, historically concrete representation of reality in its revolutionary development”. Socialist Realism was successfully imposed as a conservative norm and everyday artistic practice in the countries of the Soviet bloc and Yugoslavia. It also helped the communist regimes to secure total centralisation of and control over all cultural institutions and their respective policies, as well as to establish control over all organisations of intellectuals that had been formed freely in pre-communist times and all free cultural initiatives. After the break with the USSR, a shift occurred in art and culture in Yugoslavia. Socialist Realism was abandoned and artists were given the freedom to blend in with Western modern art trends. In the late years of the communist era, even in countries that had been faithful followers of Socialist Realism the power of its dogmas gradually weakened due to the ever wider contacts with Western culture and the relaxation of censorship on modern, alternative, abstract, and other forms of art.

The ideological clichés and “snapshots” of socialist reality literally destroyed the critical social function of the media and its outlets. In addition to creating a quasi-public sphere, ideology intervened in the intimate sphere of family holidays. In all socialist countries

attempts were made to introduce civic rituals that were meant to replace religious ones and to fulfil the directives of scientific atheism as the sole explanatory matrix of the existential problems of being. Such attempts did not always meet with success. Thus, in Bulgaria child-naming never became popular, unlike the rituals of civil marriage and civil burial. Yet many other official rituals undoubtedly helped speed up the processes of secularisation in communist Southeast Europe.

At the same time, there were attempts to build welfare states and strong economies not on state propaganda and the communist ideology of the “socialist revolution”, but on the basis of militaristic, paternalistic or nationalistic approaches. Propaganda in those cases was the reverse but also the mirror image of the communist equivalent; indeed, at times of dictatorship or authoritarian rule, it was imposed no less aggressively. There was, however, one critical difference. Wherever there were elected parliaments, there was freedom of speech for elected politicians. Similarly, the critical social function of the media could continue, except under dictatorial rule.

In Greece, both during the civil war (1946-1949) and afterwards, the state “enemy” was not the bourgeoisie as in communist countries, but the “communist bandits”. Under the seven-year military dictatorship (1967-1974), part of the press was shut down and the remaining was subjected to censorship, while thousands of the junta’s opponents were tortured, imprisoned, sent to internal exile and deprived of their citizenship if they had escaped abroad. The torture of dissidents was indeed the main reason Greece was effectively forced out of the Council of Europe in 1969, a notable precedent. Furthermore, the leader of the junta, Colonel George Papadopoulos, made a particular contribution to the ideological arsenal of authoritarianism by using the surgical metaphor of the country as a “patient in a plaster cast” in urgent need of a “doctor”. Emphasis was placed concurrently on the “21st April Revolution”, instead of the monarchy, on Helleno-Christian civilisation, and on the need for economic progress in all fields.

The aspirations to build a strong economy in Turkey, especially after the introduction of the Constitution of 1961, which put emphasis on the Republic of Turkey as “a national, democratic, secular, and social state governed by the rule of law”, were also supported by

the military. The acknowledgement of the secular character of the state was fundamental to the national doctrine. Unlike Greece, though, the conflict between the Left and the Right developed with numerous unexpected turns (here ethnic divisions also played a role), complex and unending ideological and social conflicts, and varying degrees of success in maintaining Turkey's image, established by Kemal Atatürk, as a secular and modern state. Questioning his cult of personality would gradually become part of the debates in Turkey. During the early stages of the Cold War, Turkey's ideological preferences, along with her economic and political direction, were determined by the push factor of the Soviet threat and the pull factor of American security guarantees and financial aid. This led to a swift re-formulation of Kemalism as an anti-communist doctrine (Indeed, it would even be re-branded as "Atatürkism" (*Atatürkçülük*) to free Turkish elites from Kemalism's anti-imperialist implications in their quest to join the "free world"). This anti-communist re-formulation of the founding ideology of the country would further magnify the personality cult around Atatürk and assign the military with the task of protecting the ideological direction of the republic (mainly in line with Alliance policy of NATO).

This chapter aims at conveying a balanced picture of different aspects of ideological processes in the Balkans during the highly ideologised Cold War era. Ideology

was a key weapon for both blocs as they sought to demonstrate and justify not only their military supremacy but also their moral superiority. This global competition was mirrored within Balkan societies, where each regime and each leader aspired to achieve – or simply to fabricate – the loyalty of its citizens. However, if we study propaganda mechanisms without social and cultural data, we may end up believing that propaganda was actually efficient or that no one was by his own volition loyal to the regime. Reality is more complex. Behind the propaganda façade, the dominant ideology could be opposed tacitly, e.g. at the workplace or in the family. Conversely, apart from those who publicly aired their opposition, there could be silent supporters of the regime who were not necessarily members of the ruling elites. In this respect, many, particularly among the lower social classes, supported the system because it gave them free schooling, full health insurance, numerous welfare benefits and, crucially, the opportunity for upward social mobility, e.g. by moving from the village to the city. By and large, membership in the Party was a prerequisite for this to occur; still, many saw it as a unique opportunity. As a result, in the post-Cold War era nostalgia for communism was manifested in many countries, especially in those that were "defeated by the transition" and found it difficult to cope with the problems concomitant with the transformation processes.

## ► IV.1. PROPAGANDA

### IV-1. Propaganda poster of a woman welcoming a tractor, Bulgaria 1950-1960



НБКМ [Sts. Cyril and Methodius National Library], Гр VI 4387.



The caption reads: "And Now, Let's Celebrate". The poster was designed to depict young Bulgarian women who had entered into the country's modernised agriculture "with knowledge of and responsibility for their production targets". It was also meant to demonstrate that only workers who had met their work targets deserved to celebrate holidays (in this particular case, Labour Day).

→  
The caption reads: "Working Turkish people, women and men, living in Bulgaria! The People's power demonstrates constant care for the improvement of your material and cultural lives. Give your vote to the Fatherland Front".

### IV-2. Propaganda poster in Turkish, Bulgaria 1954



НБКМ [Sts. Cyril and Methodius National Library], Гр VI 1516.



1. Describe the two posters. How are women depicted (clothing, body language, facial expression)? What is the political message transmitted through such an image? Why do you think the posters focus on women? Do you recognise a certain style here?

2. The main feature of socialist realism is a certain optimism representing the bright present and future of an ideal society based on socialism. Is this feature to be found here? Find more information and visual material representing this style in socialist countries of the time.

### IV-3. Proposals regarding the organisation of the Working People's parade in Bucharest on 23 August 1971

For the celebration of the twenty-seventh anniversary of Romania's liberation from the fascist yoke, we [the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Romania] propose the following for the working people of the municipality of Bucharest: 1. At the Aviators' Square, a military parade and a gathering of the working people should be organised between 8-11 am, with 150,000 participants. The [event] will open with the national anthem of the Socialist Republic of Romania [SRR], followed by: a military parade; a line of the patriotic guards made up of 3,000 fighters; a line of the youth participating in the training for the country defence made up of 1,100 young people and detachments of brigadiers from the patriotic work made up of 900 comrades; a line of the working people made up of some 134,000 citizens, out of which 3,000 comrades will head the column; a line of the sportsmen made up of 6,000 comrades; a group of pioneers will offer flowers to state and party leaders; the event will end with the parade of 5,000 policemen. 2. The line of the working people shall carry the following items: portraits of Marx, Engels and Lenin; portraits of the members of the Executive Committee of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Romania [CPR]; flags of the CPR and state flags of the SRR, in equal numbers; coats of arms of the CPR and of the SRR; placards with greetings to the peoples of the socialist countries; panels with slogans and graphics on achievements in production, flowers and other decorative items [...]. 4. At the Aviators' Square, an

official stand and two side stands of 500 seats each shall be built, while on the opposite side two stands of 500 seats each shall be built. 5. In the afternoon of 23 and 24 August, in the main squares and parks of the capital there will be popular festivals, with amateur and professional artistic bands. [...]

Thirty field days shall be organised, as well as youth carnivals, sports competitions, and trips.

National Archives of Bucharest, collection: Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party, section: Chancellery file 85-1971, pp. 44-45.

### IV-4. Army Parade in Belgrade 1949



Muzej istorije Jugoslavije / Museum of Yugoslav History..



The National Liberation Army of Yugoslavia held military parades from 1941 to 1945, as a troop review or to celebrate an important event. Military parades of the Yugoslav People's Army were organised between 1945 and 1960. The first large-scale parades were held on 1 May 1945 in Belgrade, Kragujevac, Niš, Novi Sad, Split and Sarajevo. In the next two years, military parades were held in all large garrisons to mark Victory Day, on 9 May, Republic Day, on 29 November, and Army Day, on 22 December. From 1948 to 1957, parades were only held on 1 May and only in Belgrade and the Republics' capitals. The May Day Parades were organised as part of the celebration of International Labour Day in which, besides army units, sports, political and other organisations participated. →

The parades were abolished in 1965 for economic reasons, and at the time it was decided that they would be held every five years on Victory Day. The first military parade, which was not attended by the Supreme Commander, Marshal Tito (who had died in 1980), and the last one organised in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was held on 9 May 1985 in Belgrade.



The two sources (IV-3 and IV-4) describe public rituals. What is the meaning of a parade? Are parades held in your country nowadays and on what occasion? Examine national parades in your country.

## IV-5. Introducing civic rituals in Bulgaria

### A. Guidelines on naming ceremony, Stara Zagora 1975

The official states: "Today we have gathered to ceremoniously announce the name of yet another citizen of our socialist motherland, the People's Republic of Bulgaria: the daughter/son of the family of Maria and Ognyan Dimitrov. Every citizen enters society with his/her name. In the spirit of the Bulgarian tradition, the parents have chosen to name their child Albena. (If the child is not Bulgarian, the last sentence is replaced, e.g. with "The parents have chosen to name their child..."). May he/she carry that name with honour". Choir starts singing softly "Like a Small Pine-Tree under the Sky" by Asen Karastoyanov. Assistant officer begins the naming ceremony. Mother, holding the child, stands up. Assistant officer: "May Albena grow up healthy and merry! May she be lively and diligent! May she be clever and studious! May she be as pretty as the flowers that blossom across our native land! May she be persistent and prudent! May she bring only joy to her parents! May she be the pride of her sponsors [godparents], of her grandmothers and grandfathers! May she love our native land as it was loved by its best sons and daughters! May she be faithful to the cause of socialism and communism!" Naming ceremony ends. Choir stops singing.

*Сборник нормативни актове...*, pp.100-101.

### B. Photo of naming a baby, 1974



<http://socbg.com/2015/01/%D0%B8%D0%BC%D0%B5%D0%BD%D1%83%D0%B2%D0%B0%D0%BD%D0%B5-%D0%B2-%D0%BE%D0%B1%D0%BD%D1%81-%D0%BF%D0%BE%D0%BC%D0%BE%D1%80%D0%B8%D0%B5-80-%D1%82%D0%B5.html>, accessed on 21.09.2016.



1. Which are the desired virtues and qualities of a child listed in the Guidelines? Which are personal and which ideological?

2. Ask your parents to recall memories related to rituals of public or private interest, like those described in sources IV-3, IV-4 and IV-5. Find old family photos. Compare these with the above sources. Then construct your own narrative based on oral testimonies and other sources.

#### IV-6. The “Casa Poporului” [the House of the Republic, also known as the People’s House; today the Palace of the Parliament] in Bucharest



<https://daniilgaucan.wordpress.com/2011/08/05/casa-poporului-vazuta-din-plan-astral>, accessed on 12.10.2016.



The building known today as the Palace of Parliament is the most eloquent architectural symbol of Nicolae Ceaușescu’s delusion of grandeur. He made the decision to build it after the 1977 big earthquake, when Bucharest’s old city-centre was severely affected. Ceaușescu ordered the construction of a new “civic centre” in the capital from scratch. Thus the old neighbourhood of Uranus was demolished, in order to develop Boulevard Victory of

*Socialism* and the People’s House. As the works started, seven square kilometers of buildings were demolished and 40,000 individuals were moved out. In 1989, the total cost was estimated at \$1.75 billion – at a time when, in order to pay off the country’s external debt, the regime had imposed severe austerity measures. As many as 200 architects and some 20,000 workers were employed in the construction of the People’s House.





Photographer Petrit Kumi.

**IV-9. Long live the Central Committee of the Party of Labour of Albania headed by Enver Hoxha. A slogan in a factory**



Photographer Petrit Kumi.

**IV-10. The ideological symbols of communist Albania: pickaxe, rifle and the History of the Labour Party of Albania**



Photographer Petrit Kumi.



Read the key carefully and examine the photo. What does the body language of the young woman reveal? Discuss in class the following sentence: "Women increasingly took part in public life, in manufacturing, in education and culture, while the patriarchal role of the family was replaced with the paternalistic role of the Party. It was the Party that would teach Albanian women to be 'good mothers and beneficial to society, but primarily workers and soldiers in service of the Nation'". How is the "upgraded position" of women in society questioned here?



Describe the above image. What symbols are included? How are they connected with the particular characteristics of the country?

## ► IV.2. CULTS OF PERSONALITY

### IV-11. Anıtkabir, Atatürk's mausoleum in Ankara (1944-1953)



Photo by Luc Wouters.



Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk) died on 10 November 1938, having radically transformed Turkish society. His cult, developed already during his life time, continued after his death. Atatürk's Mausoleum, designed by Emin Onat and Orhan Arda, may be considered as the "ultimate nationalist state monument" of Turkey, according to Sibel Bozdoğan. Its construction began on 9 November 1944, with a magnificent ceremony,

and was completed nine years later, in four stages. The monument belongs to the "Second National Architecture Period" in Turkish architecture (1940-1950), when more monumental, symmetrical buildings were erected, with cube-shaped stones. At the same time, the Mausoleum features iconographic references to pre-Islamic Anatolian civilisations and reflects the official Turkish history theses of that period.



According to Sibel Bozdoğan, Atatürk's Mausoleum may be considered as the "ultimate nationalist state monument" of Turkey. What do you understand by this? What is a

mausoleum? Compare with source VI-4 (Demolition of Dimitrov's mausoleum, 1999) in vol. 2 and discuss the symbolism of these monuments in the public sphere.

#### IV-11. Personality cults of the Ceaușescu. The Romanian leader as “godfather” at a “hunters’ baptism”



Online photo library of Romanian Communism, <http://fototeca.iicr.ro/fototeca/>, accessed on 28.07.2016.



The Romanian dictator was passionate about hunting. Quite often during his visits abroad he received hunting weapons as presents. Among his hunting partners there were other famous leaders such as Josip Tito or Todor Zhivkov. During the hunts in which members of the diplomatic personnel accredited to Bucharest participated, the Romanian leader wanted to be the “godfather” at the hunters’ baptism.

#### IV-12. The symbolic funeral of Stalin in Kniazhevo, Sofia, 9 March 1953



<http://www.lostbulgaria.com/?cat=344>, accessed on 28.07.2016.



Watch the Romanian movie *Nunta Muta* (Silent Wedding) by Horatiu Malaele on the death of Stalin. The storyline runs as follows:

In a small isolated village, in 1953, a wedding is interrupted by news about the death of Stalin. Because public celebrations are forbidden, they decide to turn the “happy event” into a silent wedding. The trailer can be found at: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LoRZBEpbqyA>.

Do research on Stalinism and discuss how it affected everyday life outside the Soviet Union as well.

#### IV-13. Statement of Valko Chervenkov at the 1956 Plenum of the Communist Party of Bulgaria, 2 April 1956

It is precisely from 1950 onwards, gradually and increasingly, following the practice of Stalin’s cult of personality, that there began a stir around my name, that there began praises, exaltations, ascription of non-existent merits, constant accentuation of everything I did, which led to a situation where Chervenkov began to be identified with the Central Committee [CC] and above the Party. [...] I myself failed to see the full extent of the profound influence that the cult of personality had upon me, and I myself did not do everything necessary to fully eliminate the effects of the cult in my own work. This is explained by the fact that the cult of personality, which we imported into our country, is such a sweet poison that – regardless of whether you want it to or not – it gradually intoxicates, blinds, creates such self-confidence that the [individual] de facto and formally places himself above the CC, above the Party and the state, and becomes increasingly susceptible to the illusion that his authority is identical with the authority of the Party. [...] Under the influence of the cult of personality, which acquired significant dimensions in our country, I developed habits and ways of acting and issuing orders, somewhat like a landlord, in the Politburo, in the CC and in the Party. In essence, I developed the mentality of a [supreme] “Leader” [*vozhda*]. The habits, ways, and methods of work that stem from such a leaderist self-confidence, created due to the cult of personality, taken as a whole may be called leaderism [*vozhdizum*]. This meant that the individual who had to speak to the Party and the people on all important issues was necessarily and only me; that the initiative always and everywhere had to be mine;

that the first and last say about everything was mine. I became, in effect, a monopolist over everything and of everything, especially on the ideological front.

Kiriakov et al. (eds), 2013, pp. 50-54.



Valko Velev Chervenkov served as leader of the Communist Party of Bulgaria between 1950 and 1954, and prime minister between 1950 and 1956. His rule was marked by the consolidation of the Stalinist model, rapid industrialisation, collectivisation and large-scale persecution of political opponents.



1. Study carefully the above source. How does Chervenkov describe his gradual transformation? Find the exact words reflecting this process. Why do you think this happened?

2. Turn this personal account into a theatrical monologue accompanied by a visual presentation of personal cult rituals of political leaders of the kind worldwide.

3. This speech was given a month and a half after the famous report ("On the cult of personality and its consequences") given by Nikita Khrushchev at the 20th Party Congress of the Communist Party of the USSR on 25 February 1956. Compare the two speeches.

<https://www.marxists.org/archive/khrushchev/1956/02/24.htm>, accessed on 28.07.2016.

#### IV-14. Football players weeping at the announcement of Tito's death



Start, 14 May 1980; Arena, 9 May 1980.



After a long illness, Tito died on 4 May 1980. Because of his role in Yugoslav society and in the international community, his death, however predictable (he was 88), came as a shock to most people. This photograph was taken during a football match between Hajduk (Split) and Crvena zvezda (Belgrade), seconds after Tito's death was announced. Players and spectators alike began to weep.

#### IV-15. Enver Hoxha's death

THE PARTY AND THE ALBANIAN PEOPLE IN DEEP GRIEF OUR BELOVED LEADER ENVER HOXHA HAS DIED

Comrades, communists, workers, cooperationists, intellectuals, women and youth of Albania, war veterans and compatriots

With deep sorrow and pain we inform you that today, 11 April 1985, at 02.15, the heart of our beloved and glorious leader of our Party and our people Enver Hoxha – First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Albanian Labour Party, Leader of the General Council of the Albanian Democratic Front, General Commander of the Armed Forces in the Socialist Republic of Albania – stopped beating.

We were separated from the founder of our glorious party, the organiser and leader of the National Liberating War and the leader of our People's Revolution, architect of the new socialist Albania. The heroic commandant of our National Liberating Army closed his eyes. He created the Democratic Front and laid the groundwork of the Power to the People.

The life and work of comrade Enver Hoxha is the living history of Albania today. His name is connected with all the battles of social classes and with all the victories of the Albanian party and people. During all the stages our people went through, since the day the Communist Party was created to today, whenever the destiny of our people and motherland was being set, his thoughts and personality were always present. At all decisive moments, when the path to be followed and war to be fought were being chosen, His leadership and direction were decisive.

*Zëri i Popullit*, 11 April 1985.



Enver Hoxha (1908-1985) was the communist leader with the longest period in power. During the Second World War, he led the Communist Party of Albania and the communist-dominated National Liberation Army. Following the coming of the communists to power in November 1944, Hoxha became gradually the undisputed dictator for nearly half a century. Initially, he held the posts of First Secretary of the Party, Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, before giving up all governmental posts and assuming absolute power as

First Secretary of the Party of Labour. He was the architect of harsh economic policies, and a series of political alliances with Tito's Yugoslavia (1945-48), the Soviet Union (1948-60), and with Mao's China (1960-78). Considering communist Albania as "the only socialist country in the world", he led it to international isolation in the late 1970s and until his death. His regime was characterised by fierce political repression; about 20,000 Albanians were executed and interned, amongst a population of some 3 million.



Why do you think the grief for the deceased Stalin, Hoxha and Tito was expressed in such a

way? What does this say for the relationship between communist leaders and the people?

### ▶ IV.3. VERSIONS OF HISTORY

#### IV-16. Extracts from a fourth-grade textbook (1954)

##### RAPID DEVELOPMENT OF CAPITALISM IN THE BULGARIAN MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY

In the first years of the twentieth century, capitalism in Bulgaria began to develop rapidly, as evinced by the large number of factories that were established. At the same time, railway lines and highways were laid out, and ports were built on the Danube and the Black Sea. The factories and trains needed coal. Coal mines went into operation in Dimitrovo [Pernik] and on the Balkan Range. Liberation [from Ottoman rule in 1878] found Bulgaria with a small number of factories, but by 1911 their number had increased to 350, with 16,000 workers.

##### CULTURAL PROGRESS

With the development of capitalism in Bulgaria, there appeared a great need for education. The Bulgarian bourgeoisie needed educated people as civil servants, as factory managers, as trade accountants, etc. That is why it opened many schools in the country, a university and an art academy in Sofia. The Bulgarian Academy of Sciences was created.

##### THE SITUATION OF WORKERS AND PEASANTS

Only the bourgeoisie benefited from this cultural progress. The life of workers and peasants did not improve. Their labour was brutally exploited by the bourgeoisie. The

workers received small wages. They lived on the outskirts of towns. The situation of peasants was also bleak. From dawn to dusk, they toiled in the fields with outdated tools. They were encumbered with taxes. A large part of what they produced went for the payment of taxes and debts.

Burmov et al., 1954, p. 93.

#### IV-17. Two different versions of the liberation of the Albanian capital Tirana, November 1944

##### A. The role of the former communist Prime Minister Mehmet Shehu is highly praised as one of the partisan leaders, 1967

Battle of Tirana. While the Second Meeting of the Anti-Fascist National Liberation Council was taking place in Berat, the Albanian National Liberation Army (ANLA) was conducting its final clashes with the German invaders and remnants of the anti-revolutionary bands, which were making every effort to leave Albania in order to escape death.

The most important military event at the time was the battle for the liberation of Tirana. [...] The Headquarters of the First Army Corps produced a detailed operation plan, pursuant to the instruction of the Commander-in-Chief. [...] In the Tirana section, troops of the First Division under the command of Mehmet Shehu were to operate.

In the crucial phase of the offensive, which was launched on 11 November, other ANLA units were deployed. [...] By liquidating one after the other enemy outposts, on 14 November the partisan forces took control of the whole city apart from three to four fortified outposts still under enemy control.

Meanwhile on 11 November Brigade XV liberated the city of Elbasan, after heavy fighting against the Hitlerian troops withdrawing from Greece. Comprising some 5,000 men, these troops were assigned to attack on the rear of the partisan forces that were besieging Tirana, to destroy the city and together with the German garrison continue withdrawing towards Shkodra. [The partisan forces] and the population of Tirana were confronted with a serious threat. But such a threat was overcome due to the determined and swift response of the First Army Corps that was leading the battle for the liberation of the capital.

In the morning of 17 November 1944 enemy resistance in the capital had come to an end. A great part of enemy forces already surrounded was annihilated. Tirana was liberated.

The battle for the liberation of Tirana continued for 19 days. ANLA warriors with unusual heroism attacked and captured one after the other enemy outposts fortified by barbed wire and mines, by tanks and armoured vehicles. In the struggle against the Hitlerians, along with partisans, the whole people of Tirana were mobilised.

Pollo, 1967, pp. 810-813.

### **B. The role of Mehmet Shehu is not even mentioned as he was declared an “enemy of the people”, after committing suicide in December 1981**

Battle of Tirana. While the Second Meeting of the Anti-Fascist National Liberation Council was taking place in Berat, the Albanian National Liberation Army (ANLA) was conducting its final clashes with the German invaders and remnants of the anti-revolutionary bands, which were making every effort to leave Albania in order to escape death.

In the Tirana section, troops of the First Division were assigned.

In the crucial phase of the offensive, which was launched on 11 November, other ANLA units were deployed. [...] By liquidating one after the other the enemy outposts, on 14 November the partisan forces took control of almost the whole city apart from several fortified outposts.

In the morning of 17 November 1944 enemy resistance in the capital had come to an end. Tirana was liberated.

Pollo, 1984, pp. 625-628.

## **IV-18. Different interpretations of the end of the Second World War**



The National Liberation Struggle (as it was called by its own adherents) during the Second World War became one of the key events on which the legitimacy of socialist Yugoslavia was based. An official interpretation of the war did not allow for any critical revisions. Crimes against the enemy and prisoners of war were swept under the rug or downplayed. On the other hand, members of the defeated forces that managed to flee from Yugoslavia, relativised their role during the war, emphasising and often exaggerating the aforementioned crimes.

### **A. The official version of Yugoslavia’s communist authorities**

During the last days of the so-called NDH [Independent State of Croatia], when it became obvious that Germany had lost the war, leaders of the Ustasha regime tried to convince themselves, other criminals and the indoctrinated tens of thousands of citizens and peasants in military uniform that they would make a breakthrough and reach Carinthia, where they would meet up with the Allies. [...] In April and early May, some 800,000 Yugoslav Army soldiers crushed the occupying army and liberated the whole country, including Trieste, reaching as far as Soč, and thus definitely overwhelming the quisling forces. During the course of these operations, the Chetniks and the Ustasha made an alliance and joined forces in their common struggle against the partisans, regardless of the previous bloody fighting between them. [...] Units of the Yugoslav Army managed to cut off the road to the quisling forces on the border between Austria and Yugoslavia and thus thwarted their surrender to the Western powers, taking some 50,000 prisoners, mainly Ustasha and Chetnik soldiers. The remnants of these forces crossed over into Austria and Italy where they were put in camps.

Bilandžić, 1978, pp. 78-79.

### **B. The version of Croatian political émigrés who fled the country in 1945**

Dubrovnik, Split, Sinj, Imotski, Mostar, Široki Brijeg, Travnik, Sarajevo, Našice, Mitrovica, Gospić and

other Croatian cities have fallen into the hands of the “reds”, which received military backing from the United States and Great Britain. All these areas had seen such massacres and atrocities, which were unprecedented since the era of the Mongolian and Turkish conquests. Tito’s followers carried out their intent to liquidate all Croatian patriots, men and women, old and young, rich and poor, educated and unskilled. I employed the same figure of 600,000 Croatian citizens killed after the end of the Second World War even 25 years ago. [...] Croats now mainly use Nikolić’s estimate about more than 200,000 victims in Bleiburg, without mentioning my estimate, although I deal with five times as many PRIMARY documents than can be found in the book in Spanish and in its subsequent translation by Nikolić-Nevestić.

Prcela, 2001, p. XXXI.

#### IV-19. Different interpretations of WWII by two Greek historians



The issue of evaluating the Greek resistance during the Axis occupation of 1941–44 has not been solely connected to the diverse historical approaches that have been employed since the 1950s. It has also been related to contemporary politics and crucially to the ways the opposing political camps of post-war Greece constructed their respective identities. The recognition of the communists’ contribution to the resistance, charges of collaboration, the civil strife of the occupation period are just few of the topics that have preoccupied, and still do, Greek historiography and politics.

##### A. A left-wing perspective

On 27 September 1941, a number of small trade unions and political personalities, together with the Communist Party (KKE) and its kindred parties, the Socialist Party and the Union of People’s Democracy that had just been founded, established the National Liberation Front (EAM) and simultaneously created a centre of military resistance, the National People’s Liberation Army (ELAS), the activities of which began in February 1942. EAM united the vast majority of the Greek people and the significance of its activities exceeds that of a mere resistance

movement. [...] EAM’s significance, its tendency for deep social reforms and the predominance of the [KKE] in its leadership worried [the British], the pre-war political parties and the royal government in Cairo, which favoured the creation of other resistance movements.

Svoronos, 1978, pp. 139,140.


##### B. A right-wing perspective

People tend to honour, and rightly so, the Battle of Britain, just as they tend to bypass with contempt the “*pourquoi*” of the French or all those who capitulated at the time. But simultaneously they tend to ignore, unjustly, the Greeks’ input [in the Second World War]. The Greeks themselves have contributed to this, for not only once more were they caught up in internal discord but they also proved incapable in peacetime to take advantage of the titles they earned and the sacrifices they underwent during the war. The King and the government fought abroad with the Allies at El Alamein and at Rimini, they helped with their merchant marine and their navy, what was left of it. Within Greece, they opposed the enemy. Collaborators and opportunists constituted an insignificant minority among the nation. Unfortunately the internal quarrels of the parties and the absence of an organisation of common effort allowed the communists to give to EAM a widespread base. Because the truth is that the communists in EAM were always a small minority.

Markezinis, 1968, vol. 4, p. 326.



Read the two interpretations of the resistance movement in Greece. Discover differences in the two approaches. Are there any common elements and which are these? Discuss the subject of historians’ objectivity.

**▶ IV.4. EDUCATION****IV-20. A page from the last socialist primer in Bulgaria, 1986**

<http://socbg.com/2015/01/%D0%B8%D0%BC%D0%B5%D0%BD%D1%83%D0%B2%D0%B0%D0%BD%D0%B5-%D0%B2-%D0%BE%D0%B1%D0%BD%D1%81-%D0%BF%D0%BE%D0%BC%D0%BE%D1%80%D0%B8%D0%B5-80-%D1%82%D0%B5.html>, accessed on 21.09.2016.

#### IV-21. Extracts from a circular sent to Romanian schools in February 1948

Schools have to start functioning at a new tempo, a dynamic, revolutionary one. We have to [...] start a new life for the people's schools. [...] Teachers in each school will organise a school choir; [...] besides pieces that should fit the spirit of our times, they will also be required to prepare the Internationale and the Soviet Anthem. [...] Classrooms will be decorated [as follows]:

The ARLUS corner with portraits of Generalissimo Stalin, members of the High Council [of the Great National Assembly], the President of the Council of Ministers, and different cards and slogans depicting the friendly relations between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of Romania.

The Wall Newspapers [propaganda boards] should include different student essays on the school and the social life of the village, the best drawings, etc., which should be replaced monthly.

The pupils' training in a republican spirit is made by daily lessons and by the agency of the "Republic class", which will take place every Saturday, at the end of the teaching day. [...] Teachers, helped by students, will collect and use the necessary material from newspapers, magazines and booklets, thus drawing up folders to be used for the "Republic class". [...] All schools should be immediately informed to make the following modifications in [existing] textbooks:

First Grade Primer: Remove the first pages with the royal portraits.

Second Grade Reading textbook: Remove the first pages with the royal portraits. On page 131, delete the lines on lesson about the king. On page 235 (Contents), delete the first two lines.

Third Grade Reading textbook: Delete the words "His Royal Majesty the King was decorated with the highest Soviet honour, the Victory Order".

Third Grade Maths textbook (pages 73 and 74): Cover the image of the former king on the 20 and 100 lei coins.

Fourth Grade Geography textbook (page 64): Delete the words "Ferdinand is crowned" "Ferdinand is crowned as the king of all Romanians", and replace it with the "Union of all Romanians is celebrated".

Circular letter no. 2265, from February 1948, published in the Official Gazette of the School Inspectorate of the County of Bacău, no. 23-24/January-February 1948" (National Archives of Iași, collection: Regional School Inspectorate of Iași, file 97/1948, page 21, pp. 1-13).



ARLUS stands for Romanian Society for Friendship with the Soviet Union. It was a cultural organisation set up by a group of leftist intellectuals in the autumn of 1944, which quickly turned into a propaganda instrument, controlled and funded by the state.



What novelties were introduced in Romanian schools in 1948? Use your knowledge and explain the reasons for deleting references to the King from the textbooks. Discuss the relationship between remembering and forgetting.

#### IV-22. Letter from the Minister of People's Education K. Dramaliev to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Bulgaria, 30 August 1950

Comrades, the extended meeting at the Ministry of People's Education on 21 August adopted a plan for eliminating illiteracy, according to which 100,000 illiterates and 50,000 functional illiterates should enrol in literacy courses during the 1950-51 school year.

The work done so far has yielded poor results. In 1948-49, 49,951 persons became literate. In 1949-50, 49,192 persons attended literacy courses. From 1945 to 1950, a total of some 140,000 illiterates and functional illiterates took these courses.

The main reason for the poor work is that it is carried out separately from the Party. The Ministry of People's Education believes that unless Party organisations are assigned the task of directly participating in the campaign for eliminating illiteracy and of stirring the public into action, major achievements by administrative means cannot be expected. Our efforts to attract public organisations have not yielded major results. The elimination of illiteracy has remained the "work of teachers".

The Bulgarian People's Women's Union should campaign among women, especially among Turkish and Bulgarian Mohammedan women. They should organise care centres for the children of mothers attending literacy courses for the duration of their study.

The General Workers' Trade Union and the Ministry of Industry should seek to trace and enrol all illiterate workers and provide premises for the

courses. Control over the regular work of the courses should be exercised by trade union committees and managements of enterprises. Heating, lighting, teaching aids and awards should be provided.

ЦДА [Central State Archives], f.15, inv. 6, a.u. 1090.



Read the source carefully. Then discuss the following phrases: “The main reason for the poor work is that it is carried out separately from the Party” and “Our efforts to attract public organisations have not yielded major results. The elimination of illiteracy has remained the ‘work of teachers’”. Whose job is the elimination of illiteracy? What was the role of the Communist Party in public affairs and especially in education? In which ways the party can help eliminate illiteracy according to the source?

### IV-23. Article 16 of the first post-civil war Greek Constitution of 1952 on Education

Education is placed under the supreme supervision of the State and is funded by the latter or by local self-government bodies. In all schools of secondary and primary education, teaching aims at the moral and intellectual education of the young and the development of their national consciousness on the basis of the ideological principles of the Helleno-Christian civilisation. Primary education is compulsory for all and is paid for by the State. The law provides that the number of years of compulsory education shall be no less than six. Higher education institutions are self-governed under the supervision of the State, and their professors are public functionaries. The establishment of educational institutions functioning according to the Constitution and the laws of the State is licensed by the authorities to individuals who enjoy civic rights as well as to legal entities.

*Εφημερίδα της Κυβερνήσεως* [Government Gazette], issue I, no. 1 (1 January 1952).

### IV-24. The Church of Cyprus and education, 1970



In a statement published in the last issue of the Limassol weekly *Paratiritis* on 21 February 1970, Metropolitan Anthimos of Kition reite-

rated what he had recently said during a sermon in the village of Erimi, namely that “those who are currently ruling Cyprus are not Greeks and do not think Greek”, and that teachers had “questionable national and social sentiments”. Although his views were not in accord with those held by the majority of Greek Cypriots, their impact on society was not negligible given the Church’s traditional role in Greek-Cypriot education. This was especially the case after 1967 as a result of the effect that the Greek Colonels’ nationalistic political discourse had on Greek-Cypriot society. In fact, the metropolitan’s indirect criticisms of President Makarios echoed those emanating from Athens. The junta considered Makarios’s tolerance of the Left unacceptable.

It is an indisputable historical fact that the Church and Education have always been the guardians of Greco-Christian traditions; the very beacons of these traditions and the strongest elements thereof, which have, over centuries of brutal slavery, upheld the national sentiment of the Greek people. I am unaware and can certainly not claim that education in Cyprus has ceased to play the role it once did. What I do know, however, is that both in primary and secondary education there are teachers of questionable national and social sentiments, whose efforts are focused on creating a Cypriot consciousness and drawing the Cypriot youth away from the wonderful Greco-Christian traditions.

I must at this point congratulate the Minister for Education, who despite being under fire from all directions, is determined to fight for the Greek character of Cypriot education. I must also underline, in this regard, the remarkable national education that Greek officers offer to the enlisted youth of Cyprus.

*Φιλελεύθερος* [Phileleftheros] newspaper, 25 February 1970.



Sources IV-23 and IV-24 refer to the Helleno-Christian civilisation and Greco-Christian traditions. What kind of ideology do you think that education in Greece and Cyprus sought to instil in children at the time? Find the words expressing this ideology to build your arguments.

#### IV-25. Façade of the Tirana State University with a gigantic photo of the communist leader Enver Hoxha (1908-1985)



Photographer Roland Tasho.



The photograph was taken in October 1988, on the occasion of the 80th anniversary of the birth of the Albanian communist leader.

#### IV-26. Family and sex education in Bulgaria

Sex and family-marital education is increasingly recognised as an integral part of the all-round education of the socialist personality. As such, sex and family-marital education, which is a separate aspect of the educational process, is most directly and immediately relevant to all other areas of education: intellectual, moral, physical, aesthetic, ideological-political, etc.

Sex and marital education should not be understood narrowly and unsophisticatedly. In fact, sex and marital education encompasses a particularly wide range of topics, which can be organised in several groups:

1. Sexual enlightenment – providing the necessary information and knowledge about the biological, psychological, social, and health-hygiene aspects of sex and family life.

2. Sex education (in the narrow sense of the word) – the pedagogical activity through which purposeful and

systematic influence is exerted on the personality of young people, on their consciousness and behaviour, in order to form correct views on sex and family life according to the norms of communist morality.

This entire complex and extensive educational and instructive activity must be conducted from early childhood to the full maturity of the personality, starting from the premises of contemporary science and categorically rejecting all anachronisms of the past.

Today, now that our educational system is being fundamentally restructured, sex and family-marital education must find its legitimate place in the overall educational-instructive process. The relevant programmes are being elaborated to this end. Of course, as regards schools, here the most important issue is that in addition to good programmes, we must also have a well-trained staff of teachers and educators capable of working authoritatively and competently.

On the other hand, school is not the only factor in the conduct of systematic, purposeful, timely and scientifically-grounded sex and family-marital education. Sex and family-marital education must be the work of our society as a whole – the family, health authorities, social organisations, media and cultural institutions.

Bostandzhiev, 1979, pp. 24-26.



The 1960s and 1970s saw a peculiar “revolution” in the behaviour of young people in the socialist bloc, which had to do with the constantly expanding – even if strictly controlled by the regime – space of contact and interaction with Western popular culture and the “sexual revolution”, which in turn cultivated particular musical tastes (above all, preferences for various kinds of rock music), promiscuous practices and ideologies of liberation of the body (such as nudism). The leading example in this regard was that of East Germany – the East German nudist movement, which was tolerated by the authorities, and Siegfried Schnabl’s bestseller *Mann und Frau intim* (Man and Woman, Intimately) made waves throughout the socialist bloc, including Bulgaria. In an attempt to control these new attitudes and new ideas about gender and sex, Bulgarian communist elites developed scientific and educational policies aimed at state and public regulation of young people’s interest in the intimate sphere. More and more articles on moral and sex education began to appear in the socialist press. As early as 1963, Professor Todor Bostandzhiev opened the first ever sexology consultation office in Bulgaria and launched a number of initiatives on sex

→

education. In addition to writing articles for women's and youth magazines and popular-science readings on sex issues, he worked actively for the introduction of sex education into the school curriculum. Other doctors and scientists also strove to liberalise the discourse on sex. It was hardly accidental that in his preface to the first Bulgarian-language edition of *Man and Woman, Intimately*, Professor Hristo Golemanov, Director of the Institute for Health Education, quoted the following speech by Todor Zhivkov: "Issues of sex culture and the sex education of the youth continue to be almost incriminated in the public eye. Ignorance in this regard often exposes the physical and moral health of young people to unnecessary risk. Obviously, there is a need to create a comprehensive system for the sex and family-marital education of the youth."



**1.** Comment on the source IV-26 and key. Why do you think it was so important for socialist societies to form certain attitudes towards sex life and intimacy? Also take into consideration the absence of religious education at the time.

**2.** Compare these initiatives to present day educational practices on the subject in your country.

## IV-27. Constitution of the Republic of Turkey, 7 November 1982



Although the 1982 constitution in principle decreed Kemalism as the official and only ideology and declared its faith to secularism, it also assigned a national mission to religion. According to Article 24, the state was solely responsible for religious education.

### ARTICLE 24

Education and instruction in religion and ethics shall be conducted under State supervision and control. Instruction in religious culture and moral education shall be compulsory in the curricula of primary and secondary schools. Other religious education and instruction shall be subjected to the individual's own desire, and in the case of minors, to the request of their legal representatives.

### ARTICLE 42

Training and education shall be conducted along the lines of the principles and reforms of Ataturk, on the basis of contemporary science and education methods, under the supervision and control of the State. Institutions of training and education contravening these provisions shall not be established. [...] No language other than Turkish shall be taught as mother tongue to Turkish citizens at any institutions of training or education. Foreign languages to be taught in institutions of training and education and the rules to be followed by schools conducting training and education in a foreign language shall be determined by law. The provisions of international treaties are reserved.

<http://www.refworld.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/rwmain?docid=3ae6b5be0>, accessed on 26.11.2015.



Discuss the phrase: "No language other than Turkish shall be taught as mother tongue to Turkish citizens at any institutions of training or education".



### TASKS ON CHAPTER IV.4

The term socialisation refers to the lifelong process during which we acquire skills and habits necessary to participate in our own society. We also learn about social expectation – norms, customs, values and ideologies. There are different agents of childhood socialisation. In addition to the family, the school is among the most important agents. That is why educational issues are regularly treated not only as pedagogical but also as political issues. Analyse sources in this section and the following one (IV.5 Language policy) and find out about some socialisation practices through the process of education. Pay special attention to social, cultural and political socialisation, and identity policies and attempts to create a "new socialist man". Select sources accordingly (note that you will not find all the sources useful in addressing this particular question).




Complete the following table:

Country	Source title	Year	Examples of socialisation practices

► IV.5. LANGUAGE POLICY

IV-28. Codification of the Macedonian language

A. Decision of ASNOM on the Macedonian alphabet



[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Macedonian\\_alphabet](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Macedonian_alphabet), accessed on 26.09.2016.

B. Resolution enacted by ASNOM declaring Macedonian as the official language, 1944

RESOLUTION Of the Anti-fascist Assembly of the People's Liberation of Macedonia declaring the Macedonian Language as the Official Language of the Macedonian State.

Article 1. The vernacular Macedonian language shall hereby be the official language of the Macedonian state.

Article 2. This Resolution shall take effect immediately. In the Monastery of the Holy Father Prochorus of Pcinja, on this second day of August, the Day of St. Elijah, 1944.

Miscellany of Documents of the Antifascist Assembly of the People's Liberation of Macedonia (ASNOM), 1964, p. 241.



At the First Session of the Anti-fascist Assembly of the People's Liberation Front of Macedonia (ASNOM), held in Pčinja on 2 August 1944, the Macedonian vernacular was declared the official language of the Macedonian state and the foundations of today's standard Macedonian were laid. The process of the codification of the language as the official language continued with the formal adoption of the Macedonian alphabet and the legislative regulation of the Macedonian orthography. A Language and Orthography Commission, established in November 1944 by the ASNOM Presidium, was tasked to work on the alphabet and the orthography. In May 1945, the People's Government of the Republic of Macedonia adopted a decision establishing the Macedonian alphabet, which was consequently published in the first issue of the first Macedonian daily newspaper *Nova Makedonija* on 5 May 1945. On 7 June 1945, the Ministry of the People's Education adopted the proposed orthography. The codification reflected the Macedonian vernacular. By a decision of the Ministry of the People's Education on 24 January 1946, the *Grammar of the Macedonian Language*, written by the linguist Krume Kepeski, was introduced as a high school textbook.

#### IV-29. The Novi Sad Agreement (1954)



In the multi-national Yugoslav federation, the language question often became a very important political issue. After Croatian and Serbian linguists agreed with the Novi Sad Agreement of 1954 that Croats, Serbs and Montenegrins spoke the same language, which is called Serbo-Croatian (Croato-Serbian), Croatian linguists rallied around the *Matica hrvatska* (Matrix Croatica cultural association) and in 1967 published a Declaration on the name and position of the Croatian standard language. Pointing out the specificity of Croatian in relation to the Serbian language constituted one in a series of demands for changes in Croatia's position within Yugoslavia.

#### CONCLUSIONS

1. Serbs, Croats and Montenegrins speak one language in a standard form that developed around

two main urban centres, Belgrade and Zagreb, with two dialects: the *yekavian* and the *ekavian*.

2. In official usage of the name of the language, it is obligatory to indicate both its constituent parts.

3. Both scripts, the Latin and the Cyrillic, have equal status. Consequently, we must ensure that both Serbs and Croats are taught both scripts in schools.

4. Both dialects are also equal in all aspects.

[...]

7. The common language must also have a common spelling. Orthography is now the most important cultural and social requirement. Under mutual consent, an orthographic manual will be drawn up by a commission of Serbian and Croatian experts.

9. A commission for orthography and terminology will be appointed by our three universities (in Belgrade, Zagreb and Sarajevo), two academies (in Zagreb and Belgrade) and the Serbian Cultural Society in Novi Sad and the Croatian Cultural Society in Zagreb. For the terminology, it is necessary to establish cooperation with the federal administrations for legislature and standardisation, as well as with professional institutions and societies.

In Novi Sad, 10 December 1954

*Pravopis hrvatskosrpskoga književnog jezika s pravopisnim rječnikom*, [Orthography of the Croato-Serbian Standard Language with an Orthographic Dictionary], 1960, pp. 9- 10.

#### IV-30. Declaration on the name and status of the Croatian standard language (1967)

The undersigned Croatian cultural and scientific institutions and organisations believe it is necessary that:

1. The equality of the four standard languages – Slovenian, Croatian, Serbian and Macedonian – should be clearly and indisputably established by a constitutional regulation. For this purpose, the wording of Article 131 of the constitution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia should read as follows: "Federal laws and other enactments of federal organs shall be published in the authentic text in the four standard languages of the Yugoslav peoples: Serbian, Croatian, Slovenian and Macedonian". [...] The vagueness contained in the wording of the existing constitutional provision about the "Serbo-Croatian or Croato-Serbian language", in practice, results in viewing the two parallel names as synonyms, not as a base for the equality of the Croatian and Serbian standard languages, mutually equal and in relation to the languages of other Yugoslav peoples. This ambiguity allows for the Serbian language to be

imposed in practice as one language both for Serbs and Croats. [...] The undersigned institutions and organisations believe that these circumstances are an indication that the Croatian people are not represented and hold an unequal position. This practice cannot be justified by the undisputed scientific fact that the Croatian and Serbian standard languages have a common linguistic foundation.

2. In keeping with the above demands and explanations, it is necessary to ensure consistent implementation of the Croatian standard language in schools, the Press, and in the public sphere (politics, radio and television).

*Telegram, 17.3.1967.*



Which were the main demands of the Declaration on the name and status of the Croatian standard language (1967)? How do they differ from the Novi Sad Agreement? How is language connected to national identity? Is it possible to have different nations speaking the same language? Do you know of any such examples? Discuss other important constituent parts of any given nation.

#### IV-31. Resolution of the Language Congress on the Albanian standard language (Tirana 1972)

[...]

III. While appreciating the unified literary language as one of the greatest achievements of our socialist society in the field of culture, as the crowning of ceaseless efforts of many generations, which even in the darkest of times dreamt about this day and worked selflessly to realise it, the Congress appeals to the all Albanians to use the unified literary language as a powerful tool of social progress and to [work] for its unceasing development and flourishing.

1. More specifically, the Congress appeals to:

a) The Albanian school, the main centre that educates the youth to love their mother tongue, to espouse the unified norms of the literary language and orthography adopted by the Congress and to fully apply the new rules of orthography as of the school year 1973-74.

b) Institutions that produce textbooks, to prepare and publish auxiliary texts and other tools necessary

for the appropriation and practical mastery of the norms of literary language and its orthography.

c) Albanian writers, who play an important and direct role in the crystallisation and inculcation of the national literary norm, to work unceasingly towards the implementation and dissemination of the unified orthographical norm.

d) Publishing houses, to faithfully comply with the rules of orthography and actively help in the dissemination of the literary norms and in the growth of the people's linguistic culture.

e) State-owned entities, social organisations, institutions of science and culture, to take measures for the implementation of orthography rules in the written language.

f) Radio and Television, Theatre and Cinematography, to aim at the implementation of grammar and pronunciation rules and to help in the dissemination of the norms of the spoken literary language.

g) Educational and scientific institutions dealing with the study of the Albanian language, to pay continuous attention to orthography problems and to undertake further studies in this field.

2. Taking into account changes experienced by the literary language during its development and new issues exposed by linguistic practice, the Congress recommends that in the future, and as necessary, grammar rules are subjected to appropriate improvements and modifications.

The Congress expresses its strong belief that this appeal will be supported with enthusiasm and will inspire teachers, writers, employees of science and culture, the entire intelligentsia and all working people, which with their creative activities enrich and advance our literary language.

[www.shqiptarja.com](http://www.shqiptarja.com), accessed on 21.10.2015.

#### IV-32. Minister of National Education Georgios Rallis on the introduction of the *demotiki* (the vernacular language) in primary and secondary education (Greek Parliament, 7 April 1976)



The so-called "language issue" troubled Greece approximately from the end of the 19th century. It was a dispute between the supporters of the vernacular language (the *demotic*) and the supporters of the *katharevousa*, an artificial "pure" language that imitated ancient Greek. Choosing the official language of the state and

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of education was a political, social and ideological issue as it was directly related to how Greek national identity was defined. From the early 20th century onwards a series of unsuccessful educational reforms were launched. In the post-war period, the most important one was implemented by the centrist government of Georgios Papandreou in 1964. However, it was abolished by the colonels' dictatorship, and only in 1976 was *demotic* Greek established as the official language in primary, secondary and higher education.

The Bill seeks to impose a language. Today none exists. You only have to look at a document written by a public functionary under the age of thirty-five or by an individual who has just finished high school. The situation is appalling, both in terms of spelling errors as well as regards syntax. This is due to the fact in primary education we were taught demotic Greek and in secondary education the *katharevousa* – and still know neither. Even we, who finished high school when the *katharevousa* reigned, cannot speak it. And since not even we can speak it, imagine what

children are going through and how important that is for the way they think. Is it possible for someone to think logically when one cannot express himself? Thus, with the introduction of demotic Greek we are seeking, without extremities and idioms, to impose a uniform language.

*Πρακτικά της Βουλής* [Parliamentary Proceedings], 1976, vol. 7, pp. 4118-4119.



The issue of language is very important for cultivating national consciousness. “Language Wars” have marked a whole century of social unrest on the issue (as in the case of Greece) or have provoked ethnic clashes. Why do you think language is so important for the self definition of a citizen? Revisit theories on the national self and on consciousness based on criteria such as language, religion and tradition (German approach / Romanticism) or free will and choice, sharing the same attitude and feeling (French approach / Enlightenment). Then discuss the subject of language politics taking into consideration your country.

## ► IV.6. ART

### **IV-33. Decree of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Bulgaria on “a further upsurge in the development of Bulgarian architecture and artistic synthesis of the arts in the construction of the architectural-artistic appearance of cities and the life environment” (28 June 1977)**

The Politburo hereby DECREES: 1. Bulgarian socialist architecture should continue to actively participate in the creation of a complex living environment that will satisfy the growing material and spiritual needs of the mature socialist society, and in the formation of an all-round, harmoniously developed socialist personality. [...] At the same time, architecture must embody the rich spirit of our people, the Bulgarians’ centuries-old love of beauty. It must serve, to the greatest possible extent, the aesthetic education of the people and youth. The main traits of our architecture should be its profoundly popular character reflecting the Party’s care for the people, their happiness and well-being; prudence in the use of the people’s funds and the country’s resources; orientation at the most

progressive industrialised methods for an accelerated realisation of construction works based on typification and unification; and beauty and perfection of the architectural appearance of buildings and complexes. Our architecture should be distinguishable for its conceptual-aesthetic maturity and stylistic purity of architectural concepts. It should correctly reflect the social processes and phenomena in the functional structure of buildings and complexes. On the basis of the attained high creative achievements and the created complex conditions and possibilities for a new flowering, as an immediate historic task our architecture is assigned with creating socialist architectural classics.

State Archives, f. 1B, inv. 55, a.u. 494.

## IV-34. Culture of commemorating the Second World War in Yugoslavia

### A. Monument of WWII by Želimir Janež in Novi Vinodolski, 1951– Social realism



To the fallen fighters in the war of liberation, 1941-1945 (photographer: Michal Klajban).

[https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Novi\\_vinodolski\\_\(center\),\\_Croatia\\_\(1\).JPG](https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Novi_vinodolski_(center),_Croatia_(1).JPG), accessed on 29.08.2016.



Želimir Janež (1916-1996) created abstract art under the influence of Constantin Brâncuși, but at the same time also monuments in social-realistic style, following official orders.

### B. Monument to partisans by Vojin Bakić on Petrova Gora (Croatia) – Abstract art



Srpsko narodno vijeće [Serbian National Council] Archives (no number).




These two monuments – both commemorating the National Liberation Struggle – document the change towards art in the memorial culture of the communist period. The first one (1951) is typical of the post-war period – its form is figurative and hyperrealistic. Monuments like this were often commissioned by local communities. They



were supposed to commemorate local heroes and victims of the war and reflected the artistic taste of these communities. The second one belongs to the huge abstract state-sponsored monuments that were characteristic from the 1960s onwards. They were commissioned by the State from famous artists and sculptors (in this case Vojin Bakić, a leading Croatian sculptor of Serbian origin). Although Tito publicly expressed his dislike of abstract art, such monuments were nevertheless sponsored by the State all over Yugoslavia.

## IV-35. Abstract art

### A. “Meander” by Julije Knifer



Private collection of Marinko Sudac.



Julije Knifer (Zagreb, 1924 - Paris, 2004) is one of the most outstanding Croatian artists of the 20th century, a representative of the “New Tendencies” movement from the early 1960s. His art excludes both figurative and abstract, concentrating on the creation rather than on the object. He became best known for his meanders created in different techniques (paintings, drawings, graphics, murals, collage). The Museum of Contemporary Art in Zagreb was created in the form of a meander. His meanders are exhibited in many museums and galleries in Europe, especially Germany and France.

## B. Extracts from the manifesto of the Exat-51 Group (Zagreb 1951)

GROUP EXAT-51 [...] believes that the [...] so-called abstract art is not an expression of decadent aspirations. On the contrary, it sees it as a possibility to study methods and principles in order to develop and enrich the field of visual communication. [...] In connection with our understanding of reality as striving for progress in all aspects of human activity, the group finds it necessary to fight against outdated views and productions in the sphere of visual art. As its main task, it sees the orientation towards synthesis of all visual arts, as first, and second, in giving work experimental character – since there can be no progress of creative approach in the sphere of visual art without experimentation – it considers its foundation and activities a practical positive result of developing conflicts of opinion, which is a necessary prerequisite for stimulating art.

B. Bernardi, architect; Z. Bregovac, architect; I. Picelj, painter; Z. Radić, architect; B. Rašica, architect; V. Richter, architect; A. Srnec, painter; V. Zaharović, architect.

Denegri, 2000, p. 69.



After abandoning the practice of shaping society according to the Soviet model (1948), Yugoslavia began to implement political, economic and social changes. In culture, the main change was to reject socialist realism as the prescribed form of action. Artists were given much more freedom of creativity and expression than in other communist countries. This change resulted in obtaining internationally recognised artistic achievements in architecture, the fine arts, sculpture, film animation, etc.

## IV-36. The New Wave in music



New Wave is a music genre of popular culture that developed in Yugoslavia under the influence of punk and new wave, which were already popular in Great Britain and the United States in the late 1970s. The Yugoslav New Wave was not a mere copy of the Western model, but as a generational phenomenon it managed to create a unique musical expression. The most influential bands were *Prljavo kazalište*, *Haustor*, *Azra*, *Film*, *Pankrti*, *Lačni Franc*, *Lajbah*, *Pekinska patka*, *Šarlo akrobata*, *Električni orgazam*, *Idoli*, *Luna*, *La Strada*, *Paraf*, *Laki pingvini* and *Boa*. Before their own albums appeared, *Šarlo Akrobata*, *Električni*



*orgazam* and *Idoli* recorded a joint album called "Paket aranžman". In February 1982, the cult band *Katarina II* (later *Ekaterina Velika*) was formed. The alternative the New Wave offered is seen in simple musical form, in visual presentation (album covers and posters) and lyrics, which were often critical of the established order. Although critical, the Yugoslav New Wave did not face major problems with communist institutions. It was supported by the magazines *Polet* from Zagreb and *Džuboks* from Belgrade, as well as the TV music show *Rokenroler*. In the mid-1980s, the New Wave abated, but the period is considered as the "golden age" of pop and rock music in the countries that emerged after the disintegration of Yugoslavia. The importance of the Yugoslav New Wave was also acknowledged in Western media (*Melody Maker*, *NME*, *Koekrand*), which praised its quality and originality.

### Poland in my heart

Gdansk 1980 / When autumn said / no /  
Gdansk 1980 / We kept our fingers crossed / miners /  
students /shipyard/ all of us  
Gdansk 1980 /Turbulent factories / You don't send  
twice /tanks against workers  
They did not dare / We won /All of us  
Poland / in my heart /in my heart /mazurka  
Poland has never /never given a Quisling /Every day /  
polonaise /ringing at my door /Polish amber /bracelets  
/Volodia's watches /slide rule at half price /Pope Wojtyła  
/and me /Gdansk 1980 /Queues for newspapers /  
independent trade unions /protection committees  
Gdansk 1980 /Turbulent factories /You don't send  
twice /Tanks against workers / Tanks against workers /  
Tanks against us

Azra, Album *Sunčana strana ulice* [Sunny Side of the Street], 1981.



The song (released in 1981) refers to the strike in the shipyard in Gdansk, organised by the first Polish independent trade union *Solidarność* (Solidarity), as well as to the events in 1970 when a similar strike was put down by the Polish People's Army and the Citizen's Militia, with at least 42 people killed and more than 1,000 wounded. At the time when the song was written many Polish citizens were traveling to Yugoslavia and selling door-to-door amber, linen and other goods ("Volodia's watches" stands for cheap Soviet watches). Pope John Paul II (Karol Józef Wojtyła), elected in 1978, was a symbol of resistance to communism.

### IV-37. Alternative Youth Day poster, Slovenia, 1987



Authors: Roman Uranjek, A.D. Knez, Darko Pokorn and Miran Mohar, Neue Slowenische Kunst.

 Youth Day was a holiday dedicated to the youth of Yugoslavia and it “coincided” with the celebration of Josip Broz Tito’s birthday on 25 May. On this day, various sporting events and ceremonies were held in schools; however, the most prominent event was *Štafetamladosti* or *Titovaštafeta* (Youth Relay or Tito’s Relay). A baton was carried throughout all Yugoslav republics by young men and women with the last stop in Belgrade, where the last carrier gave the baton to Tito and congratulated him for his birthday. In the mid-1980s, with the emergence of social movements and demands for democratisation, the idea of banning the Youth Relay began to appear. Even the Association of Socialist Youth of Slovenia supported it. As a sign of protest, a manifestation called the Absurd Relay was organised, in which a log was brought in the middle of Ljubljana and then shaped into a baton by a chainsaw. The poster for the 1987 Youth Day was made by studio *Novi kolektivizem* (New

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Collective), which was part of the *Neue Slowenische Kunst* team. New Collective symbolically reconstructed a Nazi poster by adding symbols of communism. The poster triggered the so-called “Poster Affair”. Under pressure from the Communist Party leadership, the Association of Socialist Youth of Slovenia finally changed the poster. The last Youth Relay was held in 1987, while the last Youth Day ceremony was held a year later.

### IV-38. Jazz festival in Bled, 1960



*Slovenska kronika 20. stoletja* [Slovene Chronicle of 20th Century 1941-1995], Nova revija, Ljubljana 1997, p. 263.

 In contrast to other Western (capitalist) influences, which were frowned upon by the socialist government, jazz was never prohibited in Yugoslavia. Credit for this goes to composer and the head of the Dance Orchestra of Slovenian RTV (Radio and Television), Bojan Adamič, who had established partisan cultural groups during the war and had written many partisan marches in jazz style. The idea of holding a Yugoslav jazz festival emerged at a music festival in Opatija (Croatia) in 1959. It was realised the following year at the Slovene tourist town of Bled. In 1967 the festival moved to Ljubljana, thus becoming an international festival hosting the biggest representatives of jazz music in the world, such as Tony Scott and John Lewis.

## **CHAPTER V: THE ECONOMY**

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## ► INTRODUCTION

After the end of the Second World War, the Balkan countries faced grave economic problems, the urgent resolution of which became closely bound to powerful political ideologies and geostrategic interests. The devastating consequences of the war were multiple and varied: a depleted manufacturing industry, a heavily damaged infrastructure, severe food and raw material shortages, soaring rates of inflation, a dwindling agricultural output, the booming of black market practices – to name but a few. At the same time, the beginning of the new ideological war, the Cold War, divided Europe along both political and economic lines. In June 1947 the USA proposed the Marshall Plan (named after the incumbent Secretary of State George Marshall) for Europe, which provided US\$13 billion in aid of European recovery over a four-year period (beginning in 1948). The Soviet Union and its satellites were invited to participate, but Stalin perceived the Plan as a threat to Soviet influence, and declined. Albania, Bulgaria, Romania and Yugoslavia (together with Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Finland) followed suit. Thus, these countries lost the opportunity to benefit from US aid, which in Western Europe and Greece led to a much faster economic recovery, the normalisation of economic life and the improvement of living standards within about a decade. The political antagonism of capitalism versus communism/socialism was directly extended to the economic sphere. Apart from Greece and Turkey, Yugoslavia was the only Balkan country with a communist regime that received aid under the Marshall Plan following its split with the Soviet Union.

After an immensely destructive Occupation (1941-1944) and Civil War (1946-1949) Greece made a dramatic recovery. In the late '40s and early '50s, US aid contributed to the preservation of the viability of the Greek economy. The curtailment of the American aid forced Greece to stand on its own feet. The national currency, the drachma, was stabilised, the soaring inflation rates of the 1940s were put under control, important reforms in finance and banking were implemented, control over the government's finances was restored, and the country joined NATO in 1952. With the 1953 devaluation and the associated liberalisation of the economy, the economy took off and growth rates remained extremely high for the next 20 years. High growth rates were combined with

low inflation, nearly balanced government budgets and manageable external deficits. During this period Greece had undertaken major infrastructure projects, attracted large-scale foreign investment, succeeded in developing key industrial sectors, extended its electricity supply capacity at an impressive pace and improved dramatically its transport and communications infrastructure. The result was a substantial increase in national income per capita. Finally, in 1961 the country became an associate member of the European Economic Community (EEC) – one of the key organisations of the capitalist economy, along with the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (the successor to the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation, originally established in 1948 to administer Marshall Plan aid to Europe) and the European Free Trade Association. In addition to these economic successes, during the period of the Colonels' dictatorship tourism and agriculture were considerably developed through both US support and state intervention.

Although Turkey accepted the Marshall Plan somewhat later than Greece, it was following the same model of economic development when it also joined NATO in 1952. The state encouraged the expansion of private capital into industry and sought to cope with the country's longstanding agrarian problem. It also facilitated the privatisation process, which lasted thirty years in all. However, genuine economic reforms and rapid growth came only from the 1980s onwards. In Turkey, too, state priorities were implemented and external financial aid were utilised – both by the military dictatorship of General Kenan Evren in 1980-83 and by successive governments following the restoration of parliamentary democracy. There was a tendency towards industrial growth, the backing of intensive trade, the sound organisation of the tourist industry, and other positive developments. The parliamentary elections in 1983 and 1987 were won by the Motherland Party (ANAP) of Turgut Özal, who also carried out policies of rapid privatisation and financial stabilisation. By the 1980s, Greece and Turkey had significantly modernised their economies in comparison with the 1940s and 1950s, and had succeeded in taking advantage of the positive aspects of the Western model in its welfare state variant.

The market economy had its opposite rival in the planned economy, where the exchange of commodities was based on the centrally planned and controlled production of state-owned enterprises. In the same manner, the Marshall Plan, NATO and the European international economic organisations related to them had an alternative in the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) and the Warsaw Pact. In 1949, the Soviet Union created the COMECON as a body coordinating the economies and state economic plans of Eastern Bloc countries. In 1950, it comprised the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, Romania, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, the German Democratic Republic (GDR) and Albania. Later, Albania left, Yugoslavia gained observer status, and some developing countries such as Mongolia, Cuba and Vietnam joined COMECON. Initially, the most important principle of COMECON was the almost free-of-charge sharing of scientific achievements and technologies among member countries. As a whole, economic integration (aimed at the squaring of “differences in relative scarcities of goods and services between states through the deliberate elimination of barriers to trade and other forms of interaction”) gradually became the main principle of COMECON’s activities. *Perestroika* and the conclusion of a cooperation agreement with the EEC in 1988 practically brought about the beginning of the end of COMECON.

While the economic development of the West-oriented Balkan countries followed the model of “financial aid from the USA, state support for particular industries, and encouragement of private enterprise”, the socialist model was based on the radical transformation of economic structures through collectivisation, nationalisation and forced industrialisation. In practice, the model that was established in the countries of the Eastern Bloc was characterised by absolute state ownership and control of heavy industry and other key branches of the economy, by self-sufficiency of the economic system within the framework of COMECON and by the planned regulation of all economic processes (with different levels in the collectivisation of agriculture and some allowance for private enterprise in the different countries).

The abolition of private property, the nationalisation of the means of production, and the establishment of a new, “just” distribution of goods were imperatives that would both drive and obstruct the economic development of the Balkan socialist countries. Collectivisation, especially in Bulgaria and Romania, radically and irreversibly transformed the world of the

traditional village. It was completed or, rather, it was proclaimed completed between the late 1950s and the mid-1960s. Land collectivisation rapidly changed the mostly agrarian economies of these countries, against the background of the more gradual transformation of Greece and Turkey. The organisation of land and labour into large-scale cooperative farms and the introduction of modern machinery increased agricultural production. This process had an immediate social effect in that it released surplus labour and led to large-scale urbanisation. One social psychological consequence of land collectivisation was the alienation of peasants from their traditional livelihoods and their accustomisation to urban life. Collectivisation and changes in the agricultural economy also eroded the traditional rural way of life. Urbanisation had another effect, the so-called “rurbanisation” of cities in communist societies; the persistence, that is, of rural customs determining the everyday behaviour and relationships of the new urbanites. Electrification, the new road infrastructure and the constant influence of the media were the shortest paths to this version of modernisation. It included also an overall improvement of the way and quality of life by the introduction of universal free health care, and the provision of greater opportunities for personal development and improvement through mass education and vocational training. In the long term, however, this process led to the depopulation of the countryside and, nowadays, to the tendency towards the disappearance of villages as social, economic and cultural units.

The nationalisation of industrial enterprises and banks was another aspect of the socialist revolution in the field of the economy. The ideological imperative of accelerated industrialisation was also an important driving factor in the development of the economies of the communist countries; one that required turning heavy industry into the leading branch of the economy as a way of ensuring economic independence. Ore-mining, metallurgy, energy power and chemical industries were not only important symbolic expressions of communist progress but also immediate priorities in the development of the economy. To the classical tenets of Marxism was added the Stalinist idea that the centralised economic system had to become self-sufficient to meet its own needs and those of society; a theory that was questionable even for a large country rich in natural resources such as the Soviet Union. Given the categorical priority of heavy industry (including of military technologies) and in the absence of real market competition, the economy had to periodically

compensate for the shortage of some consumer goods and foodstuff, as well as for their not always high quality. Defined by the Hungarian economist János Kornai as an “economy of shortage”, the shortcomings of this system became particularly conspicuous against the background of Western prosperity and consumption in the 1980s. Despite the rhetoric of “defending the conquests of socialism”, the faith of both the population and the ruling elites in the advantages of this economic model was strongly shaken at the time.

Some classical Marxist tenets about the economy had begun to lose their power already in the late 1950s, as evidenced by the abandonment of collectivisation in Yugoslavia and Poland, as well as by the allowance for private enterprise within certain limits in Hungary. As a whole, from the 1960s onwards there were some attempts at economic reforms involving the introduction of a contractual system in relations between enterprises and of cost accounting and self-financing at the enterprise level, while reducing state subsidies and providing a degree of self-management. These reforms, however, did not affect the very essence of the system. The attempts in the late 1980s to establish hybrid forms between market economy and command economy also failed; after 1989 they were even seen as one of the reasons for the collapse of the socialist regimes.

The only socialist country that succeeded in developing a hybrid economic system in the Balkans was Yugoslavia. After Tito’s split with Stalin, collectivisation (which had only just begun) was “postponed” and a specific system of ownership divided between the “public” and the “private” sectors of family farms was established. At the same time, private initiative was also possible in crafts and trade, and private firms were finally allowed a limited number of employees. Likewise, from the 1950s and 1960s onwards, a balance

was sought and maintained between the political and economic models of the East and the West. Within the framework of the Non-Aligned Movement, in the 1970s and 1980s campaigns were launched to restructure trade and other relations between the developed and the developing countries through the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, adopted by the UN in 1974. The “Third Way” of Yugoslav socialism was also characterised by self-management, as proclaimed and imposed by Tito. However, Yugoslavia, as well as the other countries of Eastern Europe, fell into a debt spiral that also played a role in deepening the “crisis of the system”.

The recognition of the environmental consequences of industrialisation in Iron Curtain countries became public precisely in the 1980s and, in a way, was also symptomatic of this crisis. For example, the Bulgarian city of Ruse on the Danube was exposed for years to chlorine gas emissions from a chemical plant across the river in Giurgiu, Romania. Its residents, and especially children, began to suffer from serious respiratory diseases, and this caused a series of protests that led to the creation of one of the first dissident organisations in Bulgaria. Of course, utmost alarm was caused in Europe by the “accident” at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant in the Soviet Union on 26 April 1986, which was made all the worse by the initial total news blackout in the countries of the Eastern Bloc.

Ultimately, despite the real successes achieved in overall economic modernisation, the specific development of the economies of the Balkan socialist countries – and in the case of Bulgaria and Romania, also their strong dependence on the common economic space of the Soviet Bloc – made them more vulnerable of the successive sweeping radical changes of the post-1989 era.

## ► V.1. AGRARIAN REFORMS

### V-1. Woman on a tractor somewhere in the region of Craiova, Romania, 1952



*La S.M.T. Băilești, regiunea Craiova, o femeie pe un tractor trăgând discurtoare (1952) [Woman on a tractor, in Băilești, in the region of Craiova], Foto: #W079, Fototeca online a comunismului românesc [Online photo library of Romanian Communism], accessed on 13.02.2016. Cota [Index number]: 6/1952, Sursa [Source]: Muzeul de Istorie a P.M.R. [The History Museum of the Popular Republic of Romania]*



**1.** How would you describe this photograph? Spontaneous, accidental, posed, documentary, staged? Give reasons for your answer.

**2.** Use your knowledge to explain why such a photograph was taken.

**3.** Compare with the Bulgarian propaganda poster (doc. IV-1) in chapter IV and discuss any similarities and/or differences between the two.

## V-2. Summary of a Securitate report on the general state of mind of the inhabitants of different regions of the country, following the application of new quotas concerning the mandatory contribution of agricultural produce, circa 1951

### REGION OF ARAD

Twelve mid-level peasants from the commune of Sînicolaul Mic are unhappy with the fact that after delivering the required quotas they returned home from the sorting area with not a grain of wheat. Among mid-level peasants from the communes of Fântânele, Vladimirescu, Horia and Mâsca there is a general feeling of dissatisfaction because their grain produce was not accepted at the sorting area on the grounds that it contained many non-grain impurities.

### REGION OF ARGÈȘ

In the commune of Spineni, due the absence of grain storehouses, wheat was stored in the school premises of the Vineți and Spineni communes. As adequate means of transport did not exist, these improvised storehouses were overfilled with grain, as a result of which one wall of the Spineni school had to be knocked down.

### REGION OF BAIA MARE

The members of the Collective Agricultural Households of the communes of Mădăraș, Rătești, Atea, Medieșul Aurit, Micula, Halmei, Ardud and Dara are dissatisfied because following the delivery of grain quotas they are left with only one kilo of wheat per labour day.

Berindei et al, 2009, vol. I, pp. 354-357.

## V-3. Extracts from a Ministerial Council Decision on the model status of the Collective Agricultural Household, Bucharest, June 1953

The Collective Agricultural Household is a great socialist household where the working peasants come willingly and share their land plots and their main means of production.

The grounds of this [association] are the idea of common [people's] property of all means of production, the idea of collective labour and the idea of common property of the whole production [resulting from these households].

In the Collective Agricultural Household, the work is carried out according to a plan and with the use of mechanised means and advanced methods of farming science on a large scale.

In the Collective Agricultural Household, the personal interests of the peasants and the common interests of the collective are tightly interconnected.

Following the way of collective agricultural households, the way of socialism, the only just way of the working peasantry, having as a guide the experience of the *kolkhoz* peasantry of the Soviet Union and the experience of the collectivist peasantry of our own country, the working peasantry builds a new, prosperous and happy life [...].

By means of common organised labour and common means of production:

- We can build a Collective Agricultural Household;
- We can guarantee absolute victory over the *chiaburi* [wealthy peasants] and all exploiters and enemies;
- We can completely defeat obscurantism, as well as the traditional small individual household.

The merged surface of the collective household cannot be by any means diminished, but only increased. [...]

Neither the *chiaburi* and exploiters nor those who have lost their civic rights can be accepted to the collective household.

Any misuse of collective or state assets, any sabotage against collectivised property and MTS [Machines and Tractors Stations] equipment is regarded as a betrayal of common interests and as aiding the people's enemies. Those guilty of undermining the Collective Agricultural Households will put on trial and sentenced in accordance with the law.

Roske et al, 2007, pp. 341-350.



The MTS were essentially agricultural machinery depots functioning as state enterprises. In reality, most of the peasants did not join the Collective Agricultural Households willingly, as the benefits for each individual worker were small. In spite of the propaganda, there were neither enough mechanised means and specialists nor visible advantages of being associated with such organisation, which were in fact used as a means of consolidating the power of communist officials in the countryside.



1. Use your knowledge and information from the sources and explain what Collective Agricultural Households were. Describe the ideal Collective Agricultural Household (source V-3). Compile a list with reasons for and against such households and discuss it with fellow students. What were the ideological reasons behind the establishment of such collectives?

2. Read sources carefully and compile a list with reasons for peasant dissatisfaction. What everyday problems did peasants encounter? Why do you think they were monitored by the Securitate? Compare the Securitate report with the photograph of a woman driving a tractor. Do they complement or contradict each other?



The Dimitrov Award was the highest state award presented to individuals or collectivities for outstanding achievements in science, arts and culture from 1949 to 1986. It was named after Georgi Dimitrov (1882-1949), the most prominent and internationally recognised Bulgarian communist figure, leader of the Communist International and the Communist Party of Bulgaria, and prime minister of the People's Republic of Bulgaria (1946-1949).



Describe the idealised image of the life of shepherds in Bulgaria.

#### V-4. A Bulgarian propaganda song extolling the “new” socialist way of life

Dobri tended and fed  
As many as ninety sheep,  
As many as ninety-nine,  
All of them splotch-faced.  
Early in the morning,  
He began to play his honey-sweet *kaval* [wooden pipe],  
Taking them to pasture  
Across this wide plain.  
Dobri tended and fed them  
With dewy green grass,  
He watered them  
With clean cold water.  
Every sheep bore  
Two motley lambs.  
Dobri filled and overfilled  
The farm's wide yard  
And his name was heard  
In the big city of Sofia.  
The Party rewarded him  
With the Dimitrov Award.

Central State Archives, f. 449, inv. 1, a.u. 102, n. 562.



Communist propaganda often depicted the political regime as enjoying the unconditional support all social strata. To this effect, a whole section of propaganda was devoted to inventing folk songs that extolled the “new” socialist way of life. The above song, titled “Brigade-Leader Shepherd”, was one of many such examples.

#### V-5. Extracts from an interview with Zlatko (b. 1934), a schoolteacher from Shumen, on Labour-Cooperative Farms vs. Agro-Industrial Complexes

When the collectivisation of land was completed, those were the hardest, the most difficult times. Some joined the labour-cooperative farm [TKZS]; those who joined were landless, peasants with plots of land of no more than 0.5-0.6 hectares, it was they who joined as early as 1946. And they made a bakery for the village. Well, collective life began but the pay was very low. Exactly a few years later, when we were a little older, we started going to the towns to study. There was no money, nothing [to pay for our studies]. Because when they took away our land, they left to each one of us just a few sheep and two to three hens.

Q: What did your parents make of the labour-cooperative farm?

A: Now look, at first they didn't want to join and didn't join it. But then, when the collectivisation was completed, they had no choice. They would come by every evening and tell you, “When are you joining the labour-cooperative farm? Come join us.” So at some point you'd had enough – and then, they would threaten you. [...] But then, people began to like it. Milk became cheap, there was bread at the bakery, mum no longer had to bake bread, we simply went and bought bread. People began to like it. So, up until 1960 or thereabouts, the labour-cooperative farms weren't bad. They were doing well and that's why we

came here. And it was nice at first, but then when the agro-industrial complexes [APK] were established, people no longer regarded them as their own. Workers from here, women went to Srednya, to Belokopitovo, to Drumevo, to places at the back of the beyond. They didn't feel it was theirs, they went to work as day-labourers, as hired workers, they would go to work at ten in the morning and leave at four in the afternoon, taking two hours at noon to eat their sausages, to drink their wine, *boza*, beer or what have you. So that's how things were.

*The interview was conducted in 2012 in the context of the project "Oral History of Communism in Bulgaria (1944-1989)" of the Institute for Studies of the Recent Past and the America for Bulgaria Foundation.*



Land collectivisation in Bulgaria was carried out through the so-called "labour-cooperative farms" (TKZS). The process took place between 1944 and the late 1950s, and can be divided into four periods. The first period lasted from 1944 to 1948. In April 1945 a law on labour-cooperative farms was adopted and a massive propaganda campaign was launched to promote it as the most progressive form of collective farming. Peasants were indirectly coerced into joining collective farms by the introduction of low fixed procurement prices for agricultural products as well as compulsory production and delivery quotas (called "sowing plans") for private farmers. A class-based discriminatory campaign to isolate and restrict the influence of wealthy and enterprising farmers, inspired by the so-called "struggle against the kulaks" in the Soviet Union, was also launched at the same time. With the creation of a Central Cooperative Union in 1947, all the hitherto independent cooperative farms were practically placed under state control. The end of this first period was marked by the adoption of a law on compulsory purchase of large-size farm implements from private owners in February 1948. Owners were compensated by government securities, which however due to inflation lost their value over time. Left without privately owned land and implements, with high compulsory delivery quotas for private farmers, and under political pressure, joining collective farms was the only alternative for peasants. The second stage was carried out from 1948 to 1951. This was the most violent period of the forced collectivisation of Bulgarian peasants, accompanied by mass peasant



revolts in northwestern provinces of the country. Considering that agricultural production was low and seeking to reduce social tension, the regime stepped back. This marked the beginning of the third period, which can be described as "slowing down", and which lasted until the mid-1950s. The last period was from 1956 to the Seventh Congress of the Communist Party of Bulgaria in 1958, the congress of "victorious socialism", at which it was reported that 95% of all land in Bulgaria had been collectivised. During this period, many peasants had already turned away from farming, urbanisation was in full swing, and migration to the towns and cities became the norm.



*kulak* – Russian term for a wealthy peasant, used in communist terminology to mark potential enemies of the regime among the peasants.

## V-6. Statistical data on schooling, libraries, dance groups, cultural centres, and cinemas in Romanian rural areas

**Schooling:** In the school year 1948-49, 1,291,063 pupils attended the elementary school cycle (1st to 4th grade), 162,574 the middle school cycle (5th to 7th/8th grade), and 353 the secondary school cycle (9th to 11th/13th grade). In the school year 1964-65, 1,116,280 pupils attended the elementary school cycle, 1,005,760 the middle school cycle, and 47,628 the secondary school cycle. Figures refer to day and evening classes, as well as distance learning.

**Cultural centres and "reading houses":** In 1948 there were 4,931, in 1952 12,071, and in 1964 11,945.

**Libraries:** In 1955 only 612 "communal" libraries were recorded, while in 1963 there were 2,810 (with some 15,363,810 holdings). Data refer to rural centres, which comprised several villages together. In addition, there were over 3,500 village libraries with some 4,500,000 holdings.

**Dance groups:** In 1964 there were 9,500 across the country, with a repertoire not only of traditional dances, specific to the ethnography of the areas where they performed, but also of pieces "inspired from the people's new life, [...] so suggestively entitled *Work, fruit and joy, We have moved to a*

*new house, Wedding in the Collective Agricultural Household, etc”.*

**Cinemas:** In 1963 there were 4,509 rural “cinema units”, and in 1964 5,209. In addition, there were 94 film caravans travelling all over the country.

*Anuarul statistic al României [Romania’s Statistics Annual], 1965, pp. 456-457, 508; Moraru, 1964, pp. 330-331, 352, 363, 364.*



Display these statistical data in the form of a table or a graph. Compare them, and describe trends and processes by using information from other sources, especially statistical data on urban and rural population (ch. V.3). Do they support or counter previous data?



Teachers will split students in two groups. Both groups will describe the life of peasants in Romania and Bulgaria. One group will be given both photos in this section, the folk song “Brigade-Leader Shepherd” and the Ministerial Council Decision of June 1953. The other group will be given the Securitate report, the interview with schoolteacher Zlatko and the statistical data about schooling, libraries, etc. in Romanian rural areas.

When students finish their tasks, they will compare their work. They will discuss whether their descriptions vary and account for any such variations. For example,

they can discuss about problems faced by historians when they have only the official and/or propaganda material at their disposal. They can use the interview with Zlatko to show how people’s experiences are multi-faceted and complex. They can reflect on the different experience of Romanians and Bulgarians with collective farms. They can debate how the new sources can change previous interpretations of the past. By using evidence from the sources, they can show why historians must take into consideration different perspectives and experiences of people in the past. They can discuss the reasons for and against collective farms, etc.

## ► V.2. INDUSTRIALISATION

### V-7. Rally of People’s Front youth worker brigades in Sarajevo, 1948



Photo collection, Historical Museum of Sarajevo.



Voluntary youth worker brigades were formed in Yugoslavia immediately after the end of the Second World War in order to engage the youth in the reconstruction of the country, but also to indoctrinate it with the new ideology. Many young people from other countries, especially of the West, came to Yugoslavia to participate in the brigades. The best known undertaking of the brigades was the construction of the Šamac-Sarajevo railroad in Bosnia-Herzegovina, when thousands of young people from Yugoslavia and abroad worked with very simple tools on a 239 km track littered with several bridges

and tunnels. A popular motto of the time was “We build the railway – The railway builds us”, denoting that work made young people become conscious proletarians. Youth brigades were also engaged in the construction of the Brotherhood and Unity Highway (see source V-31). With the technological development of the building sector, youth brigades became less popular, but there was an attempt to reactivate them in the 1970s, as it was believed that bringing young people together would act as barrier to the growth of nationalisms. These “youth working actions” became also an incubator for youth culture.



The People’s Front was a broad organisation encompassing all those who (willingly or not) supported the communist regime. The PF

engaged in organising the youth worker brigades at the time of post-war reconstruction.

## V-8. The Zenica Ironworks

### A. “Comrades, charge at the cubature to the last cubic metre”



Photo collection, Historical Museum of Sarajevo.

## B. Extracts from Tito's speech at Zenica on 12 October 1958

Speaking about a facility of this kind, or a large factory in general, we cannot just talk about tons of steel or other goods produced there. We must always bear in mind how our socialist workers are formed in such factories, our working people, who must be aware of their role, their importance and their responsibility. In this respect, this large metalwork complex of the People's Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina plays an important role. Because, people from villages come here, some of who did not know what a factory was until the war. These people once looked completely different than you do today. They came or now come here from villages to become workers, and to use their creative abilities to contribute to the development of our whole country.

Ademović et al, 1967, p. 46.



The Zenica Ironworks, heavily damaged during the war, had by 1946 already reached its maximum pre-war production. Situated in a region with coal mines and iron ore, from 1948 to 1958 it was the largest metallurgical centre in Yugoslavia. Several Bosnian hydro and thermo power plants provided it with the necessary sources of energy. The Zenica ironworks became a symbol of industrialisation and socialist success in Yugoslavia, and especially in the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (see its coat of arms, source V-9).



**1.** Why was the Zenica Ironworks important for Yugoslavia? How did Tito explain its importance? How did he see its role in the formation of the "socialist worker"?

**2.** The industrialisation of Soviet Union is described in Nicolae Ostrovski's well-known novel *How Steel was Trussed*, where he presents the heroic efforts of a young romantic communist to build a new humanitarian and just society (by helping in the transformation of his country from an agricultural to an industrial one), serving as an ideal model for other socialist countries. Find this pattern in the above sources and underline the words and phrases associated with it. Read the book and discuss it in class.

## V-9. Symbols of industrialisation - The coat of arms of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina



[https://sh.wikipedia.org/wiki/Grbovi\\_jugoslovenskih\\_socijalisti%C4%8Dkih\\_republica](https://sh.wikipedia.org/wiki/Grbovi_jugoslovenskih_socijalisti%C4%8Dkih_republica), accessed on 26.09.2016.



The coat of arms of Bosnia and Herzegovina was adopted on 31 December 1946. Discuss its symbols, images, messages. What is the meaning of the two smoking factory chimneys? What are the downsides of industrial development?

## V-10. Extracts from a report on the Yugoslav Shipbuilding Industry

In the period from 1968 to 1984, out of more than 11 million dwt produced, 93.5 percent was for export. Of that tonnage, 82.2 percent was sold to Western owners, the rest being delivered to the USSR. In the past 30 years, Yugoslavia has exported ships to 67 countries, including all major shipbuilding nations except Japan, South Korea, and Spain. Vessels built for Norwegian and Swedish owners, when shipbuilding in those countries was at its best, are cited as proof of the Yugoslav product.

For years Yugoslavia has maintained more or less steady production, being among the top 10 countries in world shipbuilding. In the past few years, the yards have managed to consolidate their position, being today number six on the list with production of about 2.5 percent of the world total.

Due to the heavy losses of ships during World War II contributing to the Allied war effort, Yugoslavia regained its pre-war tonnage only in 1958 (about 411,000 grt). Since then there has been a relatively steady growth. In the post-war period up to 1975 it acquired about 2.4 million grt, but still not reaching

the pre-war percentage of the world total – with 0.62 percent in 1939 and 0.56 percent in 1975.

*Maritime Reporter and Engineering News, May 1986, p. 42.*



Shipbuilding was one of the most profitable branches of Yugoslav production that was predominantly export-oriented. Most shipyards were located in the Socialist Republic of Croatia, i.e. 86% of Yugoslav ships were made in Croatian shipyards. According to the quantity and quality of its ships, Yugoslavia was a “super power”. In the late 1980s, Yugoslavia was the third largest shipbuilding country in the world.

## V-11. Statistical data on the Greek Merchant Marine



Continuing an age-old tradition, in the post Second World War era the Greek merchant marine witnessed a considerable growth, constituting one of the most robust pylons of the Greek economy. This growth is depicted in Table A

on the ten largest merchant fleets worldwide, and in Table B that records the development of the Greek merchant fleet (vessels flying the Greek flag and vessels registered in the name of Greek shipowners) from 1949 to 1990.

### A. The largest merchant fleets worldwide 1973-1992

Country	1973	World shipping fleet (%)	1983	World shipping fleet (%)	1992	World shipping fleet (%)
Liberia	49.9	17	67.6	16	55.2	12
Japan	36.8	13	40.8	10	25.4	6
Great Britain	30.2	10	19.1	4		
Norway	23.6	8	19.2	5	22.6	5
Greece	19.3	7	37.5	9	24.5	6
(Greek-owned)	(42.6)	(15)	(56.1)	(13)	(56.9)	(12)
Russia	17.4	6	24.5	6	26.4**	6
USA*	14.9	5	19.4	5	18.2	4
Panama	9.6	3	34.7	8	49.6	11
Italy	8.9	3	10	2	—	
France	8.3	3	10	2	—	—
Bahamas	—		—		20	5
China	—		—	2	13.9	3
Cyprus	—		—	1	20.4	5
A. Total of the ten largest	218.8	75	282.8	67	276.2	62
B. World fleet (A)/(B)	289.9	100	422.6	100	444.3	100

**B. The Greek merchant fleet 1949-1990**

Year	Greek-flag shipping fleet	Greek-owned shipping fleet	Growth rate (%)	World shipping fleet	Growth rate (%)
1949	1.301	2.377		82.300	
1950	1.265	2.930	23	84.600	3
1955	1.270	6.906	16	100.600	3
1960	5.575	12.201	-2	129.800	4
1965	7.198	18.575	13	160.400	5
1970	12.850	30.899	15	227.490	7
1975	25.108	48.298	6	342.162	10
1980	41.422	53.626	1	419.911	2
1985	28.646	46.909	-4	416.268	-1
1990	22.524	46.580	3	423.627	3

Harlaftis, 2001, pp. 434, 590-591.



In both the above sources there are impressive data referring to the world class presence of Yugoslavia and Greece in activities connected to shipping. Study the sources and find more information about: a) The production and quality of Yugoslav shipyards; and b) The Greek merchant fleet as an age-old tradition. Then, compare with the situation today.

Find literature or film referring to this tradition (e.g. for Greece, Pandelis Voulgaris' film "Little England", which depicts life in an island of shipowners and sailors, Andros, based on the novel by Ioanna Karystiani; Nikos Kavvadias's poetry reflecting the personal experience of seamen's life). See also <http://www.maritime-museum.gr/index.php>.

**V-12. True or false statistics?**

The percentage distribution of investment by sector was as follows:

Industry: 43.6% in 1950, 48.9% in 1965, 47.1% in 1987;

Civil Engineering: 5.9% in 1950, 3.9% in 1965, 4.7% in 1987;

Agriculture: 10.6% in 1950, 16.3% in 1965, 16.7% in 1987;

Transport: 15.5% in 1950, 9.4% in 1965, 9.8% in 1987;

Goods and Services: 2.3% in 1950, 2.6% in 1965, 2.3% in 1987

Public Administration, Housing and Other Services: 12.2% in 1950 (out of which 11.2% for housing), 14.1% in 1965 (11.29%), 16% in 1987 (9.3%).

*Anuarul statistic al României* [Romania's Statistics Annuals], 1988, pp. 59, 64.



These published figures should be taken with a pinch of salt. It is known that party officials customarily falsified data in order to embellish the communist regime's achievements. Not only former officials and managers of the regime knew it – and openly admitted after the end of the regime – but also ordinary people who had to cope with the huge discrepancy between the reality and the propaganda reports. One should also take into consideration the fact that the national currency was devalued numerous times, particularly in the 1980s. It is also worth noticing that the coming to power of Nicolae Ceaușescu in 1965 was chosen as a landmark of post-war economic development.



Imagine that you are a historian conducting a research on economic achievements of your country in the 1960s-1980s. Which factors and which data would you take into consideration? How would you be sure about the reliability and the accuracy of your statistical sources?

### V-13. The *Devrim*, first Turkish car



The first Turkish car, the *Devrim* (Revolution), symbolised the desire of the military regime to return to statist industrialisation. In actual fact, the military had called their coup *Devrim*. The car *Devrim* underscored the self-sufficiency of the Turkish economy through the employment of home-grown labour. Because of the discourses about underdevelopment and the outcome of the agricultural-led growth in the previous decade, this enterprise also had considerable symbolic connotations. The car was made up almost totally of domestic components. Turkish engineers and workers produced four prototypes of the *Devrim* in approximately 120 days. This initiative did not continue, since it was unprofitable to manufacture automobiles with labour intensive craft-based methods when compared with the Western mass production techniques.

#### A. A newspaper article

One of the cars made in Eskişehir was given to President Gürsel as a gift. All preparations have been completed for the transition to mass production.

Taking the keys of the car in front of the Grand National Assembly, Gürsel said: "I congratulate the precious engineers and workers of the State Railways who have made this car possible. With an inferiority complex, it was alleged that an automobile could not be made in Turkey. [...]"

#### WESTERN MIND EASTERN MIND

The black car carrying Gürsel stopped after a few hundred meters and the crowd gathered around it. The driver said to Gürsel: "My Pasha, we ran out of gas". Then Gürsel got out of the car and criticised the driver's

absent-mindedness by saying: "We have produced a car with a Western mind, but we forgot to refuel it with an Eastern mind".

*Milliyet*, 30 October 1961.

#### B. A *Devrim* replica



<http://pics.imcdb.org/0ge28/283260-vlcsnap-2011-01-19-17h10m03s125.jpg>, accessed on 17.08.2016.

### V-14. Sulphur mining in the Călimani Mountains: An example of a typical bad investment venture under communism

The sulphur mining in the Călimani Mountains, north Romania, was proof of Ceaușescu's desire to turn Romania into an economically independent country – no matter what the cost. The plant opened in 1969, and in the period of maximal production it had some 8,000 workers. A "city" began to develop nearby, with blocks, canteens, shops and barber shops. The plant was shut down in 1997, amidst allegations that during the communist period production figures had been heavily falsified.

<http://carieradesulf.blogspot.ro/>, accessed on 6.05.2015.



Read the sources and the keys carefully. Were all decisions about building factories, about production figures and the like sound from a financial point of view? Find in the sources other than economic reasons for embarking on such ventures.

### V-15. A propaganda photograph of the Kremikovtsi Metallurgical Complex “Lenin” in Bulgaria, 1985



<http://www.lostbulgaria.com/?p=3075>, accessed on 17.08.2016.

### V-16. Women in *Vatenkas*\*

Women of Kremikovtsi,  
 You will stay nameless  
 In my mind...  
 I see you  
 In the morning, chasing away  
 The tiredness after a night shift,  
 I listen to you  
 Talking about your home,  
 I feel you  
 Drawing fiery trails  
 With your labour...  
 Kremikovtsi's women,  
 Women in *vatenkas*.  
 Your hearts,  
 Your hands stay young.

They will always be able  
 To caress the strong.

\**Vatenka*: A rough quilted jacket usually worn by workers in factories.

Sofia State Archives, file 2337, inventory 1, archival unit 61.



What is the purpose and meaning of this poem? How does it connect with the photograph (source V-15)? Describe the photograph: The clothes and body language of the two women, the background, and the angle of shooting. Do you think these two sources are both propaganda products? Explain and present your arguments.

### V-17. The plant of the Energy Corporation of Kosovo



The Archive of the Institute of History – Priština.

### V-18. The Trepča mine in Mitrovica, Kosovo

The Trepča mine is situated in Mitrovica [...]. Kosovo mineral resources were exploited by our Illyrian an-

cestors, later by the Byzantines, the Turks and finally by Serbia and Yugoslavia. [...]

Initial geological research was carried out by British geologists in 1924. Two years later, the British Trepča Mines Limited Company was granted exploitation rights for a period of fifty years [...]. During the Second World War, the Germans kept the Trepča Mine operative, although with much reduced levels of production. From 1945 until 1990 the mine operated with an annual production of some 600,000 tons. [...]

During its 58 years of operations, the Trepča plant has “produced” three million tons of ore with an average content of 9% (Pb and Zn) or about three million tons of metal (Pb and Zn).

<http://www.trepca-akp.com/pages/posts/2/>, accessed on 12.08.2016.



The Trepča Mine (still operating but in decline) was one of the largest industrial plants not only in Kosovo but also across Yugoslavia. Thousands of workers (Albanians, Serbs, Montenegrins, Bosniaks) have worked at the plant.

### V-19. Percentage of women working in the Serbian and Yugoslav textile industry

	1952-1959	1960-1969	1970-1979	1980-1989
Percentage of women working in the textile industry of Serbia	56.75%	60.4%	66%	71%
Number of women working in the textile industry of Serbia	16,354	44,662	67,915	105,059
Percentage of women working in the textile industry of Yugoslavia	63%	64%	68%	73%
Number of women working in the textile industry of Yugoslavia	67,800	124,734	197,000	302,020
Percentage of women working in the textile industry of Yugoslavia in comparison with the total number of workers in the Yugoslav industry and mining	8.3%	9.8%	11.1%	12.1%

*Statistički godišnjak NR Srbije za 1952*, Beograd: Zavod za statistiku i evidenciju NR Srbije (*Statistical Yearbook of the PR of Serbia, 1952*, Belgrade: Institute of Statistics and records PR Serbia), p. 176; 1953, p. 216; 1955, p. 59; 1974, p. 68, 73; 1977, p. 74, 73; 1979, p. 77-80; 1980, p. 107-110; 1982, p. 78-81; 1984, p. 91-94; 1986, p. 93-97; 1988, p. 97-101; 1990, p. 94-98; *Statistički godišnjak FNRJ 1954*, Beograd: Savezni zavod za statistiku (*FNRY Statistical Yearbook 1954*, Belgrade: Federal Bureau of Statistics), p. 97; 1957, p. 106, 111, 115; 1962, p. 82, 83; *Statistički godišnjak SFRJ 1963*, Beograd: Savezni zavod za statistiku (*Statistical Yearbook of Yugoslavia 1963*, Belgrade: Federal Statistical Office), p. 101; 1964, p. 105; 1965, p. 106; 1966, p. 101; 1967, p. 95; 1968, p. 92-93; 1969, p. 94-95; 1970, p. 88-89; 1982, p. 125, 126, 128; 1984, p. 125, 126, 128. 1990, p. 144, 146.



As of 1946, women's political, social and economic rights were incorporated in Yugoslavia's federal constitution. The post-war generation of women had much greater access to education and the labour market, partly because of the broader processes of urbanisation and industrialisation. It was believed that textile factories modernised the lives of women, especially women from ethnic minorities or less prosperous republics (women comprised nearly 70% of the textile industry's workforce). By 1947, the number of working women in Yugoslavia had nearly tripled. The new socialist order nominally equated the salaries of men and women, but still supported the division of professions into so-called men's and women's jobs. Some factories had their own restaurants, medical care facilities,

discount stores, kindergartens and even housing complexes, and frequently provided holiday packages for their workers at reduced prices. Health and retirement insurance covered all workers' needs, while labour-related legislation envisaged an eight-hour workday, and part-time work was limited to four hours. All overtime work and work during holidays were paid additionally. Krešo Golik's short documentary of 1966 "From 3 to 22" depicts one day in the life of a textile worker in the Pobjeda factory in Zagreb. She gets up two hours before going to work at 5 a.m., and when she returns home she cooks, sews, and bathes her child, while her husband rests after work. The film clearly shows that women had to shoulder the burden of industrialisation.

### V.3. URBANISATION

#### V-20. Rural population decline in Eastern Europe, 1950-1990

Country	Rate of rural population (Per cent of total)					Changes in the rate of rural population from 1950 (poin)
	1950	1960	1970	1980	1987/1990	
Bulgaria	72.6	62.6	47.5	37.8	34.1	-38.5
Romania	76.6	67.9	59.2	50.4	45.6	-31.0
Yugoslavia	79.2	71.7	61.4	53.9	48.0	-31.2
Poland	60.0	51.3	47.7	41.3	38.4	-21.6
Hungary	55.5	52.5	47.4	43.6	40.8	-14.7

Ederhardt, 1993, p. 35.


#### V-21. Urbanisation in Greece

##### Evolution of total and urban population in Greece, 1951-1981

	Total Population	Total Urban Population (%)	% of Urban Population in Cities			
			10,000-20,000	20,000- 100,000	over 100,000	Athens
1951	7,632,801	37.7	4.8	11.0	3.93	18.05
1961	8,388,533	43.3	5.8	9.69	5.63	21.12
1971	8,768,641	53.2	3.0	13.50	7.70	29.00
1981	9,760,300	58.1	6.3	14.60	6.90	31.07

Hastaoglou et al, 1987, p. 156.

**V-22. Urbanisation in Turkey 1927-2000**



<https://chronicle.fanack.com/turkey/economy/>, accessed on 17.08.2016.

**V-23. Urban and rural population in Turkey, 1945-1990**

	Urban (%)	Rural (%)
1945	24.94	75.06
1950	25.04	74.96
1955	28.79	71.21
1960	31.92	68.08
1965	34.42	65.58

	Urban (%)	Rural (%)
1970	38.45	61.55
1975	41.81	58.19
1980	43.91	56.09
1985	53.03	46.97
1990	59.01	40.99

[www.tuik.gov.tr/PrelstatistikTablo.do?istab\\_id=202](http://www.tuik.gov.tr/PrelstatistikTablo.do?istab_id=202), accessed on 28.08.2016.

## V-24. The urban development of Belgrade



The first urban plan for the expansion of Belgrade along the left bank of Sava River was prepared in 1923. In 1946 the architect Nikola Dobrović developed a draft urban regulation for New Belgrade. A year later, the first five-year plan for the development of New Belgrade provided for the construction of housing pavilions, a student city,

and several monumental buildings for the Party. On 11 April 1948, the works began with the participation of some 5,000 youth brigades from all over Yugoslavia. The second phase of construction began in 1958 and was completed in 1969 with the construction of the Federal Palace (the seat of the government), of Hotel "Yugoslavia," of Airport "Belgrade," etc.

### A. New Belgrade in the 1930s: The bridge of King Alexander in 1934




*Istorijski arhiv Beograda* [Historical Archives of Belgrade], <http://www.arhiv-beograda.org/index.php/en/>, accessed on 20.09.2016.

**B. New Belgrade in the 1970s: Branko's Bridge (former King Alexander Bridge)**

Ivo Eterović, *Novi Beograd izbliza* [New Belgrade close up], Novi Beograd, 1995, p. 27.

## V-25. Town Planning in Athens



*Τα προβλήματα της μείζονος περιοχής των Αθηνών [The Problems of the Greater Athens Area], 1974, n. p.*



In 1965 the Ministry of Public Works designed the first Master Plan for Athens. It constituted a comprehensive intervention on the urban planning of the Greek capital that focused on the uses of land and on recommendations for the development of the town. It appeared at a time when urban growth in Greece and elsewhere had reached unprecedented dimensions. Key features of the period were the migratory movements from the countryside to urban centres

and the reconstruction of the built environment. Between 1940 and 1971 the urban population of Greece doubled, comprising 53.2% of the total, 32% of which resided in Athens. Already by the end of the 1950s, the Athenian landscape had changed as a result of the construction of modern multi-storey buildings and this accelerated throughout the 1970s and 1980s. The image depicts the expansion of Athens from the 1830s to 1970.

## V-26. Air pollution in Athens



<http://www.mixanitouxronou.gr/giati-forai-mask-a-o-kirios/>, accessed on 17.08.2016.



Since the 1960s, Athens has faced a serious air pollution problem, principally a consequence of traffic congestion and the consumption of low-grade unclean fuel for heating and cooking purposes. Although fuel quality has gradually improved, levels for particulates are still very high compared with other cities and air quality standards below those set by national and international organisations. Taken in the course of an early 1980s demonstration against the government's unwillingness to effectively tackle the issue, the photograph depicts a young activist wearing a gas mask and holding a placard that reads: DON'T BREATHE, NEFOS [SMOG] IS CREATED



The Greek word *nefos* is used to describe the smog in urban areas worldwide. Examine contemporary instances of *nefos*, such as in Beijing. Find the causes and compare.

**V-27. Report by the Head of the Organisation and Instruction Department for the Executive Committees of the People's Councils on the cleaning up and beautification of the town of Dimitrovo (Pernik), 18 August 1952**

The town of Dimitrovo has grown rapidly as an industrial and mining base, but the town's planned development, beautification and cleaning-up are seriously lagging behind. The town was built without a plan and looks rather unkempt and uninviting. A number of enterprises – such as the Thermoelectric Power Plant, the Stalin Works and its foundry shops, and some of [facilities] of the Georgi Dimitrov Mines – are in immediate proximity to residential neighbourhoods.

The pollution of the land, air and water is especially severe. The streets, squares and other public places are buried in garbage, dust and filth. Near the residential blocks of the mines and the industrial plants, as well as in other neighbourhoods, a number of pigsties, henhouses, garbage bunkers, etc. have been built chaotically in yards, under the widows, next to fences and even in the streets. Thus, opposite the foundry shops of the Stalin Works, just 150-200 metres away from the street, over 100 pigsties are lined in two or three rows, yet Bulgarian and foreign guests visiting the Works' shops often pass through the area. Many of the households dump their garbage on the river banks and throw out wastewater in the yards and streets. In addition to posing a health hazard to the population, all this makes the town look extremely ugly.

Located in the town are a pig farm, stables and the mines' garage. Because of the large transport [trucks], the streets are constantly littered with earth, construction materials, coal, etc., and since a small part of them are paved and asphalted, mud and dirt quickly spread across the whole town.

Central State Archives, file 254, inv. 6, a.u. 50.



Reflect upon the situation described in the above source. Which factors are responsible for such a mess? Then discuss the planning of a new city. Urban planning is the work of architectural designers: Is this enough? Which factors influence the evolution of urban areas? Is there a situation like this to be found in your country?

**V-28. Residential blocks: A Bulgarian village transformed into a town, 1970s**



<http://socbg.com/2015/02/%D0%B6%D0%B8%D0%BB%D0%B8%D1%89%D0%BD%D0%B8-%D0%B1%D0%BB%D0%BE%D0%BA%D0%BE%D0%B2%D0%B5-%D0%B2-%D0%B1%D1%8A%D0%BB%D0%B3%D0%B0%D1%80%D1%81%D0%BA%D0%BE-%D1%81%D0%B5%D0%BB%D0%BE.html>, accessed on 24.09.2016.

## V-29. Apartment blocks: Disfiguring the Athenian landscape



Benaki Museum (Athens), Photographic Archives, Dimitris Charisiadis.



To accommodate the increasing numbers of Greeks from the provinces who sought accommodation in urban centres, successive governments of the post-civil war period provided planning incentives for the implementation of the so-called *antiparochi* in the construction of apartment blocks, “whereby the owner of a building plot was compensated with apartments in lieu of payment for the land that he had relinquished to the contractor”. To accusations that the building of apartment blocks had irreparably disfigured the Athenian landscape, Prime Minister Konstantinos Karamanlis retorted: “Where should I have put them? On my head?”



Comment on the following extract from the key: To accusations that the building of apartment blocks had irreparably disfigured the Athenian landscape, Prime Minister Konstantinos Karamanlis retorted: “Where should I have put them? On my head?” What is the responsibility of the government and the state to phenomena of rapid urbanisation like this one?

## V-30. Skopje: Earthquake and modernisation

### A. Part of the urban plan for the renovation of Skopje by Kenzo Tange




Photo by Osamu Murai.

## B. The City Shopping Centre, symbol of modern Skopje



Arsovski et al, 1981, p. 54.



The 1963 earthquake turned Skopje into a large construction site. Architects and engineers from around the world worked on plans for the city's new, modern character. Under the auspices of the UN, a council of consultants was established in early 1964, comprising eminent architects, town planners and other experts from all over the world and Yugoslavia (including E. Weissmann, C. Doxiadis). At the same time, an international competition was held, which was won by

a team headed by the Japanese architect Kenzo Tange. Their design incorporated the idea of "Skopje as an open city", the modernisation and expansion of which brought about a demographic boom. People from all over the Socialist Republic of Macedonia, especially from the countryside, began to migrate to the city in large numbers. As a result, Skopje underwent significant aesthetic, social, cultural, and ethnic changes, which inevitably transformed its lifestyle as well.



**1.** How did industrialisation influence urbanisation and the appearance of the city/town (see source V-27 on the cleaning up and beautification of the town of Dimitrovo)? Use the examples of New Belgrade and Athens, and Skopje and describe how the process of urbanisation has transformed cities. Were there any other reasons for the urban development of these cities (i.e. Skopje)?

What factors influence the evolution of urban areas? Describe how the urban landscape has changed, including both positive and negative consequences of these developments.

**2.** Examine the case of Skopje's reconstruction. Follow the steps leading to the transformation of the city and compare it with other examples. Discuss.

## ► V.4. INFRASTRUCTURE

### V-31. Highway “Brotherhood and Unity” (Zagreb-Belgrade)



The construction of the highway “Brotherhood and Unity” (after the motto of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia) began on the initiative of Tito in 1948. It ran across Yugoslavia through Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia and Macedonia, all the way from the

Austrian to the Greek border. Some 300,000 members of the youth worker brigades and the Yugoslav People’s Army, as well as thousands of volunteers, worked for its completion. Its first section between Zagreb and Belgrade, a length of 382 km, opened on 27 July 1950.

#### A. The highway



[https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:SFR\\_Yugoslavia\\_autoput\\_de.svg](https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:SFR_Yugoslavia_autoput_de.svg), accessed on 22.02.2016.

**B. A propaganda poster**

V. Kostić, propaganda poster for the construction of the highway Belgrade-Zagreb. Illustrated poster in colour, 35 x 50.5 cm, Muzej istorije Jugoslavije.

## V-32. Olympic Airways



[http://boraeinai.blogspot.gr/2014/02/blog-post\\_24.html](http://boraeinai.blogspot.gr/2014/02/blog-post_24.html), accessed on 17.08.2016.



Under the ownership of the Smyrna (Izmir)-born Greek magnate Aristotle Onassis (1906-75), in April 1957 Olympic Airways (OA) began its operations with a flight from Athens to Thessaloniki. By the time the company was sold to the state, a few months before Onassis' death, it was carrying some 2.5 million passengers annually and servicing intercontinental routes as far afield as North America and Australia. Its owner's flamboyancy and lifestyle soon made OA an international brand name as did its logo and the attire of its hostesses, which was designed by well-known fashion names.

## V-33. Electrification

### A. Greece



Founded in 1950 as a public utility company that "belongs wholly to the Greek people", by the late 1960s the Public Power Corporation had taken over all privately owned electrical companies. →


Using indigenous sources, such as lignite and hydro power, it enjoyed exclusive production and distribution of electrical power.



Translation: From the oil lamp... to conquering electricity even at the smallest GREEK VILLAGE

Ιστορικό Αρχείο ΔΕΗ [Historical Archive of Public Power Corporation], 1959 advertisement.

## B. Romania and Yugoslavia



The greatest hydroelectric plant on the Danube, at the "Porțile de Fier" (Iron Gates) I [Djerdap]; Postcard (Publiturism, 1987), republished on <http://altmaris.ning.com/forum/topics/romania-de-altadata-portile-de-fier>, accessed on 12.02.2016.



The Power Station Complex of the Iron Gates is the most representative construction of its kind in Romania. The project was developed and implemented in partnership with Yugoslavia. The construction of the dam and of the hydroelectric station took place between 1964 and 1971. The whole work is made of a spillway dam that is 441 metres long and 55.5 metres wide at the most, sluices with a 17

metre fall, control towers, and a hydroelectric station with six groups of turbines. The construction of the dam caused a 30 metre rise in the water level, which led to the submergence of the isle of Ada Kaleh and the extension of the reservoir almost up to Belgrade. The hydroelectric station produces 100 million kWh of electrical power, which is shared equally with Serbia today.

## ► V.5. FINANCES

### V-34. Ljubljanska Banka. The offices of a communist bank in Frankfurt




Museum of Contemporary History, Ljubljana.



The Ljubljanska Banka was the most prominent financial establishment in post-war Slovenia, managing more than 80% of the joint potential of all banks in the Republic of Slovenia (in 1972). In 1968, the bank issued its first American Express card. As it was well valued across Yugoslavia, many working

migrants deposited their earnings with the bank, which had opened branches throughout Europe and as far afield as the United States.

### V-35. Advertisement of the Bulgarian State Savings Bank, 1952



Translation: People's savings are a powerful factor of the economic resurgence of our country. Georgi Dimitrov. Deposit your savings in the State Savings Bank.

Търговия [Trade], 1952.

## CHAPTER VI: DEMOGRAPHY

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## ► INTRODUCTION

In the second half of the 20th century, the general demographic trends of Southeast European countries were comparable. They were conditioned by a series of processes in the region that can be traced back to the end of the 19th century, which marked, albeit with different intensity from country to country, the gradual transition from a pre-modern or traditional to a modern demographic structure and reproduction pattern of the population. As a global phenomenon that had begun in Western Europe, these processes were the result of a set of economic, social and cultural factors that led to changes in the main demographic characteristics of a number of countries and societies which had made significant progress in industrialisation and urbanisation.

After the Second World War, despite the different chosen or imposed paths of development, the processes of economic and social modernisation in the Balkan countries developed on a much larger scale. At a more gradual pace in the case of Greece and Turkey and a more radical and accelerated one in the socialist countries, the region's economies were transformed from mostly agrarian to industrial-agrarian. The statistics clearly show a tendency towards a decline in the share of the rural population and a rapid growth of the urban population in the context of the expanding old and the emerging new centres of industry, which changed the social and professional status of millions of men and women. This large-scale internal migration was especially speedy in countries with a fully collectivised agriculture. For example, within only a couple of generations, the proportion of Bulgaria's rural population decreased from 75.3% in 1946 to 42% in 1975, with more than two million people moving from the countryside to urban areas. In the 1980s this wave gradually declined, but migration from small towns to large cities tended to increase. Notwithstanding local, regional and national differences, the world of the traditional village also changed in countries where family farms and ties to the land had been preserved, such as Turkey, Greece, Cyprus and Yugoslavia. Economic changes, the mechanisation and intensification of agriculture, social and health policies, an improved infrastructure – all contributed to this process.

On the whole, until the end of the 1980s the population of the Balkan countries continued to grow,

especially in Turkey, where it more than doubled within three decades. Here the countryside continued to be a significant source of population growth, with a gradual decline in birth and infant mortality rates. Along with increasing life expectancy, those two indicators reflected changes in population reproduction, as well as in age structure, marriage and divorce rates, family planning through contraception, and abortion rates. The decline in birth rates was also due to the emancipation of women and their ever more active participation in all spheres of economic and social life. From the 1970s onwards, negative trends also emerged in this sphere, especially in socialist countries, where the demographic transition had been most rapid. Once more, the most telling example comes from Bulgaria. Declining birth rates, an ageing population and the depopulation of villages and entire regions alarmed the Bulgarian authorities. They took a series of measures to encourage births and ban/restrict abortions, although these were not as consistent and firm as those in Romania and did not have a significant effect on Bulgaria's unfavourable demographic development. By the 1990s, now under conditions of economic collapse and social insecurity, the rate of natural increase had become negative, as mortality (including infant mortality) rates exceeded birth rates, while the number of elective abortions was higher than the number of live births.

The fluctuating rates of demographic growth were significantly influenced also by the ratio of emigration to immigration for political, economic or other reasons, which contributed to the increase or decrease of the population. The period of the Cold War was by no means an exception in the long history of larger or smaller migrations within or beyond Southeast Europe. Post-war emigration from the mostly agrarian countries of Southeast Europe (Turkey, Greece and Yugoslavia) to the industrially developed West continued a tradition that had already begun in the 19th century. During the Cold War, through the signing of bilateral agreements on labour recruitment, a large number of economic migrants moved either to overseas destinations or to European countries, mainly to the Federal Republic of Germany. While approximately 90,000 political refugees (children included) fled Greece after the end of the Civil War,

around 400,000 emigrated for economic reasons in the 1950s and 1960s. In 1961 Turkey concluded a bilateral agreement on labour recruitment with West Germany as a means of stabilising the country at a time of extreme economic conditions, which had occasionally caused supply shortfalls and waves of civil unrest. Twelve years later, when the German Federal Government discontinued labour recruitment, a move that applied to all countries, between half and three quarters of a million Turks lived in Germany. Yugoslavia was the only socialist state of the region that sent emigrants to Germany as a result of increased unemployment in the late 1960s. Although immigrant workers planned to stay temporarily in the host country, a large number of them settled permanently, thus contributing in the creation or strengthening of national "Diasporas". These "Diasporas" would play an economic role by sending remittances back home as well as a political one as pressure groups on national political elites.

A significant feature of the demographic picture in Southeast Europe is also the region's ethnic and religious diversity. Its importance is clearly demonstrated by the continuous, albeit in different ideological forms, policies on the integration of numerous minorities and, occasionally, on the – more or less forceful – homogenisation of societies in the changing world of the post Second World War era. The creation of Federal Yugoslavia and the proclamation of the principles of socialist internationalism in the countries of the Soviet bloc raised hopes that the inherited conflicts and tensions of the past would finally be resolved as an inseparable part of the construction of

a more progressive and more just society. The initial strong modernising impulse in socialist countries was accompanied by an overall improvement of the educational and cultural status of minorities – for example, in terms of practicing their native languages and of greater inclusion into the national educational systems. These successes, however, were rather relative and had contradictory results on the varied minority groups, while many of the means of radical and all-encompassing "social engineering" had the opposite effect, preserving some of the old tensions and fuelling new ones. This, for example, holds true as regards the measures employed to impose atheism, as well as in the case of attempts to overcome the social and cultural marginalisation of some groups, especially the Roma (Gypsies). Despite the continuous internationalist rhetoric, the rights of some minorities had already been restricted by the 1960s, while the increasingly nationalist attitudes of the ruling communist elites found expression not only in symbols but also in policies towards ethnic and religious differences. The overall democratisation and liberalisation in Turkey and Greece created possibilities for a wider expression of minority cultures and languages and for the true exercise of rights in this regard. But they also widened the possibility for political mobilisation on an ethnic basis and for the reappearance of strong nationalist attitudes, periodically fanned not only by propaganda but also by bilateral crises and conflicts; such as the Cyprus problem and the Kurdish question, which have remained among the main conflict zones on the international stage long after the fall of the Iron Curtain.

## ▶ VI.1. MIGRATIONS

### VI-1. Migration to West Germany

In response to the rapid economic growth experienced in West Germany during the 1950s and the resulting acute shortage of labour, in 1955 the German government began to conclude bilateral agreements on labour recruitment with a number of mainly Mediterranean countries (Italy in 1955, Spain and Greece in 1960, Turkey in 1961, Morocco in 1963, Portugal in 1964, Tunisia in 1965 and Yugoslavia in 1968), which provided for the entry of economic migrants to Germany. The oil crisis in 1973 and the recession that followed it halted the recruitment of foreign labour. Of the approximately 14 million labour migrants, around 11 million returned to their

home countries. In German, the word *Gastarbeiter* (guest worker) was coined to describe these migrants, implying that their stay in Germany was of short duration and solely for the purpose of work. As a communist country, Yugoslavia was a special case. Increased unemployment was one of the consequences of Yugoslavia's economic reforms of 1965. In order to curb its negative effects on society and the economy, the Yugoslav authorities allowed workers to go abroad to work temporarily. In many cases, these "temporary stays" turned into permanent residence. The majority of Yugoslav guest workers came from Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina.


#### A. Foreign nationalities in Federal Republic of Germany, 1970-1990

Annual emigration from Federal Republic of Germany (% of foreign populations in Germany each year)

Year	Italians	Spanish	Greeks	former Yugoslavs	Turks
1970	23.1	11.8	7.7	15.0	6.5
1975	17.4	16.2	16.8	14.8	13.8
1980	12.5	5.6	7.5	6.5	4.8
1981	12.9	5.0	5.3	6.3	4.6
1982	13.6	6.0	6.0	6.5	5.5
1983	12.7	6.1	6.5	5.9	6.5
1984	11.3	5.8	5.8	5.6	15.0
1985	9.7	5.1	5.8	5.2	4.3
1990	6.2	4.5	4.5	5.8	2.1
1995	5.8	5.4			

Aver and Şentürk (eds.), 2013, p. 29.

**B. Turkish population in West Germany, 1961-1991**



Zentrum für Türkeistudien, Statistisches Bundesamt in Meyer, 2002, p. 2.

**C. Turkish school class in Germany (1969)**



A Turkish class at the Elsa-Brandström School in Frankfurt am Main. Photo by Abisag Tüllman.

[http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/sub\\_image.cfm?image\\_id=625](http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/sub_image.cfm?image_id=625), accessed on 6.09.2016.



Although both governments, as well as the *Gastarbeiter* themselves, thought they would stay in Germany for a short period, a large number settled for longer periods and they started bringing their families to Germany. Their children, who had been raised at home by their mothers or grandparents, started attending school in Germany. In order to facilitate the repatriation of immigrants, Germany allowed sending states to provide their children with mother tongue courses. This policy had controversial results as it discouraged many children from learning the language spoken in the country they lived in.



Sammlung Tsakmaki / DOMiD-Archiv, Köln.

#### D. Leaving Greece with the idea of coming back



Despite an average annual rate of growth of 6% between 1953 and the late 1960s, by the mid '60s the number of emigrant workers,

principally to Australia, the Low Countries and West Germany, comprised almost 3% of the country's total population.

#### E. Female guest workers from Greece (1963)



In a Hamburg production facility for alcoholic spirits. Photo by Gerd Mingram [Germin].

[http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/sub\\_image.cfm?image\\_id=2368](http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/sub_image.cfm?image_id=2368), accessed on 6.09.2016.



In the late 1960s, 30% of all foreign guest workers in the Federal Republic of Germany were women. They worked mainly in the manufacturing industry: the clothing and textile industries, the metal and electrical industries,

as well as the food and luxury goods industries. Also, many female guest workers were employed in the service sector, working in restaurants, as nurses and cleaners.



**1.** Study carefully VI-1A and VI-1B and then discuss in class the following questions. Why do you think that most countries from which *Gastarbeiter* came were Mediterranean countries? Why did migrants from Greece, Yugoslavia and Turkey move to West Germany seeking jobs? Why do you think emigration flows from Germany declined after 1980? What does the rise of Turkish migrant population in Germany indicate? What was the situation (political, social) in the sending countries during the 1950s and 1960s? Was migration organised at that time? Compare it with the situation of migration flows in 2015-2016. Discuss the refugee and migrant situation.

**2.** Read carefully the key and then study photograph VI-1C. (a) Were there schools for your country's migrant children in Germany? (b) Now imagine that you are one of these children who have just arrived from your homeland: how would you feel? How do you imagine you would spend the rest of the day after leaving school? Do you think that it would be easy to engage and communicate with other children from the host country? (c) Describe possible problems and how you prepare to face them, or write a short diary page, describing thoughts and emotions.

**3.** Study photographs VI-1D and E. Describe and comment on the body language of the men. What does it show? How do you think the men in the photo might feel? Use your empathy and describe how you would feel at the time. Then study the photo with the female workers and read the corresponding key. Why, in your opinion, are female workers used in industries mentioned (notice that

they all are from the same country)? Compare them with current situation of women migrants in your country. What jobs do they practice?

**4. Project: I.** Divide the class into four groups. The first one will seek and find oral testimonies from migrants in Western European countries during the 1950s, 1960s or 1970s. They can address their classmates and pupils from other classes. Along with the recording of the testimonies they will collect original photographs and other documents (letters, contracts, newspaper articles etc). The second group will find films (national and international cinema) on the topic (migration at the time). The third one will find how other artistic expressions dealt with the topic (novels, music, theatre, photography). The fourth one will cover the current migration flows in South and East Mediterranean (photographs, articles, literature) and compare this type of migration with the previous one. The four groups have to present their findings building a holistic narrative which could be presented in a performative way (theatrical narrative or dialogue) and/or using multimedia. You can also create and publish (digital or paper publication) a small book with short stories based on oral testimonies you have collected. Focus on the experience of everyday life problems at the past, highlighting not only the negative but positive stories and attitude as well.

**II.** Create a Facebook page (or a wiki) under the name, for example, of *Project Migration*. You can upload your findings, comment and discuss your work. Access should be restricted to schoolmates or people you know well.

## VI-2. Emigration flow from Bulgaria

Ethnic Groups	Recipient Countries/Continents	Years	Number of Emigrants
Bulgarians – political and economic migrants	Europe, Canada, USA, Australia	1944-1989	15,000
Taurian (Crimean) Bulgarians	USSR	1944	2,000
Armenians	USSR	1946-1949	5,000
Czechs, Slovaks	Czechoslovakia	1947-1951	2,000
Jews	Israel	1947-1953	45,000
Turks	Turkey	1949-1951	155,000
Turks	Turkey	1969-1978	115,000
Turks	Turkey	1989	322,000
<b>Total</b>		<b>1944-1989</b>	<b>661,000</b>

Gruev, 2009, p. 378.



1. According to the sources of ch. VI.1 almost all Southeast European countries witnessed significant emigration flows. Why do you think this happened? What effect did these flows have on the countries in question? Where did the

majority of migrants go? Compare the situation with the current refugee crisis.

2. Make a list of the causes of migration to Germany. Divide them in push and pull factors.

## ▶ VI.2. MINORITIES

### VI-3. The “Revival Process” in Bulgaria and the “Big Excursion” of Bulgarian Turks

In early 1985, senior functionaries of the Communist Party of Bulgaria began to speak of a “Revival Process” in Bulgaria. They used this term to refer to the successive assimilation campaign against Bulgarian Turks, Muslim Bulgarians (Pomaks) and Muslim Roma (Gypsies), which, unlike previous ones, was conducted in a particularly systematic manner and on a massive scale. The campaign was based on a historical theory specially developed for the purpose, according to which Bulgarian Turks were descendents of ethnic Bulgarians. Hence, the “Revival Process” was promoted as “consolidating the unity of the Bulgarian socialist nation and its ethnic homogeneity” by changing all Arabic-Turkish names to Slavic ones and rejecting Muslim traditions and culture. This “consolidation” lasted for four whole years, during which name changing was forced upon

850,000 people, speaking Turkish and wearing traditional dress in public (above all, women’s shalwars) was prohibited, and practising Islam was persecuted and restricted. Mosques were closed down, and their visitors were condemned as believers of “mundane superstitions”. Muslim burial rituals were replaced with civic ones, and *sünnet* (circumcision) was criminalised. All these measures for “purifying the national consciousness” were implemented with the active participation of the army and the police, and they involved beatings, threats, imprisonment in forced labour camps and jails, internal exile, and other forms of violence and coercion against the Bulgarian citizens of Turkish descent who refused to obey the Party’s directives.

The reaction of the Bulgarian Turks to the “Revival Process” was contradictory. It ranged from seemingly

submissive compliance with the Party's directives to individual and collective protests and open demonstrations, which were substantial at the beginning of the campaign in 1984-1985 and again in the spring of 1989, when the absurdity of this attempt at forced assimilation was becoming ever more clear against the background of the *perestroika* in the Soviet Union and the attitude of the international community. The last "measure" of the Party and the Bulgarian government was aimed to "encourage" mass emigration to Turkey. In a statement broadcasted on Bulgarian Television and Radio on 29 May 1989, Todor Zhivkov practically called on "compatriots" who did not feel Bulgarian and did not regard Bulgaria as their homeland to leave the country and go to Turkey, and on the Turkish government to accept the immigrants. He expressly declared that "Turkey ought to open its borders to the world according to international norms and agreements". Approximately 360,000 people left Bulgaria between 3 June and 21 August 1989, when Turkey closed its borders. Before that, in the spring of 1989, several thousand Bulgarian Turks – intellectuals and/or "untrustworthy" individuals – had been selectively expelled to the

West via Yugoslavia or to Turkey. Men, women and children of different ages, different social status and different professions were forced to leave their places of birth, to part with their families, to sell their property at throwaway prices and to seek a dignified life away from their homeland. However, more than 150,000 had returned to Bulgaria by the end of 1990. The rest settled mainly in Istanbul, Bursa, Izmir and other towns and cities in Western Turkey. As the Bulgarian government insisted that the exodus was voluntary, the media coined a new term, the "Big Excursion", by which they cynically referred to the forced emigration of the Bulgarian Turks.

During this period there was also unofficial dissent or open protest on the part of some Bulgarian intellectuals, which became increasingly known to the public as part of the political demands of the first dissident organisations that appeared in Bulgaria in 1988-1989. On 11 January 2012, the National Assembly adopted a resolution, which proclaimed the following: "We declare that the expulsion of more than 360,000 Bulgarian citizens of Turkish descent was a form of ethnic cleansing conducted by the totalitarian regime".

#### VI-4. Mohamed Hyuseinov, born Uzunkış: A Bulgarian Turk on name changing

I grew up identifying myself as a Turk. The grown-ups used to get together and they often said that we had relatives in Turkey and that we would apply for visas. They even made us some sort of passport photos – we were constantly expecting to emigrate, but nothing happened. I heard from the elderly that life in Turkey was very nice, but we were told at school that life there was difficult, that it was capitalism... I found a balance for myself. I [said:] I'm a Turk but I live in Bulgaria; Bulgaria is my homeland; [Bulgarian] heroes had fought not against Turks like me or against the Turkish people, but against the sultan, against the government machine of an empire. Thus, I found it offensive when they said "Turkish slavery", while in fact it was Ottoman. The ordinary Turk certainly didn't live better than his brother Bulgarian – both lived in misery.

It turned out that a year before I entered high school, the names of some of my schoolmates had been changed. He used to be called Hasan but now he was Hristo. But the truth was more terrifying – they

addressed each other by their old Arabic names. And that is also how they wanted us to call them. They told me how name changing had been done. I was at a loss; I couldn't imagine it was possible to have your name changed by force. Then I realised that the state was a terrible machine, that it can repress you, that Party ideology can change you by force.

The first thing we decided to do was to organise ourselves and to alert the public, through foreign embassies and radio stations, about what was happening to Turks in Bulgaria. We believed we would stop the ["Revival"] process in this way. I began searching for people – for crazy people who would say that they disagreed with this process [...]. We called [the organisation] *Uzun kış*, "Long Winter" in Bulgarian. We chose this name because that was the longest winter in our lives, the most terrible one. Because we decided that it would last until we restored our names and rights and freedoms. I became a leader [...]. I didn't know all members and they didn't know me, either. Everyone knew only certain groups.

That is because we wanted to make sure that there would be fewer victims in the event of failure. I knew what I was about to do and what I was standing up against. To be honest, back then the thought of toppling communism, Zhivkov, etc., never even crossed my mind. We had no understanding whatsoever of communism and democracy – let alone any intention to demand autonomy. That was pure propaganda on the part of the regime. We wanted our names back and that was all [...]. We began collecting information about cases of abuse, of trampled rights, of people held in labour camps, and we described what was going on.

Ivanova and Mutafchieva, 2005, pp. 450-451, 453, 458-459.



How did Mohamed Hyuseinov, born Uzunkış, initially reconcile his Turkish ethnic origin with being a Bulgarian national? What made him change his mind and turned him against the Bulgarian authorities (notice that he says “we had no understanding whatsoever of communism and democracy”)? Discuss the authorities’ attempts to intervene in the shaping of one’s personal identity (through name changing, education etc.).

## VI-5. Forced migration of Bulgarian Turks

### A. Bulgarian Turks crossing the border to Turkey



[http://frognews.bg/news\\_12406/Jivkov\\_Gonim\\_300\\_000\\_turtsi\\_inak\\_stavame\\_Kipar/](http://frognews.bg/news_12406/Jivkov_Gonim_300_000_turtsi_inak_stavame_Kipar/), accessed on 21.09.2016.

### B. Statement by Todor Zhivkov, broadcasted on Bulgarian Television and Radio on 29 May 1989

As reported in the Press, tensions have mounted in the last few days in some parts of the country among certain groups of the population, instigated by foreign powers, in connection with the laws on foreign travel passports and on Bulgarian citizenship adopted by the National Assembly.

First: It is a historical fact that precisely thanks to the victory of the socialist revolution and of our socialist state, the Muslim population was led out of the darkness, the misery and the rightlessness to which it was doomed by the Ottoman Empire. Capitalist Bulgaria failed to do this.

Second: It is a historical fact that the People's Republic of Bulgaria is the fatherland of all who have been born in this land, where the bones of their ancestors rest and where their children open their eyes for the first time.

– The Islamised Bulgarian population has not come from anywhere else. Bulgaria is its one and only homeland. It has lived, lives on and will live in Bulgaria.

– This Bulgaria belongs to all of us, irrespective of our religion and customs. We are her sons and daughters, and we are called upon to carry out our parental duty to her.

Regrettably, certain circles in the Republic of Turkey have been recently engaged in the daily escalation of an anti-Bulgarian campaign.

Then, the "stage-managers" of this anti-Bulgarian campaign took up the emigration issue, trumpeting abroad that Turkey was prepared to accept all Bulgarian Muslims who want to emigrate. In this connection, on behalf of the Bulgarian Muslims and on my behalf in my capacity as Chairman of the State Council, I would like to address this urgent appeal to the competent Turkish authorities:

– Open your borders to all Bulgarian Muslims who want to go to Turkey for a short stay or for good.

<http://www.znam.bg/com/action/showArticle.jsessionid=6B2F304C789043834EF7E08F47860247?enclD=628&article=334750291>, accessed on 21.09.2016.

### C. Reactions in Turkey: Özal's speech in Bursa on 17 August 1987

Unfortunately, Bulgaria has initiated an attempt to change the names of our compatriots living there. Upon this, our President sent a special envoy. We complained saying: "What is going on?" They said: "But you don't want them anyway". Following this, I immediately sent a note: "If they are two million, we will take them all; will you give them to us?"

This is exactly the case. They do not intend to do so. Frankly speaking, what we understood is that they are afraid of the increase in the numbers of Turks there; all the studies reveal this. But let me say this, we will not leave them alone. This is not possible. We will continue to [exert pressure on the Bulgarian authorities] and resolve this matter, sooner or later. Like we did in Cyprus. Don't worry. Look, there isn't any of the old flame in Cyprus anymore. Even the Greeks don't have much flame. They don't say anything about the Aegean issue anymore. For the moment, we manage the situation with reciprocal messages. So, what's the whole matter about? I said it right from the beginning. The matter is about Turkey being powerful. Today, Turkey has a population of 52 million. It is a powerful country, but its economy has to be powerful; and its Armed Forces, as well.

Dağlıoğlu, 2014, p. 176.

### D. Breakdown of Turks who emigrated from Bulgaria to Turkey, based on gender, according to census data (1992)

Year	Total	Women	Men
1989	218,000	111,568	106,432
1990	71,195	31,326	39,869
1991	32,164	13,900	18,264
1992	23,490	10,336	13,154
Total	344,849	167,130	177,719

Dağlıoğlu, 2014, p. 176.

### E. Extracts from an interview with İsmet Sever, a Bulgarian Turk

Bulgaria and Turkey had signed a migration agreement we knew nothing about. We were simply handed passports. We were told that we fell under the provisions of this agreement, that we would be handed travel passports and that we had to emigrate within a month's time [...] I can't say it was by force, [smiles] back then one couldn't say that the Party was doing anything by force – it simply let you know [what it had decided], it notified you! [...] To my mind, one of the hardest things for all people in the world is to be driven

away from their native hearths. There is nothing more severe and sinister than this, no matter in which part of the world it is done! [...] The only thing I felt was the pain of parting with something that was deep within me. I had the feeling that an essential part of me was being torn away. I felt like an uprooted tree! I didn't know who to blame, who to complain to, I didn't know who to share my feelings with. I knew one thing only: my place of birth was here, in Bulgaria!

When the "Big Excursion" began, I was chief secretary of the emigrant organisation [in Turkey]. And it was not just as chief secretary; it was simply as a human being that I felt it was my duty to help these people. I knew what it meant to arrive all alone at a place you don't know, where you don't know anybody and don't know what lies in store for you [...]. I spent long weeks and months at the railway station in Edirne, and I have strong memories of this period. The station's windows and doors, vaults and columns were covered with notes. Families used these to send messages to loved ones – brothers, sisters, mothers, sons. The notes simply said: "Son, we're in Bursa at your aunt's", or "Sister, I'm in Kırklareli at our uncle's". I will never forget an elderly woman who was sitting on the pavement and crying. I knew I had to comfort her. I started telling her that there were people here too, that she should find the strength to overcome her human tragedy... She went on crying. At some point she looked at me with her tearful eyes and told me she was crying for the little calves she had left on their own in the cowshed. She had to leave in such a hurry that she couldn't make proper arrangements for the poor animals.

Mutafchieva and Ivanova, 2005, pp. 317-318, 320.



Changing the names of Bulgarian Turks and forcing them to move to Turkey in massive numbers during the 1980s constitute an exemplar case of the ways by which an authoritarian regime imposes the assimilation, silencing and disappearance of the ethnic "other". What was the result of such measures for both Bulgarian and Turkish society? What was their impact on those who emigrated? Why did the presence of the newcomers, who were initially welcomed by the host country, lead to social tensions? Connect this with the way economic migrants and refugees are faced in the countries of the region today.

## VI-6. Welcome speech for Jewish cadets entering the Military Academy in Istanbul



Turkey's relations with Nazi Germany during the Second World War had alarmed many of the country's Jews, who feared that the government would take measures against them. In the event, Ankara's decision to remain neutral reassured them, yet after the end of the war and between 1948 and 1951 as many as 34,547 Turkish Jews (almost 40% of the total) left for Israel. In 1946, Turkey's Military Academies, which hitherto chose entrants along religious and racial lines, began to accept also non-ethnic Turk and non-Muslim cadets.

Wanting to enter the military academy means to sincerely love and espouse Turkishness, Turkish culture, the Turkish homeland [...]. I can already see those two Jewish citizens as Turkish officers with their shining swords and their love for their country, bringing to national unity a community that has been separate for years.

Düzgün, 2000, p. 24.

## VI-7. Expulsion of Greeks from Istanbul, 1964



Between March and September 1964, 12,387 Greek nationals were expelled from Istanbul on the pretext of "national security". Upon the cancellation of the visa agreement on Residence, Commerce and Travel in April, those who at the time happened to be abroad were not allowed to return. Those already in Istanbul were not allowed to renew their residence permits in September 1964 and had to "leave" as well.

### Personal Testimonies of Expelled People

*Dionisis Angelopoulos (Athens):* I remember it was Friday, 17 July 1964. We went to the 4th Division. We had to sign statements. I took a look at the typist, and he told me: "Don't read [the statement], it's none of your business". Then they took our fingerprints and photographed us [...]. They looked at our teeth, whether there were golden teeth or not.

*Mrs Eleni (Imvros):* My [widowed] mother had Greek citizenship as well. She was over 60 years old. So, where would this woman go! My brothers left. What should my mother do? I told my mother: "We will get you married. You will take up Turkish citizenship". She was illiterate [...]. "I will get married? Are you feeling okay, my daughter?" she asked me, "are you sick?" There was a man, his wife had passed away. They got married. They separated a few days later. We gave money to that man, of course. We got to that point. We got my mother married at that age.

*Irini Brindesi (Athens):* My parents had a very tough time when they arrived here. We were kids, it was easier for us. Children get used to it, but for adults it is more difficult. My father was in a very bad situation, he was a good man. In his sleep, he would yell: "Don't deport me!" He always had that same dream, he never forgot it until he died. I won't forget it, either. Because you cannot forget these things. Because you cannot put a house, a house you made over the years, into a suitcase.

*Ahmet Tanrıverdi (Istanbul):* Some people were so unprepared to leave that they even left the refrigerator plugged in, saying "we will come back, anyway". After closing their houses, two men brought the keys to my mother. "We will come back, you keep these keys. But if it takes time, then pull the plug and feed the cats".

Büyükaşçıyan (ed.), 2014, pp. 25, 30, 31, 42.



The expelled Greeks were only allowed to take with them 20 kilos of baggage and 20 dollars. Watch the video of the project "20 dollars, 20 kilos" with oral testimonies, printed and visual materials, etc., at: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8fOmZrvGLRk>, accessed on 6.09.2016. What would you take with you if you were allowed to take only 20 kilos and never return home?

### VI-8. Extracts from a Home Affairs' report on Muslim Turks and Muslim Albanians emigrating from the People's Republic of Macedonia in the mid 1950s

Over the last two years, the emigration of the Turkish national minority from Macedonia to Turkey, which began in 1951, has continued with unrelenting intensity and, what is more, the number of individuals seeking to immigrate to Turkey has been increasing conspicuously.

This is best demonstrated by the following table with data based on the number of applications for relinquishing their citizenship submitted by members of the Turkish national minority in the People's Republic of Macedonia:

1951, applications filed	24 individuals
1952, applications filed	212 individuals
1953, applications filed	2,240 individuals
1954, applications filed	23,343 individuals
1955, applications filed	38,142 individuals
	Total: 63,961 individuals

Out of a total of 59,340 individuals, whose applications have been approved, 46,327 have filed for a passport. By the end of 1955, passports had been issued to 46,155 individuals. [...]

At the same time, many Albanians have also applied for emigration. In order to prevent the emigration of Albanians, the country has been divided into designated regions where relinquishing one's citizenship is allowed and where emigration is prohibited. Based on this division, all members of the Turkish minority, as well as Albanians, residing in the following towns and regions can relinquish their citizenship: Titov Veles, Tikveš, Gevgelija, Strumica, Štip, Kočani, Maleševo, Prilep, Resen and Bitola. These regions have large Turkish populations, whereas the number of Albanians is negligible [...]. In regions where the majority of the population is Albanian, emigration is prohibited.

State Secretariat for Home Affairs, National Security Bureau, Skopje, 12 January, 1956. Archive document, Macedonian Academy of Sciences and Arts, the Lazar Kolisevski Fund, book 43, file II, AE 25.



Conducive to the migration of Muslim Turks were the collectivisation of agriculture, the imposition of limits on land ownership (a maximum of 10 ha per village household), and the nationalisation of private property – all of which particularly affected Turkish large landowners and Turkish artisans and merchants in towns. In addition, in the spring of 1949 the authorities took measures to prohibit the veil (*yaşmak*). The first to take a stand against these changes and measures were prominent religious representatives, followed by the Turkish Consulate and the Yücel organisation. Surviving documents show that between 1953 and 1957 around 105,000 Muslim Turks and another 5,000 Muslim Albanians "left" the People's Republic of Macedonia.

### VI-9. Slav speakers and public ritual in Greece



After the incorporation of over half of what used to be described as Ottoman Macedonia into the Greek state in 1913, dictator I. Metaxas (1936-1941) followed a policy of assimilation vis-à-vis the country's remaining Slav-speakers. Press extracts give an account of the public ritual that took place at the village of Kardia in central Greek Macedonia in July 1959, during which its 692 (according to the 1951 population census) Slav-speakers took an oath.

We spontaneously swear in front of God and men, as authentic descendants of the ancient Greeks, that in the future, everywhere and always, we will cease to make use of the Slav linguistic idiom.

Kostopoulos, 2000, p. 236.

### VI-10. Excerpts from an interview with a schoolteacher of French (b. 1958) on relations between Roma (Romani/Gypsies) and Romanians in a commune about 40 kilometres away from Iași in the late 1980s

At Grajduri there was another problem: the Roma neighbourhood. There was a Roma "town", which still exists; those houses with tin roofs. And those Romani children were enrolled in school, always in the First Grade. I remember that once we made up a sort of a team, the principal and all the teachers [of the school], and we went to the Roma neighbourhood to take the children to school. We had to convince them, it was our duty. And there, we found a house, one very particular to their kind; a huge, beautiful house, without doors, without windows [...]. And those Romani children didn't attend school. That's for sure. They were written down in the school register with some strange names. All went by the surname Stănescu. I thought that was strange. Were they all brothers? What are these people doing, marrying each other within the family? They were named Stănescu Bicicleta [Rom. for bicycle], Stănescu Ferdinand [...], Stănescu Portocala [Rom. for orange]. I saw it with my own eyes [...]. I believe it's terrible for a kid's name to be Stănescu Mercedes, for instance [...]. They wouldn't have come [to school] under any circumstances, we didn't manage to convince their parents. We were afraid on the other hand to go to [their houses]. We used to go with the head of the [commune's militia] station.

They didn't get anything, so they had no motivation to come to school. The paradox was that these people, who did not attend school, lived in big, beautiful, but dirty houses, and drove cars. I sometimes saw a 13-14 or maybe 15-year old kid driving a car. He seemed to me so young. I was saying to myself, well, is this Mercedes? [...] How come he has a car? That was really something back then [as cars were expensive and difficult to get]. And one day when I got to school in the morning, the schoolyard was full of Roma. The head teacher said: "Oh dear, what's going on?" to which they answered back: "We've come for you to give us the four grades [graduation] certificate". "But if you haven't attended classes", he replied, "how am I supposed to give you a certificate?"; "we haven't", they retorted, "but you should give us one, we need it"; "what for?" And then we found out that one of the young men who used to drive the car had an accident. And when he got to the militia station and they asked him to write a statement [about what had happened], he said he couldn't write. And the next question was "then how did you get a driving license?", as he had one. And then they found out that militia officers gave driving licenses to the Romani for money. And there came a control team from Bucharest, it caused some stir. And the militia officers involved told these Roma: "Go get a certificate, evidence that you can write". And that's how we had them there, refusing to leave. 'Cause you know how they are, they refuse to leave. They kept on asking: "How much for a certificate?" [...] This mentality that such a certificate can be bought comes from the Roma. They had this problem since the '80s [...] and afterwards this habit [to sell diplomas] has become extensive. Quite a lot of our bad habits are borrowed from this ethnic group [...]. They were an ethnic population, not protected, but somehow "sheltered" by the communists. The communists experienced a major failure when they wanted to integrate them. And then, unable to integrate them, they said, ok, we'll let them be, we'll protect them a little bit, so all their [bad] habits won't come out to light.

Interview conducted by Cătălina Mihalache on 16.02.2012.



The police (militia) in socialist countries was responsible for maintaining public order, but its officers were first of all enforcing political directives. In city neighbourhoods or in rural areas, where militia stations were manned by a small number of officers, the latter's authority derived from their ability to negotiate with the local inhabitants.



Read the text in VI-10 carefully and identify:  
(a) sentences indicative of the relative isolation and marginalisation of the Roma

as an ethnic group; (b) sentences and phrases showing stereotypes about Roma.

### ▶ VI.3. POPULATION CHANGES

#### VI-11. A. Birth rates in the Balkans per 1,000 people (1950-79)

Country/Region	1950	1953	1956	1959	1975	1977	1979
Albania	38.8	40.9	44.5	41.9	31.9	-----	-----
Bulgaria	25.2	20.9	19.5	17.6	16.6	16.1	15.5
Cyprus	29.9	26.6	26.4	25.8	18.4	18.5	19.5
Greece	20	18.4	19.7	19.4	15.7	15.5	15.9
Romania	26.2	23.8	24.2	20.2	19.7	19.5	19.1
Yugoslavia	30.2	28.4	25.9	23.1	18.2	17.7	17.1

*Italics indicate that data are unreliable or incomplete. No data available for Turkey.*

Statistical Office of the United Nations, *Demographic Yearbook 1960*, New York, 1960;  
Statistical Office of the United Nations, *Demographic Yearbook 1979*, New York, 1979.

#### B. Birth rates in Yugoslavia

Period	SFRJ	Bosnia and Herzegovina	Croatia	Macedonia	Slovenia	SR of Serbia	Serbia	Vojvodina	Kosovo	Montenegro
1948-1961	12,1	18,8	7,3	15,2	7,7	12,0	11,4	9,4	20,9	17,1
1961-1971	10,1	13,3	6,2	15,8	8,1	9,9	8,4	5,1	25,3	11,5
1971-1981	8,5	9,4	3,3	14,9	8,6	9,3	7,6	3,8	24,1	9,6
1989	5,1	8,1	0,7	10,1	2,5	5,0	1,4	-1,6	22,4	9,1
1990	5,0	7,7	0,5	9,9	2,5	5,1	1,4	-1,6	23,1	8,9

*Jugoslavija 1945-1985*, p. 198; *Statistički godišnjak Jugoslavije 1990*, p. 95, 438; *Statistički godišnjak Jugoslavije 1991*, pp. 99, 443.

### C. Number of births and abortions in Bulgaria 1955-1990

Year	Births	Induced Abortions
1955	151,000	2,200
1956	147,900	2,000
1960	140,000	51,000
1965	125,800	96,000
1970	139,700	119,700
1975	144,700	120,400
1980	128,200	136,300
1985	119,000	112,200
1990	105,200	127,600

Gruev, 2009, pp. 370-385.

### C. Population growth in Turkey, 1940-2000

Year	Population (hundred thousand)	Annual Population Growth (‰)
1940	17,821	
1942		1.059
1947		2.173
1950	20,947	
1952		2.775
1955	24,065	
1957		2.853
1960	27,755	
1962		2.463
1965	31,391	
1967		2.519
1970	35,605	
1972		2.501
1975	40,348	
1977		2.065
1980	44,737	
1982		2.488
1985	50,664	
1987		2.171
1990	56,473	
1994		1.828
2000	67,804	

Compiled with data from [www.tuik.gov.tr/PrelstatistikTablo.do?istab\\_id=202](http://www.tuik.gov.tr/PrelstatistikTablo.do?istab_id=202), accessed on 6.09.2016.

### E. Mortality rates in Yugoslavia

Yugoslavia's resident population was estimated at 23.4 million people in 1987, up from 15.7 million in 1948 and 22.4 million in 1981. In addition, over a million Yugoslavs lived and worked for long periods of time in other European countries. The country's population density grew from 62 persons per square kilometer in 1948 to 92 per square kilometer in 1988.

After World War II, the mortality rate in Yugoslavia declined precipitously. In 1984 the country had a mortality rate of about 9.3 per thousand, down from 12.8 per thousand in 1948. In Kosovo the mortality rate dropped from 13 per thousand in 1947 to 5.8 in 1984, while in Slovenia it dropped from 13.5 to 10.9 per thousand.

Yugoslavia's infant mortality rate, a key indicator of a population's social, economic, health care, and cultural levels, dropped from 118.6 infant deaths per thousand births in 1950 to 26.2 per thousand in 1987. In spite of higher living standards and health care, however, in 1985 Yugoslavia's infant mortality rate ranked only above Albania among European countries.

In Slovenia, Croatia, Vojvodina, and Serbia proper, birth rates declined together with the mortality rate. But in Bosnia and Hercegovina, Macedonia, and Montenegro, a rapid drop in the birth rate came only after 1960, while Kosovo's birth rate dropped only slightly through 1990. By 1980 the population explosion among Kosovo's ethnic Albanians had become Yugoslavia's most pressing demographic problem. Between 1950 and 1983, the population of Kosovo grew by about 220 percent, while the Yugoslav total increased by only 39 percent [...]. By 1980 Kosovo had become the most densely populated part of Yugoslavia (146 persons per square kilometer), although it remained the country's least-developed region.

In the mid-1960s, the government began actively supporting family planning practices to control population growth. In 1969 the Federal Assembly (Skupstina) passed a liberalized abortion law.

<http://www.country-data.com/cgi-bin/query/r-14798.html>, accessed on 6.09.2016.



Study the statistical tables. Then try to connect the increase /decrease of birth and death rates with the political and socioeconomic status of the countries in question.

## VI-12. The pro-natalist policy of Nicolae Ceaușescu and the banning of abortion



In the decades following the issuing of Decree 770/1966, further drastic measures were taken against termination of pregnancy and those who resorted to it. For example, a woman would only be allowed to have an abortion if she was older than 45 and had already had four children. In parallel, childless couples were imposed a special tax – up to 10% of a regular monthly salary – and compulsory gynaecological controls for women of fertile age were introduced.

### A. Decree 770/1966 banning abortion

Considering that interruption of pregnancy represents an action with serious consequences on the woman's health and has a great negative effect on birth rates and the natural increase of the population, the State Council of the Socialist Republic of Romania decrees:

Art.1. Interruption of pregnancy is prohibited.

Art.2. The interruption of pregnancy will be authorised in exceptional cases [...] when: a) Pregnancy puts the woman's life in danger [and there are no other ways of saving her]; b) One of the parents suffers from a serious health condition that is hereditarily transmitted or leads to grave congenital malformation; c) The pregnant woman has grave physical or sensorial disabilities; d) The pregnant woman is over 45 years old; e) The pregnant woman has already given birth to four children and takes care of them all; f) The pregnancy is the result of rape or incest.

Art.5. Interruption of pregnancy is authorised by a medical board at the county or urban level, established for this purpose by a decision of the executive committee of the regional or city public council.

Art.6. In instances of extreme medical emergency when the interruption of pregnancy had to be made on the spot, the physician has the obligation, before performing [the abortion] or when this is not possible within 24 hours, to make a written statement to the prosecutor, who is going to ascertain, on the basis of the medical examiner's certificate and of any other relevant information, whether the interruption of pregnancy was necessary or not.

*Official Gazette*, part I, no. 60, 1 October 1966, p. 416.

### B. Decree 771/1966 on penalties for not observing the banning of abortion

Whoever, by any means, provokes an interruption of pregnancy contrary to the law's provisions is guilty of the crime of abortion [and] is imprisoned for a period of one to three years [...]. Should the pregnant woman be injured or dies during the [abortion], sentencing ranges from two to five years and from five to ten years, respectively [...]. When the act was committed for material benefit, sentencing [...] is increased by two years.

[Anyone] in possession of any special instruments intended for the interruption of pregnancy [...] outside specialised healthcare units is imprisoned for a period of three months to one year.

[Anyone] who instigates, performs and helps in [abortions] is punished.

*Official Gazette*, part I, no. 60, 1 October 1966, pp. 416-417.

### C. Extracts from Nicolae Ceaușescu's speech at the meeting of the Executive Political Council of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Romania, 24 February 1984

Because of abortions, birth rates have fallen. Doctors [carry out abortions] for profit [...], they should be punished. We must put an end to their irresponsible acts; they should not be allowed to continue practicing medicine any more.

I will hold discussions with the Higher Health Council and with the leadership of the ministry and put things in order. In each county, similar discussions should be held, so that this state of affairs should end, because these 420,000 abortions are inadmissible, when in 1975 we had 350,000 [...]. We should initiate measures against those who have [profited] at the expense of the country's population, trials included, just as the law provides.

Romania's National Archives (Bucharest), collection "CC of CPR, section Chancellery", file no. 12/11984, pp. 31-32.

### D. Extracts from an interview on the consequences of the anti-abortion decree

Everything happened in 1987. I was 18 and had already two children. It was not at all the right time for a third one. I was living with my parents. I didn't work, only my husband did. The children were less than three years old [...]. I thought there was no point in getting somebody else in trouble too, so I performed an abortion myself. At


those moments of despair and poverty, I was prepared to do anything [...]. Women used every means they had heard of, anything [...] It was awful [...] I had terrible pains [...] I was taken to hospital [...]. Two weeks after leaving, I received a note to go the militia office, room four, the criminal investigation department. I went there and made a statement, a young officer told me what to write, that I had lifted a gas cylinder. Then they called me for a second time, after I got the medical record from the hospital. I made the same statement [...]. They kept on asking me who did that to me and with what. But I [...] stood by my statement. A year later, I got pregnant again. I thought: should I have ten children? I will not have another abortion [...]. But I miscarried [...]. I had learnt there were women who had died because of that. One of my neighbours had an abortion performed by

another woman, and had died. Nobody spoke, though people knew. The woman was dead anyway, what was the point of sending someone else to prison.

Museum of the Romanian Peasant, 2008, pp. 42-43.



The very sensitive and private issue of terminating a pregnancy was dealt by Ceaușescu in an authoritarian manner that caused thousands of deaths due to illegal abortions. In several countries and cultures, the issue is dealt differently, with religious institutions playing a crucial role. Discuss the subject in class and connect it with Planned Parenthood and ways of avoiding unwanted pregnancies.



## CHAPTER VII: SOCIETY AND CULTURE

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## ▶ INTRODUCTION

The social and cultural policies of the Balkan countries after the Second World War were determined by their overall political development, their strategic alliance with international military-political blocs, the globalisation of popular culture and universal values and, last but not least, by the specific social development of each country.

Parallel with the consolidation of different political regimes and authoritarian governments, in the early post-war years the Balkan countries had to recover from the economic and social damages of the war. This required a renegotiation and new regulation of state resources and social relations. In the communist countries this was done under the direction and supervision of the omnipotent (local) communist party, which carried out the “revolutionary transformation” of bourgeois society employing mostly ideological arguments. A wide array of social groups – from industrialists, bankers, large landowners and the military to petty traders and small peasants – experienced serious repression and were forced to give up their leading positions in the public sector to the “workers” and the working class; that is to those employed in factories and enterprises, to peasants in large state cooperative farms, to women who worked as equals alongside men. Following the Marxist ideological imperative of building a “progressive communist society”, the newly established regimes focused their efforts on modernising the entire way of life and culture of citizens – from providing sewers and electricity in villages to building resorts and opening modern leisure establishments.

In Greece, Turkey and Cyprus, countries that combined a clear pro-Western orientation with nationalist visions about a social welfare system, at different periods state elites tried to assert or, conversely, to contest a paternalistic vision about the development of society, depending on whether they belonged to the left or right of the political spectrum. In these countries the restructuring of social life likewise aimed at modernisation, but depended to a large extent on the fragile balance of state, ethnic, and geostrategic interests, with a firm priority on Western economic models. With the advance of the Cold War and especially after the 1960s, the pace of the modernisation of the social and cultural sphere of the Balkan countries was accelerated, leading to a sort of “revolution” both in state governance of everyday life and in the attitudes of the citizens themselves towards the new social benefits and goods that were on offer.

For example, gender history is an excellent illustration of the social transformations of Balkan societies. Under communist dictatorships, it was premised on the Marxist appeal for freeing women from exploitation and oppression. Socialist regimes promised women new rights and a new type of involvement in professional and institutional structures. To some extent, it reflected the real entry of women into modern industry and their promotion to key positions in the state hierarchy, a definite increase in their educational attainment and the serious professionalisation of their labour. The other, not always visible, aspect of gender history in socialist countries was the continuation of pre-modern gender stereotypes and inequalities. Thus, regardless of the communist parties’ promises that men would participate equally in household and family duties and that women would be guaranteed a wide range of self-expression, in the period stretching from the 1960s to the end of the 1980s men continued to dominate in social and economic affairs, women’s household work did not decrease nor did their leisure time increase, and their income remained permanently lower than that of men. These inequalities had a particularly strong impact on the status of women from minority groups, and especially from Muslim communities. They also dictated the policies of encouraging births and banning/restricting abortions. The public and legislative understanding of abortion as an encroachment on the national biological resources took extreme forms with the criminalisation of abortions in socialist Romania, which inflicted severe traumas on thousands of women who were forced to use the secret and illegal services of incompetent or greedy doctors.

It is interesting that these traumatic stories were not unique to communist societies. In Greece, voluntary termination of pregnancy was a criminal offence until 1970, and it was not until 1978 that a law allowing abortion, but on strictly specified conditions, was adopted. The last restrictions on abortion were lifted in 1985, establishing contemporary criteria and conditions for pregnancy prevention, family planning and the decriminalisation of abortion.

The history of women and gender also shows many contradictions in the social development of Turkey. This is a history of emancipated but unliberated women; emancipated by the reforms of Kemal Atatürk, but largely unliberated because of the slow changes in the social sphere and the preservation of traditional

attitudes and patriarchal practices. As a long-term tendency, the debates on women's status in society, part of the general dilemma of the path of modern Turkey, were revived following the return of Islam in politics in the first decade of the 21st century. Conservative resistance from the so-called counter-elites against the "Western" status of Turkish women plays a special role in the public debate on their emancipation.

The history of the Church and religious people (believers) in the Balkans after the Second World War is not less complicated than that of the history of women – but with an essential difference. While women fought for emancipation, or endured the consequences of an unfinished or insufficient emancipation, believers were faced with the challenges of secularisation at the local and global level. The dominant materialistic doctrine in communist countries had established atheism as a generally valid moral norm. After the first decades of soft and hard repression of the clergy (maltreatment of conscientious clerics and recruitment of the more resigned ones as agents of the communist secret police, persecution for conducting religious rites, and so forth) and restrictions on the social activities of the Church, religion began to be treated as a "mundane anachronism", and this led to a change in the methods of fighting religion. Radical violence was replaced by more strategic and insidious attacks against religiosity. Interesting TV programmes were broadcasted on the eve of major religious festivals, confessions in church were monitored, theological education was not tolerated, and religious rituals were replaced with civic ones. All these measures against the still tangible influence of the Church were particularly successful in Eastern Orthodox countries. The marginalisation of religiosity was combined with a peculiar reformulation of the role of the ecclesiastical institution. Unlike Albania, where the policy of atheism was much more radical, in Romania and Bulgaria Eastern Orthodox Christianity began to be represented as a mainstay of national consciousness with an important historical contribution to the development of the national doctrine. Thus, paradoxically, in their policy towards the dominant religion in the period of late socialism Romania and Bulgaria (and to some extent also Serbia and Macedonia within Yugoslavia) became similar to countries such as Greece and Turkey, which likewise saw religion, along with language, as pillars of patriotism and loyalty to the national heritage.

In some of these countries the crisis of ideology cleared the way for the rise of a peculiar type of authority and communist atheism was transformed into a specific synthesis of New Age attitudes – especially in Bulgaria, through the actions of Lyudmila Zhivkova, the

chairwomen of the Committee for Culture and daughter of the Party and state leader, who favoured the mystic teachings of Nikolay Roerich and Petar Danov, and patronised the institutionalisation of parapsychology. Entirely in this context was the specific veneration of the "phenomenon of Vanga", a Bulgarian clairvoyant who was believed to be able to foretell the future and communicate with the dead. In Catholic countries such as Croatia, the Church and the clergy reserved their authority. By and large, however, the local processes of secularisation followed the global trend for a diminishing role of religion in the everyday life of citizens. Religious practices like private prayer, strict observance of religious feasts or church going on Sundays were replaced by attendance of concerts by Western bands, "comradely interaction at places for pleasant recreation and amusement", loud celebration of sports achievements with friends or in the streets, exhausting tours of "central department stores" and the first supermarkets, and by discussions on advertisements for cars or new home electrical appliances.

Both in socialist and non-socialist Balkan countries popular culture and consumerism were embraced just as fervently as in the United States and Western Europe. Their main agents and transmitters were young people, who belatedly adopted the messages of the sexual revolution and pop art and sought to emancipate themselves. Partaking in various subcultural forms, youth developed a provocative and modern lifestyle and attacked the stereotypes of the old generations, which seemingly defended national traditions and values. Parallel with the modernisation of the way of life and the ever-growing use of household appliances, TV sets, cars and luxury goods, there was a growing demand for fashionable clothes and accessories, records and cassette tapes of favourite rock, punk, new wave and heavy metal bands, and for secret places to take on new erotic challenges. A special example in this regard was Yugoslavia, which became something like the "little America" of the Balkans. Popular culture and consumerism, however, did not develop smoothly in the region. If in countries like Bulgaria and Romania there were waiting lists for goods in short supply and young people were persecuted for wearing "indecent" clothes and having long hair, in Turkey the manufacture of cars that were on a par with the Western brands did not develop very successfully. The Balkan countries had significantly greater success in modernisation in the case of tourism and sports, insofar as both created a space for exchange of products and values, of national ideologies, and of forms of entertainment of local and worldwide significance. Ultimately, however, their societies and cultures were transformed – with varying degrees of success – along the lines of greater liberalisation, secularisation and globalisation.

## ► VII.1. GENDER

### VII-1. Extracts from the report of Maria Dinkova, Head of the Department of Research and Development, on the results of the survey “The effect of the policy of raising the role of women in Bulgaria” conducted by the State Council and the Committee of Bulgarian Women in 1975

#### INFORMATION REGARDING THE SOCIAL ADVANCEMENT OF WOMEN

Just 2.15% of interviewed women do not work; 98% of women up to 35 years of age are employed in social production.

By social status, they are distributed as follows (%):

Factory workers	36.78%
Office workers with specialist qualification	35.70%
Office workers without specialist qualification	16.05%
Cooperativised peasants	8.35%
Unemployed	2.15%
Other	0.59%
N/A	0.38%

By level of education completed, they are distributed as follows (%): →

	women	men
Higher	6.25	10.47
Semi-higher and secondary vocational	27.79	17.92
General secondary and technical vocational	27.19	17.92
Primary	29.56	40.42
Elementary	8.89	6.17
N/A	0.32	1.65

In 1946 women with higher education comprised just 1.4% of their group; those with semi-higher education 1.0%, with secondary vocational education 4.2%, and with general secondary education 7.7%. Hence, we cannot assume that much progress has been made towards the social equality of women and men. 36.56% of the women are engaged in public work. The level of engagement depends on the educational background and social standing. The public activities of office workers with and without specialist qualification are the highest, while those of cooperativised peasants and the unemployed is the lowest. The activities of factory workers are alarmingly low. The public activities of women also depend on their marital status. It is higher among divorcees and lower among widows. 36.37% of married women, 33.33% of widows, and 42% of divorcees are engaged in public work. This is explained by the fact that divorcees do not have many domestic duties, they have more time for public activities and, furthermore, they seek social contacts more often than other women.

Central State Archives, file 15, inv. 55, a.u. 839.

### VII-2. Literacy in Turkey, 1980

#### Turkish Population by Literacy and Sex (12 years and over), 1980 (000 persons)

Educational Level	Percentage Distribution			Relative Share of Females in Each Educational Level
	Male	Female	Total	
Illiterate	16.8	46.6	31.3	72.2
Literate (no diploma)	10.2	6.4	8.4	27.0
Primary School	52.8	36.9	45.1	39.6
Junior High School	8.7	4.5	6.7	32.4
Junior Vocational School	0.1	0.1	0.1	40.7
High School (Lycee)	4.6	2.6	3.6	34.7
Vocational School	3.4	1.9	2.6	34.3
Higher Education	3.4	1.0	2.2	22.9
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	

State Institute of Statistics, 1981, Ozbay (ed.), 1990, p. 115 (<http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0008/000871/087174EB.pdf>)



Study source VII-2. What conclusions can be drawn as regards the position of women in Turkish society at the time? What can the marginalisation of women in terms of education cause?

### VII-3. Emancipated but unliberated women in Turkey



Even though women in Turkey were legally emancipated with the Kemalist reforms of the 1920s, these neither changed substantially the prevalent patriarchal system nor raised the status of women. The re-emergence of Islamic conservatism in the 1970s (see doc. VII-17) as a political and social force resulted in a new emphasis on the merits of the patriarchal family system. The appearance of a counter-elite whose cultural orientation differed from that of the pro-Westernisation Kemalists led to attempts of reinforcing traditional gender roles.

Yet, sixty years after the Kemalist reforms were instituted, a multitude of problems still besets Turkish women, especially those living in rural areas. This fact forces us to reconsider certain issues. To what extent can a “revolution in the legal system” change the traditional life-styles of the majority of women in a given country? Which major economic, social and/or political factors are directly or indirectly responsible for accelerating or retarding this process of change? Does religion, ideologically or morally, still maintain its decisive power to determine the degree of women’s social integration and political participation?

Abadan-Unat, 1990, p. 13;

<http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0008/000871/087174EB.pdf>, accessed on 17.08.2016.



1. Try to address and discuss all three questions raised in the above source on the legal status of women in Turkey.

2. Do you think that legal reforms can change traditional behaviour?

**VII-4. The first issue of the fashion magazine *Svijet* appeared in 1953. It was a benchmark of sorts for Yugoslav women, who looked and acted more like Western women.**



*Svijet* [World], n. 9, 1953.

### VII-5. Literacy in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1948-1991

**Population of Bosnia and Herzegovina aged 10 and over by illiteracy according to censuses (in %)**

Year	Percentage (%)
1948	44.9
1953	40.2
1971	23.2
1981	14.5
1991	9.9

*Statistički godišnjaci Bosne i Hercegovine od 1948. do 1992* [Statistical Yearbook of Bosnia and Herzegovina from 1948 to 1992] Zavod za statistiku Bosne i Hercegovine, Sarajevo.



The table in VII-5 shows a significant drop as regards illiteracy in Bosnia and Herzegovina between 1948 and 1991. Discuss the long-term processes, as well as the support (human, material, financial, political, infrastructural, institutional, etc.) that was necessary to achieve such a result.

## VII-6. Legalisation of voluntary pregnancy termination in Greece (1985)



Until the *metapolitefsi* (1974, see source III-21) Greek society and state was strictly opposed to pregnancy termination. Though induced abortion constituted a criminal offence, in 1970 as many as 9,115 reported abortions were carried out (the number of live births for the same year was recorded at 145,000). Law 821 of 1978 permitted abortion for reasons of serious foetal abnormalities during the first twenty weeks of the pregnancy, as well as in cases of a risk to the mental health of the mother, as determined by a psychiatrist on the staff of a public hospital, though only in the first twelve weeks of foetation. Eight years later, the PASOK government, which had promised to “bring to an end the unacceptable regime of illegal abortions” and provide the necessary infrastructure for family planning, contraception and the decriminalisation of abortions, passed Law 1609, the main provisions of which were incorporated in articles 304 & 305 of the Greek Penal Code. The legalisation of voluntary pregnancy termination was principally the result of the concerted efforts of various feminist organisations and groups, including the Union of Greek Women whose president at the time was Margaret Chant, the wife of the incumbent Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou.

(a) The pregnancy has not progressed beyond 12 weeks;

(b) There are indications, established in accordance with modern techniques of prenatal diagnosis, that the conceptus is suffering from a serious abnormality, which would result in a serious congenital defect in the child, and the pregnancy has not progressed beyond 24 weeks;

(c) There is an unavoidable risk to the life of the pregnant woman and of serious and permanent harm to her physical or mental health. A medical certificate to that effect shall be required;

(d) The pregnancy results from rape, sexual intercourse with a minor female, incest, or intercourse with a woman who is incapable of resisting, provided that the duration of the pregnancy does not exceed 19 weeks;

(e) If the pregnant woman is a minor, the consent of one of the parents or the person having custody of the woman shall be necessary.

305 (1) A person who publicly or by circulating printed texts or graphic or pictorial representations advertises or promotes, even indirectly, medicaments or any other articles or methods as enabling a voluntary termination of pregnancy to be performed or, likewise, offers his own services or those of another to perform, or participate in, a voluntary termination of pregnancy shall be liable to a period of imprisonment not exceeding two years.

(2) The provision of information or explanations of a medical nature on voluntary termination of pregnancy in family planning centres or in the course of training physicians or persons lawfully empowered to employ methods for the voluntary termination of pregnancy, and the publication of articles and the like in specialized medical and pharmaceutical journals, shall not constitute an offence.

<http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/population/abortion/Greece.abo.html>, accessed on 17.08.2016.

### A. Articles 304 & 305 of the Greek Penal Code

304 (4) A voluntary termination of pregnancy, carried out with the consent of the woman by an obstetrician or gynaecologist, assisted by an anaesthetist, in a comprehensive care unit shall not constitute an offence if one of the following conditions is fulfilled:

B. A Greek feminist poster claiming free abortion and contraception



<http://www.isotita.gr/var/uploads/library/posters2010/A11%20AF%20F3.992.JPG>, accessed on 17.08.2016.

Translation: Our body belongs to us: free abortion and contraception / 31 March international contraception day / meeting-discussion at the School of Law – amphitheatre YNAS / Wednesday 4 April 7 pm / group of female university students



1. Discuss articles 304 & 305 of the Greek Penal Code and compare them with regulations and debates in your own country.

2. Compare the Greek case with the Romanian case as described in sources VI-12.

3. Research the relation between feminism and abortion in Western societies: why have feminist movements claimed the right to contraception and voluntary pregnancy termination?

### VII-7. Extracts from a meeting of the Executive Political Committee on the rules of the Miss Romania contest, 24 May 1977. Eventually the title “Beauty, Youth, Diligence” was agreed upon.

*Comrade Virgil Trofin:* If you allow me, please, I would like to explain [...] why I am against this contest. Since for us beauty is already conceived as a unitary whole, it is hard to say that human beings are beautiful only when their body is beautiful, while their character and labour are completely different [...]. I don't believe we should organise such a contest with beauty perceived in terms of appearance only.

*Comrade Nicolae Ceaușescu:* Choosing a Miss is a practice now in other countries as well [...]. Of course we have to take into consideration the moral integrity of the person in question, but this is a practice everywhere in the world.

*Comrade Virgil Trofin:* Why [should we underline by] such an action [the fact that] some of them are very beautiful, and some are very ugly. What is the point?

*Comrade Elena Ceaușescu:* That's why we don't hold a contest for ugly [women]. Who's beautiful is beautiful, who's ugly is ugly.

*Comrade Nicolae Ceaușescu:* The contest is called “Beauty, Youth, Diligence”.

*Comrade Elena Ceaușescu:* Of the diligent girls, some are more beautiful, some are less beautiful. If they personify both diligence and beauty, what is the problem? And why should we think of previous contests on the election of a Miss Romania? [...] Beauty is one of the people's fortunes. Our people are a beautiful people. In the regions there are girls that are a pleasure to watch.

*Comrade Leonte Răutu:* We aren't doing a good thing

to these girls, to their mentality. And if we are to take into consideration the international experience, it confirms some things. I mean this contest has a rather commercial character.

*Comrade Elena Ceaușescu:* Maybe we should have in view the nicest clothes as well.

*Comrade Paul Niculescu:* This contest is a different kind of contest. Here girls don't come dressed.

*Comrade Ion Iliescu:* The contesters have to be measured and the representative sizes are chosen.

*Comrade Nicolae Ceaușescu:* And if we aimed at this only, that the girls eat less, because they started to get too fat, this is a justified action. Girls have to be thin [...]. Youth should be beautiful; they should try to maintain their bodies with sports.

*Comrade Leonte Răutu:* The solution might be for the Council of Socialist Education and Culture, not the Political Executive Committee, to decide.

*Comrade Nicolae Ceaușescu:* Then let's begin and call it “The Contest of Labour, Youth and Beauty”.

Extracts from the approved rules: The contestants should be aged between 16 and 28 [...], have harmonious features, grace, charm, and body proportionality [...]. If there are several contestants with the same score who top the list, the final decision is made on grounds related to the general activities and behaviour [of each contestant] as well as by taking into consideration their status as mothers.

*Douăzeci și doi* [22], no. 268 (3 February 2009), pp. 2-3.



Use your knowledge and explain why a beauty pageant like Miss Romania was treated as a political issue in Ceaușescu's Romania.

### VII-8. Women in politics



Lina Tsaldari (1887-1981) was a conservative MP and Minister of Social Welfare in the government of Konstantinos Karamanlis (1956-58). She was the first woman to become a minister in Greece. Vasso Thanasekou (1917-2015), a former political prisoner incarcerated for six years in Averoff Prison in Athens, was the first woman MP of the United Democratic Left (EDA), elected in 1956 when women voted for the first time at parliamentary elections.

### A. Excerpts from a speech by the conservative MP Lina Tsaldari

The women of Greece, who until now were not able to actively take part in politics, have always intensively lived through all the problems and all the struggles of our people and our fatherland, especially during the recent difficult years. Throughout the dark years of the Second World War, the occupation and the struggle against the communists they did their duty without bowing, without tiring, without flinching. We stood side by side with our soldiers and their families; we nursed our heroes, the wounded and the amputees; we worked in factories and in the civil service standing in for our warriors; we took care of our people who abandoned their villages to save themselves from the fire and the axe of communism; we fed our starving children; we looked after the mothers that starved so that their child survives. And when with God's help and the heroism of our stout-hearted men we were liberated, Greek women again tenaciously worked for the recovery of our fatherland and the reparation of the appalling destructions that the country had suffered during the Second World War, the occupation and from the bandits. On account of those services, the state deemed us worthy of granting us full civic rights, which we will exercise for the first time in the elections of 19 February [1956].

Tsaldari, vol. II, 1967, pp. 11-12.

### B. Lina Tsaldari



### C. Vasso Thanasekou



Pantelidou-Malouta, 2007, pp. 138-179.

### D. Excerpts from a speech by the left-wing MP Vasso Thanasekou

In all the Nation's struggles for independence and democratic freedoms, for the survival and progress of the Country, Greek women have been and are

present. From the women of Souli and of the islands of Hydra, Spetses and Crete to the women of Pindus and the heroines of the national resistance, from the women pioneers of the struggles for a better Greece to the Greek women of Cyprus [and their struggle] for Cypriot self-determination – their presence has been consistent, incessant and laudable. Their contribution to the People and the Nation has been, and continues to be, positive and valuable.

Gradually age-old prejudices, injustices and vilifications are brushed aside with tough and constant struggles, giving way to a pragmatic management of life's problems. With their active and vigorous participation in the financial, social and political life of our Country, women, who now constitute a key element of National life, undertake to contribute also to a happy and joyful Greece.

Thanasekou, 1956, p. 3.



1. Follow the discourse of the two women MPs. Underline the common elements as well as the main differences characterising their political affiliation.
2. Conduct research on female enfranchisement in Southeast Europe. Produce a timeline of women's suffrage in different countries of the region. What was the influence of the two world wars on women's efforts to get the right to vote?

## VII-9. Secularism and equality in Yugoslavia

### A. The Constitution of FPRY on equality between men and women (1947)

Article 24. Women are equal to men in all spheres of state, economic and socio-political life. For the work they do, women are entitled equal pay as men and enjoy special employment protection. The State particularly protects the interests of mothers and children by providing delivery rooms, children's homes and kindergartens, paid leave of absence before and after delivery.

*Constitution of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia*, Article 24, p. 13. Printed by the State press, Belgrade 1946; *Constitution of the People's Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina*, Article 25, Official Gazette of the NRBiH, year III, no. 1, Sarajevo, 1947, p. 5.

## B. The Law on the prohibition of the Islamic veil in the People's Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (1950)

Article 1: Expressing the will of the people, the work collectives and mass organisations and for the purpose of removing the centuries-old sign of submission and cultural backwardness of Muslim women in order to enable them to fully enjoy the rights won in the National Liberation Struggle and the socialist construction of the country, and to ensure full equality and greater participation in the social, cultural and economic life of the country wearing the face veil and covering are hereby prohibited, as well as all coverings of a woman's face.

Article 2: It is prohibited to force or persuade women to wear a face veil and covering, i.e. to cover their face, as are all actions aimed at upholding the wearing of the face veil and any form of covering a woman's face.

Article 3: A prison sentence of three months or a fine of up to 20,000 dinars shall be imposed on: a) Any woman wearing a face veil or covering her face; b) Those who force female members of one's household to wear a face veil or to cover their face.

Article 4: A prison sentence and forced labour of up to two years or a fine of up to 50,000 dinars shall be imposed on: a) Anyone who uses force, threats, blackmail and the like so that [women] wear a face veil or covering; b) Those who abuse religious feelings, use prejudice and backwardness or in any other way propagate the wearing of a face veil and covering.

*Official Gazette of the People's Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, no. 32 (5 October 1950), p. 427.*



The campaign to ban the face veil and headscarf began in 1947, mainly by activists of the Women's Anti-Fascist Front. Mass lifting of the headscarf was usually linked to some sort of celebration, a conference or a similar public event, when the slogan "Down with the face veil" was chanted and Muslim women took off their face veils. After the COMINFORM resolution in 1948, which expelled the Communist Party of Yugoslavia after the Tito-Stalin Split, the Yugoslav communist authorities resolved to organise women and include them in the economic reconstruction of the country. The press constantly wrote that Muslim women without a face veil could earn money more easily and participate more actively in reconstruction. The face veil was treated as a remnant of the past, a relic of feudal society and an outdated social phenomenon. The drive was supported by the highest organs of the Islamic religious community →

in Yugoslavia. Implementation of the law was met with strong resistance in Kosovo and Metohija, where opponents of banning the face veil maintained that religion was in danger, and argued that the law constituted a victory for the Serbs and an attack on the national rights of the Albanians. State officials arrested and punished the most vociferous of them.



How did the 1950 law justify the decision on the banning of the face veil? Do you know of any contemporary debates about banning the face veil (the *niqab*) in public? Find out reasons for and against such bans (take into consideration different religious and cultural practices, traditions and the issue of women's rights). Are there any similar debates in your country?

## VII-10. The abolition of school uniform in Greece (1982)



In February 1982, the Minister of Education in the first ever socialist government of Greece brought to an end a staple symbol of state-run education: school uniform. School uniform was compulsory for both girls and boys, but in reality only girls were obliged to wear it, because teachers were more tolerant with boys. In the 1970s a school uniform market was flourishing and there were fashion brands for girls' uniforms. The abolition of school uniform was by and large perceived favourably by the majority of society, though not without a certain degree of regret. The online testimony of a high school female pupil from the provinces at the time attests to this.

It seems it was yesterday that thirty-one years ago we went to school without [wearing our] school uniform, without that "uniform" that followed us since kindergarten. The previous day its abolition had been officially announced. We had reached the fifth grade and in the spirit of modernisation the school uniform was abolished. What joy! What enthusiasm! We surged to the streets wearing multicoloured dresses and skirts – for the time being, there was no suggestion of wearing trousers save during the physical education class; as recently

a male schoolmate told me, we looked like a bustling beehive. The boys were taken aback, you see for eleven years they were seeing us with the school uniform. And from that morning we faced one more problem, in addition to the strain of earning [high] grades so that we could leave the province of the provinces. What should I wear today? We began to wake up half an hour earlier so that we could tend to our wardrobe. Soon and before the end of February our enthusiasm had ceased. Man gets used to everything. Now that the years have gone by, I think the school uniform was not such a burden after all. With it we grieved, we shed tears, we got angry, we dreamt, and lived through our first love frisks. [...] It was just a garment. But you know something? Now I long for that garment and what we went through together in those wild years of adolescence.

[http://kritivismata.blogspot.gr/2013/03/31\\_9.html](http://kritivismata.blogspot.gr/2013/03/31_9.html),  
accessed on 17.08.2016.

## ► VII.2. RELIGION

### VII-11. Marija Bistrica: A pilgrimage site in Croatia

Marija Bistrica has changed forever and will never be like it was before. Although no one remembered the public proposal of Father Karlo Batić that the shrine be declared as the Croats' main national shrine, this was done spontaneously by the people – Marija Bistrica has become Croatia's Lourdes. Never before has faith rallied so many Croatian believers, from all parts of our homeland, in one place. Croats have also never been presented to the world in such great numbers and on the occasion of such a large-scale international event. This year, over the past few days, Croats were helped by their intrinsic soul – the Catholic Church. And – just to be perfectly clear – the Catholic Church in its most modern and most original sense: God's people in the Croatian people. Because, if anyone deserves praise and credit for the success of this grand international Marian Congress in Marija Bistrica, then it is the people. They came from near and far, in thousands, in tens of thousands. Why?

*Glas Koncila, 22 August 1971.*



Marija Bistrica is Croatia's shrine to the Virgin Mary. It has been a place of pilgrimage for large numbers of Catholics even after the communists



"Now that the years have gone by, I think the school uniform was not such a burden after all": Discuss the meaning and use of wearing a school uniform. Do you consider it a "burden" or a symbol of equality among pupils? Discuss how clothing can be a means of social discrimination and distinction.

#### QUESTIONS ON CHAPTER VII.1

Sources in this section refer to the status of women in different societies of Southeast Europe in the second half of the 20th century. What were the challenges women faced and needed to overcome? Do you agree with the following statement: "Expanding the space of freedom for women means expanding the space of freedom for everybody".

came to power. One of the largest pilgrimages was in August 1971. Regarding the traditional relationship of the Croatian national identity and Catholicism, the ever growing mass participation in pilgrimages should be observed also in the context of the stronger expression of national feelings in the 1960s and especially during the Croatian Spring (1971).

### VII-12. Uncle Frost



Uncle Frost was hugely popular in Yugoslavia during communism, especially in Slovenia and Croatia, as a result of changes in the social system and a tendency towards a more secular society. Even though the origins of Uncle Frost are situated in Russian stories, in Slovenia he was supposed to live on the highest Slovene mountain (Triglav), his coat was ornamented with typical Slovene symbols, and he wore a grey fur hat. He normally gave presents on New Year's Eve. He also visited kindergartens and gave presents to children at their parents' work place in the course of events usually organised by the trade unions. Since the collapse of communism, it has become customary for Slovene children to be visited by the three good men: Saint Nicholas (on 6 December), Santa Claus (on Christmas Eve or Christmas Day) and Uncle Frost (on New Year's Eve).



Museum of Contemporary History, Ljubljana.

### VII-13. Baba Vanga: A famous Bulgarian clairvoyant tolerated by Party elites



<http://informiran365.net/Aferi/Sapyori-tragnali-po-sledite-nasakrovishtata-na-baba-Vanga>, accessed on 17.08.2016.



Vangelia Pandeva Gushterova, better known as Baba Vanga (Granny Vanga), was born in the town of Strumitsa in 1911. When in 1947 her family moved to the town of Petrich, she was already famous for her ability to find lost livestock and communicate with the dead. In the late 1960s and early '70s, her reputation as a fortune-teller, clairvoyant and healer was promoted by the Bulgarian socialist elites thanks to her contacts with Lyudmila Zhivkova, the daughter of Todor Zhivkov, who between 1975 and 1981 chaired the Committee of Culture. Under the supervision and control of the Communist Party, preliminary lists of those who wanted to visit her were drawn up; visitors were also monitored by the secret police. Vanga gained the interest, respect and patronage of a number of Bulgarian and foreign politicians and people of the arts such as Alexander Lilov, Nicolai Ghiaurov, Svetlin Roussev, Lyubomir Levchev, Boris Yeltsin, Vyacheslav Tikhonov, Svetoslav Roerich and Yevgeny Yevtushenko. The "Bulgarian prophetess" died in 1996. In 2008 her house in the town of Petrich was turned into a museum.

### VII-14. "She invited us to speak against God": Interview with Ivanka Grozdeva (b. 1937), a librarian from Targovishte

Yulia Dyulgerova invited us to an atheist club, there were clubs like these all over the country, atheist clubs or associations, I can't remember. So she invited us, we were 22 librarians at the local library where I worked at the time. So she invited us to speak against God, to impose atheism on us [...]. The man from the club delivered his lecture, it was about two hours long; and he said: "When there are holidays we go to churches and we keep track of the people who visit them". But then I told him: "You can't imagine how wrong your statistics are. I work here. The church of Saint Nicholas is here; so before I come to work, I go to there to light a candle, then I go to [the church of] Saint George and you've probably put me on your lists as a person who goes to church. Your statistics aren't very precise. But there's something else I want to tell you. When you enter a church, you can't imagine how easy it is to spot your people. They wear plain clothes, your people, I say, your colleagues you send to churches. But they don't hold a candle [...], they obviously count us, the way you counted us today – you count us in order to report the exact figure: The number of people attending church". There were consequences, of course. But it was much later that I realised this [...]. In 1992 I met a

colleague of mine in the church shop. We met while I was buying books, icons and things. And he told me: "Director Yulia Dyulgerova came to us suggesting that you should be sacked from the local library because you were deeply religious and you attended the three churches in our town".

Interview recorded on 10 July 2010 (10.30 – 12.30), Archive of Marking Transitions and Meaning across the Life Course: Memories of Religious and Secular Ceremonies in Eastern and Western Europe Project Fellowship, AHRC/ESRC Religion & Society – Third Phase.



Baba Vanga and Yulia Dyulgerova coexisted in the same political environment. What did they represent? Spot any contradictions in the two sources on the activities of the two women. Were there or are there any influential personalities like Baba Vanga in your country?

### VII-15. Religious faith in Yugoslav society 1953-1990 by percent of the entire population 1953-1990

	1953		1964	1968	1990
Believers	87%	88.6%	70.3%	39%	43%
Indifferent or undecided		0.8%	0.5%	10%	9%
Atheists	13%	12.6%	29.2%	51%	48%

Ramet, 1990, p. 201; Velikonja, 2003, p. 189. Data for 1953 are slightly different in the two books and are listed in two separate sub-columns.



After the Second World War, religious faith and observance in Yugoslavia declined due to modernisation, urbanisation, and anti-religious propaganda. A survey taken in 1964 showed that 70.3% of the total population considered themselves to be religious believers. The highest percentage was recorded in Kosovo (91%) and Bosnia and Herzegovina (83.8%), while the lowest in Slovenia (65.4%), Serbia (63.7%) and Croatia (63.6%).



Compare the changes in the percentage of religious believers in Yugoslavia before 1990 and in Serbia after 1990 (vol. 2, chapter V.2 Religion). How do you explain changes in attitudes towards religion and secularism during these six decades?

### VII-16. Multi-ethnic cohabitation in Ferizaj, Kosovo



Ferizaj in Albanian, or Uroševac in Serbian, is a city in southern Kosovo. In the centre on the city, the Big Mosque of Mulla Veseli, built in 1891, and the St. Uroš Orthodox Cathedral, built from 1929 to 1933, are considered symbolic of religious tolerance between Muslim Albanians and Christian Serbs.

Agjencioni Shtetëror i Arkivave të Kosovës, Fondi Fotografitë në versionin bardhë e zi, Fondi: Fotografitë [State Archives of Kosovo, Photograph Collection].

## VII-17. The Turkish-Islamic Synthesis



Despite the dominant secularist ideology of Kemalism, Turkish elites had begun to turn to religion already in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War. The perception, however, that the two main sources of the national culture were Turkism and Islam appeared systematically, as a Turco-Islamic synthesis, only in the 1970s. It was reinforced by the coup of 1980, the instigators of which believed that Islam could act as a barrier to communism. In the 1980s this “synthesis” became a state ideology, and religion reappeared in state semiotics and ceremonies. An important role in its dissemination was played by the Institute for the Study of Turkish Culture (*Türk Kültürünü Araştırma Enstitüsü*, TAKE). It was founded in 1961 and published the monthly periodical *Türk Kültürü*. The place of religion as a fundamental element of Turkish national identity is upheld in a 1978 article titled “The particularities of Turkish nationalism and of Turkish nationalists”.

Turkish nationalists are attached to Islam from the bottom of their hearts and greatly respect it. Due to the fact that the two pillars of the nation are language and religion, they consider the latter as an indispensable source and seek to ascribe to it the position it befits it. The nationalists bear no relation to superstitions and delusions and they conceive Islam as the return to the sources. The nationalists respect all the religious and national spiritual values.

*Türk Kültürü*, issue 188, 1978, pp. 449-452 in Copeaux, p. 97.



**1.** Which are the two basic pillars of the Turkish nation according to source VII-17? Read sources in this section carefully and find other examples of firm connections between religion and nationalism/national identity.

**2.** Read the sentence: “It was reinforced by the coup of 1980, the instigators of which believed that Islam could act as a barrier to communism”. Search for similar attitudes in other areas and periods, for instance during the Franco-Algerian War. Why do you think the idea of Islam as a barrier to communism is widespread? Use arguments based on sources on religion in the two volumes.

## VII-18. Joint Catholic-Orthodox Declaration of Pope Paul VI and the Ecumenical Patriarch Athenagoras I, 7 December 1965, on lifting the mutual excommunications of 1054

Pope Paul VI and Patriarch Athenagoras I with his synod, in common agreement, declare that:

A. They regret the offensive words, the reproaches without foundation, and the reprehensible gestures which, on both sides, have marked or accompanied the sad events of this period.

B. They likewise regret and remove both from memory and from the midst of the Church the sentences of excommunication which followed these events, the memory of which has influenced actions up to our day and has hindered closer relations in charity; and they commit these excommunications to oblivion.

They hope that the whole Christian world, especially the entire Roman Catholic Church and the Orthodox Church will appreciate this gesture as an expression of a sincere desire shared in common for reconciliation, and as an invitation to follow out in a spirit of trust, esteem and mutual charity the dialogue which, with God’s help, will lead to living together again, for the greater good of souls and the coming of the kingdom of God, in that full communion of faith, fraternal accord and sacramental life which existed among them during the first thousand years of the life of the Church.

[https://w2.vatican.va/content/paul-vi/en/speeches/1965/documents/hf\\_p-vi\\_spe\\_19651207\\_common-declaration.html](https://w2.vatican.va/content/paul-vi/en/speeches/1965/documents/hf_p-vi_spe_19651207_common-declaration.html), accessed on 17.08.2016.



What are the sad events to which this Declaration refers to? Do you think that this move was welcomed by all sides inside the Catholic and Orthodox Churches? Find the contemporaneous press articles on the subject and present your findings.

### QUESTIONS ON CHAPTER VII.2

How did communist regimes in Southeast Europe attempt to suppress religion and religious traditions? Did all communist regimes deal with the religion in the same way? Did you find any examples in the sources of the coexistence of the “old” and the “new”?

### ► VII.3. YOUTH CULTURE

#### VII-19. Caricature of the so called “zozi” and “swingers”



Translation: Animal-sights of Sofia

Herds of *swings* and hooligans behaving indecently and disturbing the resting workers have recently reappeared on Ruski Boulevard and in the parks of the capital.

The Zoo. The [public] garden in front of the Central House of the People's Army [in downtown Sofia].

Стършел [Starshel], 1950s.



The Bulgarian swings and *zozas* were followers of a subcultural movement that originated in Germany and France during the Second World War. The *zazous* were young Parisians who expressed their resistance to the Nazi occupation by openly embracing American fashion and jazz. Their German counterparts were the so-called *Swing-Jugend* (Swing Kids). The Bulgarian term *swings*, however, referred only to young men, while *zozas* denoted young women. After 1946, the *swings* and *zozas* were increasingly condemned as lovers of “decadent music” and propagators of “bourgeois values”. Their extravagant appearance and dress – skin-tight dresses with plunging necklines, shortened skirts and high heels for young women, and long, loose jackets and

trousers for young men – were widely derided. The humorous newspaper *Starshel* (Hornet) published a number of satirical cartoons emphasising their unwillingness to take part in the workers' initiatives organised by the Party. The *zozas* and *swings* were depicted as promiscuous and lazy people who lived as “parasites” at the expense of workers, and who cared only about dancing and satisfying their unhealthy passions for American culture. In addition to public condemnation, the *zozas* and *swings* were subjected to serious repression – many of them were sent to labour camps on charges of hooliganism and of violating public order. In this regard, they can be defined as representatives of the first youth subcultures in Bulgaria.



Study source VII-19 and the accompanying key and describe how the cartoonist expressed his attitude towards youth subcultures.

Find some of the stereotypes about swings and zozas mentioned in the key.

## VII-20. The Rolling Stones concert in Athens, 17 April 1967



Photo by K. Megalokonomos, in Katsapis, 2007, p. 416.



This photograph of young Greeks of both sexes expressing their adoration of the Rolling Stones under the watchful and bemused eyes of policemen was taken four days before the coup of 21 April. A couple of minutes later the gig was abandoned following clashes with the police. From the late 1950s onwards a considerable part of young Greeks in urban centres had turned to Rock 'n' Roll. Espousing to a great extent new modes of conduct in attire, hairstyling and recreation, they attracted the negative attention of conformist circles which levelled against them accusations of immorality and of an "unnatural" inclination to follow American forms of behaviour.

## VII-21. *Bijelo Dugme* (The White Button)



*Bijelo Dugme*, the best-known Yugoslav rock group, was formed in Sarajevo in 1973 and recorded nine albums until 1988. The group's leader and its only permanent member was guitarist Goran Bregović. With their first album ("If I Were a White Button", 1974), they were dubbed as a "shepherd rock band", one that combined rock 'n' roll with the rhythms and traditional music of the Yugoslav peoples. This trend was preserved in all their other albums, with just a touch of the *New Wave*. Their last album ("Čiribiribela", 1988) had a political "hue" as it urged the unity of the Yugoslav peoples at a time when the country was bogged down in economic crisis and ethnic nationalism. Thus, the song "Lijepa naša" (Our



beautiful) combines verses from the Croatian national anthem with lyrics from a Serbian patriotic war song of the First World War. This “mixing” was not received well by audiences in Croatia and Serbia, which booed loudly when it was performed at concerts. The group held its last tour in 1988, and they met again in 2005 when they held concerts in Zagreb, Belgrade and Sarajevo.

**Our beautiful (1988)**

Sometimes I dream that we fly  
That we fly alone like we are cursed  
I dream about northern wind  
Which tires the wings  
And me and you, hawk and she-hawk  
Looking for a hawk's shoulder

Our beautiful homeland,  
Heroic sweet country  
There, far away  
There, far away  
There, far away  
Far away from sea  
Far away from sea

Sometimes I dream about Christmas  
Then trains wake me up  
They travel to south from my pillow  
To the place where my heart lives  
Where people mourn for me on Christmas

<http://lyricstranslate.com/en/lijepa-nasa-our-beautiful.html>,  
accessed on 17.08.2016.

**VII-22. Hippies**



In the late 1960s the caves of Matala on the southern coast of Crete became a haven for middle-class youngsters from across the world who wanted to experience and practice “freedom” along the lines of the motto of the internationally renowned Greek writer and philosopher Nikos Kazantzakis: “I Hope for Nothing; I’m Afraid of Nothing; I’m Free”. The hippy community at Matala expressed the youth movement of the 1960s, who were seeking a “return to nature” and to “lost innocence” represented by pre-modern ways of life. However, their presence and particularly their recreational activities, from nudism and pot-smoking to sex-sharing, were provocative for the local traditional agrarian society of Crete and met with the stern opposition of the locals and the junta in Athens. Taking into account the fact that it was a period of development of mass tourism, esp. in Crete, local reactions were more complex and not →

unanimously negative. In summer 1970, on the pretext of a forthcoming international “congress of hippies”, the police moved the “community” away, stormed the caves and set them on fire.

**A. Caves of Matala, Crete**



<http://agonaskritis.gr/%CE%BC%CE%AC%CF%84%CE%B1%CE%BB%CE%B1-%CE%B7-%CF%80%CF%81%CE%B1%CE%B3%CE%BC%CE%B1%CF%84%CE%B9%CE%BA%CE%AE-%CE%B9%CF%83%CF%84%CE%BF%CF%81%CE%AF%CE%B1-%CF%86%CF%89%CF%84%CF%8C%CF%82/>, accessed on 17.08.2016.

**B. Bishop Timotheos, February 1970**

These goblins should have been evicted from the caves before turning them into potholes of hashish and venereal diseases. Evicted from their countries as useless, this scum has now fallen upon us. In a while, the whole of our country will become a huge Matala, our villages, our houses. Nobody will be able to contain the lava of hippism. The evil will overflow us.

Theodorou, 2007, p. 86.



The concept of subculture usually connotes “value systems, beliefs, customs, practices, cultural preferences and lifestyles distinct from, but interconnected to, those widely held in mainstream culture”. Youth subculture groups tend to be seen as subverting the normative values of the adult population. How would you describe the relation of youth subcultures outlined in these sources with their mainstream cultures? As forms of delinquency, forms of resistance or forms of distinction? Build your arguments from the evidence in the sources. Be careful not to automatically accept the points of view of the sources’ authors.

## ► VII.4. LITERATURE AND CINEMA

### VII-23. Nobel Prize winner Ivo Andrić describes Bosnia during the Ottoman period

Des Fossés did not conceal the fact that he was surprised at the obstinacy with which in Bosnia not only the Turks but people of all the other faiths too, resisted every influence, even the best, opposed every innovation, every advance, even what was possible in the present circumstances and depended on no one but themselves. He pointed out all the harm done by this “Chinese” rigidity, the way they cut themselves off from life.

“How is it possible”, asked Des Fossés, “for this country to become stable and orderly and adopt at least as great a degree of civilisation as its closest neighbours, if its people are divided as nowhere else in Europe? Four faiths live in this narrow, mountainous one meagre strip of land. Each of them is exclusive and strictly separate from others. You all live under one sky and from the same soil, but the centre of the spiritual life of each of these four groups is far away, in a foreign land, in Rome, Moscow, Istanbul, Mecca, Jerusalem, and God alone knows where, but at any rate not here where the people are born and die. And each group considers that its well-being is conditioned by the disadvantage of each of the other three faiths, and that they can make progress only at their cost. And each of them has made intolerance the greatest virtue. And each one of them is expecting salvation from somewhere outside, each from the opposite direction.

Andrić, 1963; [http://www.ivoandric.org.rs/html/bosnian\\_andric\\_s\\_treasury.html](http://www.ivoandric.org.rs/html/bosnian_andric_s_treasury.html), accessed on 17.08.2016.



Ivo Andrić was born in Travnik (Bosnia) in 1892. During his high school years in Sarajevo, Andrić actively participated in the South Slavic Oriented Youth Movement, which later became known as Young Bosnia. Between 1912 and the outbreak of the First World War he studied at the universities of Zagreb, Vienna and Krakow. In summer 1914, while holidaying in Split, he was imprisoned by the Austrian authorities under suspicion that he had been involved in the Sarajevo assassination. After spending three years in prison, he was rehabilitated and sent for treatment of tuberculosis to Zagreb. After the end of the First World War and the foundation of



Yugoslavia, he moved to Belgrade. From 1920 until the beginning of the Second World War he worked mainly in the diplomatic service. In 1937 he was appointed Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and in 1939 Minister Plenipotentiary and Envoy Extraordinary to Berlin. He returned to Belgrade in early summer 1941 and lived a secluded life during the war, focusing on the writing of his novels *Bosnian Chronicle*, *The Bridge on the Drina* and *The Woman from Sarajevo*. After the war, he got involved in the cultural and political life of the new socialist Yugoslavia. He won the Nobel Prize for Literature in 1961 for his novel *The Bridge on the Drina*. Andrić died in Belgrade in 1975.

### VII-24. Nobel Prize winner Orhan Pamuk describes Istanbul of the 1950s



Novelist and academic Orhan Pamuk (b. 1952) is the first Turkish author to receive the Nobel Prize in Literature (2006). Born in Istanbul in an upper-class family, he was educated at Robert College secondary school. He describes his childhood in his novels *The Black Book* (1990) and *Cevdet Bey and His Sons* (1982), and in much greater detail in *Istanbul* (2003), his personal memoirs.

Gustave Flaubert, who visited Istanbul 102 years before my birth, was struck by the variety of life in its teeming streets; in one of his letters he predicted that in a century's time it would be the capital of the world. The reverse came true: After the Ottoman Empire collapsed, the world almost forgot that Istanbul existed. The city into which I was born was poorer, shabbier, and more isolated than it had ever been before in its two-thousand-year history. For me it has always been a city of ruins and of end-of-empire melancholy. I've spent my life either battling with this melancholy or (like all *Istanbullusu*) making it my own.

At least once in a lifetime, self-reflection leads us to examine the circumstances of our birth. Why were we born in this particular corner of the world, on this particular date? These families into which we were born, these countries and cities to which the lottery of life has assigned us – they expect love from us, and in the end we do love them from the bottom

of our hearts; but did we perhaps deserve better? I sometimes think myself unlucky to have been born in an aging and impoverished city buried under the ashes of a ruined empire. But a voice inside me always insists this was really a piece of luck. If it is a matter of wealth, I can certainly count myself fortunate to have been born into an affluent family at a time when the city was at its lowest ebb (though some have ably argued the contrary). Mostly I am disinclined to complain; I've accepted the city into which I was born in the same way I've accepted my body (much as I would have preferred to be more handsome and better built) and my gender (even though I still ask myself, naïvely, whether I might have been better off had I been born a woman). This is my fate, and there's no sense arguing with it. This book is concerned with fate.

Pamuk, 2006, pp. 6-7; <https://books.google.gr/books?id=FEPbryS4KBUC&printsec=frontcover&dq=pamouk+orhan+istanbul&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjPnle-l8PKAhULlxoKHasLAvUQ6AEIJJAA#v=onepage&q=pamouk%20orhan%20istanbul&f=false>, accessed on 17.08.2016.

### VII-25. An extract from the poem *King of Asine* by Nobel Prize winner George Seferis (1900-1971)



The offspring of a middle class family and a career diplomat, Seferis's work was praised for its "spending lyric style, which is inspired by a deep feeling for the Greek cultural ideal". *The King of Asine* (1938-40) is one of his most important poems. It draws on a verse from the *Iliad*, where for the first and only time the name Asine, a town near today's Nauplio that participated with ships in the Trojan War, appears. In the extract, Seferis searches for traces of the presence of the King of Asine employing a number of symbols: the visor, the statues, the oars. These symbols highlight the meaning of decay and absence, and simultaneously underscore the poet's constant dialogue with the Ancient Greek world.

#### *The King of Asine*

All that morning we looked about the castle  
beginning from the shadowy side where the sea  
green and without brilliance, breast of a slain peacock,  
received us like time without break.

Veins of rock descended from high above,  
twisted vines, bare, many-branched, coming alive

at the touch of the water, while the eye in following them  
strove to escape the fatiguing undulation  
and constantly weakened.

On the sunny side a long extended coastline  
and the light grating diamonds on the great walls.  
Not a single creature alive, the wild pigeons flown,  
and the King of Asine, for whom we have sought two  
years now  
unknown, forgotten by all, even by Homer  
only one word in the *Iliad*, and that uncertain  
flung here like a gold burial mask.

*Modern Greek Poetry*, 1982, pp.105-106.

### VII-26. Giannis Ritsos, Golden Wreath Laureate at the Struga Poetry Festival, 1985



Giannis Ritsos (1909-1990) is considered one of the greatest 20th-century Greek poets. A prolific man-of-letters, in his poetic oeuvre which has been translated in numerous languages he combined lyricism and morphological innovation with themes largely drawn from his country's political and social struggles. He became a member of the Communist Party of Greece in the inter-war period and participated in the National Resistance against the Axis. On account of his communist beliefs and ideals, he was exiled during the Greek Civil War and again during the military dictatorship of 1967-1974. In 1977 he received the International Lenin Peace Prize. Eight years later he was named Golden Wreath Laureate at the Struga Poetry Festival. Held at a small town on the shore of Lake Ohrid, since 1962 this international poetry festival has honoured numerous renowned poets from across the globe. Award recipients have included Eugenio Montale, Seamus Heaney, Ted Hughes and W.H. Auden, as well as poets who were considered dissidents in their countries, such as Joseph Brodsky, Pablo Neruda and Bulat Okudzhava.

#### Extracts from Gane Todorovski's foreword honouring Ritsos

His verse is excitement, condemnation, an oath, rage, an attack, a breakthrough, a weapon. His verse is Boldness. His verse is a majestic fluttering metaphor of the Greek resistance [...]. Ritsos's poems have been translated all over the world. Carried by the

magical sounds of Mikis Theodorakis's melodies, they circumnavigate the Earth's globe. Their revolutionary resonance soars across the oceans and seas of every continent, taking root in people's hearts. Ritsos belongs to humanity, for his verse incessantly wages war on behalf of Man.

Let us welcome him to our Macedonian clime and let this betoken an honest handshake between two closest neighbouring peoples in their inexhaustible commitment to joint wellbeing, togetherness and better understanding.

Gilevski and Todorovski, 1985, pp.19-20.

### VII-27. An extract from the poem *Axion Esti* by Nobel Prize winner Odysseas Elytis (1911-1996)



Odysseas Elytis's poem *Axion Esti* (1959) runs to 88 pages. It is considered his magnum opus and one of the most important pieces of Modern Greek literature. The poem is structured along Orthodox tradition and Byzantine hymnography, and consists of three parts: "The Genesis", "The Passion", "The Gloria". Highlighting the historical and artistic continuity of Hellenism, "The Genesis" refers to the poet's birth and how the creation of the world is embedded in his consciousness. "The Passion" refers to the passions of Hellenism and of the poet until the catharsis, reflecting the historical memory of the Second World War. "The Gloria" comprises a hymn to the triumph of life over death, a hymn to Greece and Greek nature. The extract comes from "The Genesis" and refers to the creation of the sea and particular of the Aegean Sea, a poetical site precious to Elytis. Through a diachronic gaze, the poet connects the ancient stone horses and the amphorae with the olive trees that still today adorn the Aegean islands. The extract concludes with the exclamation "This world / this small world the great!" which is repeated throughout the poem, highlighting thus the continuous connection of the individual experience of the poet with the infinitude of the universe.

Then he spoke and the sea was born  
And I gazed upon it and marvelled  
In its centre he showed little worlds in my image and likeness:

Horses of stone with manes erect  
and tranquil amphorae  
and slanting backs of dolphins.

los, Sikinos, Serifos, Milos.  
"Each word a swallow  
to bring you spring in the midst of summer" he said  
And ample olive trees  
to sift the light through their fingers  
that it may spread gently over your sleep  
and ample cicadas  
which you will feel no more  
than you feel the pulse inside your wrist  
but scarce the water  
so that you hold it a God and understand the  
meaning of its voice  
and the tree alone  
no flock beneath it  
so that you take it for a friend  
and know its precious name  
sparse the earth beneath your feet  
so that you have no room to spread you roots  
and keep reaching down in depth  
and broad the sky above  
so that you read the infinite on your own.

THIS WORLD  
this small world the great!

(translation: Edmund Keeley and Philip Sherrard)  
Keeley and Sherrard, 1981, p. 50.



Mikis Theodorakis composed music for Elytis's *Axion Esti* (1964) You may listen to one song ("Bloods of Love") here: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4zWLCemYdCg>, accessed on 17.08.2016.



1. Search for literary descriptions of your town (or region) of origin; then read them aloud in class and discuss.
2. Read the final verses of Elytis's poem "This world / this small world the great!" and discuss their meaning.
3. Find Nobel Prize novelists and poets from Southeast Europe. Name them and then try to find whether their work has been translated to other regional languages. Do you think we know the cultural elements of our neighbour and how well?

**VII-28. Greek Cinema, *Stella* (1955)**

Directed and co-written by the Greek Cypriot Michael Cacoyannis, *Stella* featured Melina Mercouri in her film debut. The film recounts the story of an attractive *rebetiko* singer who lives an independent life, choosing partners without taking into consideration social conventions. Although initially she accepts the marriage proposal of the football player Miltos, she will not turn up at the altar on their wedding day, spending instead the night with

a casual acquaintance. In the early hours of the following day Miltos will plunge a knife in her abdomen and kill her. A bold film, which was criticised in Greece at the time of its screening on the grounds that it portrayed norms foreign to society, *Stella* has been internationally acclaimed as a unique re-enactment of the conflict between traditional values, sexual desire and women's right to self-determination.



Melina Mercouri Foundation, Athens.

## VII-29. The Black Wave movement in Yugoslav Cinematography



Black Wave is a blanket term used to describe a movement in Yugoslav cinematography that marked the 1960s and early 1970s. It was inspired by contemporaneous developments in European filmmaking, especially the French New Wave. Black Wave films were mostly black-and-white, with an aesthetic very different from the socialist one. Subjects were mostly around the everyday life of ordinary people, and this clearly met head-on the heroic partisan films or those that glorified socialist progress and the prosperity of Yugoslavia. The Black Wave movement depicted a reality that was depressing, pessimistic and without perspective. The films constitute the golden age of Yugoslav cinematography, winning many awards at international festivals. For example, Aleksandar Petrović's *I Even Met Happy Gypsies* was awarded the Special Grand Prize of the Jury at the 1967 Cannes Film Festival. Among the movement's internationally-renowned directors were Dušan Makavejev, Želimir Žilnik and Lazar Stojanović. The latter was sentenced to prison for his first film *Plastic Jesus*. After 1973, Black Wave films were banned and several cinematographers were forced to emigrate.

### A. The moment of doubt

All films culminating in cruelty and humiliation, depicting man's tragedy within and around him, all authors looking to use the most extreme effects in momentous scenes, skillfully destroying, in the name of anti-dogmatism, all world postulates. [...] The rat has become the mascot of our cinematography.

Boglić, 1969, pp. 1-6.

### B. Criticism of socialism

In some of our films, as in other spheres of art, there is a tendency to degrade the importance and extent of the revolution. [...]. There is a certain tendency, not clearly expressed, nihilism of sorts, not believing in anything, helplessness, apathy towards everything in life [...] A particular problem is adopting a critical view of our reality [...]. The reasons why our films are so successful at West European festivals lay in the

fact that they express a comprehensive criticism of socialism, which they approve, from which they derive their own social and political interest, propagating, promoting and awarding such films. [...]


"Stanje i problemi u jugoslovenskoj kinematografiji" (The State and Problems of Yugoslav Cinematography), *Filmska kultura* 68-69 (December 1969), pp. 1-26.

### C. Film noir

To negate, to negate at all cost – has become the guiding light of many. Even at the cost of disparaging art, even at the cost of becoming a flyer, a manifest, a pamphlet, film has become less and less aesthetic, less and less art.

Čolić, 1970, pp. 3-25.

### D. Film *W.R. Mysteries of the Organism* (1971)



Cover created by Lucien S. Yang for the Criterion Collection.



Dušan Makavejev (b. Belgrade, 1932) is a film director, screenwriter and professor. His first three feature films – *Man Is Not a Bird* (1965), *Love Affair or the Case of the Missing Switchboard Operator* (1967), and *Innocence Unprotected* (1968) – were a prelude to the Yugoslav Black Wave. His 1971 *W.R.: Mysteries of the Organism* is his most influential film, which was banned in Yugoslavia due to its sexual and political content. The story is based on Wilhelm Reich's theory of life energy or how to release man through the sexual revolution. On 5 July 1971 (two weeks before the Serbian Public Prosecutor's Office was to ban it) a big public discussion was held in Novi Sad, which focused mainly on the criticism of Stalin's image in the film, as well as on the fear that Josip Broz Tito could also become the subject of criticism. Makavejev left Yugoslavia and stayed in exile until 1988.



You may want to listen to two songs (related with doc. VII-28 and VII-29D): <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VtWd6M2ADuY>, accessed on 17.08.2016. ("Love that you turned to a double edged knife", Melina Merkouri-Manos Hadjidakis, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=evGC9hekem0>, accessed on 17.08.2016; "Children down at the meadow", music by Manos Hadjidakis for the film by D. Makavejev, *Sweet Movie*).



Make a list of award winning Southeast European artists, novelists and scientists.

## ► VII.5. CONSUMERISM

### VII-30. First self-service market in Ljubljana, 1959



Museum of Contemporary History, Ljubljana.




The first self-service market in Ljubljana was opened on Tito Street, the main street of the city, in 1959, a day before the most important national holiday in Yugoslavia, the Day of the Republic. Over the next couple of years, several other stores were opened, including the first department store called *Modna Hiša* (Fashion House) in 1961, which was the first to have escalators in Yugoslavia.



Why do you think there were so many people at the opening of the first self-service market in Ljubljana? Ask your grandparents how general stores used to look before the appearance of self-service markets.

### VII-31. Department stores in Athens



Pocket diary of 1957 which figures the new Dragonas building.

Chatziotis, 1999, p. 104.



Catering for the needs and aspirations of an increasingly consumerist milieu, a number of department stores opened in Athens from the mid-1950s onwards. The first such was Dragonas (est. 1938), the premises of which in 1955 comprised seven floors and four lifts, and served some 660 thousand customers. Nine years later, its main rival Minion boasted eight floors, moving staircases and the promise of installing an air-conditioned system by May 1965.

### VII-32. Coca-Cola as symbol of consumerism and of the West



Сн. 51. Кока-Кола, сп. Турист, 1965 г.

Турист [Tourist] magazine, 1965.



Advertisement of Coca-Cola: You will feel real pleasure, drinking Coca-Cola. Coca-Cola will become your favourite drink. Coca-Cola will refresh you and will quench your thirst.

### VII-33. A caricature about IZOLA household machines



“Don't worry, there's plenty for everyone!”

Caricature by K. Mitropoulos.



Established in 1930, the Izola company was the largest home appliance manufacturer in Greece until the 1990s, with a 50% share of the domestic market. Catering for improved living standards and the

corresponding rise of consumerism among Greeks, mostly in urban centres, its brand name became synonymous with “progress” or, as this 1959 advertisement explicitly declared, with the entry of “civilisation into the household”.

### VII-34. Tradition and innovation in Romanian rural occupations



At a small scale, the layout of this self-service shop corresponds to the Soviet-inspired urban model, which in this instance equalled modernisation. But the products on display did not cater to the villagers' real needs. Most goods on offer (e.g. bottles of alcoholic beverage and cans) were similar to what peasants “produced” at home. In this respect, the shop could be seen as an exhibition site. The article accompanying the photograph, titled “Tradition and innovation in rural occupations”, highlights this very discrepancy. Its author deplored the low number of small workshops or repair shops in the county of Ialomița. For their part, the heads of local organisations noted the absence of qualified workers in villages and the fact that crafts that had once been traditional were now neglected, such as basketwork. The article conveyed the view that the new regime's attempts to impose the state-controlled economy in villages as well had led to the destruction of family workshops and of small businesses, which were based on sound knowledge of the rural market and its labour capacity.



Într-unul Pădure, județul Mureș, cetățenii au la dispoziție un magazin cu autoservire, bine aprovizionat. Foto: V. MOLDOVAN

Tradiție și inovație  
în meseriile satului



*Satul Socialist*, no.1 (4 May 1969), p. 2.



Compare the more Western-style self-service market in Ljubljana with that in the Romanian village. Notice how women are dressed. Is it more in line with tradition or the modernism propagated by the communist regime?

### VII-35. Advertisement of Zastava in Egypt



TANJUG /Photo of Mioljub Jelesijevic.



Jugo (Yugo) was a car produced in the Zastava factory at Kragujevac in Serbia. From 1986 to 1991, Yugo cars were also sold in the United States.

### VII-36. Television



On the thirtieth anniversary of the first radio broadcast from Zagreb, on 15 May 1956 the first television broadcast in Yugoslavia went on air from that same city. In the beginning, due to lack of a home production, TV Zagreb broadcasted the Austrian programme. TV centres were also established in Belgrade and Ljubljana and then in the capital cities of the other republics and autonomous regions.

#### A. The first broadcast of the Zagreb television station

History repeats itself. Thirty years ago, the first listeners of Radio Zagreb were guests in taverns who followed broadcasts through headphones. Tonight at eight, something similar will happen. People who happen to be at the Republic Square at the time, and many will come just because of that, will be able to see the first programme of the future Zagreb radio and television station. Over

the past few days, hurried preparations are underway to put up television sets in Tomislav house on Sljeme, and antennae have been hoisted at several locations in the city.


*Vjesnik*, 15 May 1956.

#### B. Television programme in Croatia

Graz television programme broadcasts. Regular television broadcasts on Tuesdays, Thursdays, Saturdays and Sundays between 20.00 and 21.30 hours. Youth programmes on Thursdays and Sundays, between 17.00 and 18.00 hours.

*Vjesnik*, 15 May 1956.

#### C. Production of TV sets



Museum of Contemporary History, Ljubljana.




In 1956 Television Ljubljana (*Televizija Ljubljana*) broadcasted for the first time, prompting the purchase of 985 television sets. In 1958 an additional 3,000 television sets were registered, while in 1959 there were as many as 13,208. Soon, key home appliance manufacturers such as Gorenje and Iskra began to produce home-made television sets. Iskra's television set was considered an example of modern design.



In Yugoslavia, TV broadcasting began in the second half of the 1950s. Compare it with the situation in your country. Describe the early TV programme (source VII-36B). How many hours per day was the programme broadcasted? Talk to your relatives and find out what life was like before television and the Internet. What information and entertainment means were available?

## VII-37. Design displays for alcoholic drinks, grapes, and dairy products in Bulgaria (1956)



Marinski et al, 1956, p. 82.

## VII-38. Shortages of everyday goods

### A. A list of goods in short supply in Bulgaria (1979)

1. Furniture (corner beds, wall units, coffee tables, children's room furniture)
2. Smoked fish
3. Cheese curds
4. Toilet paper
5. Sugar (in almost all shops)
6. Detergents
7. Haricot beans
8. Olives
9. Meat (some kinds)
10. Baby food
11. Apples (only in some shops)
12. Biscuits (assortment)
13. Paprika
14. Baking soda
15. Red peppers
16. Fresh fish and anchovies
17. Hotplates
18. Batteries
19. Heaters for *Mehta* electric cookers
20. Spare parts for some cars (socket bolts, pistons, indicators, etc.)
21. Beer (assortment)
22. *Vero* dishwashing liquid
23. Some kinds of chocolate
24. Mayonnaise
25. Cement

Central State Archives, file 15, inv. 55, a.u. 808.

**B. Queuing for sugar in Bucharest (May 1982)**



<http://forum.romanian-portal.com/threads/16502-Trecutul-in-fotografii/page17>, accessed on 22.11.2015.



Use your knowledge and information from sources (also from ch. VIII.3) and make a list with the causes of shortages in some countries of Southeast Europe at the end of the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s. Which were the goods in short supply?

### VII-39. Light industry in Turkey



The first domestic production of washing machines in Turkey began in 1959. Because of overly expensive prices, every woman's dream of purchasing a washing machine could not be realised. In an attempt to increase their circulation, in the 1960s some newspapers began to offer their readers a number of home electrical appliances (washing machines, refrigerators), as well as modern apartments.



Translation: The lucky ones who won a washing machine this week.

*Milliyet newspaper, 1966.*



Try to imagine how life was at home without any electrical machines. How did

home electrical appliances influence women's emancipation?

## ► VII.6. TOURISM

### VII-40. Minutes of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party, on the closure of disco Club 33 at Sunny Beach resort, 21 October 1969

Club 33, or the so-called "Swedish disco", is shrouded in some secrecy that arouses the unhealthy curiosity of Bulgarian youth, not just of those staying at the resort but also of those from Burgas. Many people from the interior of the country come [to the resort] because they are especially interested in the goings-on at the disco. For nights on end, groups [of young people] crowd in front of the club, hoping to be let in despite the prohibition in place, but there are also others who regularly make their way inside [the disco] and subsequently become some of its most enthusiastic advocates [...]. The [interior] decoration of the club is extremely naturalistic, vulgar and cynical. A large poster depicts a three-headed horse-legged monster carrying a torn human corpse and gnawing at human bones. Another poster depicts a naked man by the name of Frank Zappa sitting on a potty; apparently he

is the idol of the club [...]. At night-time parties loud music is played through an amplifying system late into the night, accompanied by erotic dancing, with the electric lights switched off. Clubbers wear extravagant, provocative clothes, have long dirty hair, and propagate and practice "absolute freedom" above all in the sexual sphere [...]. In view of all the information collected, Club 33 will be closed down, and a Bulgarian disco club will be opened in its place next year.

Central State Archives, file 15, inv. 36, a.u. 676.

### VII-41. Greek Tourist Organisation



By the mid-1960s, the tourist industry in Greece had taken off as a result of the growing prosperity of the Western world, the multiple attractions of the country, as well as the sustained efforts of the in-house promotion department of the Greek Tourist Organisation. This poster by the graphic designer Freddie Carabott won the second prize at the 1962 International Tourist Poster Exhibition of Leghorn (Italy).

# griechenland



Carabott & Katzourakis, 2008, p. 119.

VII-42. Poster for Yugoslav Air Transport (JAT), 1960



### VII-43. Architectural modernism and the tourist industry



Hotel Haludovo, Malinska, Croatia.

<http://pogledaj.to/arhitektura/ljetovanja-u-socijalizmu-pa-u-tranziciji/>, accessed on 18.08.2016.



After its fallout with the USSR, Yugoslavia also broke off with socialist realism. Alongside culture and art, this transformation was parti-

cularly reflected in architecture. Excellent examples are hotels on the Adriatic coast which often represented architectural masterpieces.




JAT (Jugoslovenski Aerotransport) was launched on 1 April 1947. Until the mid-1950s, because of the country's isolation, air transport was limited to domestic flights. However, in the early 1960s, the number of Yugoslav citizens travelling abroad began to increase, reaching some two million by the late 1970s. This was due to rising living standards, fewer obstacles in the issuing of passports, visa-waiver agreements

with a number of countries and the liberalisation of the banking system that allowed the opening of bank accounts in foreign currency. Leisure and holiday needs apart, travel abroad constituted an opportunity to purchase goods, such as textile garments and spare parts for cars, that were in short supply within Yugoslavia. The most popular destination of Yugoslav "consumerist" tourism was Trieste.



Designer: B. Spremo, Art Museum Zagreb.

### VII-44. Tourists' overnight stays in Croatia 1946-1990



Duda, 2010, p. 328.



1. Explore how tourism developed in each Southeast European country. Which countries could be considered as having a tourist industry? Find visual material on advertisements of tourist destinations, and statistics and oral testimonies about tourist experiences.

2. Compare with sources from ch. VII.7 on workers' resorts and discuss various styles of tourism and social discrimination.

### VII-45. The Hotel Hilton in Istanbul (1959)



[https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Hilton\\_Istanbul,\\_1959.jpg#/media/File:Hilton\\_Istanbul,\\_1959.jpg](https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Hilton_Istanbul,_1959.jpg#/media/File:Hilton_Istanbul,_1959.jpg), accessed on 18.08.2016.



Designed by a US firm with Sedad Hakki Eldem as the local collaborating architect, the Hilton Hotel was built between 1952 and 1955. It represents the fashion of "Americanism" in architecture but also in lifestyle, consumer goods and middle-class wealth, observed in Turkey and in many other countries in the 1950s.

## ► VII.7. SOCIAL POLICY

### VII-46. Workers' resorts

#### MULTI-COLOURED SUNSHADES

There are many workers' resorts in our republic along the Adriatic coast from Neum to Baška Voda [...]. There are three types of organised workers' resorts. The first is permanent workers' resorts. Either purchased by pooling their funds or built by workers' collectives, these resorts are jointly used by all labour organisations or OOUR [basic organisations of associated labour] of a SOUR [complex organisation of associated labour]. The second type is the so-called temporary workers' resorts. Tourist workers call them trade union resorts because they exist only as long as the sun shines on the coast, with is about three months. The third type of organised workers' resorts combines accommodation and board in private homes. Those who invested in the social standard in the past are now in a better position. Many

of our enterprises have their own resorts at "B" category hotels. We visited the Đuro Salaj hotel in Gradac, which belongs to the labour organisation of the SOUR Tito Coal Mines of Tuzla. Miners and their families from nearly all mines in our republic holiday here. [...]. In the pre-season and post-season, ill and feeble workers, who need rehabilitation in order to return to work, stay here for free. Everything here is good. [...]

*Oslobođenje, god. XL, br. 12608, Sarajevo, 30.7.1983, p. 8.*



In June 1947 the government of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia issued a decree that gave the right to everyone who worked for 11 months to have at least 14 days of leave with full pay, while shock workers and those working under difficult conditions were given as many as 30 days of paid leave. Trade union members could travel at half price on all public means of transport, except airplanes. A system of social tourism based on workers' resorts had begun.



Tourism was regarded as a social, health and cultural activity necessary to all, but also as a sign of material and cultural progress. New habits were being shaped, and tourism even needed to be imposed, as workers sometimes refused referrals that enabled them to stay at a trade union resort. The rejection of this aspect of modernisation was seen by the authorities as a sign of the workers' slow integration in the working class and its industrial culture. In the mid-1960s, a number of reforms with respect to tourism were implemented, which focused on foreign guests and foreign currency earnings. As a result, the share of workers' resorts in the overall tourist capacity of Croatia dropped from around 30% in the 1950s to 10% in the 1970s.

## VII-47. Family policy in Yugoslavia

### CONSTITUTION OF THE FEDERATIVE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA

Article 24. The state especially protects the interests of mothers and children through the establishment of maternity hospitals, children's homes and day nurseries, as well as through the provision of paid leave before and after childbirth.

*Official Gazette, no. 10 (1946).*



Maternity leave was guaranteed by the Constitution of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia in 1946. Until 1981 maternity leave was granted for a period of six months, and thereafter for a period of twelve months.

## VII-48. Extracts from the 1972 Romanian Labour Code on "Women's and Young People's Labour"

Art. 151 (2). Women in employment enjoy special health protection and are provided with the necessary means for caring and educating their children.

Art. 152 (1). Pregnant and breastfeeding women will neither be placed in a harmful, difficult or dangerous work environment nor asked to work extra-hours.

Art. 152 (2). Pregnant and breastfeeding women who are concerned by the conditions described in the above paragraph will be transferred to other workplaces, with no risk of wage decrease.

Art. 154. From the sixth month of pregnancy and until they stop breastfeeding women will not be assigned to night shifts.

Art. 155 (1). Women have the right to paid maternity leave; 52 days of pre-natal and 60 days of post-natal leave.

Art. 156 (1). The units have to make sure that women benefit from breaks during their working programme; these breaks should last at least half an hour, every three hours, and are meant for the child's feeding and care. The time the women need in order to go to and to come back from the place where the child is shall not be counted as part of the break, but added to the break. The whole period of time meant for the feeding of the baby plus the time necessary for the way forth and back cannot exceed 2 hours per working day. These breaks should be guaranteed until the child turns 9 months and could be prolonged to 12 months in case of premature or dystrophic children or children with special care needs, based on medical recommendations.

Art. 156 (2). On a mother's demand, breaks for child feeding and care can be replaced with a two working-hour reduction from the normal daily programme.

Art. 156 (3). Breaks and working-hour reduction with a view to feeding and care are included in the working programme and have no consequences upon remuneration or other financial rights.

Art. 157. Upon medical consideration, women with children under the age of three are guaranteed paid leave for child care, which is not part of the annual leave.

Art. 158. Women with children under the age of six can work part time unless they make use of nurseries; This period of part-time work shall be considered, when the working years are calculated [for pension], a full-time working period.

*Buletinul Oficial al Republicii Socialiste România (Official Gazette of the Socialist Republic of Romania), part I, no. 140 (1 December 1972), p. 1183.*



Find regulations and laws on social benefits (vacation in workers' resorts, pensions, maternity leave, day care, health insurance, etc.) during and after the socialist period. Also examine schooling and sport facilities. Then compare with the situation in countries such as Greece, Turkey and Cyprus at the same period. Discuss your findings.

► VII.8. SPORT

VII-49. Nadia Comăneci



Nadia Comăneci, Unconditional Olympic Champion The high artistry of our champion was again rewarded with maximum [10 out of 10] grades in the parallel bars and the balance beam. Yesterday Nadia was far ahead from her main opponents, Nelli Kim and Ludmila Turischeva. A very good result [was secured] by another representative of our country, Teodora Ungureanu: fourth place.

NADIA COMĂNECI, THE BEST GYMNAST IN THE WORLD! – Here is a piece of news that we hurry to communicate to the editorial staff, though we are very much aware that millions of TV viewers across the country watched this exceptional result achieved here, at the Forum, in front of an overcrowded hall, by our great gymnast. Apart from the qualities we were aware of – perfect technical mastery, virtuosity, perseverance, resoluteness–, we realised this evening the great self-control that she demonstrated over two hours of contest. She knew very well that she had to resist the assault of her strong opponents, the Soviet gymnasts Nelli Kim, Ludmila Turischeva, Olga Korbut, as well as her team mate Teodora Ungureanu. Nadia Comăneci, with her famous composure, performed exceptionally in all four events of the competition, getting again two maximal grades [...]. After the four titles she earned at the 1975 European Championship, Nadia Comăneci now holds the greatest prize a sports person can aim at: the golden Olympic medal.

*Sportul*, 23 July 1976.

VII-50. Atina Bojadzi



Radenkovic, 2001, p. 76.



Atina Bojadzi, the star of marathon swimming in the Socialist Republic of Macedonia and the Yugoslav Federation, was born in Ohrid on 13 March 1944. At the 1962 international swimming marathon in Ohrid, Bojadzi became the youngest world freshwater marathon swimming champion. Having swum from Capri to Naples, also in 1962, Bojadzi became saltwater marathon world champion as well. She won numerous titles at national and international events. The peak of her swimming career was when she swam across the English Channel on 9 September 1969. She was the

first Balkan woman to complete this feat. Aleksandar Gjurginov's 1977 film *Rise Up, Delfina*, with the famous Yugoslav actress Neda Arnerić in the title role, was made in her honour. Bojadzi later came to be a trainer. She first worked for Belgrade's Red Star club, and then moved to Los Angeles, where she worked at a sports centre. She moved to Sarajevo in late 1991, only to find herself in the midst of a military siege. She managed to leave, and returned to the Republic of Macedonia. Ohrid's sports complex is named after her. She died in Skopje on 28 December 2010.

### VII-51. Yugoslavia winning the 1970 Basketball World Championship



Edi Šelhaus/Svetozar Busić (photographer); Museum of Contemporary History, Ljubljana.



The Basketball World Championship was held for the first time outside South America in Yugoslavia in 1970. The qualifying rounds were hosted in Sarajevo, Split and Karlovac, whereas the final rounds in Ljubljana. As hosts, Yugoslavia

went straight into the final rounds. In the final, Yugoslavia beat the USA and won the world champion title. The fans displayed a banner at the game, which read: "You've got the Moon, we've got the gold".

## VII-52. "Ready for Ever": The Spartakiade in Albania, 1989



Photographer Roland Tasho.



The Spartakiade was an interwar international sports event "controlled" by the Soviet Union, which hosted it five times from 1928 to 1937 as a counterpart to the "bourgeois" Olympic Games. In the post-war period, Spartakiade were held in countries of the Eastern Bloc. The name of the event was inspired by Spartacus who led a slave rebellion in the Roman Empire and it was intended to

symbolise proletarian internationalism. Spartakiade constituted public manifestations of youth readiness and loyalty to the Party, and of a healthy and joyful socialist youth. In Albania, six Spartakiade were held (in 1959, 1969, 1974, 1979, 1984, and 1989). The photo was taken in November 1989 on the occasion of the forty-fifth anniversary of the liberation of the country.


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## CHAPTER VIII: TIMES OF CRISES

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## ► INTRODUCTION

Constructed in 1961, with its forty-five thousand concrete blocks, the Berlin Wall would become one of the major symbols of the Cold War and totalitarian regimes. In the first years after its completion, hardly anyone suspected that the crisis of socialism would unfold in the countries of Eastern Europe; a crisis that would lead to the dismantling of the oppressing blocks and mark the collapse of a whole world of cultural divisions, confrontations and battles for identity. The attempts to reform and liberalise the communist system – most notably, Czechoslovakia's move towards “socialism with a human face”, with greater freedom of thought and public expression, and successive measures in Hungary to boost economic life by allowing some private enterprise – were made while keeping intact the overall economic and ideological framework. In the 1970s and 1980s, however, the tendency towards stagnation, epitomised by Leonid Brezhnev, intensified in the Soviet Union, holding back ideas for reforming the system in the countries of the Soviet bloc. Keeping the balance between the centralised development of heavy industry, agriculture and the other branches of the economy was not an easy task despite mutual cooperation in COMECON. Within their economic space, socialist countries were by no means immune from global developments; for instance, in the 1970s their financial situation worsened due to high oil prices. This specific vulnerability grew because of the heavy price paid for the arms race, for proxy wars and conflicts, and for the financial support of friendly regimes and movements in the Third World. As the West's strategy of “containment” included the economic embargo of the East, the negative tendencies in the command economic model deepened, and it became less competitive against the background of post-industrial Western consumerism.

A number of events hinted at the collapse of the communist regimes in Southeast Europe. Josip Broz Tito, the “soft dictator” in the Balkans, died in 1980. The only communist leader in Europe who had succeeded in overthrowing the domination of the Soviet Union, he resolutely upheld the federative principle throughout his rule. In the 1960s he opened up Yugoslavia to the resources and capital of the developing countries as well as to the economic and cultural models of the West, imposing by force the model of a multi-ethnic socialist

federation in which the different communities and religions coexisted peacefully under the umbrella of the communist ideal. Yet it took only a decade for Yugoslavia to be gripped by a brutal war, a decade in which a grave economic crisis gained momentum, constitutional arrangements were revised, and strong nationalist attitudes were cultivated. Not that those other socialist countries avoided the crisis of communist values and the decentralisation of political and economic power. All of them experienced rising levels of foreign debt and economic instability, which inevitably also affected the authority of the leaders of the Party and the state. For example, after Romania sold 30% of its gold reserves in order to pay its foreign debt, the economic situation in the country worsened considerably, and Nicolae Ceaușescu came to be increasingly seen as a merciless dictator with megalomaniac tendencies. His declining image suffered a final blow when he ordered the construction of the House of the Republic (*Casa Republicii*), a gigantic palace that was to house the government and communist party, and of the Victory of Socialism Boulevard (*Bulevardul Victoria Socialismului*) that led to it, thus destroying a part of the historical centre of Bucharest.

The crisis of socialism was compounded by the emergence of new social hierarchies that were imposed by the regimes of different countries. Above all, there was a growing chasm between the ever more privileged Party elites and ordinary citizens who, deprived of access to some economic and social benefits, became more sensitive to the political and administrative arbitrariness in place and the absence of basic freedoms. This, in turn, totally undermined the ideological clichés of peace, internationalism, democratic pluralism and socialism with a human face, which came to be regarded as a sort of information blackout and cover-up of the crisis in all spheres of social life. Following the example of the mass protests headed by the independent anti-communist Solidarity trade union in Poland, various dissident movements appeared, organisations seeking international assistance were created, and a wide range of *samizdat* (unofficial) publishing activities were undertaken. As the well-known Bulgarian dissident and the country's first democratically elected president Zhelyu Zhelev put it, this was “the great time of the intelligentsia”.

The resistance against the communist regimes in the Balkans was inspired by what was known in the 1980s as the “Helsinki Spirit” – the establishment and consolidation of international standards in the sphere of human rights and freedoms as the basis for shaping a critical social potential. At the same time, the Party and its leaders began to be accused of abuse of power, corruption and usurpation of the common good. Individuals and groups among younger generations which, as a whole, had been successfully indoctrinated with Marxist ideals by the Komsomol and Pioneer Children’s organisations for years, also became critical of the political and cultural vacuum of late socialism. Finding refuge in various subcultural forms influenced by the West, they embarked on their difficult journey to freedom and democracy. From listening to Vladimir Vysotsky, the Russian poet and singer-songwriter who was immensely popular in the Soviet Union and throughout Eastern Europe, to imitating the lifestyle of iconic rock, punk, and New Wave musicians, young people refused to conform to the sterile, grey and dull world of large parades, addresses by Party officials and meaningless Komsomol events.

The ruling elites chose to respond to attacks from the intelligentsia and subcultural youth movements with nationalist arguments in what was a specific attempt to redirect social criticism at minority communities and to manipulate existing tensions and fears. This was evident not only in Yugoslavia, but also in the case of the Hungarian minority in Romania, as well as minorities in other countries. In Bulgaria, a mass compulsory campaign to rename the Bulgarian Turks, aiming at their ethnic assimilation, was conducted in 1984-1985. The repression ended with the forced emigration of thousands of citizens to Turkey. Shortly before the fall of the Berlin Wall, there were celebrations on the occasion of the 600th anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo Polje (28 June 1989), with over a million participants – a sinister sign of the triumphant return of nationalism in a country whose motto was “brotherhood and unity”.

Meanwhile, in 1985, a comparatively young, dynamic and liberal-minded (as compared with his predecessors) leader had come to power in the Soviet Union: Mikhail Gorbachev. He proclaimed a new course of *perestroika* (restructuring) and *glasnost* (openness) – an attempt at economic and social reforms combined with an open public sphere. But the various initiatives and improvisations undertaken to this end, led to ideological chaos and growing discontent with the

economic and social crisis. Gorbachev’s concept of reforms in the economy, society and the Party resonated in all socialist countries and led to at least superficial changes in the structure of power and economic relations. On paper, at least, more rights were granted to private sector producers and companies. Party cadres began to speak of *glasnost* and of lifting censorship on the media and the arts. The crisis of the communist system deepened after the latter was opened up, and Gustáv Husák in Czechoslovakia and János Kádár in Hungary tendered their resignations. At last came 1989, the year of miracles and revolutions. On 10 September Hungary opened its borders with Austria and thousands of East German refugees fled to the West. In October Erich Honecker, the leader of East Germany, also resigned. On 9 November East Germany opened its borders with West Germany, the Berlin Wall fell and the world entered a new era.

The Berlin Wall, the Iron Curtain and generally insurmountable cultural boundaries were not a priority only of the “cold-warring” socialist and capitalist countries. The powerful economic and foreign policy factors of this global antagonism left their imprint on the whole world, while various potential conflicts also had regional or bilateral dimensions. On the other side of the Iron Curtain, relations between Greece and Turkey and the foundations of the Western world in general – in the face of international organisations like UN and the Council of Europe – were put under severe strain by the Cyprus crisis in 1974. The Greek junta’s coup against Makarios and the Turkish invasion which resulted in the Turkish occupation of the northern part of the island were not only the climax of a series of crises which had erupted during the previous decade, but also the starting point of a major and complex global issue which was meant to go through new critical phases during the 1990s and the 2000s and which, in 2016, remains still open.

This chapter unravels the various crises that developed in various places of Southeast Europe, mainly in the 1980s. From the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in July 1974 to the “Romanian Revolution” in December 1989, a series of political and economic crises, which were not only local but also global, paved the way for the dramatic changes of the 1990s. In fact, this chapter needs to be studied in dialogue with chapter I of volume 2, where the collapse of the communist regime in Bulgaria as well as the path to the disintegration of Yugoslavia are presented in more detail.

## ► VIII.1. CYPRUS 1974

### VIII-1. The Greek junta's coup against Makarios



On 15 July 1974, on the orders of the Greek junta, Greek-Cypriot forces with the support of officers from mainland Greece and the ultra-nationalist underground organisation EOKA B, launched a coup against the President of the Republic of Cyprus, Archbishop Makarios. Makarios fled the presidential palace and later in the day addressed a short message to the "Greek-Cypriot people" that was aired by Radio Paphos. The coup served as the pretext for the first Turkish invasion of the island on 20 July, which in turn led to the collapse of the junta in Athens four days later.

### A. Transcript of Makarios's radio-broadcast (15 July 1974)

Greek-Cypriot People!

Familiar is the voice you're hearing. You know who is speaking. I'm Makarios. I'm the one you elected to be your leader. I'm not dead, as the junta in Athens and its representatives here would have wanted. I'm alive and I'm on your side, fellow-fighter and standard bearer in the common struggle.

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tRvAxp5tcUM>,  
accessed on 26.08.2016.

### B. The Archbishop's palace after the coup



Press and Communication Office, Republic of Cyprus.



The two sources depict the situation in Cyprus following the coup and the assassination attempt on President Makarios's life. Describe the photo and comment on Makarios's statement: "I am not dead, as the junta in Athens and its representatives here would have wanted". Why did the Athens junta want Makarios dead? Bear in mind that after the attempt, the Greek media (controlled by the junta) reported him dead.

## VIII-2. The Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974



The Turkish invasion of Cyprus, named "Operation Attila" by the army and "Operation Peace" by the government, led to the division of the island. It forced some 160,000 Greek Cypriots to hurriedly "migrate" as refugees to the southern part of the island. A few months later, the great majority of the Turkish Cypriots who lived in the south were willingly transferred in the northern part of the island. More than 4,000 Greek Cypriots were killed and about 1,600 persons were reported missing. During the retaliation measures by the Greek Cypriot National Guard and paratroopers, about 350 Turkish Cypriots were killed and some 450 were reported missing. A UN committee is still investigating the fate of the missing persons of both sides. Many of them are already identified as dead. The General Assembly of the UN, with the Resolution 3212/74, asked for the withdrawal of all foreign soldiers from Cyprus, but this never occurred. The Security Council adopted the resolution with its own Resolutions 365/74 and 367/75, and called the two sides to start a negotiation process under the goodwill services of the UN Secretary General. In 1975 the Turkish Cypriot side unilaterally proclaimed the establishment of the "Turkish Federated State of Cyprus". Their leaders implied by this that the final solution of the Cyprus problem would be the establishment of a loose Federation, where two federated states, a Greek Cypriot and a Turkish Cypriot one, would form a kind of an entity.

### A. Speech by Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit, 20 July 1974

The Turkish Armed Forces have begun to land and deploy troops in Cyprus. May Allah bring good luck to our nation, all Cypriots and humanity. We believe that in this way we will offer a great service to humanity and peace. I hope that no fire will be opened against our forces and no bloody conflict occurs. Actually we go to the Island to bring peace, not to wage war; to bring peace not only to Turks, but also to Rums [Greek Cypriots].

We were obliged to make this decision only after exhausting all political and diplomatic means. I feel obliged to mention my gratitude to all our friends and allies, and especially the United States of America and Great Britain, with which we have been in close consultation lately, for their well-intended efforts in solving the problem without [military] intervention through diplomatic means. If these efforts were not successful, surely the fault does not lie with these well-intentioned states.

Once again I wish that this operation is auspicious for all humanity, our nation and all Cypriots. I wish that Allah protects our nation and humanity from disasters.

[https://tr.wikisource.org/wiki/B%C3%BClent\\_Ecevit%27in\\_K%C4%B1br%C4%B1s\\_Bar%C4%B1%C5%9F\\_Harek%C3%A2t%C4%B1\\_Konu%C5%9Fmas%C4%B1](https://tr.wikisource.org/wiki/B%C3%BClent_Ecevit%27in_K%C4%B1br%C4%B1s_Bar%C4%B1%C5%9F_Harek%C3%A2t%C4%B1_Konu%C5%9Fmas%C4%B1), accessed on 26.08.2016.



Bülent Ecevit (1925-2006) was the leader of the Republican People's Party/CHP (Kemalist). He won the elections of 1973, campaigning on a "Centre-Left" platform, and headed a coalition government with the National Salvation Party (Islamist) of Necmettin Erbakan. In 1989 he became the leader of the Democratic Left Party (DSP). He served as prime minister of Turkey in 1974, 1977, 1978-79 and 1999-2002.



Read the key and document VIII-2A. Which arguments does Bülent Ecevit put forward as regards the Turkish invasion of Cyprus? Why does he speak about peace?

## B. Relatives of missing persons of the 1974 Turkish invasion protesting



Press and Communication Office, Republic of Cyprus.

### VIII-3. Towards a settlement or a breakdown (1977-1983)

In February 1977 President Makarios and the Turkish Cypriot leader R. Denktaş agreed to negotiate in order to achieve a bi-communal federal state with two areas which would be under the administration of each community. In August 1977 President Makarios died, but several efforts for negotiating a solution kept on under the UN mandate. In 1979 the leaders of the two communities, Sp. Kyprianou and R. Denktaş, concluded a new and more elaborate agreement ("The 10-Point Agreement").

Between 1979 and 1983 the two successive UN Secretary Generals Kurt Waldheim and Pérez de Cuéllar submitted ideas for proceeding to a negotiation. The framework called "Ideas", which was submitted by Pérez de Cuéllar, came to a dead end in 1983. After this failure, in November 1983, Turkish Cypriot leaders abandoned the "Turkish Federated State of Cyprus" and declared the "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus"; a "state" recognised only by Turkey till today.

### A. High-Level Agreement of 12 February 1977

1. We are seeking an independent, non-aligned, bi-communal Federal Republic.

2. The territory under the administration of each community should be discussed in the light of economic viability or productivity and land ownership.

3. Questions of principles like freedom of movement, freedom of settlement, the right of property and other specific matters, are open for discussion, taking into consideration the fundamental basis of a bi-communal federal system and certain practical difficulties which may arise for the Turkish Cypriot Community.

4. The powers and functions of the central federal government will be such as to safeguard the unity of the country having regard to the bi-communal character of the State.

<http://www.moi.gov.cy/moi/pio/pio.nsf/7e10bb4ee842cb7ec2257076004d01da/263fd94aa15b6f2dc2256d6d00311d48?OpenDocument>, accessed on 27.8.2016.

### B. Declaration by the Parliament of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus on the establishment of the independent "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus" (TRNC), 15 November 1983



The declaration of statehood was presented as a manifestation of the Turkish Cypriot people's right of self-determination. The Security Council of the UN met on 17 and 18 November 1983 and adopted Resolution 541 which described the attempt to establish the "TRNC" as "legally invalid", called for the withdrawal of the Declaration of Independence, and asked all countries not to recognise the new Republic. The Turkish Cypriots argued that the Security Council was a political organisation concerned with peace and security, and not a judicial organisation competent to judge the "legality" or "validity" of states.

Our Assembly,  
Representing the free will of the Turkish Cypriot People;  
Believing that all human beings, who are born free and equal, should live in a free and equal [society];

Having declared the right of the Turkish Cypriot People to self-determination, by its Resolution of 17 June 1983;

Rejecting discrimination between human beings on grounds of race, national origins, language, religion or any other grounds; and rejecting also all forms of colonialism, racism, oppression and domination;

Expressing the hope that peace and stability will prevail and that freedom and human rights will flourish not only in Cyprus, but also in the Eastern Mediterranean, the Middle East and the world at large;

Believing that each of the two Peoples in Cyprus has the right to live and govern itself in its own territory in peace and security, and has the right to preserve its own national identity;

Firmly adhering to the view that these two Peoples, who are destined to co-exist side by side on the island, can and must find peaceful, just and durable solutions to their differences, through negotiations on the basis of equality;

Firmly convinced that the proclamation of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus will not hinder but facilitate the re-establishment of the partnership between the two Peoples within a federal framework, and will also facilitate the settlement of the problems between them;

Earnestly hoping that negotiations will be carried out on the basis of equality and under the auspices of the UN Secretary General with a view to resolving in a peaceful and conciliatory manner all the outstanding issues between the two Peoples, and convinced that the proposed Summit Meeting would be useful in this regard;

Acting on behalf of the Turkish Cypriot People, approves the establishment of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus and the Declaration of Independence.

Expressing the legitimate and irrepressible will of the Turkish Cypriot People, we hereby declare before the world and history the establishment of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus as an independent state.

On this historic day, we reiterate our gratitude to our Martyrs who sacrificed their lives in order that the Turkish Cypriot People may never again be subjected to servitude under foreign domination and may live in dignity and freedom. May God's mercy be upon our Martyrs.

[https://tr.wikisource.org/wiki/Kuzey\\_K%C4%B1br%C4%B1s\\_T%C3%BCrk\\_Cumhuriyeti'nin\\_Ba%C4%9F%C4%B1ms%C4%B1zlı%C4%B1k\\_Bildirgesi](https://tr.wikisource.org/wiki/Kuzey_K%C4%B1br%C4%B1s_T%C3%BCrk_Cumhuriyeti'nin_Ba%C4%9F%C4%B1ms%C4%B1zlı%C4%B1k_Bildirgesi), accessed on 26.08.2016.

### C. UN Resolution 541 of 18 November 1983

*The Security Council, [...]*

1. Deplores the declaration of the Turkish Cypriot authorities of the purported secession of the Republic of Cyprus,

2. *Considers* the declaration referred to above as legally invalid and calls for its withdrawal,

[...]

6. *Calls upon* all States to respect the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and non-alignment of the Republic of Cyprus,

7. *Calls upon* all States not to recognise any Cypriot state other than the Republic of Cyprus,

8. *Calls upon* all States and the two communities in Cyprus to refrain from any action which might exacerbate the situation,

[...]

Adopted at the 2500th meeting by 13 votes to 1 against (Pakistan) with one abstention (Jordan).

United Nations, Security Council Resolutions, 1983, <https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/453/99/IMG/NR045399.pdf?OpenElement>, accessed on 26.08.2016.

## ► VIII.2. YUGOSLAVIA IN THE 1980s

### VIII-4. Mihailo Đurić and his arguments against the new Constitution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (1974)



The new Constitution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was promulgated in 1974. It provided for the further decentralisation and federalisation of the country by granting the right of veto to all republics, as well as to the autonomous provinces that were part of the Republic of Serbia. The makers of the Constitution claimed that it was the only way to preserve Yugoslavia, while its critics, for the most part from Serbia, argued that it would lead to its dissolution. The Constitution's promulgation was preceded by a series of political events that marked the beginning of federalisation: the Brijuni Plenum of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia; the student demonstrations and the Kosovo demonstrations in 1968; the constitutional amendments of 1968, 1971 and 1972; the Croatian Spring; and the fall of the "liberals" in Serbia in autumn of 1972 (see ch. III.5.3). During the public hearings on the draft of the Constitution, Mihailo Đurić, a professor at the Belgrade Faculty of Law, was sent to prison as in his speech he had publicly opposed the planned constitutional changes.

#### A. Mihailo Đurić on the constitutional debate

It must be said straight away that the proposed constitutional amendment fundamentally changes the



1. According to the key, "The declaration of statehood was presented as a manifestation of the Turkish Cypriot people's right of self-determination". Find elements that support this view in the Declaration by the Parliament of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus on the establishment of the independent "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus" (TRNC) of 15 November 1983.

2. The "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus" was recognised only by Turkey, while the UN Resolution 541 (1983) "considers the declaration referred to above as legally invalid and calls for its withdrawal". Why do you think this happened? Discuss.

character of the hitherto state union of the Yugoslav peoples. This amendment, in fact, rejects the very idea of such a state. If anything remains of it, that will be only because in the next, the so-called, second stage of changes we should still have something to bring to an end. We must be quite clear that Yugoslavia is already only a geographical concept since on its territory or, more precisely, on its ruins, under the mask of the consistent development of equality among its peoples, several independent, even mutually antagonistic national states have been established. This fact should be looked at straight in the eye [...]. It is more important to point out here that the position of the Serbs is already unequal in relation to the other nations. Thus, the proposed constitutional amendment is ultimately aimed against their core interests. The ultimate consequence of this amendment would be their complete disintegration. Obviously, the borders the Socialist Republic of Serbia today are incomplete; they are neither the national nor the historical borders of the Serbian people [...]. Do I really need to remind you that around 40 percent of Serbs live outside Serbia proper, or that their number is nearly equal to the number of Croats in the Socialist Republic of Croatia, i.e. the total number of Slovenes, Macedonians and Muslims? At a time when, by force of circumstances, they were placed in a position of having again to establish their national state, can the Serbian people be indifferent towards such a large part of its people living outside the present borders of the Socialist Republic of Serbia?

Đurić, 1971, pp. 230-233.

## B. Latinka Perović, historian and Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist League of Serbia, on the constitutional debate

Q. What is your assessment of the 1974 Constitution from the standpoint of the survival of Yugoslavia?

A. I believe it should be seen as an attempt to prepare Yugoslavia for the post-Tito era, as an assessment of the process of integration that had already begun on a European scale [...]. It brought about a chaotic electoral system, practically impossible to implement, but it still aspired to an agreement within Yugoslav society community for some sort of a framework under which all [nationalities] could live. Everyone was making fun of the verb “to federate”, but for me it is quite normal, really!

Q. The case of Professor Đurić is frequently mentioned. [What is your view?]

A. From the beginning of the constitutional debates, the debates on the 1971 constitutional amendments held at the [Belgrade] Faculty of Law, he was critical, he said that it was a revision of the Constitution of Yugoslavia. It was an interpretation of Yugoslavia from the standpoint of Greater Serbia! They didn't [bother] him for a long time, he was arrested only after we [i.e. the liberals] had already left, and today [his arrest] is blamed on us, it has remained as a stigma [...]. This stigma, that we had banned him, that we were false liberals, that we were in fact true Stalinists, comes from the fact that we were not nationalists, and that we believed that Yugoslavia should live on a consensus and an agreement of sorts [...]. The way we conducted it was to show that the Constitution wasn't, and never was, against the interests of Serbia, it was ultimately a new version of Yugoslavia.

Milosavljević, 2010, pp. 47, 163, 164.

## VIII-5. Demonstrations in Kosovo in 1981

### A. Kosovo communists assessing the events

#### BEHIND DEMAGOGIC SLOGANS – HOSTILE ACTS

Workers, citizens and the youth of Kosovo witnessed with great concern the demonstrations and the “excessive” situation created lately in Priština and certain other parts of the Province, condemning them in the most severe and determined manner, because they understood quite clearly the hostile background of the forces [behind them]. [...]

The demonstrations, which were organised by

hostile elements, even though they used as a starting point slogans for better conditions, actually were designed to ruin what our workers from ranks of all nations and nationalities had realised with great efforts, in order to cause unrest, to create distrust, to worsen inter-ethnic relations and to undermine our coexistence. Nevertheless, they did not manage and will never manage to achieve this aim. When the students and the people saw the true face of the organisers and realised that the demonstrations were totally hostile, they began to withdraw. [...]

Today, as in the past, our workers are determined to increase productivity, our farmers to cultivate the land, and our students and pupils to take in their lessons. Only in this way we will contribute further to our rapid development along the lines of socialist governance and consequently to the realisation of the historical interests of our working class and our nationalities, to the strengthening of unity and coexistence, to our socialist Yugoslav patriotism and the unimpeded development of our socialist self-governing community, to our Yugoslavia, to Tito's Yugoslavia.

*Rilindja*, 5 April 1981.



The first issue of the Kosovo Albanian newspaper *Rilindja* (Renaissance) appeared on 12 February 1945 in Prizren, and it was the first newspaper in Albanian language inside Yugoslavia. In 1981 it was the official mouthpiece of the communist leadership.

### B. Reaction in Belgrade

The fourth session of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Serbia, held on 6 May 1981, discussed the causes and consequences of the “counter-revolutionary operation” in Kosovo. On that occasion, Špiro Galović said the following: “How could it be that extensive preparations were being carried out for the demonstrations right under our nose, and that no one knew about them? Where are the communists and their organisations, where is the Kosovo Security Service? [...] It turns out that the main protagonists of nationalist ideas in Kosovo are education officers, a segment of the youth and the intelligentsia; nationalism is entrenched in university circles and in schools [...]. In our desire to build good relations with our neighbours, we did not devote enough attention to Greater Albanian

nationalism [...]. Albanian nationalists are pitting the youth against Serbs and demanding an ethnically clean Kosovo [...]. The demand for a republic, the predominant slogan during the Kosovo demonstrations, is expressed in the context of a counter-revolutionary chauvinist urge to expel from Kosovo every non-Albanian”.

At the same session, Dragoslav Marković said: “Serbs and Montenegrins [are] leaving Kosovo [...]. This migratory wave is disproportional to such an extent and that it predominantly involves Serbs and Montenegrins. It is characteristic that a large number of farmers are also leaving, although they are usually the least mobile segment of society. They abandon their farms in Kosovo and buy land in other parts of Serbia and Yugoslavia [...]. I believe that it would be dangerous if this process continued”.

Petranović et al., 1987, pp. 591-617.



Read the two paragraphs from sources VIII-5A and VIII-5B:

a. “The demonstrations, which were organised by hostile elements, actually were designed [...] to cause unrest, to create distrust, to worsen interethnic relations and to undermine our coexistence.”

b. “The fourth session of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Serbia held on 6 May 1981 discussed the causes and consequences of the ‘counter-revolutionary operation’ in Kosovo”.

How are the demonstrations and the complaints of the people in Kosovo described by the authorities and the state-controlled media? Discuss their argumentation and the kind of language/vocabulary they employ. Compare words and expressions used in both sources and find similarities and differences. How do you explain that the language employed in the newspaper is more vague and blurred than that of some members of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Serbia? How serious do you find the charge of a “counter-revolutionary operation” taking place in Kosovo?

## VIII-6. Verdict against Izetbegović et al., 1983

### FROM THE COURTHOUSE

Yesterday ended the month-long public trial of a twelve-strong enemy group accused of engaging in

organised activities in the name of Muslim nationalism – against the brotherhood, unity and equality of our nations and nationalities, and against the authority of the working class – for the purpose of undermining Bosnia and Herzegovina as a socialist republic and thus undermining the social order of the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia.

Alija Izetbegović, a 58-year-old attorney from Sarajevo, and Omer Behmen, a 54-year-old engineer in the Sarajevo Railway Transport Organisation, were sentenced to 14 and 15 years imprisonment respectively for the crime of associating to undertake hostile activities by forming a group to carry out counter-revolutionary threats to the socio-political order of our country.

The verdict, which Judge Rizah Hadžić read out for over an hour, explained in detail how this group of nationalists acted in an organised manner, urging the creation of an “ethnically clean” Bosnia and Herzegovina for the purpose of establishing a republic based on Islamic principles in the context of the “unity of religion and law”, which would be incorporated in a huge Islamic state stretching from Afghanistan to Bosanski Brod in Bosnia and Herzegovina by annexing certain parts of our country’s other republics and autonomous provinces. Alija Izetbegović’s “Islamic Declaration” served as the ideological platform [of the whole enterprise].

Expounding on the verdict, Judge Rizah Hadžić said:

“This was not a trial against religion or against believers, as the accused tried to present it from the very beginning. Does preaching religion mean loudly shouting slogans at the Tabaci communal mosque, such as ‘Death to the infidels’, ‘Don’t hang out with the infidels’, ‘Don’t look for a friend in an infidel’? This is nothing less than an open attack on the brotherhood and unity of our nations and nationalities, a legacy left to us by our President Tito.”

*Oслобоđenje*, 21 August 1983, p. 3.



Alija Izetbegović (8 August 1925 – 19 October 2003) was a Bosnian activist and politician who in 1990 became the first Chairman of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina. He was the author of the controversial *Islamic Declaration* (1970) and *Islam between East and West* (1985), in which he claims that Islam is vastly superior to all intellectual and spiritual



alternatives. In 1983 he was sentenced to fourteen years in prison for “hostile activity inspired by Muslim nationalism”. This verdict was criticised by Amnesty International and Helsinki Watch as “communist propaganda”. Izetbegović was released after five years. In 1989 he established the predominantly Muslim Party of Democratic Action, winning 33% of the seats in the Parliament of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In February 1992, he called an independence referendum for recognition of Bosnia and Herzegovina as an independent state. (see vol. 2, ch. 1, doc. I-12). Izetbegović spent most of the war in besieged Sarajevo. After the Dayton peace accord in November 1995, he became a Member of Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina, stepping down in 2000. An ICTY investigation of Izetbegović was in progress when he died of heart disease.

### VIII-7. Public address by the Committee for the Defence of Freedom of Thought and Expression, 20 November 1984

Dear comrade,  
The practice of putting people on trial for what they think, not only for what they say (i.e. “verbal delict”), and of confiscating their manuscripts as well, has become more frequent in our country; it has become an ideological and a legally legitimate method that the authorities employ to politically deal with their opponents. The draconian punishment (eight years imprisonment!) of Vojislav Šešelj for the contents of his seized manuscripts; the arrest of Belgrade intellectuals; the forthcoming trial of the Belgrade Six (Vladimir Mijanović, Pavluško Imširović, Miodrag Milić, Milan Nikolić, Dragomir Olujić and Gordan Jovanović) for intellectual talks in private flats; a manuscript seized by the police as well as some earlier verdicts in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Slovenia, Kosovo and other parts of Yugoslavia; and the persecution at the work place of “morally and politically unsuitable” intellectuals – all these are a source of deep concern for all conscientious and free-thinking persons in our country. Freedom of thought and expression are under threat and obliterated by the arbitrariness of powerful and unscrupulous lawlessness; in one word, by retrograde political motivations and tendencies.

These frightening arrests, trials and verdicts constitute a blatant violation of basic human rights, [in particular] the right to freedom of thought and expression, one that today is not respected only by authoritarian regimes.

Prompted by humanitarian and socialist concerns and in light of the disturbing events and circumstances, we have decided to propose the establishment of a Committee for the Defence of Freedom of Thought and Expression. [...]

The Committee represents a free association of Yugoslav cultural, scientific and public sector workers, who are prepared to publicly defend the freedom of speech and expression.

The Committee will provide support to the citizens of Yugoslavia who are subjected to persecution for expressing their thoughts. The Committee will call for the release of all those arrested because of their beliefs. The Committee will not defend anyone who propagates violence and hatred.

With friendly greetings and respect,  
10 November 1984

Dobrica Ćosić, Belgrade, Branka Đonovića 6  
Taras Kermauner, Ljubljana, Jamova 75  
Rudi Supek, Zagreb, Ivana Gorana Kovačića 2

Ćosić, 2002, p. 122-125.



The Committee for the Defence of Freedom of Thought and Expression was established on the initiative of Dobrica Ćosić in November 1984. The events that led to its establishment were the arrest and trial of the so-called Belgrade Six. According to the intentions of its founders, the Committee's remit was to cover the whole of Yugoslavia. It was the first committee for the defence of civil and human rights in Yugoslavia. Its principal aim was to protect all those Yugoslav citizens, save its founding members, whose freedoms of thought and expression were endangered, by publicising their case. The Committee ceased its activities in 1989.



How does this source describe the situation as regards basic human rights in 1980s Yugoslavia?

## VIII-8. Youth protesting against the “persecution” of the punk movement in Ljubljana, 1980s



Museum of Contemporary History, Ljubljana.

 In the early 1980s, punk was considered solely as a subculture of a specific category of young people. However, by the middle of the decade it developed into a broader social movement. Its emergence was linked to the poor socio-economic conditions of Yugoslavia at the time. Punk largely resisted the traditional and ideological views of socialism by striving towards pluralism, both political and social. The movement's ideas appealed to the youth, and even the Association of the Socialist Youth of Slovenia supported them through Radio Student and the magazines *Tribuna* and *Mladina*. The older governing elites, however, did not share the same opinion.

 What did the punk movement represent for Slovenian youth? Find information on punk music and the punk movement in your country and account for its popularity at the time.

## VIII-9. Economic crisis and shortages in Yugoslavia

 In the late 1970s, Yugoslavia was in the grip of a deep economic crisis. Its debt had grown from \$1.4 billion in 1966 to around 20 billion in 1980, as new loans were taken out under increasingly unfavourable conditions in order to service previous ones. The governments of Milka Planinc and Branko Mikulić sought to stabilise the economy by means of a so-called “shock therapy economy”. A ban was imposed on all imports not intended for production, including consumer goods. The forced austerity measures, aimed at repaying loans, caused many tremors in the economy and had consequences on standards of living. Restrictions on electricity consumption were introduced, and there were fuel shortages. Fuel consumption was limited to 40 litres per car per month, as was driving one's car; oil and coffee were rationed, and imports of raw materials were cut down.

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People waited in long queues to buy detergent, soap, toothpaste, bananas and other imported goods. Yugoslavia was ranked among the world's 17 largest debtors. Inflation and unemployment increased. Prime Minister of SFRY Ante Marković sought to put in place a programme of economic reforms, which was partly successful in the short-term. By the early 1990s, it was becoming clear that the federal government was unable to implement the programme.

**A. Cars with odd- and even-numbered license plates during the crisis (1979)**



Translation: We planned everything nicely, except that this weekend only cars with odd-numbered license plates are allowed on the roads.

Vjesnik, 6 May 1979.



As a result of the devaluation of the Yugoslav dinar and the scarcity of foreign currency, there were numerous shortages in Yugoslavia in the late 1970s and early 1980s, especially of imported goods, such as coffee. There were also fuel shortages as a result of the devaluation of the dinar and because of high oil prices. The authorities sought to deal with the crisis by introducing a number of austerity measures, including that of allowing cars on the roads on the basis of whether the last digit of their license plates was an odd or even number.

**B. Cartoon on shortages (1982)**



Borba, 10 February 1982.



The cartoon satirizes the ways of payment accepted by a restaurant: American Express; Diners Club; Carte Blanche; Voucher for hot meal, referring to the emergence of social differences in the 1980s. Free vouchers for meals were given to workers and employees since the 1960s, esp. in factories and enterprises which had a restaurant or a canteen. In the 1970s credit cards appeared.

**VIII-10. The “Anti-bureaucracy Revolution”, the “Yogurt Revolution” and changes in the political elites of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 1988**



“Anti-bureaucracy Revolution” or the “Happening of the People” are the terms used to describe a series of mass protests that took place in the second half of 1988 and the first half of 1989, damaging the Party and state elites in Vojvodina, Montenegro and Kosovo, which were soon replaced with supporters of Slobodan Milošević. The protests, a continuation of those held by the Kosovo Serbs in the 1980s, became massive and organised after Milošević came to power in 1987. Their political consequences were particularly significant, as the Socialist Republic of Serbia now had four out of a total of eight votes in the Yugoslav federation and enjoyed a majority in the League of Communists. At the same time, the autonomy of Kosovo and Vojvodina was significantly reduced. “Yogurt Revolution” is the term employed to describe the mass protests in Vojvodina, which started in the summer of 1988 and culminated on 5 October 1988 when protesters threw cans of yogurt at the Provincial Assembly building in Novi Sad.

### A. Exporting the “Yogurt Revolution” to Montenegro

During the discussion, it was frequently pointed out that the perpetrators of the ugly scenes, slogans and unacceptable views, in the early morning hours on 8 October at the rally in Titograd, had been incited by the “exporters of the revolution”, various emissaries and instigators and that there was irrefutable evidence of this. This was the reason for the adoption of the decision for urgent measures and a police intervention, not the workers and students who were justified in their calls for changes and taking responsibility.

In his opening statement, Dr Miljan Radović said: “The most recent events, the likes of those in Titograd last Friday, and then in Nikšić, have shown us that the difficult economic situation and social circumstances are the source of all dissatisfaction. [...] This was an unprecedented outpouring of anti-communist and anti-socialist understanding of our reality, which would have been considered impossible until yesterday... Under the circumstances, the national originality of the Montenegrin nation and statehood of Montenegro are increasingly being openly brought into question [...] On this occasion, at these difficult times, I again want to point out that the League of Communists of Montenegro will strongly urge and fight for the unity of the SKJ [League of Communists of Yugoslavia] and the working class, as it had always done, for a unified federative and socialist Yugoslavia, for brotherhood and unity and the equality of all its nations and nationalities”.

*Pobjeda*, 14 October 1988, pp. 1-3.

### B. Song sung during the protests against the autonomists (local Party leadership) in Titov Vrbas, Vojvodina, August 1988

Slobodan, may you be called Sloboda [Freedom]  
You are loved by the young and old alike.  
While Sloba reigns over this land  
We shall be slaves to no one.  
People now wonder and ask  
Who will take the place of Tito.

Đukić, 2009, p. 290.

## VIII-11. The strike of the Stari Trg miners in Kosovo and reactions in Serbia and Slovenia, 1989



Headed by Azem Vlasi, the leadership of the Autonomous Province of Kosovo was against the constitutional and political changes announced

by Milošević, according to which Kosovo’s high degree of autonomy that was guaranteed by the 1974 Constitution would be no more. Vlasi and other Albanian leaders were dismissed on 17 November 1988. In response, Albanians in Kosovo organised mass protests in support of their dismissed leaders. Since their demands were ignored, Stari Trg miners went on hunger strike in February 1989. A meeting of support for Albanian miners was held in Ljubljana on 27 February, which was attended by Slovenian President Milan Kučan. At the same time, large-scale demonstrations were staged outside the federal assembly in Belgrade on 28 February. The demonstrators demanded an urgent resolution of the situation in Kosovo and the arrest of Azem Vlasi. Milošević addressed the demonstrators and promised he would be arrested. Under pressure by Milošević, the federal leadership proclaimed a state of emergency the same day, while the miners’ strike was ended by force. A month later, on 23 March, the Kosovo assembly adopted the constitutional amendments, and on 28 March the Serbian assembly adopted the amendments to the federal constitution. A “Rally of Truth” by Serbs and Montenegrins from Kosovo was scheduled to take place in Ljubljana on 1 December 1989 with the aim of presenting the real facts about the events in Kosovo. The Slovenian leadership banned the rally, and on 1 December the leadership of Serbia called for the severance of economic ties with Slovenia. What followed was a mass boycott of Slovenian goods in Serbia, which was sanctioned by secret decisions passed by the Serbian Assembly. The Slovenes replied in kind with their own measures.

Mirko Rapaić, Beograd (1 December 1989)

The Presidency of the Socialist Alliance of the Working People of Serbia has called on all centres, institutions and enterprises in Serbia to break all ties and relations with Slovenia. I believe this is a historic appeal, equal to the one of 27 March. I congratulate the leadership of Serbia on its decisive and patriotic stand. I join this appeal and I am strongly against Slovenian Nazi-fascism [...]. It has finally become clear how much hatred there is in Slovenia towards the Serbian people.

Milorad Simeunović, Rakovica (7 December 1989)

Ever since the end of the Second World War, the Slovenes have enjoyed a privileged position in our common state of Yugoslavia. Owing to the fact that key positions in our Federation were held by their “smart” and “Yugoslav”-oriented people, they did what they wanted in this country, all for the benefit of Slovenia and Croatia.

Let us take a look. Right after the war, Serbia was showered with taxes and surtaxes. Hundreds of thousands of heads of cattle were confiscated from the Serbian cattle fund. Let us recall which Slovenian politician held ranking posts in the federation. Also, we must remember how many enterprises from Serbia were transferred to Slovenia and other western republics. [...]

Let the Slovenian comrade's wake up and realise that they can no longer exploit Serbia, either through their former raw materials or through their trade network.

Readers' letters published in the Belgrade daily *Politika*;  
Mimica et al., 2001, pp. 247-248.



Azem Vlasi (1948) is a Kosovo Albanian politician and lawyer. In the 1970s he was a prominent and popular leader of official youth organisations favoured by Tito. In 1980 he criticised Enver Hoxha for his dictatorial rule, claiming that Albanians were better off in Kosovo than in Albania. Continuing his political activity, he became president of the League of Communists of Kosovo and in 1986 president of Kosovo (after the constitutional changes in Yugoslavia, the autonomous regions differed little in their status from the republics). In 1988 Vlasi and some other leading Albanian politicians were toppled by the Anti-bureaucratic Revolution because of opposing Milošević. He was arrested in 1989 on charges of "counter-revolutionary activities" (the usual accusation made against political opponents in Yugoslavia) and released some months later. After the war he took no prominent position in Kosovo politics, but served as advisor to the prime minister, working as a lawyer and political consultant.

### VIII-12. Extracts from the speech by Slobodan Milošević on the occasion of the 600th anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo (1989)

In this place, in the heart of Serbia, at the field of Kosovo, six centuries ago, six hundred years ago, one of the greatest battles of that time took place [...]. By the force of social circumstances, this great 600th anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo is taking place in a year in which Serbia, after many years, after many decades, has regained its state, national and spiritual integrity. [...]

The concessions that many Serbian leaders made at the expense of their people could not be accepted historically and ethically by any nation in the world,

especially because the Serbs have never in the whole of their history conquered and exploited others. Their national and historical being has been liberational throughout the whole of history and through two world wars, as it is today. They liberated themselves and, when they could, they also helped others to liberate themselves. The fact that that they are a major nation in the region is not a Serbian sin or shame. [...]

Thanks to their leaders and politicians and their vassal mentality, they felt guilty before themselves and others. This situation lasted for decades, it lasted for years and here we are now at the field of Kosovo to say that this is no longer the case. [...]

Six centuries later, now, we are again engaged in battles and facing battles. They are not armed battles, although such things cannot be excluded yet. However, regardless of their kind, battles cannot be won without resolve, bravery and sacrifice. [...]

Six centuries ago, Serbia defended itself at the field of Kosovo, but it also defended Europe. Serbia was at that time the bastion that defended European culture, religion and European society in general. [...]

Slobodan Milošević's 1989 St. Vitus Day Speech, Gazimestan, 28 June 1989; <http://www.pecat.co.rs/2011/06/govor-slobodana-milosevica-na-gazimestanu-1989-godine/>, accessed on 25.8.2016.



After the Eighth Session of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Serbia in 1987, Slobodan Milošević was quickly promoted to Serbian leader. The peak of his rise to power came with the speech he gave on the occasion of the 600th anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo on Saint Vitus Day, on 28 June 1989. Milošević landed on Kosovo Polje in a helicopter and delivered his speech to a crowd of between 600,000 and 2,000,000 people. Yugoslavia's complete state leadership was present, as well as many foreign ambassadors, although the US and Turkish ambassadors refused to attend. His speech was later interpreted differently, but remained known as an indication of future wars in the territory of Yugoslavia.



A couple of extracts from Milošević's speech caused uproar in Yugoslavia, since they were interpreted as threatening the other republics with war. Find these in the source. Use your knowledge and explain the significance of celebrating the 600th anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo battle in the context of the late 1980s Yugoslavia.

### The Yugoslav Republics and Autonomous Provinces



### ► VIII.3. CRISIS OF COMMUNISM

#### VIII-13. The strike of the Valea Jiului miners (1-3 August 1977)



Nicolae Ceaușescu paying a “visit” to the Valea Jiului miners on 3 August 1977.

Online Communism Photo Collection, reference number 142-1977, <http://fototeca.iicr.ro/picdetails.php?picid=44492X6X75&lang=en>, accessed on 27.08.2016.



The photograph is staged. Ceaușescu was urgently called to the mines in order to bring to an end the strike, while the newspapers announced that he would visit numerous other workplaces across the country. The pretext for the prevailing generalised discontent was new legislation on social insurance (Law no. 3/1977), which had provided for a substantial decrease in workers’ wages. Miners from Lupeni and Aninoasa manifested their dissatisfaction with the new measures, and especially with the fact that Party leaders had neither consulted them on the legislation nor responded to their requests for a series of consultation meetings. A minority of miners proposed that a 100-strong delegation should go to Bucharest and ask for clarifications, but the majority thought otherwise. They asked that Ceaușescu come in person and listen to their demands. Upon his arrival on 3 August, Ceaușescu refused to talk to the strike committee (led by Constantin Dobre), giving instead a speech to all miners, in which he accepted their demands, but afterwards failed to take any measures for their realisation. There were some 30,000 miners from several locations, an impressive

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show of solidarity, discipline and organisational spirit. The following day the authorities began to identify the strike leaders, particularly those who were party members. Security forces moved in and “removed” several hundreds of “suspect” persons from the area, bringing the strike and, indeed, one of the largest protest movements in communist Romania to an end.

#### VIII-14. Extracts from an interview with the principal of the Technologic High School of Nicolina at the time of workers’ protests at the courtyard of the Nicolina factory (Iași, February 1987)

I was young and I had never seen such a thing in communism up until then [...]. Of course afterwards many [investigations] were undertaken in order to find out how and from where the whole thing had started. I mean, no one could believe this was spontaneous. And a quite curious conclusion was that those who brought the people out and gathered them in the courtyard could only be the school’s students, who had come in for training [...] Next, a Securitate man came, certainly from the Central Committee, his name was Blănaru [...]. The first thing he did, of course, was to attack the individual in charge of the students’ training. He was asking questions like “Why don’t you take enough care of your students?” He said that it was chaos, students went wherever they wanted to and moved anywhere in the factory. I couldn’t say whether he had been given this piece of information or whether he had invented it and used as justification. [In the event], the school was found guilty.

Pintilie, 2015, p. 183.



The interviewees tend to omit or to play down this event, which was somewhat blanketed by the subsequent 1989 anti-communist revolts. The most frequently met opinion was that some of the workers were angry for getting such reduced wages because the prescribed productivity targets had not been met. Iași Party and Securitate officials eventually lay the blame on factory directors, who allegedly had applied salary norms in a too rigid manner. Though very brief, the workers’ demonstration of force impressed many of their contemporaries.

### VIII-15. Informal youth associations in Bulgaria

We should resolutely reject the rigid schemes of organising the life of children and adolescents, which are so characteristic of many pedagogical collectives and, regrettably, of the majority of families. So far in Bulgaria the preferred style of parenting has been the authoritarian one, and the coercive approach as regards the manner of extracurricular activities and socially useful works has been persistently instilled in the Pioneer Children's and Komsomol organisations.

Until now, ideological-educational work has focused on reproducing the cultural heritage of previous generations. Now, one can observe a greater receptivity to – and a struggle for – the new socialist values that correspond to universal ones.

The amassing of youth social creativity and energy should not be done by way of “participation”, “obedience”, “unanimity” or wasted in the private life of youth, but in the context of constructive initiative and a readiness for societal changes.

Among culture-creative informal associations, particularly prominent are the fans of the poetry of Petya Dubarova, whose verses carry the traits characteristic of youth as a socio-demographic group: an aspiration to self-affirmation, autonomy, maximalism, a refusal to compromise, critical-mindedness, heightened emotionality, etc. Such verses are, for example, the following:

#### Free Will

Everything's in its place in this room.

I mustn't move anything.

I'll go out.

Everything's in its place in this world.

I can't change anything.

I'm redundant here.

Everything's in its place in your heart.

Its rhythm is impeccable.

I'll start crying.

#### A Ballad About Tiny People

The tiny people were many.

The tiny people sat in a circle.

They were crying, the tiny people!

They were crying around the corpse of the newborn,  
around the corpse of the youngest among them.

THEY'VE KILLED HIM!

They've killed him because he said at his birth:

“I HAVE AN IDEA.”

Balkanski, 1989, pp. 56-57.



In the 1980s the incapability of the official political organisations of youth to direct the cultural and everyday life of young people in Bulgaria became glaringly obvious. Informal youth associations were spontaneously formed around new phenomena of mass culture: the body, sexuality, consumerism, sports, pop music, and generally, the possibility to build one's own cultural world and way of life that did not conform to the established socialist values. Such associations brought together jazz fans, hippies, punks, heavy metal fans, bikers, fans of disco culture and a luxurious lifestyle, Hare Krishnas, “drug addicts” and others. Although these informal associations were difficult to register and control and did not have a direct social effect on the majority of socialist citizens, their existence was a cause of great concern for the regime. If in the 1950s they were kept under regular police surveillance, by the 1980s the special services no longer sought to “stop their activity, but to control and redirect” it with the help of the official youth organisations, educators, psychologists and sociologists.

### VIII-16. The story of Kamen Belopitov, one of the first graffiti artists in Bulgaria



In contemporary art terms, Kamen Belopitov would be called an urban conceptual artist. His inscriptions in the streets of downtown Sofia are not merely a prototype of present-day graffiti. They are a unique art form which appeared and disappeared before it could be understood, framed or made fashionable; and before it grew old. Just like its author.

Kamen Belopitov's work and his public presence were a fusion of an extremely subjective thinking and an absolute freedom of social expression. One must remember that in Sofia in 1986-1989 there was a big visual “silence”. Compared with the present-day visual environment, the city looked almost sterile: there were no powerful advertising media, billboards or illuminated signs, while posters promoting events were mostly textual and could be found only at specially assigned places. Street inscriptions were done mostly in chalk and usually depicted football clubs. Against the background of today's visual glut, Kamen Belopitov's 10 to 15 cm graffiti inscriptions would have been completely lost. But in the 1980s they were quite

conspicuous in an otherwise neatly ordered visual environment, and passers-by did not have to look closely in order to notice them.

*Club rimsko prane / Roman Washing Club*

*Muhtyat me chorapkite / My socks moss me*

*Kamara ot podlogi / Pile of urinals (doormats)*

Tenev, 2015, pp. 210-211.



Study the sources and the keys. Find textual and visual material describing the organisation, the duties, the ceremonial manners and the uniforms of official youth associations. Then compare with the manners and aspirations of the youth movement as presented in the above sources. Which are the main differences? What role does art play in these new forms of expression? Discuss.

### VIII-17. Bulgarian youth and the disaster at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant in the Ukraine (USSR)



In the months following the Chernobyl nuclear disaster of 26 April 1986, the Bulgarian authorities imposed a total news blackout on the consequences of the explosion. Young people in Bulgaria reacted strongly to this lack of information. Their feelings of total abandonment, neglect and uncertainty were transformed into a quest for accountability regarding previous cases of disinformation and crisis situations about which, until then, no one had dared to initiate a public debate. A number of sociological surveys showed beyond doubt that most young Bulgarians did not trust official sources of information. They did not expect to learn the truth from anybody; they sought it for themselves. Young people most often tried to find information by listening to "hostile radio stations", such as Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, the Voice of America, the BBC and Deutsche Welle. The growing discontent over censorship in the official media in general was coupled with an increasing awareness of environmental issues, which led to a series of protests against environmental pollution. The ultimate effect of the Chernobyl nuclear disaster on Bulgarian youth was that they became more critical of socialist government policies and willing to engage in issues of public concern.

Information by Professor Petar Mitev, Director of the Institute of Youth Studies at the Central Committee of the Dimitrov Communist Youth Union, on the attitude of youth towards media coverage of the radiation situation, 14-17 May 1986

Even prior to receiving official reports from the USSR via the dailies *Izvestiya* (30 April) and *Pravda* (4 May), there were rumours in Sofia about the [explosion]. Obviously, this information came from listening to western news agencies. It is also plausible to assume that later too, i.e. at the present moment, the acquisition of information by our citizens through those means is quite active. It is precisely due to such information that a certain psychosis was created among our people as well, a psychosis that led to the inclination to avoid consumption of fresh vegetables, of drinking water and milk. Also, strong rumours circulated as regards levels of radioactivity in some districts of the country and, in recent days, at the Black Sea coast. Since 6 May there has been a significant gathering of people at thermal springs with the intention of using the water from the springs instead of the drinking water from the common reservoirs. It should be noted that rumours concerning the official authorisation of abortions up to the third month of pregnancy, as well as of the handing out of iodine pills in kindergartens and crèche centres, have also had an active stress-generating effect. Information about this spontaneous increase and spread of the most incredible rumours about our country has been quite scarce and too general. It is no accident that the people's humorous inclination has given rise to a number of apposite anecdotes such as, for example, the definition of radiation as a phenomenon that does not exist at all but is constantly decreasing, etc. [...]. This syndrome of mass confusion and non-clarity has been intensified also by the official and unofficial use of terms that few people understand: "becquerel", "curie", "rem", "millirem", "rad", etc.

Central State Archives, f. 15, inv. 55, a.u. 712.



"The ultimate effect of the Chernobyl nuclear disaster on Bulgarian youth was that they became more critical of socialist government policies and willing to engage in issues of public concern" (in the key). How do you understand this statement? Discuss on the connection of the three elements mentioned here (environmental situation, publicity, and prospects for the future) with youth behaviour. Why do such topics interest young people?

### VIII-18. Imposing limits on the daily use of electricity, water and gas in 1980s Romania

The water went off when you wouldn't have thought it. Then it came back in the form of diluted mud for minutes. Generally, it had no pressure. In kitchen sinks [people had] jars and pots with water for drinking and cooking, and in bathroom tubs kept water to wash one's hands and face and water for the lavatory [...]. Hot water too was "rationed", two hours in the evening and two hours in the morning, twice a week. It's just that one could hardly call it hot water, as it either didn't go up the pipes or, if it did, it was rather cold.

Electricity was cut off quite often [...] to economise. By night cities were in complete darkness, the so-called "socialist darkness". Only a few street lights were on in central streets.

Every time electricity was off, I used to get out my flat, approach the elevator and shout: *Is there anybody trapped between floors?*

One could never know the schedule of the power cuts; most of the times electricity went off in the evening, between 6 and 8 o'clock, with slight variations, especially in winter [...]. Some thoughtful neighbours used to glue a candle on the staircase handrail.

We began looking for oil lamps in villages [...]. One of the problems was to purchase oil. It was sold for eggs in the countryside but in the cities it was harder to find, [we had to go] to a small number of gas stations on the outskirts, which had it.

There was no gas [during the day]. In order to be able to cook, I had to stay awake during the night, when the gas was on. At work we used to ask each other: *What did you cook last night?*

The gas was off every day, from the morning to ten in the evening. I used to cook in the morning between 4 and 7 o'clock. Others cooked at night, after 11 o'clock.

Museum of the Romanian Peasant, 2008, pp. 32, 145-147, 181-182.

### VIII-19. Romanian jokes on power shortages and lack of central heating

- A. - Did you know that Romanians invented the biggest refrigerator in the world?  
- And how much does it cost?

- 280,000 lei!
- Way too much!
- Well, it has everything you need, kitchen, bathroom, bedroom.

- B. - Did you find out what the last decree is about? The people living on the first floor are forbidden to open the windows in winter.  
- Why's that?  
- To prevent passers-by from freezing.

- C. An aged couple read a newspaper at the light of a candle in a freezing room.  
- Provided that we had some food, it is just like during the war.

Niculescu Grasso, 1999, p. 114.

### VIII-20. Bulgarian jokes on the shortage of goods

*A conversation at a butcher shop in 1985*

- Do you have veal?
- No.
- Do you have pork?
- No.
- Do you have sausages?
- No.
- So what do you have, then?
- Opening hours to 6 pm.

<http://spodeli.net/3/story-43198.html>, accessed on 26.09.2016.



Jokes are a means of facing difficult situations and restrictions on freedom of expression. Try to find political jokes in other countries (such as in Greece or Turkey during dictatorships).

### VIII-21. A queue of people waiting for petrol in Albania, 1989



Petrol was used by Albanian families during the communist regime (1944-1990), mostly for cooking. The photograph was taken in the autumn of 1989 at a time of a severe economic crisis.





Photographer Roland Tasho.

### VIII-22. Slogans heard at the first democratic rally after the fall of Todor Zhivkov that was held in Sofia's Alexander Nevsky Square on 18 November 1989



At a plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Bulgaria on 10 November 1989, Todor Zhivkov resigned as General Secretary of the Party after 33 years of authoritarian rule. His resignation marked the end of the communist regime and the beginning of the transition to democracy. It was followed by a wave of protests and demonstrations, which led to important constitutional and legislative changes in the country.

Don't decide on our destiny unanimously!  
 Let's become citizens instead of workers!  
 Freedom at school, civil rights for pupils!  
 Democracy requires at least two political parties!  
 Censors, toadies, lickspittles: Move out from the Press,  
 Radio and Television!

Abolish Article 1(2) of the Constitution! It states: The leading force in society and the state is the Communist Party of Bulgaria.

Multiparty system, free elections!

Workers of the world, unite with the intelligentsia!

Laws are for everyone!

Let's resurrect freedom, this great deceased!

Culture without dictatorship!

Don't crush citizens!

Let's return smiling from the grocer shop as from the rally!

Root out ideology from science!

Let's follow Hungary and Poland!

People, wake up! The floor is yours!

Hear the voice of the people: SOS!

Perestroika is a revolution!

Glasnost, oxygen, sausage!

Never again totalitarianism!

Professionalism, competence, conscience!

The millions of red plutocracy – for student grants!

Pluralism, yes! Democracy, "100 times yes!"

Don't let yourselves be restructured today by those who restructured you yesterday!

Let's cut out the metastases of socialism!  
 Communism can't be reformed, it must be unformed!  
 Rulers, don't crush the people – they are yours!  
 Clean environment for our children.  
 Glasnost, oxygen!  
 Let's get rid of 50% of the militia [police] in order to fix  
 the economy.  
 Let's catch the chameleons of the tyrant Zhivkov!  
 Trial by People's Tribunal for all who've plundered  
 Bulgaria.  
 The 35-year-long totalitarian circus is over.  
 Stalin and Hitler killed people, Brezhnev and Zhivkov  
 killed souls.  
 Hospitals instead of [government] residences!  
 Give our Turks their names back!  
 Don't turn the problem of minorities into a social bomb.  
 Be tolerant, be human. God created man, not the nation.  
 Equal rights for the Bulgarian and Turkish populations  
 in Bulgaria!  
 We want ecclesiastical freedom, social welfare, charity  
 schools.  
 Equal rights for atheists and believers.  
 Independence of the church from the state.  
 A Bible for everyone!

[http://www.omda.bg/public/arhiv/sabitia/parviat\\_miting.htm#\\_ftn52](http://www.omda.bg/public/arhiv/sabitia/parviat_miting.htm#_ftn52), accessed on 27.08.2016.



1. Discuss the language and content of the slogans. Which is the overriding demand? What does the country seem to be lacking so far? How do you understand the term "socialism" within this context?
2. Comment on the slogan "Give our Turks their names back" (see also documents in chapter VI.2).
3. What are, according to slogans, the most serious problems the country is facing?
4. Why do demonstrators demand "Equal rights for atheists and believers" and ask for "A Bible for everyone"?

## VIII-23. The Revolution in Romania, December 1989



On 21 December 1989 the people, who had been forced to gather at Bucharest's Palace Square to express their usual "admiration" for the policies of Nicolae Ceaușescu, booed him instead. The



following day, the official mouthpiece of the Communist Party of Romania, seemingly unwilling to rise above its usual propaganda, published the dictator's last angry speech, with a laudatory commentary designed to conceal from its readers the very beginning of the Romanian Revolution.

### A. "In defence of socialist achievements and Romania's independence and territorial integrity": Extracts from Ceaușescu's last speech

Dear comrades and friends,  
 Citizens of the capital of Socialist Romania,  
 It is becoming more and more obvious that the events in Timișoara are the work of circles which aim at destroying Romania's integrity and sovereignty, at stopping the furtherance of socialism, and at placing our people again under foreign domination. That is why we should defend with all our forces Romania's integrity and independence!

Some people would like to reintroduce unemployment and to lower the people's living standards, to dismember Romania and endanger the very future of our people and our nation's independence.

*Scînteia poporului*, 22 December 1989, p. 1.

### B. The former mouthpiece of the Communist Party of Romania on the new anti-Ceaușescu, "liberating" power

*"Measures and recommendations for the quick ending of the terrorists' injustice. The former dictator and servants of his clan were arrested".*

We had a full and difficult day. We are returning from the military headquarters of the National Salvation Front. Because of the criminal actions of some groups of terrorists, especially trained to fight against the people and in defence of the dictator, our regular activities could not be undertaken in a normal way today. We had to prioritise and coordinate the struggle against terrorists. The existence of these groups of terrorists, of fanatical individuals acting with unprecedented cruelty, shooting at houses and citizens and causing victims among the military, is one more eloquent expression of the unpopular character of the Ceaușescu dictatorship, which harmed enormously the people.

Finally, dear citizens, we wish to inform you that Nicolae Ceaușescu and Elena Ceaușescu were arrested and are now under military guard.

*Scînteia poporului*, yr. 1, no. 2, 24 December 1989, p. 1.

### C. Extracts from the transcript of the closed “trial” of Nicolae and Elena Ceaușescu



That same day the two Romanian communist leaders were executed by firing squad. This show trial and the gruesome scene of the execution were videotaped and shown on Romanian TV, and then to the world.

Military base Tirgoviste – 25 December 1989

Prosecutor Gica Popa

NICOLAE CEAUȘESCU: I only recognise the Grand National Assembly. I will only speak in front of it.

PROSECUTOR: In the same way he refused to hold a dialogue with the people, now he also refuses to speak with us. He always claimed to act and speak on behalf of the people, to be a beloved son of the people, but he only tyrannised the people all the time. You are faced with charges that you held really sumptuous celebrations on all holidays at your house. The details are known. These two defendants procured the most luxurious foodstuffs and clothes from abroad. They were even worse than the king, the former king of Romania. The people only received 200 grams [of salami] per day, against an identity card.

*Elena and Nicolae reject this. Another question to Ceaușescu: “Who ordered the bloodbath in Timișoara?” Ceaușescu refused to answer.*

*The prosecutor asks the counsel for the defence to ask Ceaușescu whether he knows that he is no longer president of the country, that Elena Ceaușescu has also lost all her official state functions and that the government has been dissolved [...]. He answers: “I am the president of Romania, and I am the commander in chief of the Romanian army. No one can deprive me of these functions.”*

CEAUȘESCU: It is a lie that I made the people starve. A lie, a lie in my face. This shows how little patriotism there is, how many treasonable offenses were committed.

PROSECUTOR: Elena and Nicolae Ceaușescu [...] are not only accused of offenses committed during the past few days, but of offenses committed during the past 25 years [...]. I would like to refer once more to the genocide, the numerous killings carried out during the past few days. Elena and Nicolae Ceaușescu must be held fully responsible for this [...]. They not only deprived the people of heating, electricity, and foodstuffs, they also tyrannised the soul of the Romanian people. They not only killed children, young people and adults in Timișoara and Bucharest; they allowed Securitate members to wear military uniforms to create the impression among the people that the army is

against them. They wanted to separate the people from the army. They used to fetch people from orphans’ homes or from abroad whom they trained in special institutions to become murderers of their own people. You were so impertinent as to cut off oxygen lines in hospitals and to shoot people in their hospital beds [...]. I would not call for the death sentence, but it would be incomprehensible for the Romanian people to have to go on suffering this great misery and not to have it ended by sentencing the two Ceaușescus to death.

[http://www.ceausescu.org/ceausescu\\_texts/revolution/trial-eng.htm](http://www.ceausescu.org/ceausescu_texts/revolution/trial-eng.htm), accessed on 15.6. 2015.

### D. “The Romanian Revolution has nothing to hide. A clarification for our colleagues of *Le Figaro*”

The progress of the revolution was neither smooth nor did it take place under the spotlight. And yet, the whole world could watch on their TV sets at home the dramatic course of events of the Romanian revolution. But the Romanians did not wage the revolution at home, in front of the TV. The Romanian youth fought armed, not so much with weapons, but rather with their hate of the dictatorship and with their thirst for freedom; and they died without hesitation in the name of the revolution.

*România liberă* [Free Romania], no. 18, 13 January 1990, p. 1.




Use your knowledge from your textbook and information from sources and explain what the external and internal causes of the Romanian Revolution were.

### VIII-24. The “Embassy Crisis” in Albania, July 1990

In July 1990, in the last communist country in Europe, more than 5,000 Albanians crowded into the courtyards of Western embassies in Tirana seeking political asylum. The so-called Embassy Crisis was resolved after two weeks of talks held between the Albanian communist authorities and UN representatives, whereby asylum seekers were allowed to go to the West. This first mass exodus was one of many to follow after the fall of the regime in December 1990. For example, during 1991 thousands left the country in search of a better life and headed mainly to Italy and Greece.

### A. Albanians at the courtyard of the German embassy in Tirana, asking for political asylum, July 1990



Archive of Lothar Parzeller.

### B. The official daily of the Communist Party of Albania on the “Embassy Crisis”

Hooligans know well the force of the working class, and as such we say to them: “Work, because only work provides you with everything. Goods come by the sweat of your brow”.

The workers of the mill expressed numerous views and thoughts, full of optimism for the future. “I work with my husband at the mill”, said loom worker Violeta Musabelli. “I live by the sweat of my brow. I’m not showered with goods, but when we are at home we sleep peacefully because we don’t owe anything to anybody. There is nothing that connects us with the hooligans and the evil people on the streets. The Police have arrested some young people working in our factory. We know them very well. They shied away from work and distanced themselves from our traditional way of life”.

“I just returned from visiting my folks who live abroad”, said mechanic Sotiraq Najdo. “I wanted to go and I went without encountering any problems whatsoever. I saw everything with my own eyes and I would say to some people: You have gone out of your mind. There is no place like our country! Here there is everything and so let’s get to work. Goods do not fall out of the sky. Bread and ash and be at home, as the folk proverb goes. People used this proverb when in Albania there was not even one factory, not even one school, not even one hospital – let alone today! Do you have eyes? Look closely, think and place your finger on your forehead. With the Party and comrade Ramiz as our leader we will accomplish everything”.

One of our friends at work, the miner Sokrat Sotiri, went inside an embassy. He can’t discredit the

honourable mining profession. Here there are 300 hundred miners working in Valiasi underground, and we are discussing the ugly actions of some people whom we are right to call “the scum of society”.

*Zeri i Popullit*, 4 July 1990.

### C. The communist newspaper *Bashkimi* condemning the “Hooligans”

The social rally held by workers of the Enver factory, a pioneering factory of our mechanic industry, voiced unanimously the solidarity that characterises our People for the Party, its Central Committee and its leader comrade Ramiz Alia.

“We are very upset by the events that took place on the evening of 2 July”, said the workers of the Centre for Technical and Scientific Information and Documentation. “By no means can we allow our state to be harmed and the socialist achievements of our country to be blemished”.

At the open meeting of grassroots Party organisations no. 1 and 2 of the geological factory, workers condemned unanimously the hostile acts of the hooligans. “Nothing can stop us from implementing the decisions of the Ninth and Tenth Plenum of the Central Committee of the Party. We will stand at the forefront of our workplace and our community in order to accomplish the [Party’s] aims and combat foreign influences and manifestations”.

The members of the Democratic Front in Quarter no. 39 of the capital, veterans and young people, condemned vigorously the actions of the hooligans and at the same time came up with concrete tasks to intensify the educational work in families, blocks and in society at large. There was a wide participation of young people, who expressed their indignation against such actions and vowed to be more active in order to raise the awareness of society as regards similar manifestations.

*Bashkimi*, 5 July 1990.



1. How did the regime’s newspapers characterise those who protested? What were their aims in doing so? Which audiences did they address? What were “the benefits of socialism”, and what put them in danger? Follow and comment on the wording and rhetoric of these newspapers.

2. From which age group do you think the majority of those who “provoked” the Embassy Crisis came? →

What did this mean for the country? Discuss the current exodus of young people from Southeast European countries (e.g. Greece) due to the financial crisis.

3. Find visual material on the mass exodus of Albanians, mainly young men. Compare it with the current refugee crisis and discuss the differences (e.g. the ship full of men sailing to Italy).

### VIII-25. Albanian novelist and poet Ismail Kadare flees to France, October 1990

Ismail Kadare fled. The foreign Press reports that the writer Ismail Kadare, who was on duty for about a month in France, yesterday sought political asylum. Through this shameful act that deeply insults the patriotic and civil consciousness of our people, he abandoned his people and Fatherland and placed himself under the service of enemies of Albania and the Albanian nation.

*Bashkimi*, 27 October 1990, p. 1.

### VIII-26. Students burning Hoxha’s portraits, December 1990



Photographer Roland Tasho.



Find and compare photographs depicting similar instances of activism (demolishing state monuments, destroying portraits, statues and busts of politicians, etc.) in other countries, both at the time and in later years. What is the meaning and symbolism of such activism? What is the common characteristic of regimes that are questioned and fought in this way?





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