Farrar, L. L., Jr. Aggression versus Apathy: The Limits of Nationalism during the Balkan Wars, 1912-1913. - East European Quarterly, Volume: 37, Issue: 3, Fall 2003.

Introduction

 

Eruption of war in the Balkans during the 1990's revived attention for nationalism which had been demoted by many observers to an atavistic phase through which societies passed on their way to modernization. Suddenly nationalism again seemed critical to western civilization. Balkan behavior in the 1990's was traced back to Balkan history and notably the nationalism which had been regarded as the salient feature of the first and second Balkan Wars.

 

The earlier conflicts have implications beyond their serving as a cause of the 1990's wars--"Nationalism is most frequently cited as a force impelling Europe toward war in 1914." (1) Those Balkan events "set the precedent in this century for massive wars and ethnic cleansing." (2) Balkan Christian sub-nationalities in the Ottoman Empire were "filled with a natural desire for political freedom and national unity." (3) War was seen to have been caused by conflict between status quo and "growing nationalist sentiment." (4) Thus the national ferment of 1912-13 was critical not only for the Balkans but also for the world. Nationalism is simply "one of the basic elements of modern history." (5) In the last analysis evaluation of nationalism is critical to our system of periodization in being regarded as a distinguishing feature of modern history.

 

Any discussion of a concept as complex as nationalism requires a precise and candid definition. The present study starts with "loose and comprehensive concepts of the nation and nationalism--roughly defining 'nation' as the ethnic-cultural group of 'people,' and 'nationalism as self-centered collective resistance to foreign rule to preserve the group and its culture." (6) In short, nationalism is the effort of nations/peoples to defend/extend their power. It is first judged by the breadth of support for the nation and second by its influence on decision-makers and thereby the course of events. Conversely nationalism is viewed as limited to the extent that leaders disregard, manipulate and/or fabricate public opinion as a tool of policy. This definition is as critical in suggesting what nationalism is not as what it is. Accordingly mass, defensive behavior related to the nation is designated as patriotism, while elite, aggressive behavior related to the nation can be denoted as cabinet diplomacy.

 

Balkan Nationalism

 

Conventional wisdom holds that the first and second Balkan Wars were caused by mass, aggressive nationalism which is perceived as the engine driving events and "the arrow of causality." Accordingly the Balkans have been conceived as proverbially fractious because of "ancient hatreds." This view is contested by recent criticism which attributes 20th century Balkan history more to specific circumstances and "manipulative leaders." (7) Not surprisingly the received wisdom is widely attested. The Balkan wars were "significant in providing a classic case study of the forces of nationalism at work." (8) Emblematic is George Kennan's assertion that "the strongest motivating factor involved in the Balkan wars was not religion but aggressive nationalism," what the Carnegie report condemned as "the megalomania of the national ideal." (9) Balkan nationalists and parliaments were supposedly enthusiastic about war and expressed "general rejoicing and outbursts of popular gratitude." (10) "The outbreak of war was welcomed in the Balkan states with an overwhelming public acclaim; huge demonstrations in its support took place in the allied capitals and other cities and towns." (11) The process and period were idealized as "the national-romantic-patriotic atmosphere of the years leading up to the Balkan Wars." (12) In short, nationalism was regarded as ubiquitous and taken as a given.

 

More significantly nationalism is presented as influencing official policy. There were "popular demands in Sofia, Athens and Belgrade" for "bellicose" policies. (13) Bulgaria seemed to have the most blatant popular influence on policy in favor of an immediate war, and even accepted the assassination of the king and prime minister if they sought to avoid the second Balkan War. (14) Most striking is the "headlong, head-down pressure of public opinion influenced by incitement by the war party on either side and hurrying the governments into hostilities;" with the result that "a great patriotic meeting took place in Sofia of all the country's war supporters." (15) The Bulgarian government "was backed by the Bulgarian people who, with few exceptions, were for war." (16) On the eve of the second war the Rumanian war party put tremendous pressure on the government, accompanied by patriotic enthusiasm and demonstrations against Austria-Hungary. Their moment of military glory in the summer of 1913 "stirred Rumanian nationalists, so much so that King Carol had to respect their views." (17) Montenegrin King Nicholas played off the great powers against each other but was simultaneously a "prisoner of his subjects' strident nationalism" and "Serbophile sentiments." (18)

 

However widely asserted, this war hysteria should not be taken at face value. The accounts reveal an undertone of exaggerated nationalist history more than judicious evaluation. Furthermore, support for war derives mainly from the urban minority and but little from the rural majority. Since the decisions for war had been taken in secret long prior to its outbreak, the enthusiasm was more consequence than cause of policy. By its nature such enthusiasm is short-lived as illustrated in Bulgaria at the outbreak of the second war. By that juncture "the Bulgarian army leadership had been under tremendous strain" and feared mutinies of troops who were fed up with war and demanding demobilization. Clearly, "Bulgarian nationalism had lost its fire for the time being." (19) Bulgarian policy was driven more by patriotic defense than nationalist aggression.

 

The most shocking evidence for nationalism would seem to be the atrocities committed by all sides. The Carnegie report observed that "war is waged not only by armies hut also by nations themselves ... which is why these wars are so sanguinary ... and end in the annihilation of the population and the ruin of whole regions." (20) Some, such as the Macedonians, suffered more as result of these atrocities than of war including ethnic cleansing. The atrocities seemed to make the case for nationalism as strong, if not irresistible. In fact, this argument suffers from basic flaws. Considerable evidence suggests that the claim for enduring nationalism may be exaggerated and due less to the past than to specific circumstances. (21) The Carnegie commission questioned whether the atrocities had been committed less by governments than by "armed bands of like political sympathizers operating semi-independently under their own chieftains" and motivated less by nationalism than by local rivalries. (22) To the extent that the later collapse of Yugoslavia offers any insight, it was "a tale not of 'ancient hatred' or centuries of ethnic strife and inevitable conflict but of very modern nationalist hysteria which was deliberately generated in the media." (23) In their competition for influence in Macedonia, the Serbian, Greek and Bulgarian governments fostered ethnic rivalries and then atrocities in their efforts at "systematic denationalization and assimilation." (24)

 

Likewise the claims that nationalist opinion forced the hands of governments can be contested. Perhaps the best measure of limitations on nationalism is government propaganda campaigns to fabricate nationalism. "The Greek government sought to prepare public opinion and the Greek press as if by a common impulse." The Greek government's propaganda was by the press which painted Bulgarians as "a race of monsters" and public feeling was roused to a pitch of chauvinism presenting Greece as "the appointed avengers of civilization." (25) The Serbian government conducted a campaign of history education designed to prepare the way for a Serb-dominated south Slav state. (26) The "nationalistic press" in Serbia, Bulgaria and Greece "raised clamor that swept up the masses" supported by "the war party and bellicose military clique." (27) Thus throughout the Balkans "the new states sought to inculcate national values into populations that had been often isolated from the processes of nation-building." (28)

 

Governments sought simultaneously to influence the opinion of other populations. The most active campaigns were conducted by the Greek, Serb and above all Bulgarian governments in Macedonia. What began as peaceful penetration then became direct action: the Serbian and Greek governments in response to Bulgarian activities created a three-way propaganda contest through churches and schools "to take control over the thoughts of the Macedonian people." Bulgarian propaganda included secret organizations and Bulgarian refugees from Macedonia who aroused Bulgarian bellicosity. (29) The Serbs and Montenegrins were active in seeking influence in Albania in hope of annexing it. The Serb secret society, the Black Hand, was founded to arouse support in Macedonia and later sought to cause revolt in Albania to exploit a crisis in the Ottoman Empire. Most ominous, the Serbs agitated among the Slavs in the Habsburg Empire and entertained dreams of a "greater Serbia."

 

The ambitiousness of these efforts was matched by their general failure. The Macedonians resisted external pressure, established their own propaganda institutions, and "obviously plagiarized the historical arguments" of the Bulgarians. (30) Indeed there was a fine irony in the Bulgarian refugees from Macedonia stirring up fervor in Bulgaria and warping its political process. The Albanians understandably feared and resisted Serb propaganda. Perhaps most curiously, "thirty years of proselytism, indoctrination, terror, uprisings and guerilla warfare by the Balkan people had failed to uproot the Turks from Macedonia." (31) All these efforts fell victim to the fundamental obstacle of Balkan peasants more concerned with local economic problems than grandiose political schemes. (32)

 

The limits of nationalism are reflected likewise in widespread denial of the national sensitivities of others. This was demonstrated most forcefully in the division of spoils by the Balkan governments contracting in the Treaty of Bucharest, which typically did not consider the populations in the annexed territories. (33) The Serb-Bulgarian division of Macedonia on the eve of the first Balkan war was emblematic of this. Most indicative of this anti-nationalist impulse were the Serb and Montenegrin plans to annex much of Albania in blatant disregard of the indigenous population's wishes. The outcome was a result less of nationalism than of military events.

 

The Balkan wars are in fact regarded as setting the precedent in this century for massive ethnic cleansing in its worse aspects. The Montenegrins sought to convert, expel or kill annexed Albanians. The Greek and Serbian efforts to "Grecianize" and "Serbianize" Macedonians proved worse than under the Ottomans. The Serbs and Greeks thereby sought to "denationalize" the Bulgarian population in Macedonia, a process the Serbs began during the second war using the Black Hand to force Bulgarians to call themselves "Serbian" and acquire "Serbian national consciousness," rechristened the area "Old Serbia" but treated it as a conquered territory under a "reign of terror." (34) Serbia and Greece sought "every conceivable means of concessions to compel the Bulgarian Macedonians to disown their nationality." (35) Serbs propounded a "national unity" ideology and "dominant national type" which was adopted by most Serbian politicians. In effect Serbia had become a multinational, militarized state as a result of the war. (36) Meanwhile Serbia sought "an entire transformation of the ethnic character of the Albanian regime." (37) Annexations from Macedonia were rationalized as "Old Serbia." Serbs, Greeks and Bulgarians tried to legitimize their claims on Macedonia through "national consciousness, ethnic identity, linguistic affiliation and religious loyalty." (38) In practice Serbia proclaimed a "strident self-assertion" to "legitimate its territorial conquests and use of armed force." (39)

 

The extent and forms of Balkan nationalism were conditioned by the social structure. In an overwhelmingly village society with a small modern state confronting peasant masses, it was unavoidable that "the simultaneous pursuit of state building and nation building entailed considerable tensions between the urban and rural sectors." Although governments cleverly used the church, schools and conscription to achieve the nationalization of the peasantry, efforts to bridge the gap were unsuccessful: the Bulgarian constitution had been fashioned for peasants by intellectuals but failed to win the confidence of the peasants who refused an active role in politics. (40)

 

In short, the nationalist ideal had weak domestic roots, imported as it was from northern Europe by middle class intellectuals, then foisted onto an illiterate and uneducated peasantry. From 1880 to 1920 it was the state-dependent urban strata and military in Greece, Serbia and Bulgaria who favored absorbing co-nationals in other states. By contrast the peasantry's support for such irredentism was limited, when it existed at all. While "the promotion of Greek, Serbian and Bulgarian national missions owed much to the local urban (and mostly state-dependent) strata, these national agendas faced the hostility of the peasantry" who "were not among the groups associated with the mission." The nationalist agenda "faced hostility of the peasantry but was aggressively pursued by the Balkan military corps." (41)

 

These divergent perspectives on nationalism were reflected in political parties. The Bulgarian conservative and middle class parties favored war whereas the mass parties--the agrarians and socialists--favored peace, declared themselves "emphatically against an aggressive foreign policy" and were opposed to the Balkan League but were unable to prevent a military solution or overcome "popular enthusiasm for that solution." Yet it was the peasant soldiers' threat to desert which precipitated Bulgaria's desperate launching of the second war. (42) Widespread criticism of the defeat prompted the masses to turn to the mass parties which were anti-war and "increased socialist influence in Sofia and throughout Bulgaria generally." (43)

 

Offsetting these impulses, Balkan armies pursued a secretive yet bold nationalist policy. In Bulgaria, Serbia and Greece, the "rise of the military officers into an important constituency was closely connected to the organization of the armed forces into more substantial and sophisticated entities in which military officers were upwardly mobile ... at the forefront of the national agenda ... and experienced professionalization and expansion of armies by 1912." (44) Armies were the pride of Balkan state-elites, the most effective force in centralizing society and "the symbol of national aspirations." (45) At the same time, however, the insecurity of "Balkan governments themselves and their vulnerability to internal nationalist pressures ... [derived from] the officer corps and secret terrorist organizations such as IMRO or the Black Hand," which were linked to the national armies. (46) A combustible mixture of Serbian students and army officers was spoiling for war with Austria-Hungary after the 1908 crisis although the government and ruling Radical Party were opposed. (47)

 

Terror provides another gauge of nationalism. It seemed to offer the last resort when official policy appeared insufficiently nationalist. Serbian officers had initiated a coup in 1903, assassinated the Obrenovic king and reinstated the more expansionist Karadjordjevich dynasty, while the Greek military had launched a coup in 1909. The military played a role in Serb politics, most ominously in the rivalry between the Black Hand and governing Radical Party. While less political, the Bulgarian army's "growing militarization was accompanied by an increase in the economic gap between the officer corps and the Bulgarian peasantry." (48) The terrorist IMRO and Black Hand "came to have influence on their respective governments ... and [were] important factors in shaping the national policy of their states"; (49) IMRO members even threatened the king with assassination. (50) Although irredentism was not endorsed by the peasantry, the Bulgarian urban strata took the country into the second Balkan War and later the First World War which caused them to "become the main targets of the Bulgarian Agrarians, who took a strong antimilitarist stand." The Serbian "Unification or Death," informally "the Black Hand" (1910), at first had the goal of coordinating Serbian guerilla bands in Macedonia but later had acute political-military tension with the government over administration of Macedonia. (51)

 

The role of Balkan nationalism during the first and second Balkan wars must be qualified in several areas. The indicators are largely anecdotal and difficult to quantify. Nationalism is largely expressed by an urban minority. The extensive governmental propaganda campaigns and terrorist activities suggest that they regarded popular nationalism as insufficient to their purposes yet their campaigns were widely unsuccessful. It is difficult to measure nationalism and public opinion in general. Perhaps the most honest conclusion is the Scottish verdict of "not proven." Yet in the final analysis the burden of proof lies with those who argue for the importance of nationalism, whereas the skeptics need only raise doubts which are clearly warranted.

 

The Balkan States

 

An alternative to Balkan nationalism as the primary explanation of the Balkan wars can be found in the policies of the Balkan states and great powers. This should not surprise us since international relations were candidly conducted during this period according to the principles of cabinet diplomacy which placed nigh-total responsibility for foreign policy in the hands of a selective group of statesmen. Viewing the Balkan wars from this perspective provides us with fresh insight.

 

The origins of the Balkan wars can be traced most immediately to Bulgarian-Serbian negotiations for an alliance. The Balkan states feared that Austria-Hungary would try to obtain a European mandate to occupy Macedonia or Albania as it had Bosnia-Hercegovina. Their concern was to prevent "the extension of Hapsburg (sic) power in the peninsula." (52) The idea of a Balkan League was galvanized into life again by the news of Italy's war on Turkey in September, 1911, and the possibility of profiting from the demise of the Ottoman Empire. Serbia hoped Bulgaria would then join in dismembering the Habsburg Empire. As much to anticipate mutual conflicts as to pursue genuinely common interests, they resolved their competing aspirations in Macedonia with their alliance (13 March 1912) which gave northern Macedonia to Serbia, a contested zone left for arbitration by the tsar, and eastern Macedonia to Bulgaria. Bulgaria compromised in the hope for territory in Thrace and even Constantinople, while Serbia envisaged acquisitions on the Adriatic, namely Albania, despite its lack of Serbs. The alliance was joined by Greece without specified territorial demands because it could not agree with Bulgaria and Serbia and Greece concluded an agreement secretly. When shown the text of the Bulgarian-Serbian alliance by the Russian Foreign Minister Sazonov, French Premier Poincare correctly asserted that "this is an agreement for war." (53)

 

The Balkan states quickly confirmed this observation and profited from their uncharacteristic unanimity. In October Montenegro, Bulgaria, Greece and Serbia attacked and defeated Turkey everywhere in Europe. Events had been determined more by the gamble of war and distribution of forces than the niceties of nationalism: Bulgaria and Greece were closest to the Ottoman Empire and thus had harder fighting, while Serbia and Montenegro had an easier time because they were farther from the Turks. Austria-Hungary refused Serbia a port on the Adriatic by constituting Albania an independent state and winning great power support. (54) The danger of a great power conflict was removed when Serbia was informed that Russia would not go to war over Albania.

 

Concluding peace with Turkey in May 1913, the Balkan League was immediately disrupted when Serbia sought compensation for Albania by taking all of Macedonia and Greece occupied Adrianople while Bulgaria was engaged against the Turks. Fearing dissolution of its army and seeking "proportionality" for having done most of the fighting, Bulgaria launched a desperate attack on Greece and Serbia, which were joined by Rumania. The belligerents concluded peace in Bucharest by which Bulgaria made extensive concessions and was granted only 400,000 new subjects whereas Serbia and Greece each got a million and a half. (55) Having established a precarious "Balkan balance of power," the Treaty of Bucharest was not submitted for the approval of the powers. Indeed Sazonov complained that the Balkan states "have escaped me." (56) Reported by journalist Leon Trotsky, the dictum "the Balkans for the Balkan peoples" seemed to have been realized. (57)

 

Appearances notwithstanding, the wars had been governed less by considerations of nationalism or the popular will than according to traditional methods of state behavior, namely, war and the rough and tumble diplomacy of compensation and compromise. In fact the two big winners--Greece and Serbia--had more non-nationals than ever and were more like the Ottoman Empire. Furthermore, the Balkan states may have become more independent of the great powers but they were more like them in their policy.

 

This procedure is known as "cabinet diplomacy" or "old diplomacy" as contrasted with the "new," more open diplomacy associated with Wilson and Lenin. It began with the assumption that the state (rather than the nation) was the fundamental unit of international relations. Over all such proceedings was cast a veil of secrecy both toward their own populations and parliaments, as well as foreign governments. Cabinet diplomacy was conducted by rulers and statesmen drawn from an informed and committed elite. Interstate relations were a delicate system constructed upon quasi-Newtonian laws, above all, the balance of power. (58) War and peace were integral elements and the choice between them was made on the basis of state interest.

 

Consequently nationalism was subordinated to state power. King Ferdinand of Bulgaria in his "private regime" kept his policy secret even from his own cabinet. (59) Secrecy pervaded the construction of the Balkan League: "the Balkan coalition was ... a series of secret treaties, negotiated by secret correspondences and personal conferences between the premiers in consultation with their sovereigns only." (60)

 

The Balkan governments observed the classic tradition of state interest. Accordingly, "each state stood ready to throw in its lot with whichever one seemed most likely to satisfy the national ambitions." (61) The Balkan alliance was "a diplomatic deal on the most approved basis of Realpolitik." (62) Indeed, the "idea of a 'greater Serbia,' a 'greater Bulgaria,' a 'greater Greece' as the aspiration of the Balkan states for territorial expansion and hegemony unavoidably reflected itself in the fratricidal inter-allied war." (63) The Balkan states "competed ... for spheres of influence and to extend territorial holdings ... against perceived political rivalries." (64) Serbia proclaimed a "national program inherently expansionist" which "inevitably collided with others and forced assimilation." (65)

 

The Balkan states' pursuit of territorial and human loot operated quite separate of nationalist considerations. Despite their claims to the contrary, they were in fact "incited primarily by the prospect of aggrandizement" in Albania and particularly Macedonia. (66) The "expansionist tendencies of the Balkan states reached their culmination in the Balkan wars of 1912-1913." (67) These states "coveted the remaining Ottoman territories in Europe because the expansion would help them economically, and because people there aspired, or were deemed to aspire, to join in order to escape the sultan's crumbling rule." (68) The central issue in Macedonia was the "expansionist ambitions" of its neighbors which sought not only to acquire territory but to get rid of rival or antagonistic ethnic groups, at least culturally or statistically. Likewise Albanian ethnic considerations were ignored by the Serb "proposed aggrandizement of Albania; although nominally at the expense of Turkey, the move was almost wholly at the cost of Albania. Confident in the ignorance or heedlessness of Western Europe, Serbia and Montenegro proposed to deprive Albania of all that was distinctly Albanian." (69) British Foreign Secretary Grey caught the contradiction: "The war began as a 'war of liberation,' it became a war of annexation, and ended as a war of extermination." The Treaty of Bucharest was "imposed against the teachings of equity, ethnography and experience and professed pursuance of a Balkan balance of power but took no account of forces of public sentiment and actual development"; likewise it had "no popular base at all but on a political arrangement between the governments that profited by it--Rumania, Serbia and Greece--and imposed pacification by force." (70)

 

The ultimate test of power was war. Balkan armies had grown rapidly and mobilized approximately 725,000 soldiers in the war of 1912. The officer class had become an important constituency organizing the armed forces into more substantial institutions. Deriving from upwardly mobile strata, they were at the forefront in pursuing the state-building agenda. In all Balkan states a "war party" and "military clique" existed, most notably the secret Black Hand in Serbia. In essence, the Balkan states had adopted the "European ethos that viewed war and force as necessary elements of the international system." (71)

 

Critical to cabinet diplomacy were alliances. Generally constructed against a common foe rather than with friends, the Balkan League was no exception, concluded, as it was, against the Ottoman and Habsburg Empires rather than for shared objectives. The Ottoman Empire

 

    was a tempting target for the ever-more powerful Balkan states,

   whose governments were spurred into action not just by their own

   territorial ambitions but also by their peoples' well-justified

   hatred for the age-old Turkish oppressor; the Greek-Bulgar alliance

   was achieved by simply denying the two countries' conflicting

   claims in Macedonia in order to smash the Ottomans before the

   latter recovered their strength. (72)

Negotiations for an alliance had been sought but failed until the impending Ottoman demise provided the necessary inducement to compromise and drove Greece and Bulgaria, age-old enemies, together and fostered the Balkan League, "the greatest miracle in European diplomacy." (73) Poincare even speculated that the new Balkan League might constitute itself effectively into a new great power. The arrangement was, however, fundamentally opportunistic: Ignatiev, Russian military attache in Paris, observed that "we must not have any illusions about the sincerity and stability of [the Balkan League]. It is inevitable that, once the struggle with the Turks is ended, race rivalries will reappear and nothing stable will be built in the Balkan Peninsula until many years have elapsed"; thus mutual trust or any conception of some sort of a Balkan federation never entered the picture. Even during the Serbian-Bulgarian negotiations Serbian Premier Pasic mistrusted King Ferdinand of Bulgaria and Turkish defeat left nothing to hold the alliance together. (74)

 

The formation of alliances was conditioned by the logic of negotiations. National objectives could be extensive, almost infinite, but had to be submitted to bruising negotiations. Thus, according to the Serbs, "Bulgaria's dissatisfaction with Serbia is caused ... solely and alone by the fact that they feel Serbia is the chief obstacle to the realization of their aspirations ... that the Macedonian question should be purely a Bulgarian matter." (75) But power was in fact finite and the vocabulary of negotiations included compromise, concessions, compensation and proportionality. In negotiations with Serbia, Bulgaria demanded "proportionality" for having borne most of the fighting against Turkey. Serbia claimed "compensation" for the Albanian territory it was denied. Each concession constituted a compromise of diplomatic goals as idealistic dreams were transformed into blatant "spoils" in the Second Balkan War.

 

The wars demonstrated that the Balkan states constituted a state system analogous to the great power system. The Balkan system was fluid with alliances constituted and dissolved according to perceived state interest. Patterns of friction revealed bad neighbor policy, i.e., conflict with neighbors and friendship with bad neighbors' neighbors. Like the great powers, the Balkan system had a sense of balance of power. "The issue was no longer an ethnic one; it was not even one of realizing 'great ideas' at the expense of the Ottoman Empire; it was blatantly about the balance of power between the Balkan states." (76) King Charles of Rumania spoke of a "balance of Balkan power." (77) There existed anxiety about one state's hegemony. Critics of Ferdinand attributed to him a "dream of establishing Bulgarian superiority in the Balkans" and wanting to convert the Balkan League into a tool for reducing Bulgaria's allies to the "status of vassals." (78)

 

The Great Powers

 

If the Balkan governments operated at one remove from Balkan nationalism, the great powers were even more aloof. No power wanted Ottoman collapse or war amongst the powers. After its setbacks in the war with Japan (1904) and revolution (1905), Russia was particularly anxious to avoid war. In fact it first encouraged a rapprochement between the Ottoman Empire and Balkan League (79) and then joined Austria-Hungary in demanding that the Balkan League not alter the status quo in October 1912. (80) In doing so, Austria-Hungary and Russia elected to preserve the useful Ottoman Empire rather than liberate their Christian co-religionists or "Slav brothers."

 

Russian aspirations were ambivalent. On the one hand its leaders sought to defend against Austro-Hungarian "Drang nach Suden." (81) Foreign Minister Sazonov applauded the Balkan League as a barrier against Austria-Hungary and Germany: "Well, this is perfect! Five hundred thousand bayonets to guard the Balkans--this would bar the road forever to German penetration, Austrian invasion." (82) "The general fear of Austrian ambitions underlay Russian foreign policy in the years 1909-14; to block any Austrian advance to the south the Russian government had from December 1908 been urging that Belgrade and Sofia should draw together." (83) But the defensive interpretation of the League for Russia unavoidably appeared offensive to Austria-Hungary: "With the creation of the Balkan system of alliances the Russian Empire attained a position of unprecedented dominion in the Balkans," just as the second Balkan war "virtually wiped out its prestige and sway" in the Balkans. (84) By 1914 an "influential body of opinion in Russia was convinced that Russia must expand her influence in south-east Europe." (85) Critical for Russia was the future of the Straits: "fear of being strangled at the Straits was the dominant motive of Russian policy" and Prime Minister Kokovstov asserted that "on the Bosphorus there can only be the Turks or ourselves." (86) Yet, however undesirable Russian aims might be, they did not constitute the sine qua non for Russian great power status: "For Russia no such directly important issues were involved" in the Balkans outside of "prestige and diplomatic influence" which were desirable but "not essential to the life of great power." In short, "Russia unlike Austria was not threatened by the events in the Balkans in 1912-13." (87)

 

Austro-Hungarian leaders were even more conflicted, trapped as they were between Angst and aggression in a zero sum game with the Russians for domination of the Balkans. The threat of Russian predominance in the Balkans (perhaps through the League as "guardian angel of the Slavs" or a "Greater Serbia") was the "ultimate cause of anxiety" for Austria-Hungary. (88) It was fearful of the "rise of national states" but determined to extend the Empire's influence in the Balkans, as they had done in the Bosnian Crisis. (89) Although defensive from Vienna's point of view, its policy inescapably seemed offensive to Serbia and Russia. (90) Austro-Hungarian ambitions in the Balkans have been compared to the African aspirations of the other European powers. (91) Yet events in the Balkans seemed threatening to Austria-Hungary: Serbia, "by reason of its acquisitions in the central Balkans, bestrode the routes for Austria to Salonika" and thus, according to Foreign Secretary Berchtold, "jeopardized the future of Austria." (92) William II oscillated between images of Teuton-Slav Armageddon and fears of Russian hegemony over the Balkans through the League. (93)

 

Events in the Balkans were, however, subordinated to more immediate goals. The powers sought to avoid an Austro-Russian conflict and preserve control of events by convening an ambassadorial conference in London (December 1912). The danger of war was averted when Austria-Hungary did not intervene against an expanded Serbia in October and Russia refused support for Serbian aspirations in Albania. When they agreed that conflicts (such as Albania) should be localized and managed, the powers had no great difficulty imposing their will on the Balkan states.

 

Despite their show of independence and dangerous behavior, the Balkan states were perceived by the powers as devices measured in terms of utility. Sazonov's attitude toward the League was sympathetic: "these peoples whom we have called into life" (94) and have constituted themselves into the League which would "guard the Balkans." (95) Slav brotherhood occasionally appeared in official policy and unofficial Russian support but it is more notable by its infrequency. Austria-Hungary's establishment of an independent Albania was Realpolitik in its classic form with the irony that Austria-Hungary, the arch-opponent of national states, found itself its advocate. Russian abandonment of Serbian wishes for an Adriatic port illustrated Serbia's dependence.

 

The Balkan states gave the impression of independence with their launching of wars and conclusion of peace on their own. Indeed, "the situation is the first occasion that the small states had won a position so independent of the powers that they feel they are in a position to act completely without them and indeed to carry [the powers] along with them. (96) But, though they would have preferred to settle matters without the powers, the Balkan states could not realistically expect to dictate terms to the Turks on their own. (97) When the Balkan states collided with the brutal reality of the great power system and the powers coordinated their policies, the small states had to accede.

 

The powers did not cooperate, however, without serious danger of conflict. Russia and Austria-Hungary played the "game of Machtpolitik with military preparations, partial mobilization, troop buildups," (98) talk of war and development of more forward military strategies. (99) Nevertheless, as Poincare said in urging negotiations on 31 October 1912, "the powers were preoccupied above all else with the preservation of peace in Europe." (100) At the London conference of ambassadors in November 1912, they asserted their right to settle outstanding issues. Russia abandoned Serbian aspirations for an Adriatic port and the Albanian buffer state, while Austria-Hungary accepted the expanded Serbia. Thereby the powers revitalized the Concert of Europe, i.e., a consensus which they imposed on the Balkan states. (101)

 

Although the powers had been drawn into Balkan events, their main concern had been alliance politics. The Entente had suffered strains first during the Bosnian crisis (1908) when France had insufficiently supported Russia against Austria-Hungary and Germany, then in the second Moroccan crisis (1911), when Russia had backed France and Britain only tepidly against Germany. Poincare was determined to insure future Russian support by promising French backing of Russia if "Germany intervened and of her own initiative provoked the application of the casus foederis." Meanwhile, Berlin guaranteed that "Austrian-Hungary could count unconditionally on the support of Germany." (102) In true cabinet diplomacy fashion the powers--even while seeking to tighten their own alliances--pursued allies in the opposing camp, though without success. (103) Neither did the need to tighten alliances prevent pressing allies, as the Germans demonstrated in restraining Austria-Hungary's threats against Serbia in July 1913 during the second Balkan war and doubting the Slav threat. (104)

 

Statesmen used nationalism as a convenient tool of policy. Poincare told Sazonov French public opinion would not allow the government to "decide on military action for purely Balkan questions" but would if Germany became involved. (105) Likewise, "Sazonov even felt it useful that Russia's opponents could be made to believe that the Foreign Ministry was in a difficult position and constantly obliged to struggle against the pressure of public opinion." (106)

 

Cabinet diplomacy commonly exploited nationalism. "Self-interest generally motivated Russia's sporadic support of the Balkan Christians." (107) Sazonov, "though caring little for the Serbs themselves and leaving them in the lurch in crucial moments, nevertheless encouraged and supported them at other times as an outpost of Slavdom in the Balkans and as an asset in a future war with Austria." He brutally admonished Serbian Prime Minister Pasic in autumn 1913 to withdraw from Albania or risk diplomatic defeat by Austria-Hungary. (108) In fact, initial Russian support of Serb claims was largely bluff since the Serbs had been warned previously by Sazonov. (109) Sazonov viewed the Balkans peoples through the prism of their utility to Russia: "It is important for us ... to achieve the reinforcement of the independence ... of the peoples we have called to life, who are our natural allies in Europe." (110) The British minister in Belgrade observed that "Servia [sic] is, practically speaking, a Russian province" which he had never known to act "against the directions of the Russian minister." (111) It would be hard to find a more blatant example of Serbian obsequiousness to Russia than Pasic's submission in late November 1912 on the Adriatic port issue: "We leave that question to the great powers for settlement when they settle the other questions which will arise after the conclusion of peace." (112) For his part, Sazonov was not loath to substitute bombast for support in May 1913: "Serbia's Promised Land lies in the territory of the present Austria-Hungary," not in areas contested with Bulgaria and Serbia should prepare for the "inevitable struggle of the future." (113)

 

Russia provides a case study of the relationship between nationalism and great power cabinet diplomacy. Although the government decided not to share information with the press and became more secretive, "public opinion undeniably influenced the formulation and conduct of Russian foreign policy" during the years before the war. While "neither Sazonov nor Assistant Foreign Minister Neratov seriously consulted leaders of public opinion, nevertheless they hesitated to follow policies repugnant to the Octobrists, Kadets, and moderate right" parties. Yet neither should the influence of the press over Sazonov's Balkan policy in 1912 be exaggerated. Although some see Sazonov as "representative of Russian public opinion," Nekludov, Director of the Foreign Ministry press office, and Sazonov were "quite capable of ignoring the press." (114) Russian policy was not due primarily to public opinion but rather to the incompetence with which this "disorderly policy" was formulated, particularly by the erratic personal influence of a cluster of grand dukes and ambassadors. (115)

 

Pan-Slavism played a contradictory role in Russian official policy. Serb military success may have caused the two to coalesce. And Russia's apparent influence on the Balkan League encouraged hopes of increasing "Slav solidarity" and common cause with "Slavdom" at the Straits. (116) There appeared to be sympathy in the army for Pan-Slavism; in particular during the pro-Slav demonstrations of 6 April 1913 in which officers may have played a great part. In 1912-13, pro-Slav feeling "strengthened the tendency already existing within the high command to support a firm assertion of Russian power," and in the winter of 1912-13, senior General Staff officers "were determined to face down any Austrian attempts to block Slav demands." Sazonov was criticized by the normally pro-government Octobrist and Nationalist parties for his "abandonment of Slav interests." (117) He at first resisted pressure for war and sought to exploit it but by early November, 1912, the "press outcry had become so insistent, especially in support of Serb demands for an Adriatic port," that Sazonov even complained to the press about its criticism. (118)

 

There were, however, undercurrents here. Though nationalist and pro-Slav enthusiasm grew, "it is difficult to be sure how deep it went." For all the "talk about neo-Slavism and the fears it generated abroad, ... there was only insubstantial interest in it or the Balkans in Petersburg educated society." (119) Octobrist leader Milyukov defended Sazonov against "Serb chauvinism." Nekludov was promptly sacked when he assured correspondents that Russian intervention in the Balkans was "unavoidable," that "public opinion would force the government to intervene and that it was impossible the Russian government would not help Balkan states win territory." (120) In practice, Sazonov regarded public opinion as a device which he did not take seriously. It is ironic that the closest Russia came to war during the Balkan conflicts was with fellow Slav Bulgaria over Adrianople and the Straits.

 

Fortuitously we are provided a revealing insight into the government's estimate of public opinion on nationalism. In its December 1912 meeting, the Russian Council of Ministers discussed continuing Austro-Hungarian pressure on Serbia but acknowledged that "the armed forces were ill-prepared and the internal state of the country is far from the inspired patriotic mood which would allow one to count on a mighty upsurge of national spirit." (121) By curious coincidence, the German government was reaching the same conclusion at the same moment. In a meeting on 8 December 1912, they estimated that the German people were insufficiently aroused and should be mobilized by a governmental press campaign (which in fact was not done). (122) Far from being aggressive, both populaces were apathetic.

 

What emerges most forcefully from the Balkan wars is the marginal role of nationalism in great power policy. The powers perceived little nationalism at home and were only minimally interested in Balkan nationalism. Their main concern during the crisis had been the pursuit of their interests through the preservation of peace amongst them. With unabashed candor, Grey acknowledged in the Commons on 7 April 1913 that the essential had been "accomplished only just in time to preserve peace between the great powers" and on 12 August 1913, asserted that "the primary essential was to preserve agreement between the Great Powers themselves." (123) They would not be so fortunate a year later.

 

Conclusion

 

According to received opinion, the Balkan wars of 1912-1913 offer a classic instance of nationalism. Apparently confirming the Balkan reputation for violence and fractiousness, the wars seemed to stand Santayana's observation on its head: those who recall history are condemned to relive it. Nationalism appeared widespread and influential on governmental policy. Yet a skeptical reading erodes this impression. Government efforts to fabricate nationalism at home and legitimize territorial annexations cast doubt on the strength of nationalism in both. The social structure revealed a gulf between the urban, middle class, aggressive minority and the rural, myopic, apathetic peasant majority unmoved by the alien national concept. This bifurcation was reflected in the nationalist conservative and middle class parties on one side and the socialist and agrarian parties on the other. Terror revealed nationalist frustration both with the moderation of their own governments and the unresponsiveness of conquered population to the conquerors' propaganda. War hysteria was response rather than cause of the conflict planned long before by Balkan governments. Like the most notorious popular enthusiasm for war in August, 1914, Balkan excitement was in reality brief and largely restricted to urban, middle class, male youth.

 

This circumscribed nationalism can be further qualified. Viewing the wars through the prism of Balkan governmental policy subordinates nationalism to traditional cabinet diplomacy. Critical considerations in their decisions were not nationalist pressure but rather the diplomatic opportunity provided by the Italian-Ottoman war and the simultaneous threat of great power intervention into the Balkans. The Balkan governments rapidly cobbled together the Balkan League observing the tenets of cabinet diplomacy.

 

Balkan diplomacy was further constrained by the long shadow of the great powers. The initial impression of Balkan independence was soon dispelled by the imposition of concerted great power demands. Changes precipitated by the two Balkan wars were allowed to stand only when compatible with great power interests. Thus, for instance, Serbia kept its conquests because Austria-Hungary elected not to contest them at the risk of war with Russia, while Serbia abandoned Albania because Russia was loath to risk war with Austria-Hungary. The two great powers temporarily shelved their major Balkan ambitions in order to maintain these minor successes and to pursue their greater concerns of alliance politics. The example of Russian policy making suggests that nationalist opinion (especially Pan-Slavism) sometimes operated but in general was subordinated to strictly diplomatic considerations, above all, postponement of war and maintenance of its alliances. Most revealing was the simultaneous acknowledgement by both German and Russian leaders of popular apathy.

 

This interpretation of the Balkan wars has broad implications. If these supposedly classic instances of nationalism are demoted, then less significant cases become even more so. In particular, the frustrated efforts to fabricate nationalism both at home and abroad suggest that it was neither wide nor deep. Diminution of nationalism reasserts the importance of traditional statecraft and the role of leaders over masses. Like other ideologies, nationalism sometimes serves as the cloak to conceal naked power. Finally, the diminution of nationalism jeopardizes our system of historical periodization which relies on features (imperialism, capitalism, socialism, perhaps totalitarianism, as well as nationalism) to give the modern era its distinctive character.

 

Notes

 

(1.) Oron J. Hale, The Great Illusion 1900-1914 (New York: Harper & Row, 1971), p. 11.

 

(2.) Timothy Judah, The Serbs: History, Myth and the Destruction of Yugoslavia (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997), p. 83.

 

(3.) Sidney Bradshaw Fay, The Origins of the World War, Volume I (New York: The Free Press, 1966), p. 542.

 

(4.) D. C. B. Lieven, Russia and the Origins of the First World War (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983), p. 38.

 

(5.) L. S. Stavrianos, The Balkans 1815-1914 (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1963) p. vii.

 

(6.) Anthony Smith, Theories of Nationalism (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1983), p. 164.

 

(7.) Maria Todorov, Imagining the Balkans (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997); Stuart J. Kaufman, The Symbolic Politics of Ethnic War (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001), p. 5.

 

(8.) Stavrianos, The Balkans 1815-1914, p. vii.

 

(9.) George F. Kennan, "The Balkan Crisis: 1913 and 1993," The New York Review of Books, July 15, 1993, p. 6.

 

(10.) C. Anastasoff, The Tragic Peninsula: A History of the Macedonian Movement for Independence Since 1878 (St. Louis: Blackwell Wicklandy, 1938), p. 190.

 

(11.) Andre A. Rossos, Russia and the Balkans: Inter-Balkan Rivalries and Russian Foreign Policy, 1908-1914 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1981), p. 79.

 

(12.) Judah, p. 71.

 

(13.) Douglas Dakin, The Unification of Greece 1770-1923 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1972), p. 194.

 

(14.) L. S. Stavrianos, The Balkan Federation: A History of the Movement for Balkan Unity in Modern Times (Northampton: Smith College, 1944), p. 172; R. J. Crampton, A Concise History of Bulgaria (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 138; R. J. Crampton, Bulgaria 1878-1918. A History (Boulder, CO: East European Monographs, 1983), p. 325.

 

(15.) George Young, Nationalism and War in the Near East (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1915), p. 185.

 

(16.) George G. Mylones, The Balkan States: An Introduction to their History (St. Louis: Eden Publishing House, 1947), p. 106.

 

(17.) Samuel R. Williamson, Jr., Austria-Hungary and the Origins of the First World War (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991), p. 160.

 

(18.) John D. Treadway, Montenegro and Austria-Hungary, 1908-1914 (Lafayette: Purdue University Press, 1983) pp. ix-x, 240.

 

(19.) Misha Glenny, The Balkans, 1804-1999: Nationalism, War and the Great Powers (London: Granta Books, 1999), pp. 246-247; Crampton, Bulgaria 1878-1918. A History, p. 403; Williamson, p. 123; Stavrianos, The Balkans 1815-1914, p. 173.

 

(20.) Kennan, p. 5.

 

(21.) Jasminka Udovicki and James Ridgeway, eds., Burn this House: The Making and Unmaking of Yugoslavia (Durham: Duke University Press, 1997), p. x.

 

(22.) Kennan, p. 5.

 

(23.) Christopher Bennett, Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse: Causes, Course and Consequence (New York: New York University Press, 1995), p. viii.

 

(24.) Vladimir Ortakovski, Minorities in the Balkans (New York: Transnational Publications, 2000), p. 53.

 

(25.) Anastasoff, pp. 211, 212.

 

(26.) Charles Jelavich, South Slav Nationalism: Textbooks and Yugoslav Union before 1914 (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1990), pp. 263-264.

 

(27.) Michael Boro Petrovich, A History of Modern Serbia. 1804-1918, Volume II (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1986), p. 601.

 

(28.) Norman M. Naimark, Fires of Hatred: Ethnic Cleansing in Twentieth-Century Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), p. 142; Wesley M. Gewehr, The Rise of Nationalism in the Balkans. 1800-1930 (New York: Henry Holt, 1931), p. 80; Edward C. Thaden, Russia and the Balkan Alliance of 1912 (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1965), pp. 30, 104; Crampton, Bulgaria 1878-1918. A History, pp. 410-411.

 

(29.) Ernst Christian Helmreich, The Diplomacy of the Balkan Wars (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1938), pp. 36-42; J. Swire, Albania: The Rise of a Kingdom (New York: Arno Press, 1971), p. 127; Ferdinand Schevill, History of the Balkan Peninsula from the Earliest Times to the Present Day (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1933), p. 475; Anastasoff, p. 237.

 

(30.) Dennis P. Hupchick, Conflict and Chaos in Eastern Europe (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995), pp. 142-144.

 

(31.) Evangelos Kofos, Nationalism and Communism in Macedonia: Civil Conflict, Politics of Mutation, National Identity (New Rochelle: Caratzas, 1993), pp. 22-23, 36; Hupchick, p. 143; Helmreich, p. 252.

 

(32.) Crampton, Bulgaria 1878-1918. A History, p. 18.

 

(33.) Christopher Boehm, Montenegrin Values: Political Ethnography of the Refuge Area Tribal Adaptation (New York: AMS Press, 1983), p. 251; Young, p. 356.

 

(34.) Anastasoff, pp. 237-238.

 

(35.) Swire, p. 162.

 

(36.) Bennett, p. 30; Petrovich, p. 603.

 

(37.) Swire, p. 178.

 

(38.) Loring M. Danforth, The Macedonian Conflict: Ethnic Nationalism in a Transnational World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), p. 28.

 

(39.) Alexander Pavkovic, The Fragmentation of Yugoslavia: Nationalism and the State (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997), p. 18.

 

(40.) Victor Roudometof, "The Social Origins of Balkan Politics: Nationalism, Underdevelopment, and the Nation-State in Greece, Serbia, and Bulgaria, 1880-1920," Mediterranean Quarterly 11 (2000), no. 3, p. 154; Z. A. B. Zeman, Pursued by the Bear: The Making of Eastern Europe (London: Chatto & Windus, 1989), p. 45; Crampton, Bulgaria 1878-1918. A History, p.325.

 

(41.) Roudometof, pp. 146, 154, 155, 161.

 

(42.) Crampton, Bulgaria 1878-1918. A History, pp. 346, 419-420.

 

(43.) Crampton, Bulgaria 1878-1918. A History, p. 426; Stavrianos, The Balkan Federation, p. 500.

 

(44.) Roudometof, p. 155.

 

(45.) James Joll, The Origins of the First World War (London: Longman, 1984), p. 74.

 

(46.) Lieven, p. 41; Stavro Skendi, The Albanian National Awakening, 1878-1912 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967), p. 445; Helmreich, pp. 46-47.

 

(47.) John Lampe, Yugoslavia as History: Twice There was a Country (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 91.

 

(48.) Roudometof, pp. 156, 158.

 

(49.) Helmreich, pp. 35-41.

 

(50.) Crampton, Bulgaria 1878-1918. A History, p, 420; Hupchick, p. 148.

 

(51.) Roudometof, pp. 158-159.

 

(52.) Stevan K. Pavlowitch, A History of the Balkans, 1804-1945 (London: Longman, 1999) p. 196.

 

(53.) A. J. P. Taylor, The Struggle for Mastery in Europe, 18148-1918 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1954), p. 488.

 

(54.) Neville Forbes, Arnold J. Toynbee, D. Mitray and D. G. Hogarth, The Balkans: A History of Bulgaria, Serbia, Greece, Rumania and Turkey (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1915), p. 153; Taylor, p. 491; Helmreich, p. 249; Young, p. 227; Petrovich, p. 201.

 

(55.) Taylor, pp. 497, 498.

 

(56.) Ibid., p. 498.

 

(57.) Robert D. Kaplan, Balkan Ghosts: A Journey through History (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993), p. 79; Taylor, p. 498; Petrovich, p. 594.

 

(58.) Joll, pp. 34-37.

 

(59.) Crampton, A Concise History of Bulgaria, pp. 327; Petrovich, p. 602.

 

(60.) Young, p. 182.

 

(61.) Stavrianos, The Balkan Federation, p. 175.

 

(62.) Young, p. 151.

 

(63.) Anastasoff, pp. 233-234.

 

(64.) Nicholas Costa, Albania: A European Enigma (Boulder, CO: East European Monographs, 1995), p. 13.

 

(65.) Naimark, p. 144.

 

(66.) Pavlowitch, A History of the Balkans, p. 207.

 

(67.) Ortakovski, p. 50.

 

(68.) Pavlowitch, A History of the Balkans, p. 196.

 

(69.) Swire, p. 116.

 

(70.) Young, pp. 280, 356.

 

(71.) Williamson, p. 155.

 

(72.) Lieven, p. 43.

 

(73.) Anastasoff, pp. 176, 188.

 

(74.) Stavrianos, The Balkan Federation, p. 170.

 

(75.) Mylones, p. 91.

 

(76.) Pavlowitch, The Improbable Survivor: Yugoslavia and its Problems, 1918-1988 (Columbus: Ohio State University, 1989), p. 199.

 

(77.) R. W. Seton-Watson, A History of the Roumanians from Roman Times to the Completion of Unity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1934), p. 438.

 

(78.) Edgar Hosch, The Balkans: A Short History from Greek Times to the Present Days (New York: Crane, Russate & Co., 1968), p. 142; Mylones, p. 94.

 

(79.) Thaden, pp. 9, 20, 38.

 

(80.) David MacLaren McDonald, United Government and Foreign Policy in Russia, 1900-1914 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992), pp. 179-181; Helmreich, p. 116.

 

(81.) Treadway, p. 105; Helmreich, p. 61.

 

(82.) Taylor, p. 489; Thaden, p. 134; Mylones, p. 91; Rossos, p. 208.

 

(83.) Lieven, pp. 42-43.

 

(84.) Rossos, p. 207; Arthur J. May, The Habsburg Monarchy 1867-1914 (New York, Norton, 1968), p. 460.

 

(85.) Joll, p. 106.

 

(86.) Taylor, pp. 484, 489.

 

(87.) Crampton, A Concise History of Bulgaria, p. 175.

 

(88.) May, p. 470; Pierre Revouvin, L'Apogee de L'Europe. Le XIXe siecle. Volume VI, Part II of Histoire des relations internationales (Paris: Librairie Hachette, 1955), p. 236; Helmreich, p. 56.

 

(89.) Taylor, pp. 489-492.

 

(90.) May, p. 468.

 

(91.) Mark Mazower, The Balkans: A Short History (New York: Modern Library, 2002), p. 98.

 

(92.) May. p. 466.

 

(93.) Young, p. 369; Helmreich, p. 56.

 

(94.) McDonald, p. 189.

 

(95.) Taylor, p. 484.

 

(96.) Joll, p. 52.

 

(97.) Rossos, p. 107.

 

(98.) Hale, p. 281.

 

(99.) Taylor, pp. 488, 496, 500-501.

 

(100.) Rossos, p, 86.

 

(101.) Williamson, p. 123; J. M. K. Vivyan, "The Approach of the War of 1914," pp. 140-171 in C. L. Mowat, ed., The Shifting Balance of World Forces, 1898-1945, Volume XII (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968), p. 146.

 

(102.) Taylor, pp. 490, 492-494, 500.

 

(103.) Fay, pp. 346, 455.

 

(104.) May, pp. 466-467.

 

(105.) Taylor, p. 488.

 

(106.) Thaden, p. 135; Fay, p. 436; May, p. 544.

 

(107.) Thaden, p. 27.

 

(108.) Fay, pp. 470, 544.

 

(109.) Vivyan, p. 146.

 

(110.) McDonald, p. 189.

 

(111.) Lieven, p. 41.

 

(112.) Rossos, p. 106.

 

(113.) Fay, pp. 446-447.

 

(114.) Thaden, pp. 25, 34.

 

(115.) Rossos, pp. 210-211.

 

(116.) Thaden, p. 24.

 

(117.) Lieven, pp. 116, 125.

 

(118.) McDonald, p, 182.

 

(119.) Lieven, pp. 126, 137, 138.

 

(120.) Helmreich, pp. 154-155.

 

(121.) McDonald, p. 186.

 

(122.) Fritz Fischer, Krieg der Illusionen (Dusseldorf: Droste, 1969), pp. 232-235.

 

(123.) Swire, pp. 152-153.

 

L. L. Farrar, Jr.